
were usually useful for a historian? How could ideas and methods
be borrowed from other related disciplines to discover new questions
and topics in history? How should one distinguish primary and
secondary sources and verify the validity of a historical source? The
latter guided a historian to work on a specific topic, helping him
to find a perspective, design his research, and conduct an investi-
gation of historical events. The focus of his course, however, seems
not to be on theories. Yao advised his students to take an empirical
approach. In order to learn how to ride a horse or swim in a river,
he said, one needed to get on the horseback and jump into the river.
In other words, historical methodology was not a subject to discuss,
but a subject to practice.
161
Like Hu Shi, therefore, Yao also regarded
historical study as a scientific experimentation.
Indeed, Yao’s method in history was not theoretical. He was fully
aware of the difference between history and philosophy, which
reminds us of Ranke’s contempt for Hegelian philosophy. For Yao
history was essentially different from both literature and philoso-
phy for historians pursued a different “vocation” (shiming). Unlike
his friends, who pursued a versatile interest in Western learning,
Yao believed that specialization and professionalization were two
important developments in modern scholarship. From the perspec-
tive of the “vocation,” he stated that, on the one hand philosophers
were interested in the aesthetic question of how to understand ulti-
mate beauty and goodness; they were less interested in the actual
existence of beauty or goodness. Literary writers, on the other hand,
created images in their stories with inspiration and imagination;
like the philosophers, they were not concerned about real facts. By
contrast, historians worked primarily with three things: “what
happened in the past,” “well-grounded records,” and “remainders of
the past—antique substances.” Historians, thus viewed, were not
supposed to indulge themselves in speculations.
From this empiricist perspective, Yao questioned Georg Hegel’s
(1770–1831) philosophy of history. Hegel believed that everything
occurred in history was Vernunftig (reasonable)—“was geschien ist,
ist Vernunftig.” Yao disliked this conclusion. For him, not everything
in history was reasonable, such as Japan’s invasion of Manchuria,
nor did it have to happen. As a practicing historian, Yao believed that
the duty of the historian was to investigate an event and provide an
explanation. In doing so, one had first to discard any prior ideas or
beliefs and present truth (zhenxiang) with evidence (zhengju).
162
In refuting Hegel, Yao reiterated Ranke’s position regarding the
difference between history and philosophy.
163
96 SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY