Wang Q.E. Inventing China Through History: The May Fourth Approach to Historiography

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However, like Jiang Tingfu and Ding Wenjiang as well as Hu

Shi, Fu Sinian rarely held back his criticisms of the GMD. In 1932,

Fu wrote a short article, criticizing the GMD government for its

unrealistic economic plans and unattainable promises. He openly

expressed his disappointment that “The biggest problem [in the gov-

ernment] seems to be too much talk, too many plans, too many meet-

ings, too much propaganda, yet short on practical planning, short

on appropriate procedures. Up to date, the country has drawn to the

bottom of the deep loophole, is there any face to brag about any

more? It is better to complete some basic things before talking

highly of any major constructive plans!”

Fu also criticized the

GMD government in his article on Manchuria. Having analyzed the

domestic and international situation a year after the Manchurian

Incident, Fu openly expressed his great disappointment, lamenting

that “under such a serious national disaster, it is odd to see that the

rulers in China were even unable to ﬁnd a way out.” The GMD gov-

ernment, in Fu’s opinion, was too tied down to its internecine polit-

ical struggle to concentrate on national defense. “Till today, not only

was the resistance not organized, but the government itself was

neither one thing nor another, neither there nor not-there.”

Despite his high hopes for Chiang Kai-shek, Fu also maintained an

independent position.

The Independent Critique’s independence was shown nowhere

more clearly in its discussion on China’s foreign policy, especially in

dealing with Japan’s aggression. Hu Shi contributed a series of arti-

cles to the journal warning the people that this was not the time to

openly engage in a war with Japan, given China’s military weak-

ness. Rather, China should seek peaceful negotiations with Japan

to solve the crisis. This peaceful solution required both Japan and

China to restrain their actions; the Chinese people should not act

on emotions and the Japanese government should not escalate its

military aggression. According to Hu Shi, Japan now faced choices

between “nine generations of enmity or a century of friendship”

with China, because “Japan can never conquer China by force.

There would be a way for Japan to conquer China, that was to stop

immediately the invasion and conquer (zhengfu) the mind of the

Chinese people,”

which meant to develop friendship. Although Hu

was not a defeatist but more a paciﬁst, his statement was tanta-

mount to an endorsement of Chiang Kai-shek’s unpopular nonre-

sistance (bu dikang) policy, which made him very unpopular among

his friends. Fu Sinian and Ding Wenjiang both disagreed with him.

Fu even told Ding that he wanted to leave the journal, which made

Hu Shi very sad—Fu was later persuaded by Ding not to do so.

168 SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY

Some left-wing writers even accused Hu Shi of betraying the

nation.

But Hu Shi had his reasons. As Jerome Grieder has noticed,

Hu Shi believed that international politics was no different from

domestic politics. An active public opinion would promote China’s

democracy; in world politics, international organizations such as the

League of Nations could, through the pressure of “world public

opinion” (shijie gonglun), restrain Japan’s aggression. Having heard

about the Lytton report, conducted by the League of Nations that

condemned Japan’s invasion in Manchuria, Hu wrote optimistically

that the pressure of world opinion could “sober up the drunken

Japanese.”

Examples in European history were used to justify his

optimism. On the one hand, he analyzed, if Japan chose to conquer

China by force, it would become Weimar Germany, which ended

with a dictatorship; to do otherwise could turn Japan into a strong

and wealthy nation like Britain. On the other hand, he wrote,

France lost Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia in 1871 but regained it

forty-eight years later in World War I. He shared his historical

wisdom with his readers: In the long life of a nation, ﬁfty years

of loss or suffering did not have a huge impact on the entire

course of its history.

He called for endurance and restraint, espe-

cially by young college students. When many of them were agitated

by Japan’s aggression, Hu Shi and Ding Wenjiang urged them

to focus on their studies, for China would need their talents and

education.

But Hu Shi’s admonition had no appeal to his students at the

time, including the most loyal one—Fu Sinian, nor did his warning

have any effect on Japan. Two years after occupying Manchuria,

Japan in 1933, concluded the notorious Tanggu Truce with the war-

lords in northern China, resulting in a pro-Japanese government.

But this still did not change Hu’s intention to seek a peaceful solu-

tion. It was not until 1935 when Japan plotted to establish the

“North China Autonomous Zone” that he and Fu Sinian stood

together and openly protested against it.

