Weingast B.R., Wittman D. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
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1082 subject index
liberalization:
and demand management 645–6
economic and political 531–2
and supply-side economic policy 648–9
see also globalization
limited government:
and constitutionalism 289, 305–7
and United States Constitution 343
list proportional representation 104
Lithuania, and democratization 661–2
local government:
and basic model of fiscal competition 505–9
exit and voice 512–14
interpretations and applications of 509–12
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
and transfers from central government 465, 467
and United States 505–6
localism, and electoral systems 112–13
logrolling, and legislative choice 8
Loosemore-Hanby Index of Distortion 105
Louisiana 308
Luxembourg Income Study 604
Maastricht Treaty 806
macro political economy:
and Coase theorem 529
and death of 525
and depoliticization of monetary policy 536
and extreme unforeseeable events 525, 539–40
requirements of international institutions 541–2
and independent central banks 533, 536
and inflation 532–3
and inflation/stabilization goals 533
and intellectual background:
comparative political economy 530
liberalization 531
–2
political economy 528–30
public choice theory 527–8, 532
social choice 526–7
special interest politics 530–1, 532
and intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8
and monetarist revolution 536
and political business cycle 534
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
and political vulnerability 533–4
and rationalization obsession 534–6
and research program of 526
and voter rationality 534–5
see also monetary policy
macroeconomic voting, see economic voting
majoritarian postulate:
and exchange postulate 9
and legislator preferences 7–8
majority rule:
and allocation of public goods 485–7, 489–91
and core in committee decision-making:
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21
Fiorina and Plott’s experiments 918–19
multidimensional policy bargaining 917–18
as object of study 985
malapportionment, and bicameralism 184–6, 191
Malawi, and ethnicity 860–
1
market access, and agglomeration 743
markets:
and impossibility theorem 974
and legislative interference with 342
and perfect competition 503
and public goods allocation 480–1
and public sector economics, property rights 444
and regulation 342–3
mechanism design 373
median voter theorem 65, 70, 71
and bicameralism 184
and candidate divergence 35
candidate preferences 37
political parties’ platform choices 37–8
third parties 36–7
valence issues 36
and criticisms of 31
and equilibrium analysis of public finance 448
and income redistribution 313–14, 604
and inequality 631–2
and laboratory experiments on 923–4
and paradoxes of rationality 43
attempted resolutions of 40–2
rational ignorance 39–40
rational non-participation 38–40
and partisanship 606
as pivot theory 224, 239
analysis of roll rates 230–2, 234–8
and spatial theory of voting 29–30
and tax rates 86–7
and voters’ sources of information 43–
6
memes, and evolutionary models of behavior 18–20
methodology, and political economy 3–4
see also economic methods in political science;
laboratory experiments
Mexico 367
and authoritarian government 702, 703–4
and economic openness 827
and financial crisis (1994–5) 524, 595
migration:
and agglomeration 743
and international trade 823–4
Heckscher-Ohlin model 815–18
neo-Ricardian model 821–2
specific factors model 820
types of trade 824
military power, and survival of democracy 319
minority governments:
and agenda power 150
and cabinet stability 173–4
and institutionalism 164–5
and parliamentary systems 128–9
and veto rights 150
moderate government, and survival of
democracy 321
monetary policy:
and depoliticization of 536
as domestic and international non-issue 523–5
and electoral cycles 547–8
and extreme unforeseeable events 525, 539–40
requirements of international institutions 541–2
and improvement in 524
subject index 1083
and independent central banks 533, 536
and inflation 532–3
and inflation/stabilization goals 533
and intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8
and international financial crises 524
and monetarist revolution 536
and political business cycle 534
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
and political vulnerability 533–4
and voter rationality 534–5
see also economic policy; exchange rates; macro
political economy
money supply, and monetary policy 533–4
motivation, and expressive activity 333–5
