Weingast B.R., Wittman D. The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
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1072 subject index
democratization 656–7, 665
as commitment mechanism 690
and elections 664
and elite agency 658–9
institution formation 659
role of regime crises 658–9
and political costs of 715
and post-communist experience 659–60
elite competition 662–3
elite use of structures 661–3
role of informal institutions 664
role of the states 663–4
structural legacies 662
structures enabling elites 660–1
and redistribution 604
and structural preconditions 657–8
authoritarian legacies 658
economic performance/reform 657–8
and theory of 679–82
demography, and intergenerational conflict 525,
536–8
dependency theory 760–1
developing countries:
and assumptions about 1003–4
and comparative political economy 530
development, see economic development; political
and economic development
dictatorships and authoritarian government 22,
704–5
as benign despots/stationary bandits 697–8
and citizen coordination 1007–8
and democratic transitions 705
and economic growth 693
, 697
under co-opting regime 702
organizational proliferation 703
under terror regime 700
and economic literature 694–5
and insecurity of 694–5
and lack of understanding of 693–4
and launching organizations:
co-optation of 701–2
need for 696
organizational proliferation 702–4
strategies for dealing with 696–7, 704
terrorisation of 698–700
threat from 696
and natural resource exploitation 700, 704–5
and organizational theory of 695–7
and political sociology literature 694
and predatory nature of 698
and property rights 693, 694, 697
benign despots 697–8
under co-opting regime 701–2
organizational proliferation
703–4
under terror regime 699–700
and selectorate theory 842–5
and social choice 972
and survival of democracy 315, 325, 326
and threats to 695
and typologies of 694
Diermeier-Merlo model, and cabinet stability 173–4
‘Director’s Law’ 610
discretion:
and bureaucracy 214–16, 258–9
and judicial independence 282
see also delegation
distance, and economic impact of 740–2
distributive justice:
and microeconomic approach to 374–6
and representative democracy 303
distributive politics:
and bicameralism 187–8
concurrent majorities 188–9
fiscal prudence 190–1
malapportionment 191
super-majorities 189
and cross-national variations 603–4
and democracy 601
coalitional politics 602, 608–11
federalism 613–14
impact of electoral rules 612–13
institutional design 602, 611–14
partisanship 602, 605–8
and impact of electoral systems 731–2
and international trade 823–4, 827
age 825–6
compensation mechanisms 826
economies of scale model 822–3
factor specificity 824–5
gender 825
Heckscher-Ohlin model 815
–18
neo-Ricardian model 820–2
specific factors model 818–20
surveying of attitudes/support 826–7
types of trade 824
andmedianvotertheorem 313–14, 604
and new structuralism 617–18
and state size:
income inequality 790–1
prevention of secession 788–90
and varieties of capitalism 614–17
coordinated market economies 615
institutional complementarity 615
liberal market economies 615
relationship of economic/political
institutions 616
role of economic institutions 614–15
welfare state 615–16
see also income redistribution; inequality
distrust, and constitutionalism 291
divided government (USA) 134–5, 224–5
and judicial independence 282
dollarization, in Latin America 590–1
domestic politics:
and international conflict 832, 838–9, 875–6
audience costs 841
foreign aid 845–6, 847–8
institutional constraints 840–1
institutional incentives 842
–5
leaders’ motivations 838, 839, 870, 871–2
nation-building following conflict 845–7
role of opposition 841
selectorate theory 842–5
tax and spending constraints 839
theories of influence of 839
subject index 1073
and war 869, 875–6
audience costs 874–5
leaders’ motivations 870
political institutions 870
public opinion constraints 870, 871–3
Dominican Republic 701
dual-convention theory, and constitutionalism 297–8
duty, and voting behavior 40–1
economic and financial crises:
and budget process 473–4
and exchange rates 595
and political impact of 716
and survival of democracy 318–19
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 590, 591
economic development:
and collective action 530
and development theory 760–1
and electoral systems 735–6
and inequality 626–7
and public choice 532
see also economic geography; political and
economic development
economic geography:
and agglomeration mechanisms 742–3
firm linkages 744
labor mobility 743
market size/access 743
technological externalities 745
thick labor market 744–5
and borders 741
and cities:
attractions of 749
economic policy 750–1
equilibrium size 750
transport costs 749–50
and costs of distance 740
–2
implications for remote economies 742
and cumulative causation 751
and definition of 739–40
and externalities 751–2
and patterns of development:
‘great divergence’ 747
industrialization in the New World 747–8
Krugman-Venables trade/location model 745–6
sequential economic growth 748–9
and spatial disparities 751
and spatial relationships 739, 740
economic growth, and authoritarian
governments 693, 697
under co-opting regime 702
organizational proliferation 703
under terror regime 700
economic liberties, and United States Supreme
Court 347
contracts affected with the public interest 350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
economic methods in political science 912
and Arrow’s influence 900
and collective preference theory 902–5
core emptiness 908–9
large populations 907
opportunities for trade 906–7
and Downs’s influence 900
and game theory 900–1, 905–6
core of cooperative games 901–2
non-cooperative game theory 902
, 906
Poisson games 910–12
and rational choice theory 899, 900–1
and Riker’s influence 900–1
economic policy:
and cities 750–1
and constitutions 723–4
and form of government 724
and impact of electoral systems 723–4, 735, 765
direct effects on accountability 727–8
direct effects on government spending 730–2
electoral policy cycles 729–30
indirect effects on accountability 729–30
indirect effects on budget deficits 734–5
indirect effects on government spending 732–4
and role of the state 642–3, 652–3
macroeconomic demand management 643–6
socio-economic institutional
environment 649–52
supply-side strategies 646–9
see also political-economic cycles
economic sociology:
and definition of 937
and different approach required 937–8
and economic-social action 948
and embededness 938–40
criticism of concept 939
network theory 939–40
uses of concept 938–9
and the field 941–3
definition of 941
organizational field 941
structure of society 941
uses of concept 942–3
and institutions:
definition of 945–6
interest-based concept of 945–7
and interest 943–4
social relations 944
and perspectives of 938
and reciprocity-redistribution-exchange 948
economic voting:
and clarifying incumbent responsibility 578–82
and electoral cycles 548
and Fair’s model 567–9
and Kramer’s model 566–7
and prospective voting 569–71
pure prospective voting 571
as rational retrospection 572–5
and research on:
challenges facing 584
development of 582–3
origins of 565–6
and retrospective voting 569–71
principal-agent relationships 570
pure retrospective voting 575–8
see also electoral cycles; political-economic cycles;
voting behavior; voting theory
1074 subject index
economics, and foundations of 976
economies of scale model of international
trade 822–3
education policy, and inequality 629, 638
efficiency, economic 974
efficient negotiations, and coalition formation
171–2
El Salvador 681
electioneering, and political-economic cycles
545
elections:
and analysis of 64
and democratization 664
and deterministic voting 67–8
office motivation 68–70
policy motivation 70–2
and forecasting of 34
and framework for 66–7
and laboratory experiments 917, 922
asymmetric contests 926
candidate convergence 923
median voter theorem 923–4
multicandidate elections 924–5
retrospective voting 923–4
and legislature/parliament distinction 121–2
and median voter theorem 29, 31
and position-taking by candidates 64
and probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship
model 72–3
vote motivation 73–5
win motivation 75–7
and probabilistic voting, stochastic preference
model 77–8
policy motivation 80–
1
vote motivation 78–9
win motivation 79–80
and public funding 59, 60
and spatial theory of voting 29–30
candidate divergence 35–8
criticisms of 30–1
cut-points 33–4
paradoxes of rationality 38–42, 43
valence issues 32–5
and timing of 32, 549
parliamentary systems 124–5
voter behavior 12
and turnout 929–32
and voters’ sources of information 43–6
see also candidates; economic voting; electoral
cycles; electoral systems; median voter
theorem;
political advertising; political competition, and
theory of; political-economic cycles; voting
behavior; voting theory
Electoral College (USA) 295, 298
and impact on government spending 731
electoral cycles:
and adaptive retrospective citizens 547–50
and coalition governments 549, 550
and context conditionality of 548–9, 550, 551,
559–60
and economic policy 729–30
and economic voting 548
and election timing 549
and electoral challengers 551
–2
and evidence of 548–9
and exchange rates 595
and monetary policy:
partisan variant 535
rational expectations 534–5
and policy manipulation 550
and policy targeting 549
and policy timing 549
and post-election electioneering 552
and rational expectations 550–1
and rational prospective citizens 550–1
see also economic voting
electoral equilibrium 81–2
and deterministic voting 67–8
office motivation 68–70
policy motivation 70–2
and probabilistic voting, stochastic partisanship
model 72–3
vote motivation 73–5
win motivation 75–7
and probabilistic voting, stochastic preference
model 77–8
policy motivation 80–1
vote motivation 78–9
win motivation 79–80
electoral systems:
and accountability 468, 724, 726–7
direct effects on 727–8
indirect effects on 729–
30
and ballot structure 726
and categorization of 726
and class 613
and corruption 725, 727–8, 730
and cross-country correlations 726
and distributive politics 612–13
and district magnitudes 726
impact on accountability 729
impact on government spending 730–1
impact on policy 765
and Electoral College (USA) 295, 298
and electoral formulas 726
impact on budget deficits 734–5
impact on government spending 730–4
and electoral incentives 102–3
district magnitude 109
ideological spread 111–12
party divergence 110–11
party factionalism 114–15
personal votes 112–13
and electoral rules 102
Condorcet criterion 103
and future research on 115
and government ideology 733–4
and impact of:
bias toward large parties 109–10
ideological spread 111–12
localism of representatives 112–13
on number of parties 106–8
party factionalism 114–15
party ideological homogeneity 113–
14
party non-convergence 110–11
subject index 1075
on proportionality of party
representation 108–9
voting outcomes 527
and impact on economic development 735–6
and impact on economic policy 723–4, 735
direct effects of accountability 727–8
direct effects on government spending 730–2
electoral policy cycles 729–30
indirect effects of accountability 729–30
indirect effects on budget deficits 734–5
indirect effects on government spending 732–4
and income redistribution 87–8, 90–2
and list proportional representation 104
and modeling outcomes of 452–3
and monetary policy manipulation 547–8
and plurality voting 104
and politicians’ incentives:
direct effects on 727–8
indirect effects on 729–30
and presidential systems 107–8
and proportionality continuum 104–5
measures of proportionality 105
swing ratio 105
and public finance 468–9,
472
and responding to external shocks 765
and single non-transferable vote 113, 114–15
and single transferable vote 112
and stability of 725
and strategic voting 102, 110
and threshold of exclusion 104–5, 106
proportionality of party representation
108–9
elites:
and democratization 658–9
elite competition 662–3
portable skills 660–1
use of structures 661–3
and European integration 803–4, 812
embededness 938–40
and criticism of concept 939
and network theory 939–40
and uses of concept 938–9
emergency powers 1046–7
emotions, and evolutionary models of
behavior 18–20
endogenous institutions 4
and legislative organization:
committee expertise 10–11
committee system 8–9
political parties 9–10
preference-based approach 7–8
see also legislatures
endstate justice 376–8
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–
3
and endstate/procedural justice
complementarity 379–81
equilibrium:
analysis of, and public finance 447–9
applications of 451–3
citizen-candidate model 450–1, 452
issues to be covered 448–9
median voter theorem 448
party coalition model 451, 452
probabilistic spatial voting models 449–50,
451–2
problems faced by models 452–3
spatial voting model 452–3
and bargaining games 188
and coalition formation:
cabinet stability (Diermeier-Merlo model)
173–4
demand bargaining 170–1
efficient negotiations 171–2
sequential bargaining (Baron-Ferejohn model)
168–70
structure-induced equilibrium (Laver-Shepsle
