Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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SUPERNATURALISM

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century, any incursions from the supernatural

realm were understood as ruptures of the natural

order. As such, supernaturalis could only gain cur-

rency as that which was naturalis came to be un-

derstood as the order of things in the postlapsar-

ian, rather than the prelapsarian, world. This

distinction arose in mediaeval theology.

For the medieval Christian philosopher

Thomas Aquinas (c. 1225–1274) God is the super-

natural truth contemplated by the fathers, the su-

pernatural cause of all things, a supernatural prin-

ciple whose effects are registered throughout the

created world. These were not entirely separate, or

even antithetical, orders of being as the latter par-

ticipated in the former by being the effects of the

God who maintained and sustained them. The par-

ticipation of creation in the operations of the di-

vine constituted the sacramentum mundi. Never-

theless, for Aquinas, theological knowledge as a

divine science rested upon understanding the ef-

fects of God within creation as revealed in Christ,

the operation and pedagogy of salvation. He dis-

tinguished such knowledge from the knowledge

of created things in themselves, which was a natu-

ral science.

This distinction between knowledge on the

basis of revelation and knowledge on the basis of

observation led increasingly to a division of intel-

lectual labor, and the examination of things created

took on an independence that, ultimately, led to

the establishing of “Nature.” The Reformation em-

phasis upon faith as distinct from human reason-

ing, revelation opposed to fallen creation, called

into question the older construals of the sacra-

mentum mundi. So by the time of the Council of

Trent (and the Catholic counterreformation), “Na-

ture” was becoming an autonomous, rule-gov-

erned realm open for systematic enquiry, manipu-

lation, and improvement. When the older Platonic

and Ptolemaic cosmologies were being super-

seded, then the supercelestial lost its valance. The

“supernatural” arrives as that which transcends the

natural and is superior to the natural insofar as it is

more powerful (for both good and evil) in being

more spiritual.

Secularization and disenchantment

According to M. H. Abrahams, the contemporary

understanding of the supernatural is a cultural

product of early romanticism and the processes of

secularization. With modernity and the authority

given to human reasoning, the increasing explo-

ration and cataloguing of the natural world, and

with the continuing Protestant attacks upon super-

stition, the world became secularized.

Secularization brought about a demythologisa-

tion of human experience, just as the technological

calculation and manipulation of the world brought

about what the sociologist and economist Max

Weber (1864-1920) termed its “disenchantment.”

The process of disenchantment took place through

the systemic rationalization of observable (and

therefore verifiable) phenomena. The early roman-

tics were themselves reacting against the stripping

of the world of its mysteries and mythologies—the

world according to the mathematics and mechan-

ics as Isaac Newton (1642–1727) conceived it and

the industrial revolution constructed it.

In an early essay titled “Language and Human

Nature,” the philosopher Charles Taylor wrote of a

distinction between two views of the world, the

objectivist and the expressivist. In premodern cos-

mologies what was real was expressive of cre-

ation’s divine and spiritual origins. But from René

Descartes (1596–1650) onwards the world was not

viewed in terms of its theological provenance, but

in terms of what the human subject observed. Ob-

jectivism conceived the world as a realm of con-

tingent, neutral facts that could be gathered ency-

clopedically. Materiality lost its translucence and

became opaque. Objects lay passive beneath the

scrutinizing gaze of a subject who calibrated and

catalogued them. This objectivist realm, from the

seventeenth century onwards, became nature and

all its values, laws, and dynamics were immanent

and self-manifesting. The natural was that which

presented itself to the senses and could therefore

be examined by empirical science. It was a state

that lent itself to systematic explanation. Nature

could be made to deliver up whatever secrets it

contained so that people might learn how the use

them to their own advantage.

A new functionalist, instrumentalist, pragmatic,

and utilitarian approach to the world cut creation

free from a dependency upon a creator. In doing

this a series of further divisions followed: subject

and object, the cultural and the natural, the private

and the public, the freedom of enlightenment and

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the dangerous darkness of ignorance. The super-

natural was born of these new binaries. It was con-

ceived as the opposite of the natural, that which

stood outside of the rational and integrated orders

of nature. The supernatural was then irrational, dis-

ordered, a realm of darkness, ignorance, and su-

perstition. Religion—a conceptual category also

coined during this time—was to be purged of

these cruder, mythological elements and refigured,

as the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804)

termed it, within the limits of reason alone. As

such, religion—a private devotion that no longer

trespassed on public truth—was clawed back from

the supernatural. Catholicism, with its liturgical and

doctrinal commitment to the sacramental world

view, was repeatedly condemned by both deists

and Protestants for its supernaturalism and its pro-

motion of superstition.

Re-enchantment

The supernatural as it emerged from the gothic

imagination came to be defined as a realm of

forces and dominions beyond the human. These

forces and dominions are either mythically organ-

ized in some cosmic battle between good and evil

(angels, demons, wizards, and vampires) or make

manifest another dimension following death

(ghosts, hauntings, and intimations of heaven).

Both of these forms of the supernatural have a his-

tory within the Western tradition, but, as Mark Ed-

mundson has noted, what is striking in contempo-

rary Western and Eastern cultures is the resurgence

of that gothic imagination.