multimember districts 104
mutual advantage, and constitutionalism 291, 298–9
mutualism, and cooperative behavior 953, 954–7
nation state, see state, the
national identity, and constitutions as expressive
documents 337–8
national interest, and international conflict 831–2
National Labor Relations Board 206–7, 213–14
national policy, and political economy research
1000
National Reform Union (UK) 686
National Rifle Association 14
nationalism, and modernist theories of 859–60
nation-building, post-military intervention 845–7
natural resources:
and authoritarian governments 700, 704–
5
and state failure 715–16
neo-liberal institutionalism 767
neo-realism:
and international relations 832, 833–6
assumptions about 833
bipolarity/multipolarity 834
core hypotheses of 834
defection strategy 835–6
essential states 835
evidential weakness 836
falsity of theorems 835
as non-cooperative game 833–4
resource allocation 835
stability 834–5
and the state 837
neo-Ricardian model of international trade 820–1
and migration and investment 821–2
and trade in products 821
network theory, and embededness 939–40
new institutionalism, see institutionalism
New International Economic Order 759
new structuralism 617–18
New World, and industrialization 747–8
New Zealand 319
and economic openness 827
and electoral reform 723
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
Nicaragua 701–2
no-confidence votes 122–3
NOMINATE, and measuring policy positions of
legislators 136–7
oil price shocks 524, 759
open access orders 1004
Open Economy Politics (OEP), see international
political economy (IPE)
opinion polls, and election-timing
124–5
opposition parties, and parliamentary systems 130
order:
and anthropological perspective 709
and international relations perspective 710
and societies with states 712–15
and stateless societies 710–11
Organization of European Economic
Cooperation 801
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) 759
other-regarding behavior 17–18, 952
paradoxes:
and fair division 432, 433, 434
and ranking paradoxes 398–9
and reconciling 971–2
and voting behavior 38–42, 304, 333, 971–2
Paraguay 703
Pareto indifference 409, 412
Pareto optimality 379, 988–9
parliamentary systems:
and distinction from legislatures 121–2
and election-timing 32
impact on voter behavior 12
and legislature:
elections 124
election-timing 124–5
executive coalitions 128
government control of agenda 125–6
investiture votes 123
minority governments 128–9
no-confidence votes 122
–3
opposition parties 130
parliamentary support coalition 128
party discipline 126–7
role of political parties 126–7
single-party majority governments 129–30
and policy choice 6
see also coalitions
Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) 703
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 703–4
partisan cycles:
and adaptive retrospective citizens 552–5
and context conditionality of 555, 559–60
and electoral surprises 555–6, 557
and evidence of 554–5, 556–8
and partisan divergence 553
and rational partisan theory 555, 556–9
and rational prospective citizens 555–8
and unemployment/inflation aversion 553–4
partisaneering, and political-economic cycles 545–6
partisanship:
and citizen-candidate models 607
and commitment issues 606–7
and cross-national variations 607
and demand management 644
and distributive politics 602, 605–8
and median voter theorem 606
1084 subject index
partisanship: (cont.)
and party activists 606
and political bargaining 607
and probabilistic voting 606
and voter/party preferences 608
party coalition model, and equilibrium analysis of
public finance 451, 452
party identification 997
path dependency:
and European integration 808–11
and political/economic development 674
peer effects 975
pension reform, and democratic support for
456–7
perfect competition 503
performance, and politicians 304
personal votes 32, 34
and localism of representatives 112–13
Philippines 701
Pivot mechanism 487–9
pivot theories 223–4, 238–9
and endogenous status quo points 233–4
and gridlock interval 223
and median voter theorem 224, 239
and pivot points 223
and pivotal politics theory 224–8, 239
analysis of roll rates 234–8
criticisms of 228
divided government 224–5
equilibrium 227
gridlock 225, 228
status quo points 227–8
super-majoritarianism 225–6
and procedural cartel theory 228–30, 238–9
gridlock 229–30
and roll rates analysis:
comparative analysis 230–2, 234–8
endogenous status quo points 233–4
median voter theorem 230–2
procedural cartel theory 230–2