model) 165–8
and evolutionary models of behavior 17
and income redistribution:
restricted tax schemes 86–7
targeting of heterogeneous groups 92–8
unrestricted transfer schemes 88–92
and institutions as 1033–5
and pivot theories:
pivotal politics theory 227
procedural cartel theory 229
and political advertising 52
directly informative advertising
57–9
indirectly informative advertising 55–7
and political behavior 4
and statutory interpretation 275
and survival of democracy 312, 321–2, 323, 324–5
see also electoral equilibrium
equity flows, and impact of distance 741
essential states, and neo-realism 835
Estonia, and democratization 664
ethnicity 852
and definition of ethnic group 852–3
and ethnic violence 857–8
cross-national variation 857–8
definition of 857
deliberate provocation of 863–4
intraethnic politics 863
unitary actor explanations 862–3
and politicization of 853
as basis for coalition-building 860–2
conflicting ethnic preferences 858–9
cross-national variation 854–5
impact of economic modernization 859–60
political boundaries 856
pork-barrel politics 861–2
post-colonial environments 860
primordialist explanation of 858
research on 864–5
temporal variations 856
see also common-pool problem
and racism and redistribution 1026
and social relevance of 853
cross-national variation 854
and survival of democracy 322
–4
Eurobarometer surveys 807
European Central Bank 591, 799, 803, 804, 810–11
European Coal and Steel Community 799, 801–2
European Commission 802, 804
and delegation 263
European Council of Ministers 804–5
1076 subject index
European Court of Human Rights, and Bowman vs
UK (1998) 51 n2
European Court of Justice 799, 802
European Economic Community 799
European Exchange Rate Mechanism 524
European integration:
and attitudes towards, survey data on 807
and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 803
and constitutional convention 804, 810
and coordination problems 801
and Council of Ministers 804–5
and decision-making processes 805–6
and democratic deficit 804, 806
and development of scholarship on 799–800
and economic motives 805, 806–7
and European Coal and Steel Community 801–2
and European Payments Union 801, 803
and exchange rates 803
and foreign policy 809–10
and historical-institutionalist accounts 812
and institutional approach 800–1, 802, 808
commitment issues 802
and interest group politics 806, 807
and intergovernmental approach 800–1
and issue linkage 802
and monetary union 803–4
attitudes towards 806–7
and national preferences 806
and neo-functionalist view of 808
spillover effects
802–3
and normalization of studies of 805–8
and path dependency 808–11
and political integration 804
and role of elites 803–4, 812
principal-agent slack 804
and security concerns 801–2
and Single Market Program 803
and synthetic view of 807–8
and transnational bureaucracy 803
European monetary integration 589
European Monetary System 589, 590, 591
European Monetary Union 469
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
European Parliament 799, 802, 804
and policy positions of legislators 137
European Payments Union 799, 801, 803
European Single Market 799, 803
European Union:
and delegation 263
and federalism 359
evolutionary fitness 4
exchange:
and economics 989–90
and politics as 992–3
exchange rates 591
and Bretton Woods system 588, 590
end of 759
and centrality of 588
and dollarization 590–1
and domestic political economy of:
choice of regime 591–3
competitiveness/purchasing power
trade-off593
–4
electoral cycles 595
electoral politics 593, 595
exchange rate level 593–4
interest groups and regime choice 592
and European integration 803, 806–7
and fixed rate systems 588, 589, 590, 591–2
and free floating systems 588, 589
and gold standard 588, 589
and interest groups:
exchange rate level 595
regime choice 592
and internation political economy of 588–9
cooperation 590–1
coordination 589
nation state 588–9
and regional regimes 588, 590–1
and research on:
challenges facing 596
integration of domestic/international
factors 595–6
policy substitutes 595
executive:
and parliamentary systems 122
control of legislative agenda 125–6
elections 124
election-timing 124–5
executive coalitions 128
investiture votes 123
minority governments 128–9
no-confidence votes 122–3
opposition parties 130
parliamentary support coalition
128