Compared to Hu Shi, Fu Sinian long realized that resisting

Japan was the only option for the Chinese people. When Hu praised

the Lytton report on the Manchurian Incident for representing

world public opinion, Fu, disagreeing with Hu, expressed his sus-

picion and urged the Chinese people to seek other alternatives. After

the Tanggu Truce, he questioned the gesture of the Sino-Japanese

reconciliation pursued by both the Japanese and Chinese govern-

ments. For him, there would be no peace between two unequal part-

ners. “There is no country that can survive without cost,” Fu

SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 169

warned, “there is no nation that can earn freedom without sacriﬁce

and struggle.” He advised the government to prepare for the worst,

rather than wait under the illusion of peace.

By exchanging different assessments about the domestic and

international situations, the Independent Critique writers worked

toward a common goal in forming an active public opinion. During

1932 and 1937, the journal was an indispensable forum in China’s

politics, representing a distinct voice from the prominent Chinese

intelligentsia. According to some studies, the majority of the con-

tributions to the journal came from university professors and stu-

dents, especially from Beijing University and Qinghua University.

Their opinions received not only public attention, but also the atten-

tion of the government.

Although the journal published criticisms of the GMD govern-

ment, the government leaders, especially Chiang Kai-shek, seemed

to be interested in these intellectuals, as were the intellectuals in

the government. Jiang Tingfu, for instance, met Chiang a few times,

discussing the need for a centralized government, which resulted in

Jiang’s appointment in the government. Hu Shi also received exten-

sive attention from the GMD leaders, as shown in his receiving of

a few appointments from the GMD, although Hu turned them down.

He believed that he should maintain his position as a liberal and

stay away from governmental posts. On April 8, 1933, Hu wrote to

Wang Jingwei (1883–1947), then the head of the executive Yuan: “I

have thought it over, that I believe I can help the nation more if I

stay outside of the government than inside the government. I want

to keep myself in an independent position, but the reason is not to

pursue fame in vanity, nor to protect myself. I only want to main-

tain a detached status and say some unbiased words should the

nation need them in critical moments. It is not right for a nation

not to have that kind of people; the more there are of them, the more

stable its social foundation. ...I hope you can allow me to stay

outside the government in order for me to become a critic-minister

(zhengchen) to the country and a critic-friend (zhengyou) to the

government.”

Obviously, what Hu intended to become was also what he hoped

for the journal. But to remain as a “critic-friend” was never easy. At

several times the warlords were irritated by the journal’s criticisms

and ordered its conﬁscation. Once the journal had to suspend its

publication for more than four months as ordered by Song Zheyuan

(1885–1940), the warlord in north China.

In addition, there were

problems within. Although Hu Shi declined a few offers from the

government, some of his colleagues, such as Ding Wenjiang, did

not. Following Jiang Tingfu and Ding Wenjiang, Weng Wenhao

170 SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY

(1889–1971), the British-educated geologist, also joined the govern-

ment. After the Sino-Japanese conﬂict turned into a full-scale war,

Hu Shi himself accepted an appointment to become China’s ambas-

sador to the United States, although he vowed to make it a tempo-

rary assignment. Hu’s becoming the ambassador ofﬁcially ended the

publication of the journal. This also ended the attempt by these

intellectuals to form an independent political voice based on their

understandings of history.

History and Politics

Having analyzed the achievement of Hu Shi and his group in

shaping China’s politics, Eugene Lubot remarks that Hu Shi was a

true liberal in an illiberal age.

Indeed, Hu in many discussions was

in a defensive position. Intellectuals, even the ones who were

exposed to liberal ideas, appeared eager to make contributions to

the cause of national salvation, serving the government or support-

ing a “strong leader.” Thus Chinese liberalism incurred a big

setback because of the war. In the following pages we shall analyze

the impact of the war on the careers of Fu Sinian, Yao Congwu, and

Luo Jialun during the 1940s and the 1950s.

If Ding Wenjiang, Jiang Tingfu, and others chose to join the

government, Fu Sinian took on a different project. After the loss of

Manchuria, Fu gathered a group of historians and decided to write

a general history of China. Their goal was to present a Chinese view

of Asian history, refuting the Japanese interpretation. As noticed by

Tao Xisheng, an Independent Critique contributor who also cosigned

with He Bingsong the Declaration, by introducing the term (Toyo no

bunmei) “Eastern civilization”, or simply “Eastern history” (toyoshi),

Japanese historians reinterpreted Asian history and vindicated

Japan’s occupation of Manchuria and other Asian regions.

Sinian’s project thus was an attempt to thwart the Japanese effort

and defy their false claim on Manchuria. As a collective project, it

initially involved a few scholars. As Fu was to write its ﬁrst volume

about ancient Manchuria, Yao Congwu, Jiang Tingfu, Xu Zhongshu

(1898–1991), Fang Zhuangyou (1902–1970), and Xiao Yishan

(1902–1978) were to write subsequent volumes about Manchuria’s

late history, its relations with other regions and the makeup of its

people. In 1932 after Fu completed a short history of ancient

Manchuria, however, none of the others completed theirs.

Fu called his book An Outline History of Northeast China

(Dongbei shigang), avoiding the word Manchuria. After he com-

pleted it, Li Ji, his colleague in the Institute of History and Philol-

SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 171

ogy, translated it into English under the title Manchuria in Chinese

History. The GMD government presented it, with other docu-

ments, to the Lytton Commission to evidence its sovereignty over

Manchuria.

In its belated report, the Lytton Commission indeed

supported China and denounced Japan’s invasion. Of course, the

Lytton report did not stop Japan from invading China, but Fu must

have felt that he did his job by contributing his knowledge to the

country. To answer his own question, Fu did what a scholar can for

his country.

Fu’s argument in the book was quite clear. What remains inter-

esting, however, was his methodological approach. In writing the

book he implemented the methods he advocated in leading the Insti-

tute of History and Philology. Using the method of history and

philology, for instance, he studied the myths in ancient Manchuria

and compared them with those known to other Chinese regions.

Employing the method of anthropology, he examined ethnic

behaviors of the Manchurian inhabitants and compared them with

those of the rest of Chinese. He also based his research on a variety

of sources, ranging from written and material to linguistic and

archaeological. Thus viewed, his book not only provided an exclu-

sive account of Manchurian history, but practiced modern historical

methodology. As a conclusion, Fu stated that according to the evi-

dence, Manchuria was always an important part of ancient China

and was long ruled by a Chinese government. In fact, he stressed,

Manchuria could be considered one of the earliest origins of Chinese

civilization. By comparison, its tie with either Korea or Japan was

tenuous.

A successful political project notwithstanding, Fu’s book was the

result of hastiness, containing mistakes and even ﬂaws that were

detrimental to his scholarly reputation. No sooner had his book

come out than it incurred relentless criticisms from his fellow his-

torians. Interestingly, the criticisms centered on Fu’s use and inter-

pretation of the sources, an area in which he had made himself an

expert. Miao Fenglin, for example, enumerated a number of factual

mistakes Fu committed in the book. At the end, Miao ridiculed that

Fu had broken the record for mistake-making in historical writing.

Besides Fu’s mistakes in treating his sources, Miao and Chen

Hesheng (1901–?), another critic, also found that Fu overlooked and

discarded, intentionally or unintentionally, many available sources,

probably because they would contradict his thesis.

Having made so many avoidable mistakes, Fu’s history of

Manchuria became almost a mockery to his campaign for scientiﬁc

history, to which source criticism was considered crucial. How could

172 SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY

one believe that it was the same Fu Sinian who had claimed “no

historical sources, no history” who had produced such shabby

scholarship? Many expected Fu to give an explanation. Fu did

nothing. He only kept those critical reviews in his possession and

thought about writing a rebuttal, but never did.

This could be

interpreted to mean that he felt it was difﬁcult to defend his work,

hence admitting to the accuracy of the criticisms. But his lack of

action could also indicate a different motive. Given Fu’s keen nation-

alist concern, it is possible that he might not have committed these

errors by simple mistake. “It is unbelievable,” writes Wang Fansen,

“that Fu could had been ignorant of the fact that in past dynasties

China had exercised no complete control over Manchuria.”

Obvi-

ously, Fu should have known better of the history. But he was com-

pelled to say the opposite in order to defy Japan’s claim. He probably

thought that his critics made an even bigger mistake, a political

mistake, by disclosing his mistakes. In Fu’s mind, nationalism out-

weighed scholarship, at least at that time.

It is thus no coincidence that during the mid- and/or late 1930s,

Fu Sinian began writing a national history of China, entitled “A

Revolutionary History of the Chinese Nation” (Zhongguo minzu gem-

ingshi). While an incomplete and thus never published manuscript,

it provides an important source of evidence for us to see the change

of Fu’s idea of and approach to history, in response to the national

crisis. Unlike his previous emphasis on source examination, Fu in

the beginning of the book declared that “although the book can be

considered a monograph, it is in fact written for a practical purpose,

which is didactic, not evidential.”