status quo points 231–2
and status quo points 223, 227–8, 231–2
endogenous 233–4
see also median voter theorem
pivotal legislators 182, 275–6
plenary time 142
and bottlenecks 143–4
and legislative state of nature 143–4
and organization of 157–8
agenda-setting offices 145
centralized agenda powers 155–7
creation of inequality 144–5
evolution of agenda-setting powers 146–7
negative agenda power 149–50, 151–3
political parties 147–9
positive agenda power 149–50, 153–5
types of agenda power 149–51
and regulation of 141–2
plurality elections 726
and bias toward large parties 109–10
and definition 104
and electoral policy cycles 729
andimpactonbudgetdeficits 734–5
and impact on government spending 730–3
and leverage effect of 725
and party non-convergence 110–11
and public finance 468
and voting theory 392
see also electoral systems
Poisson games 910–12
Poland:
and constitution of 337–8
and democratization 659, 661, 664
policy uncertainty, and delegation 259–60, 262, 263,
266, 269
policy-making:
and bicameralism:
multi-dimensional models 186–7
spatial models of 181–4
spatial models of apportionment 184–6
and centralization 185–6
and decentralization 185
and electioneering 545
and institutional arrangements 6–7
and institutional interactions 217–18
and judicial decision-making 210–11, 273
statutory interpretation 276–7
and legislative choice:
committee expertise 10–11
committee system 8–9
preference-based approach 7–8
role of political parties 9–10
and partisaneering 545–6
and public opinion 43–4
see also political-economic cycles
political advertising 61–2
and candidate quality 52
and directly informative 52, 53–7
and equilibrium behavior 52
directly informative advertising 57–9
indirectly informative advertising 55–7
and expenditure function 59–60
and indirectly informative 51, 53–7
and public opinion 43
and rational voters 51
and role of 455–6
and vote share 50–1
and voter behavior 12–13, 45–6
political and economic development 690–1
and democracy 679–82
allocation of political power 679–80
concessions by elites 680
democratic consolidation 680
elite coups 680–1
emergence of 683–4
relative political equality 679
repression by elites 681, 689
transitory nature of de factor power 679, 680
and development of ‘good’ economic
institutions 682–3
and Great Britain 685
concessions by elites 688–90
education reform 687
emergence of democracy 686–7
interpretation of 688–90
origins of economic supremacy 685
subject index 1085
political reform 685–7
reform of economic institutions 687
and human cognition 1005
and inadequate knowledge of 1003–4, 1008
and non-incremental change 1004–5
and path dependency 674
and role of political institutions 683
and role of the state 718–20
anthropology 709
creation of institutions 709
equilibrium path 712–15
international relations 710
necessity of 708
state failure 715–16
state formation 716–18
stateless societies 710–12
and theoretical framework:
changes in political institutions 678–9
commitment problem and power 675, 677
conflicting interests 675, 677–8
de facto political power 676
de jure political power 675–6
persistence of behavior 677
political institutions 676–7
potential for change 677
power as determinant of economic
institutions 675
primacy of political power 677–8
resource distribution 675, 677, 678
role of economic institutions 674
and variations in 673–4
political behavior, see behavior
political business cycle, and monetary policy
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
political competition, and modeling of 1010–11
political competition, and theory of:
and citizen-candidate equilibrium 1022–3
and endogenous-party Wittman
equilibrium 1015–17, 1027
and impossibility theorem 1028–9
and inadequacy of Hotelling-Downs model 1027
and multidimensional generalizations 1017–23
and party faction model 1019–20, 1027–8
and party-unanimity Nash equilibrium
(PUNE) 1020–2, 1027–8
flypaper effect 1025–6
progressive taxation 1023–4
racism and redistribution 1026
taxation and non-economic issues 1024–5
and the political environment 1011–13
and unidimensional competition 1013–17
political economy:
and bounded rationality 977–8
and constitutional political economy 991–2
and diverse approaches of 3
and ethical norms 982–3
and extending exchange nexus 989–90
and future research areas 977
and the individual 985
and mathematization of 978
and meaning of 3
–4
and methodology of 3–4
and micro-foundations of 982
and national policy 1000
and normative relevance 988–9
and object of collective action 986–7
and omissions from 1003