role of political parties 126–7
single-party majority governments 129–30
and presidential systems:
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
executive/legislature dependence 130–1
role of political parties 131–2
executive orders, and American presidency 249–50
exit, and fiscal competition 512–14
experiments, see laboratory experiments
expertise, and legislative committee system 10–11
expressive activity 329
and political behavior 333–5
constitutional relevance 336–8, 339–40
expressive voting 41, 333–5
expropriation:
and authoritarian governments 699–700
and inequality 633–4
factor mobility:
and fiscal competition 504–5, 508–9, 512–14,
518–19
dynamics of 514–17
and international trade models:
Heckscher-Ohlin model 815–18
neo-Ricardian model 820–2
specific factors model 818–20
and state size
794
fair division 425, 435
and endstate justice 377
and indivisible goods 432–5
assumptions made 432–3
subject index 1077
Borda Count 435
efficiency 432, 433
envy-free division 432, 433, 434
paradoxes 432, 433, 434
Rawlsian maximin criterion 434
and procedural justice 378
and several divisible goods:
adjusted winner 429–32
efficiency 431
equitability adjustments 430
equity 431
and single heterogeneous good:
assumptions made 426
cut-and-choose 426–7
envy-free division 426–9
squeezing procedure 428–9
and social choice 373
see also resource allocation
Federal Reserve System 541
federalism:
and bicameralism 181
and centralization/decentralization tension 358–9
and distributive politics 613–14
and economic problems 361
and economic theories 359–60
competitive federalism 360
‘Leviathan’ theory 360
public finance theory 359
welfare economics 359–60
and endogenous institutions 364
intergovernmental fiscal systems 365–7
political parties 367
representation 365
and goal of 358
and necessity of 359
and normative tradition 357
, 367
and perspectives on 357, 367–8
and positive political economy literature 357–8,
361, 368
intergovernmental fiscal systems 363
nature of representation 361–3
political incentives 361
political parties 363–4
field, and economic sociology 941–2
and definition of 941
and organizational field 941
and structure of society 941
and uses of concept 942–3
filibusters 143
and pivotal politics theory 225, 226–7
financial crises, see economic and financial crises
fiscal competition 502–3
and basic model of 505–9
American local government 505–6
capital investment 506–7
capital mobility 508–9
interpretations and applications of 509–12
property taxes 505–9
and capital mobility 504–5
and exit and voice 512–14
and implications of 505
and institutional change 517–18
and labor mobility 504
and models of 504–5
tax competition 504–5
and nature of 503–4
and normative implications of 512
and perfect competition 503
and policy choice 502
and resource mobility 512–14, 518–19
dynamics of 514–17
see also fiscal institutions; public finance
fiscal institutions 465, 474
and budget process 470–4
centralization 470–1
common-pool problem 473–4
contract approach 471–2
delegation 471–2
enforcement 472
impact of centralization 473–4
impact of electoral rules 472
stages of 470–1
and electoral rules 468–9
common-pool problem 468–9
evidence of impact of 469
political competition 469
and ex ante fiscal rules 466–7
effectiveness of 466–7
see also fiscal competition; public finance
fiscal systems, and federalism 361–3, 365–7
flat taxes 527–8
flypaper e
ffect 1025–6
folk theorem 710, 955
foreign aid policy 845–6, 847–8
foreign direct investment, and impact of distance 741
foreign policy:
and audience costs 874–5
and public opinion constraints 871–3
see also international conflict
free riding, and spatial theory of voting 39
free trade 758
and state size 782, 793–4
see also international trade
freedom of speech, and United States Supreme
Court 344–6
Gallagher Index 105
game theory:
and application in political science 900–1, 905–6
and bicameralism 187–8
concurrent majorities 188–9
fiscal prudence 190–1
information acquisition 193
malapportionment 191
super-majorities 189
and coalition formation:
cabinet stability 173–4
demand bargaining 170–1
efficient negotiations 171–2
sequential bargaining 168–70
structure-induced equilibrium 165–8
and committee decision-making:
bargaining in multidimensional policy
spaces 917–18
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21
1078 subject index
game theory: (cont.)