In other words, he did not intend

to produce a text based on evidential research, or source criticism,

but simply to help his readers learn about the past experience for

better understanding the present situation. This intention is also

shown in his deﬁnitions of both “nation” (minzu) and “national

revolution” (minzu geming), especially the latter. According to Fu

Sinian, the term nation, by quoting Sun Yat-sen, referred to a group

of people who shared the same ethnic origin, lifestyle, language, reli-

gion, and culture. While this deﬁnition is not so particular, Fu’s

understanding of “national revolution” seems very speciﬁc. He

emphasized that “national revolution” referred only to the uprising

mounted by an oppressed majority of a nation against the oppres-

sive minority of another nation. That is, “national revolution” is the

same as national defense, in which one nation ﬁghts to survive the

invasion of another.

This deﬁnition of “national revolution” shaped the structure of

the work. Given his interest in describing the conﬂict between

SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 173

nations in China, Fu began his work in the third century, after the

fall of the Han Dynasty, which was generally considered an end of

the classical period of Chinese culture and the beginning of a new

age when Han Chinese faced challenges from non-Han ethnic

groups in the north and the inﬁltration of foreign cultures and reli-

gion, such as Buddhism. With this focus, Fu left out of his work the

political struggles that occurred within the Han Chinese nation, as

well as the examples of peaceful assimilation and accommodation

of non-Han Chinese groups in Chinese history. The bulk of his

writing was centered on the events that depicted Han Chinese

heroism in defending their land and culture, such as the unsuc-

cessful yet worthwhile attempts made by both the Northern and

Southern Song Dynasties to fend off the invasions of the Jin

(Jurchen) and the Mongol during the twelfth and the thirteenth cen-

turies. While this example is the only one given by Fu in his incom-

plete manuscript, it is sufﬁcient for us to see the scope and focus of

his entire project. In a few places, Fu did mention that he also

planed to discuss similar events in Chinese history through the

founding of the Republic in 1912, which, in his opinion, was a prime

example for the success of national revolution in modern China, for

Sun Yat-sen and his party successfully overthrew the Manchu rule

of the Qing Dynasty.

Although Fu failed to complete his manuscript, he highlighted

the main points, or the “general ideas” (gaiyi), he hoped he could

accomplish with his writing. These were considered main traits of

the Chinese nation:

1. The Chinese nation was peace-loving, cherishing a peaceful

relation with her neighbors. When faced with an invasion,

however, she would ﬁght back with all her strength.

2. Even if the Chinese nation was overrun by foreign nations

from time to time, it would never obliterate the national

awareness, which would reemerge whenever there was an

opportunity.

3. The Chinese nation would never forget her territorial losses

to the enemy.

4. Although there were at times problems and weaknesses, the

Chinese nation would always come back and cure her ills

once a new and effective leadership was established.

These traits, Fu Sinian concluded, as they were realized and ampli-

ﬁed by the modern Chinese, would lead the Chinese nation to a glo-

174 SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY

rious age, rivaling the glory and power of the Tang Dynasty in the

past. By stressing these national traits, Fu demonstrated his didac-

tic approach to historiography, which was, quite obviously, different

from his earlier scientiﬁc and positivist approach. Indeed, during

and after the war, it seems that Fu no longer had the same conﬁ-

dence in holding the positivist stance in regard to the universal

value of science.

His study of history became more and more politi-

cized, as did his career. But due to his untimely death in 1950, we

are unable to ﬁnd more concrete evidence about how the change

affected his understanding of history, as well as his leadership at

the Institute of History and Philology.

There were still other examples that demonstrate Fu’s strong

nationalist commitment. As much as he would like to use his book

to defy Japan’s claim on Manchuria, he was eager to see the Chinese

army recover Manchuria. When his son was born, he named

him Rengui, after Tang general Liu Rengui (601/2–685) who

defeated the Japanese in Korea several centuries previously.

As shown in his A Revolutionary History of the Chinese Nation,

Fu’s deep love for the Chinese nation followed the demarcation

between the Hans and non-Hans. His friend recalled that Fu at

that time would be particularly embarrassed if anyone mentioned

his ancestor, Fu Yiqian, an otherwise very honorable ﬁgure due

to his successes in the civil service examination. Fu despised

him because Fu Yiqian took the examinations under the early

Qing. His ensuing service to the Manchu ruler disgraced the Han

Chinese.

Fu Sinian’s nationalist feeling for his country, especially Han

China, was far from extraordinary for his generation. Yao Congwu’s

conduct during the period, also reﬂected nationalism. First, Yao’s

return from Germany was related to Japan’s occupation of

Manchuria, according to Wang Deyi, Yao’s assistant during the

1950s and the 1960s at Taiwan University;

Yao probably thought

he could do something, for China’s northern borders were a focus of

his study. After his return, in addition to teaching the historical

methods course, Yao taught two other courses: the history of the

Huns and the histories of the Liao, Jin, and Yuan Dynasties.