beliefs and learning 1005–6
knowledge of development 1003–4, 1008
nature of cognition 1005
non-incremental change 1004–5
political and economic development 1004
and operational science of politics 987–8
and Pareto optimality 988–9
and political motivation 987
and politics as a process 985
and politics as exchange 992–3
and problems for future research 997–1000
adherence to strict rationality 999
lack of common knowledge 999
multidimensional issues 998
need for interdisciplinarity 997–8
non-linearity of political/economic systems 999
oversimplification of game theory 998
and size of nations 20–2
and spread of 5, 20
and the state 981–2
and unanimity benchmark 990–1
and unitary or multiple decision-makers 983–4
and utilitarianism 983, 988
political parties:
and candidate divergence 37–8
and electoral systems:
bias toward large parties 109–10
ideological spread 111–12
impact on ideological homogeneity 113–14
impact on party factionalism 114–15
impact on party numbers 106–8, 732
impact on proportionality of
representation 108–9
non-convergence of parties 110–11
and federalism 361–3, 367
and ideological identification 44
and legislative choice 9–10
and legislative organization:
access to high office 147–8
agenda-setting powers 149–51
party-rule symbiosis 148–9
and normative analysis of public finance 454–5
and parliamentary systems 126–7
minority governments 128–9
party discipline 126–7
single-party majority governments 129–30
and partisan cycles 552–5
and presidential systems 131–2
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
and procedural cartel theory 228–30
and redistributive politics 92–8
and roll rates (US Congress) 153
endogenous status quo points 233–4
pivot theories 230–2, 234–8
and voter behavior 31
see also political competition, and theory of
1086 subject index
political-economic cycles 545–7
and context conditionality of 546–7, 559–60
and electioneering 545
and electoral cycles:
adaptive retrospective citizens 547–50
coalition governments 549, 550
context-conditionality 548–9, 550, 551
economic voting 548
election timing 549
electoral challengers 551–2
evidence of 548–9
monetary policy manipulation 547–8
policy manipulation 550
policy targeting 549
policy timing 549
post-election electioneering 552
rational expectations 550–1
rational prospective citizens 550–1
and evidence for 546
and partisan cycles:
adaptive retrospective citizens 552–5
context-conditionality 555
electoral surprises 555–6, 557
evidence of 554–5, 556–8
partisan divergence 553
rational partisan theory 555, 556–9
rational prospective citizens 555–8
unemployment/inflation aversion 553–
4
and partisaneering 545–6
see also economic voting
politicians:
and bureaucratic delegation 256
administrative dominance 265–6
administrative state 256–7
agency design 261–2
ally principle 260, 262–3, 264, 266, 267, 269
assumptions underlying models of 257–8, 268–9
bureaucratic capacity 267
commitment problem 268–70
control of 265
empirical tests of 261–4
information asymmetries 266–7
modeling of delegation strategies 257–61
multi-principals issue 267–8
nature of legislation 262–3
oversight of 257, 264
policy uncertainty 259–60, 262, 263, 266, 269
political context 264–5, 269–70
political uncertainty 260–1,
263–4, 266
substitution effect 260, 263, 266
and incentive effects of electoral system:
direct effects 727–8
indirect effects 729–30
and legislature/parliament distinction 121–2
and performance 304
and public finance:
budget process 470
common-pool problem 465
ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
principal-agent relationship 464–5
pork-barrel politics 530–1
see also common pool problem
and ethnicity 861–2
and presidential governance 251
positive political theory (PPT) 912
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and game theory 905–6
Poisson games 910–12
and judicial independence 281–4
and judiciary 273–4, 284
and legal control of bureaucracy 277–81
Chevron decision 280–
1
implications of Administrative Procedure
Act 278–80
and statutory interpretation 274–7
poverty 23
power:
and democracy and capitalism 604
and political and economic development:
allocation of 679–80
commitment problem 675, 677
de facto political power 676
de jure political power 675–6
as determinant of economic institutions 675
emergence of democracy 683–4
primacy of 677–8
transitory nature of de factor power 679, 680
power transition theory:
and international relations 832, 836–7
and the state 837
preferences:
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and legislative choice 7–8