Fiorina and Plott’s experiments 918–19
and cooperation 956–7
and cooperative game theory 901
core of the game 901–2
and folk theorem 710
and non-cooperative game theory 902, 906, 978
and Poisson games 910–12
and political economy 528
and social choice:
endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
endstate vs procedural justice 376–8
endstate/procedural complementarity 379–81
microeconomic approach to 374–6
strategy-proof mechanisms 383–6
and strong reciprocity 957–60
Gamson’s Law 172
gatekeeping authority, and legislatures 6
General Agreements on TariffsandTrade
(GATT) 759
genes, and evolutionary models of behavior 18–20
geographical economics, see economic geography
geography, and fundamental importance of 740
see also economic geography
Germany:
and bicameralism 181
and budget process 473
and constitution of 320
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
and federalism 366
and special interest gridlock 530
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 383–4, 403
Gini coefficient 625
globalization 757
and demand management 645–6
and development theory 760–1
and global governance 769–70
and international financial crises 524
and nascent phase of 759
and sequential development 748–9
and supply-side economic policy 648–9
see also international trade
gold standard 588, 589, 590
governance, and global governance 769–70
government:
and distribution of income 84–5
and fiscal competition 503–4
and purpose of 342
see also income redistribution
Great Britain:
and American colonies 1006–7
and colonial America 1038–9
and ethnicity 854
and political and economic development 673, 685
concessions by elites 688–90
education reform 687
emergence of democracy 686–7
interpretation of 688–90
origins of economic supremacy 685
political reform 685–7
reform of economic institutions 687
gridlock:
and legislative organization 151–2
and pivot theories:
pivotal politics theory 225, 228
procedural cartel theory 229–30
group rule utilitarianism, and voting behavior
41–2
Guatemala 681
habitus 941
Haiti 690
and political/economic development 673–4
Heckscher-Ohlin theory:
and international trade
migration and investment 816–18
trade in products 815–16
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 762
hegemonic stability theory 761–2
heresthetics 130
Hungary 320
and democratization 659, 661–2, 664
and repression 681
Hyde Park riots (1866) 686
identity, and constitutions as expressive
documents 337–8
ideology:
and electoral systems 733–4
and party labels 44
and voter behavior 32, 34
imperfect information, and income
redistribution 98–9
impossibility theorem 373, 601, 972
and economic outcomes 973–4
and markets 974
and political competition 1028–9
and social evaluation 409, 419
and voting theory 405–6
income, per capita, and democracy 314–18, 684–5,
705
income inequality, see inequality
income redistribution 84–5, 99–100, 313–14
and cross-national variations 603–4
and electoral systems 87–8, 90–2
and ethnic heterogeneity 630
and federalism 365–7
and imperfect information 98–9
and increased preference for 631–2
and intergenerational conflict 536–8
and political institutions 630–1
and proportional representation 87–8, 635–6
and restricted tax schemes 85–8
and role of government 84–5
accountability of 85
and survival of democracy 319–20
and targeting of heterogeneous groups 92–8
and unrestricted transfer schemes 88–92
and voluntary redistribution 446
see also distributive politics; inequality
India:
and economic development 531–2
and economic openness 827
and election timing 549
and ethnicity 856
and federalism 359
indoctrination, and beliefs about inequality 637–8
subject index 1079
Indonesia 702
industrialization:
and inequality 626–7
and the New World 747–8
and newly industrializing countries 760
inequality 624–5, 639
and American exceptionalism 634–8
beliefs about inequality 637–8
economic explanations of 634
ethnic heterogeneity 635
failure of left-wing movements 636–7
political institutions 635–7
and causes of 625–31
demand for skilled workers 627
distribution of skills 627–8
economic development 626–7
education policy 629
ethnic heterogeneity 628–9, 630
political factors 627
political institutions 630–1
religion 628
technology 627
welfare spending 629–30
and cross-national variations 627–8
and measurement of 625
Gini coefficient 625
Kuznets curve 626
share of national income 625
and political impact of 631–4
corruption 634
democracy 632–3
expropriation 633
–4
increased preference for redistribution 631–2
institutional structure 632–4
reduced redistribution 632–3
and state size 790–1
inflation:
and macro political economy 532–3
and public opinion 524
see also demand management, and the state
information 4
and aggregation of:
bicameralism 192–3