Both

of them had something to do with Manchuria. The Jin Dynasty, for

example, was established by the Manchu, then known as the

Jurchen, in the twelfth century.

Besides teaching, as mentioned earlier, Yao also participated in

Fu Sinian’s project on writing the history of Manchuria. Although

he failed to complete his writing, his participation indicated that he

was no longer a bookish student who cared little about anything

SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 175

around him, as his behavior in the May Fourth Movement sug-

gested. Indeed, Japan’s invasion had even changed Yao Congwu.

From his return to China in 1934 to 1949 when he followed the GMD

to Taiwan, Yao published only about one article every three and a

half years. His major publications during that period included an

introduction to Franke’s Chinese historical study and an article on

the religious activities among the Jurchens and Mongols.

Some

have explained that Yao’s meager record of scholarly productivity

during the period was a result of his high devotion to teaching.

But a more convincing reason, it seems to me, is that Yao probably

was involved in many nonacademic projects.

The Sino-Japanese conﬂict exerted a formidable impact on the

lives of the academics and students. In response to Japan’s military

offensive, for example, Beijing students organized several demon-

strations, demanding that the GMD government take prompt mili-

tary action. The largest student rally was held on December 9, 1935

in Beijing, in which Beida students again played the vanguard role.

There was a widely circulated saying in society describing student

patriotism at the time: “Despite the largeness of all north China,

there was no place to set down a peaceful study table.”

Political

instability and national crisis fundamentally changed the campus

climate. Few scholars could remain indifferent to the ebullient tide

of nationalism.

When the Japanese army launched a large-scale invasion in

1937, academic life became even more difﬁcult. Refusing to collab-

orate with the Japanese invaders, Beida faculty and students began

a year-long migration and ﬁnally reached Kunming, the southwest

city on the Yunnan Plateau in 1938. In Kunming the university was

incorporated into the National Southwest Associated University

(Xinan Lianda) with other universities from northern China.

Despite all the hardships and changes, Yao proposed to form an ad

hoc committee for collecting and preserving sources about the

ongoing war. It was called “The Committee for Soliciting Historical

Sources of the Sino-Japanese War” (Zhongri zhanzhengshi shiliao

zhengji weiyuanhui), and it involved many of his fellow members on

the university faculty.

In his proposal, Yao thought it worthwhile to collect the mate-

rials as follows:

1. government documents, including statements, reports,

telegrams, meeting minutes, and memoirs of ﬁrsthand wit-

nesses or participants;

176 SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY

2. foreign reports about the war, especially in the major news-

papers such as the American New York Times and the

English Times;

3. published reports and records;

4. war ruins and relics.

The reason for doing so was that, Yao believed, these materials were

historical sources. He made it clear that by collecting them, the

project would help the work of the historian in the future. In order

to do a good job, the committee should provide adequate supervi-

sion and hire only qualiﬁed people to ﬁrst categorize the sources and

then publish them as source books.

For Yao this kind of source collection was important because it

was the foundation of historical writing, both in China and the West.

In the Song Dynasty, he noted, historical writing proliferated and

overshadowed that of other dynasties because the people paid great

attention to the preservation of sources. Sima Guang was able to

complete his magnum opus, Comprehensions Mirror, because he

had access to a great number of sources at the time. However, after

completing the writing, Sima decided to eliminate the traces of

sources from the text in order to improve the readability of the book

(obviously Song historians had not yet learned to use footnotes). The

success of Song historiography, Yao explained, lay not in the work

of Sima Guang but in the work of many lesser known historians

who collected and prepared sources. How much a historian could

accomplish in his study depended on the availability of sources.

Yao also referred to his own experience in Germany to empha-

size the importance of source preservation. Having worked as an

intern in the archives of Berlin and the Rhineland, Yao said, he

learned that it was very easy for valuable sources to be lost. If one

did not do the collecting early, it would make the job much more dif-

ﬁcult when people wanted to collect them later on, for they would

ﬁnd it difﬁcult to place them in the right context.

Due to his his-

torian’s training and insight, Yao realized that the struggle of

modern Chinese against the Japanese at the time was going to be

an extremely important event in Chinese history. Having explained

the importance of the project and prepared its implementation with

his experience, however, Yao wrote to Chen Yinke and Fu Sinian,

modestly asking them to be in charge of the project.

Yao was also drawn to other extracurricular activities in Kun-

ming. Like his friends, he chose to support the GMD government.

SEEKING CHINA’S NATIONAL IDENTITY 177