and peer effects 975
and preference drift 1037
presidential systems:
and budget process 472
and legislature 130–1
committee system 135–6
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
role of political parties 131
–2
and political parties 107–8
see also United States presidency
pressure groups, see interest groups
primordialism, and politicization of ethnicity 858
principal-agent relationship:
and economic voting 570
and principal-agent slack 804
and public finance 464–5
probabilistic spatial voting models 606
and equilibrium analysis of public finance 449–50,
451–2
procedural cartel theory 228–30, 238–9
and analysis of roll rates 230–2, 234–8
procedural justice 378
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate/procedural justice
complementarity 379–81
subject index 1087
property, and United States Supreme Court 347
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
property rights:
and authoritarian governments 693, 694, 697
benign despots 697–8
co-opting regime 701–2
organizational proliferation 703–4
under terror regime 699–700
and public sector economics 444
property taxes, and basic model of fiscal
competition 505–9
proportional representation 726
and distributive politics 612–13
and electoral policy cycles 730
and ideological spread of parties 111–12
and impact on budget deficits 734–5
and impact on government spending 730–3
and income redistribution 87–8, 635–6
and list system 104
and modeling outcomes of 452–3
and party factionalism 114–15
and proportionality continuum 104–5
measures of proportionality 105
swing ratio 105
and proportionality of party representation 108–9
and public finance
468
and single transferable vote 112
see also electoral systems
proposal rights/powers:
and American presidency 242, 247–9
and legislative organization 149–50
and positive agenda power 153–5
counterbalancing of 154–5
decentralization of 154
prospective voting 569–71
and pure prospective voting 571
as rational retrospection 572–5
see also economic voting; voting behavior; voting
theory
protectionism 759–60
and gender 825
see also international trade
protest movements, and United States Supreme
Court 344–5
proto-coalitions 163–4
psychology, and economics 976
public appeals, and American presidency 250, 251–2
public choice theory 989
and economic development 532
and macro political economy 527–8
and political corruptibility 528
and taxation 527
and United States Constitution 343
public constraints, and war 871–3
public finance:
and allocation of, majority rule 485–7
and collective choice 443, 444, 446, 457
and common-pool problem 465
see also pork-barrel politics
and electoral rules 468
–9
and equilibrium analysis 447–9, 457–8
applications of 451–3
citizen-candidate model 450–1, 452
issues to be covered 448–9
median voter theorem 448
party coalition model 451, 452
probabilistic spatial voting models 449–50,
451–2
problems faced by models 452–3
spatial voting model 452–3
and federalism 359
and governing institutions 443
and maximization of social welfare 442
and normative analysis 453–4, 458
citizen-candidate model 456
creeping constraints 457
democratic support for policies 456–7
efficiency and political competition 454–5
political advertising 455–6
political equilibria 455
political failure 455–6
and political economy approach 448–9
and principal-agent relationship 464–5
and public sector economics 443–7
behavioral assumptions 444
coercive action 446
decision externalities 447
decision mechanisms
444
equilibrium outcomes 446–7
policy choices 446
political competition 446
role of markets 443–4
taxes and spending 444–6
voluntary redistribution 446
and social planner model 442, 443, 457
and transfers from central government 467
and transfers to local government 465
see also fiscal competition; fiscal institutions
public goods 84, 479, 987
and allocation of 479, 481–2, 499
Bayesian approach 492–4
best mechanism for 490–1
consumer behavior 483
demand-revealing mechanisms 487–9
doubts over ‘Voting Works’ 497–8
incentive compatibility 484–5
majority rule 489–91
market processes 480–1
mechanism performance 483–4
mechanisms 482–3
multidimensional issues 498–9
public good environment 482
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms 487–91
virtual cost-benefit mechanisms 494–5
voting in large Bayesian environments 495–6
voting in large environments 497
and clubs 780
and state size 781, 782
public opinion:
and constraints on war 871–3
and monetary policy 523–4
and non-economic issues 524
public opinion: (cont.)