in committees 917, 927–9
voting behavior 15–17, 44–5, 46
and income redistribution 98–9
and social evaluation and information
invariance 417–19
and voting behavior:
information aggregation 15–17, 44–5, 46
information revelation 11–15
sources of information 43–6
institutional analysis 223
Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) 367
institutionalism, and coalitions 162–5
cabinet stability 165
minority governments 164–5
reappraisal of existing theory 163–4
structure-induced equilibrium 165–8
institutions:
and approaches to study of 6
and choice of 1035–7
preference drift 1037
status quo bias 1036–7
uncertainty 1036–7
veil of ignorance 1035–6
and comparative analysis of 7
as constraint 1034
and definition of 945–6, 1032
and distributive politics 611–14
and dynamic nature of 1032
as equilibria 1033–5
as game forms 1032–3
and interest aggregation 764–6
and interest-based concept of 945–7
and maintenance of 1037–40
incomplete awareness 1038–9
self-confirming equilibrium 1038–9
self-generating revision 1038, 1039–40
self-stability 1041
and new structuralism 617–18
and origins of 617
and problems in studying 976
and procedural change 1042–3
admission of new members 1046
amendment procedures 1040–1, 1043
emergency powers 1046–7
escape clauses/nullification 1044–5
interpretative courts
1043–4
secession 1045–6
suspension of rules 1044
and research process 4
and Riker Objection 1032, 1040–2, 1047–8
and strategic social interaction and choice 1033
and varieties of capitalism:
coordinated market economies 615
institutional complementarity 615
liberal market economies 615
relationship of economic/political
institutions 616
role of economic institutions 614–15
welfare state 615–16
instrumental activity 329
and constitutions 333, 334, 339–40
interdependence 759
interest groups:
and campaign contributions 50, 52
and economic practice 530–1
and European integration 806, 807
and exchange rates:
level of 595
regime choice 592
and older people 537–8
and political actors 528
and political advertising:
directly informative 57–9
indirectly informative 53–7
and political economy approach 528–9
and special interest gridlock 530
interests:
and interest-based concept of institutions 945–7
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 762–4
institutional aggregation of interests 764–6
and sociological concept of 943–4
social relations 944
intergenerational conflict 525, 536–8
1080 subject index
International Coffee Organization 767
international conflict 838
and democratic peace 838
institutional constraints 840–1
normative explanation of 840
and domestic politics 832, 838–9, 875–6
audience costs 841, 874–5
foreign aid 845–6, 847–8
institutional constraints 840–1
institutional incentives 842–5
leaders’ motivations 838, 839, 870, 871–2
nation-building following conflict 845–7
public opinion constraints 871–3
role of opposition 841
selectorate theory 842–5
tax and spending constraints 839
theories of influence of 839
and international political economy 770–1
and national interest 831–2
and the state 710
and state size 781, 794–6
and structural theories 832, 833, 837–8
neo-realism 833–
6
power transition theory 836–7
and transformation of field of study 831
see also anarchy; international relations
international economics 739
international institutions, and monetary policy
541–2
International Monetary Fund 532, 541, 542, 589,
759
international monetary relations:
and cooperation 590–1
and coordination 589–90
international political economy (IPE):
and early approaches of:
dependency theory 760–1
domestic theories 762
hegemonic stability theory 761–2
and future research areas:
conflict and war 770–1
endogenous state formation 768–9
global governance 769–70
and globalization 757
and growth of 771–2
and Open Economy Politics (OEP) 757–8, 762–3
characteristics of 772
institutional aggregation of interests 764–6
interests 762–4
international bargaining 766–8
success of 772
and origins of 758–60
and subject matter of 758
international relations, see anarchy; international
conflict
international trade:
and distributional consequences
814–15, 823–4, 827
age 825–6
compensation mechanisms 826
factor specificity 824–5
gender 825
surveying of attitudes/support 826–7
types of trade 824
and economies of scale model of 822–3
and Heckscher-Ohlin model of:
migration and investment 816–18
trade in products 815–16
and impact of distance 741
and neo-Ricardian model of 820–1
migration and investment 821–2
trade in products 821
and specific factors model of:
migration and investment 820
trade in products 818–19
and state size 782, 793–4
see also international political economy (IPE)
interpersonal comparisons, and social evaluation
408
intuitionism 294
investiture votes, and parliamentary systems 123