1088 subject index
and policy 43–4
and political advertising 45–6
public sector:
and collective choice 443, 457
and governing institutions 443
and maximization of social welfare 442
and social planner model 442, 443, 457
see also public finance
quantal response equilibrium (QRE) 928–9
Quebec 21
race:
and inequality 628–9, 630
United States 630, 635
and United States Supreme Court 346–7
see also ethnicity
racial politics 610–11
racism, and redistribution 1026
rational choice theory, and application in political
science 899, 900–1
rational expectations:
and demand management 644–5
and electoral cycles 556
and expressive voting 333–4
and monetary policy 534–5
and political-economic cycles 546
and rational partisan theory 555, 556–8
and voting behavior 335, 550–1
prospective voting 572–5
rational partisan theory, and partisan cycles 555,
556–9
rational retrospection, and voting behavior
572–5,
583
rationalist approach to war (RAW) 770–1
redistribution, see distributive politics; income
redistribution
Redistribution Act (UK, 1885) 687
Reform Act (UK, 1832) 673, 686
Reform League (UK) 686
regional economics 739
regionalism, and growth of 799–800, 805
regulation, and markets 342–3
regulatory politics 609
religion, and inequality 628
representation:
and accountability 724–5
and federalism 361–3, 365
and voter preferences 185–6
Representation of the People Act (UK, 1919)
673, 687
representation theorem 454
representative democracy 303–5
and audience democracy 304
and corporate democracy 304–5
and virtual representation 303–4
repression 681, 689
resource allocation:
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate justice 376–8
and endstate/procedural justice
complementarity 379–81
and modeling of 89, 374–
6
and neo-realism 835
and procedural justice 378
and public goods 479, 481–2, 499
Bayesian approach 492–4
best mechanism for 490–1
consumer behavior 483
demand-revealing mechanisms 487–9
doubts over ‘Voting Works’ 497–8
incentive compatibility 484–5
majority rule 485–7, 489–91
market processes 480–1
mechanism performance 483–4
mechanisms 482–3
multidimensional issues 498–9
public good environment 482
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms 487–91
virtual cost-benefit mechanisms 494–5
voting in large Bayesian environments 495–6
voting in large environments 497
and selectorate theory 842–4
and strategy-proof mechanisms 383–6
and strategy-proofness 382–3
see also fair division
retrospective voting:
and accountability 468
and economic voting 569–71
and laboratory experiments 923–4
and principal-agent relationship
570
and pure retrospective voting 575–8
see also economic voting; voting behavior; voting
theory
Ricardo-Viner theory:
and international trade:
migration and investment 820
trade in products 818–19
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 762
rights, and welfare 374, 376
Riker Objection 1032, 1040–2, 1047–8
Riot Act (Great Britain, 1714) 1046
risk-pooling, and labor market 744
roll calls:
and analysis of 136–7
and United States Congress 133
roll rates (US Congress), and analysis of 153, 230–2,
234–8
endogenous status quo points 233–4
Russia:
and democratization 662
and federalism 359
and financial crisis (1998) 524
and political/economic development 674
Rwanda 300, 302
Samuelson-Jones specific factors model 819, 820
Schelling conjecture 767
Second Reform Act (UK, 1867) 687
selectorate theory, and international
conflict/democratic peace 842–5
self-interest, and voting behavior 38–42, 304
separation of powers:
and judicial independence 281
and legislatures 121
subject index 1089
see also American politics, new
separation-of-powers approach to
sequential bargaining (Baron-Ferejohn model), and
coalition formation 168–70
Serbia, and democratization 662
service sector, and employment in 646–7
shame, and pro-social emotions 962–3
shirking, and evolutionary models of behavior 19
single non-transferable vote 113, 114–15
single transferable vote 112
single-member districts 104
Slovakia, and democratization 662
Slovenia, and democratization 661–2, 664
social choice:
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and collectivities 972–3
and constitutional design 973
and decision-making 972
as descriptive theory 974
and dictatorships 972
and distributive justice 374–6
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate justice 376–8
and endstate/procedural justice
complementarity 379–81
and fair division 373
and game theory 905–6
core emptiness 910–12
and impossibility theorem 373
and macro political economy 526–7
and mechanism design 373
and origins of
373
and procedural justice 378
and resource allocation, modeling of 374–6
and social welfare functions 526–7
and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms 383–6
and strategy-proofness 382–3
see also social evaluation
social contract, see contractarian theories
social evaluation 421–2
and alternatives 408–9
and Arrow’s theorem 409, 419
and axioms 413–16
anonymity 413–14
continuity 414
independence condition 415
independence of irrelevant alternatives 409, 412
minimal equity 414–15
Pareto indifference 412
unlimited domain 412
and information invariance 417–19
and interpersonal comparisons 408
and Pareto indifference 409
and social evaluation functionals 409, 411–12
and social evaluation orderings:
dictatorial 415–16
leximin 416
utilitarianism 416
and theorem statements 419–21
and utility functions 409, 410
and utility profiles 409, 411
and welfarism 409
, 411–13, 421–2
and well-being 409–10
interpersonal comparisons 409, 410–11
measurability 409–10
social groups, and voting behavior 41–2
social planning, and public sector 442, 443
social relations, and interest 944
social welfare:
and inequality 629–30
and maximization of 442
and social welfare functions 526–7
sociology, see economic sociology
South Africa 681
South-East Asian crisis (1997–8) 524
Soviet Union, and democratization 662
Spain:
and ethnicity 854
and federalism 366
spatial models of policy-making, and
bicameralism 181–4
spatial relationships, see economic geography
spatial theory of voting 29–30, 65
and candidate divergence 35
candidate preferences 37
political parties’ platform choices 37–8
third parties 36–7
valence issues 36
and criticisms of 30–1
and cut-points 33–4
and equilibrium analysis of public finance 452–3
probabilistic spatial voting models 449–50,
451–2
and median voter theorem 29, 31
and paradoxes of rationality 43
attempted resolutions of 40–2
rational ignorance 39–40
rational non-participation 38–40
and valence issues 32–5
and voters’ sources of information 43–6
see also voting behavior; voting theory
specific factors model, and international
trade 818–20
speech, freedom of, and United States Supreme
Court 344–6
stability:
and bicameralism 182–3
and neo-realism 834–5
state, the:
and anthropology 709
and formation of 716–18
and international bargaining 766–8
and international monetary relations 588–9
cooperation 590–1
coordination 589–90
as object of study 981–2
and organic conceptualization of 981
and political competition 1010–11
and role in development 718–20
creation of institutions 709
equilibrium path 712–15
international relations 710
necessity of
708
1090 subject index
state, the: (cont.)
state failure 715–16
stateless societies 710–12
see also state, economic role of; state size
state, economic role of 642–3, 652–3
and demand management 643–6
impact of globalization 645–6
impact of rational expectations 644–5
institutional environment 644–5
and socio-economic institutional
environment 649–52
actors’ policy preferences 651–2
as constraint 652
regime types 650
resistance to changes in 651–2
varieties of capitalism 650–1
and supply-side policy
impact of globalization 648–9
institutional environment 647–8
service sector 646–7
structural continuity 649
wage levels 647–8
welfare state policies 647, 648
see also economic policy
state intervention, and constitutions 342
state size 20–2, 768–9
and analytical framework for understanding 783–8
average utility 785–6
, 787–8
border determination 792
break-ups 791
compensation for the dissatisfied 788–90
efficient borders 787
government type 783
income inequality 790–1
inefficient break-ups 786
‘Leviathans’ 792
majority voting 786, 787
preferred government type 783–4
taxes per capita 784–5
and benefits of large size 781–2
and costs of large size 782
and defense/security issues 794–6
and factor mobility 794
and historical concern with 778–9
and international economic integration 793–4
and literature on:
clubs and local public goods 780
conflict and appropriation 781
national borders 779–80
trade blocs 780–1
statutory interpretation 274–7
strategic pre-action, and American presidency 242,
249–51
strategic voting 102, 110, 403–4
strategy-proofness:
and allocation mechanisms 383–6
and social choice 382–3
strong reciprocity
957–60
and evolution of 960–1
structure-induced equilibrium, and coalition
formation 165–8
substitution effect, and bureaucratic delegation 260,
263, 266
suicide bombers 18
super-majorities, and pivotal politics theory 225–6
filibuster pivots 226–7
supply-side economics, and role of the state 646–9
and impact of globalization 648–9
and institutional environment 647–8
and service sector 646–7
and structural continuity 649
and wage levels 647–8
and welfare state policies 647, 648
see also economic policy
survival:
and evolutionary models of behavior 17
and political behavior 4
Sweden 308
and budget process 473
swing ratio 105
Switzerland, and ex ante fiscal rules 466
Ta iw a n 701
takings clause, and United States Supreme
Court 351–4
taxation:
and basic model of fiscal competition 509–12