investment, and international trade models
Heckscher-Ohlin model 815–18
neo-Ricardian model 821–2
specific factors model 820
Iran, and ethnicity 855
Iraq:
and ethnicity 855
and terror 699
Ireland, Republic of, and constitution of 337
Italy:
and corruption 728
and electoral reform 469, 723
and ex ante fiscal rules
466
and federalism 366
Japan:
and election timing 549
and electoral reform 723
and electoral system 113, 115
and ethnicity 854
and ex ante fiscal rules 466
and political/economic development 674
judicial review:
and approach to 344, 354–5
and balancing private rights/government
interest 343–4
and constitutional interpretation 1044
and intermediate scrutiny standard 343
and policy-making 217–18
andprotectionofcontractandproperty:
contracts affected with the public interest
350–1
contracts clause 347–8
economic liberties 348–50
takings clause 351–4
and rational basis standard 343
and social and moral issues:
equal protection of the laws 346–7
freedom of speech 344–6
and strict scrutiny standard 343
judiciary:
and bureaucratic delegation 269
and judicial independence 281–4
strategic interactions 282–3
and legal control of bureaucracy 277–81
Chevron decision 280–1
subject index 1081
implications of Administrative Procedure
Act 278–80
and new separation-of-powers approach to 207–12
agenda-setting 211
appointments process 211
interactions with other institutions 207–8
judicial decision-making 208–10
legislative override 209–10
limits on policy-making capacity 210–11
and policy-making 273
statutory interpretation 276–7
and positive political theory 273–4, 284
control of bureaucracy 277–81
judicial independence 281–4
statutory interpretation 274–7
and strategic interactions 274
judicial independence 282
statutory interpretation 274–7
and subversion of 632
and traditional legal analysis 273
justice:
and choice of institutions 1035–6
and constitutionalism 301–2
and distributive justice 303
microeconomic approach to 374–6
and endstate cum procedural justice 381–3
and endstate justice 376–8
and endstate/procedural justice
complementarity 379–81
and procedural justice 378
Kikuyu 856
kleptocracy 85
Korea:
and ethnicity
854
and terror 699
Kuznets curve 626
Laasko-Taagepera Index 106–7
labor market:
and agglomeration 745
and service sector 646–7
labor mobility:
and agglomeration 743
and fiscal competition 504
laboratory experiments:
and committee decision-making 916–17
bargaining in multidimensional policy
spaces 917–18
committee bargaining 921–2
core clustering 919–21
Fiorina and Plott’s experiments 918–19
and competitive elections 917, 922
asymmetric contests 926
candidate convergence 923
median voter theorem 923–4
multicandidate elections 924–5
retrospective voting 923–4
and future research areas 932–3
and importance of institutions 916
and information aggregation in committees 917,
927–9
and link with experimental economics 915–16
and requirements of 915
and voter turnout 917, 929–32
laissez-faire 84–5
Latin America:
and democratization 664
and ethnicity 855
Laver-Shepsle model, and coalition formation
165–8
law, and statutory interpretation
274–7
leadership theory 761
learning 1005–6
Lebanon, and ethnicity 855
legislative committee systems (LCS):
and acquisition of expertise 10–11
and exchange postulate 9
and legislative choice 8–9
and political parties 10
legislatures 4
and definition 121
and distinction from parliaments 121–2
and gatekeeping authority 6
and legislative choice 6
and measuring policy positions of legislators 136–8
and organization of 157–8
agenda-setting offices 145
centralized agenda powers 155–7
committee expertise 10–11
committee system 8–9
creation of inequality 144–5
evolution of agenda-setting powers 146–7
legislative state of nature 141, 143–4
negative agenda power 149–50, 151–3
plenary bottleneck 143–4
plenary time 142
political parties 9–10, 147–9
positive agenda power 149–50,
153–5
preference-based approach 7–8
regulation of plenary time 141–2
types of agenda power 149–51
and parliamentary systems 122
elections 124
election-timing 124–5
executive coalitions 128
government control of agenda 125–6
investiture votes 123
minority governments 128–9
no-confidence votes 122–3
opposition parties 130
parliamentary support coalition 128
party discipline 126–7
role of political parties 126–7
single-party majority governments 129–30
and presidential systems 130–1
committee system 135–6
divided government/cohabitation 134–5
electoral incentives for party cohesion 132
legislative incentives for party cohesion 132–3
role of political parties 131–2
and separation of powers 121
see also bicameralism
‘Leviathan’ theory, and federalism 360
liberal market economies 615, 650
liberalism, and international relations 832, 833