and federalism 363, 365–7
and flat taxes 527–8
and flypaper effect 1025–6
and income redistribution:
restricted tax schemes
85–8
targeting of heterogeneous groups 92–8
unrestricted transfer schemes 88–92
and non-economic issues 1024–5
and progressive taxation 1023–4
and public choice 527
and public sector economics 444–6
see also fiscal competition; fiscal institutions;
public finance
technology, and inequality 627
terror, and authoritarian governments 698–700
terrorism 1008
third parties:
and candidate divergence 36–7
and plurality voting 109–10
Third Reform Act (UK, 1884) 687
Thirty Years War 719–20
trade blocs 780–1
trade unions 644
and inequality 627
transfer spending 609–10
Transparency International 727
Trinidad and Tobago 319
trust 975
Turke y :
and ethnicity 855
and political/economic development 674
turnout, and laboratory experiments on 917,
929–32
ultimatum game 18
unanimity rule 990–1
uncertainty, and choice of institutions 1036–7
see also policy uncertainty
underdevelopment, and development theory 760
subject index 1091
United States:
and bicameralism 181
and campaign financing 51
and colonial period 1006–7, 1038–9
and ethnicity 854
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
and inequality 634–8
beliefs about 637–8
economic explanations of 634
ethnic heterogeneity 630, 635
failure of left-wing movements 636–7
impact of technology 627
political factors 627
political institutions 635–7
and local government 505–6
and terrorism 1008
see also American politics, new
separation-of-powers approach to
United States Congress 4
and divided government 134–5, 224–5
and judiciary:
judicial independence 282–3
statutory interpretation 274–7
and legislative organization:
acquisition of expertise 10–11
agenda-setting powers 149, 150, 154–5
committee system 8–9, 135–6, 145
preference-based approach 7–8
role of political parties
9–10
and measuring policy positions of legislators 136–7
as ‘model generator’ 131
and political parties 131–2
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
and presidential veto power 245–7, 250–1
and roll calls 133
analysis of 136–7
and roll rates:
analysis of 153, 230–2, 234–8
endogenous status quo points 233–4
and suspension of rules 1044
United States Constitution:
and Constitutional Convention (1787) 1040
and establishment of 299–300
and judicial review:
approach to 344
balancing private rights/government
interest 343–4
intermediate scrutiny standard 343
rational basis standard 343
strict scrutiny standard 343
and limited government 343
and procedural change:
amendment procedures 1040, 1043
interpretative courts 1043–4
and public choice theory 343
and representative democracy 303–4
United States presidency:
and constitutional foundation of 243
and judiciary:
judicial independence 282–
3
statutory interpretation 274–5
and legislature:
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
role of political parties 131–2
and new separation-of-powers approach to 202–7,
241–2
appointments process 204–7
interactions with other institutions 202
spatial model of budget problem 202–4
veto powers 202–4
and political economy approach 253
appointments process 247–9
executive orders 249–50
features of 241–2
going public 250
intellectual roots of 244–5
legislative program 249
proposal powers 242, 247–9
research opportunities 252–3
strategic context 245
strategic pre-action 242, 249–51
veto powers 242, 245–7
veto threats 250–1
and presidential governance 243–4
normative implications of 251–2
and relative weakness of 131
United States Senate, and presidential
appointments 204–5
United States Supreme Court:
and Abrams vs United States (1919) 344
and Adair vs United States (1908) 349
and Allgeyer vs Louisiana (1897) 349
and appointments process 248–9
and Baker vs Carr 183
and Baldwin vs GAF Seelig, Inc (1935) 351
and Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969) 344
and Brown vs Board of Education (1954) 346
and Buckley vs Valeo (1976) 51 n2
and Carolene Products Co vs United States
(1938) 344
and Chevron vs Natural Resources Defense Council
(1984) 280–1
and compliance problem 283–4
and constitutional interpretation 1043–4
and Coppage vs Kansas (1914) 349
and Corfeld vs Coryell (1823) 348
and Duquesne Light Co vs Barasch (1989) 350
and Eastern Enterprises vs Apfel (1998) 348
and Euclid vs Ambler Realty (
1926) 353
and Grutter vs Bollinger (2003) 346
and Hawaiian Housing Authority vs Midkiff
(1984) 352
and Home Building & Loan Association vs Blaisdell
(1934) 348
and judicial independence 281
and judicial review 354–5
and Lochner vs New York (1905) 349–50
and Loretto vs Teleprompter (1982) 351
and Loving vs Virginia (1967) 346
and Lucas vs South Carolina Coastal Commission
(1992) 354
and Marbury vs Madison (1803) 273
and McConnell vs Federal Electoral Commission
(2003) 345, 346