There has been a cultural shift with respect not

only to the credibility of the supernatural but also

to its interface with the everyday. Postmodernity,

as the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman observes, has

re-enchanted the world. The everyday is again

being mythologized, such that where once C. S.

Lewis placed his supernatural world of Narnia on

the far side of the wardrobe, the writers Philip Pull-

man and J. K. Rowling have their supernatural

worlds investing the ordinary. Furthermore, the

scientific reasoning that Weber saw as fundamental

to the process of disenchantment plays an impor-

tant role in the re-enchantment of the world. In the

popular imagination the cyborg, the clone, the

alien, and the android have all joined the tradi-

tional array of supernatural figures. Science has ab-

sorbed the supernatural, as more and more cyber-

space games trade in gothic fantasies, and the

exhilaration of surfing the net is being described in

terms once reserved for mystical experiences of

self-transcendence.

See also NATURALISM; NATURE; THOMAS AQUINAS

Bibliography

Abrams, Meyer Howard. Natural Supernaturalism: Tradi-

tion and Revolution in Romantic Literature. New

York: Norton, 1971.

Bauman, Zygmunt. “Introduction.” In Intimations of Post-

modernity. London: Routledge, 1992.

Edmundson, Mark. Nightmare on Main Street: Angels,

Sadomasochism, and the Culture of the Gothic: Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Heim, Michael. The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality. Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1993.

Lubac, Henri de. Surnaturel: Etudes Historiques. Paris:

Aubier, 1946.

Lubac, Henri de. Le Mystère du Surnaturel. Paris: Editions

Montaigne, 1965. Available in English as The Mystery

of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed. New

York: Crossroad, 1998.

Taylor, Charles. “Language and Human Nature.” In

Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers

1. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Ward, Graham. Cities of God. London: Routledge, 2000.

GRAHAM WARD

SUPERSTRINGS

Superstrings are extremely tiny, theoretically pos-

tulated, one-dimensional loops or segments that

are conceived as being the most fundamental

physical entities, superseding point particles in that

role. All other particles and fields, both bosonic

(integer spin, interaction carrying) and fermionic

(half-integer spin, matter constituting), are then

considered to be the result of the vibrations and

interactions of these superstrings. Superstring the-

ories hold the best hope for unifying quantum the-

ory with Albert Einstein’s General Relativity. They

should at the same time effect the total unification

of the four fundamental physical forces: electro-

magnetism, the weak and strong nuclear interac-

tions, and gravity. These fundamental objects are

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called superstrings instead of just strings because

they manifest supersymmetry, which means that

both bosons and fermions are treated within

the same mathematical framework, or sym-

metry group.

See also STRING THEORY

WILLIAM R. STOEGER

SUPERVENIENCE

Ever since Donald Davidson introduced the notion

of supervenience within the philosophy of mind in

1970, it has come to play a key role in philosophi-

cal discussions regarding reducibility and the on-

tological structure of the world in general. With its

help, philosophers of mind, in particular, hoped to

solve the question of whether a nonreductive kind

of materialism could be upheld that would avoid

the pitfalls of traditional dualism on the one hand

and of traditional materialism on the other. The

key attraction of supervenience was that it seemed

to deliver dependence without reduction. Events at

higher levels of reality could thus be seen as totally

determined by lower-level events without higher-

level laws of the so-called special sciences being

reducible to physics.

Definition and types

In a loose sense, the core idea is as follows: B-prop-

erties (e.g., mental properties) supervene on A-

properties (e.g., physical properties) if any two pos-

sible situations identical in their A-properties are

identical in their B-properties. In other words, the B-

facts “come along with” the A-facts, hence superve-

nience. The term is derived from the Latin words

venire (to come) and super (on top of). Thus, if B-

properties supervene on A-properties, then once the

A-facts are fixed, the B-facts are fixed. They are au-

tomatically put in place as soon as the lower-level

properties are put in their place. This is because,

where supervenience reigns, there is no room for

variation of the higher-level properties independ-

ently of the lower-level (e.g., physical) properties. In

this way supervenience yields ontological depend-

ency relations. At the same time supervenience has

also been supposed to bar reducibility, thus freeing

the way for a novel nonreductive brand of material-

ism in the philosophy of mind and, more generally,

allowing special sciences to be autonomous without

abandoning, as in traditional dualism, a unified ma-

terialist picture of the world.

The dependency relations enabled by super-

venience may in fact vary in strength depending

on the specific kind of supervenience relation in-

volved. The above definition of supervenience, in

effect, generates in its turn four different kinds of

supervenience relations. First, the word situation

as used in that definition may refer either to indi-

viduals or to entire worlds. Accordingly, local and

global supervenience must be distinguished. Sec-

ondly, the word possible may refer to either logical

or nomological possibility, giving rise to logical

versus natural supervenience.

For the former distinction between local and

global supervenience, consider an animal and its

molecular “twin” (a molecule-by-molecule replica

of the given animal). Although they must share the

same shape, they do not necessarily share the

same degree of fitness, since they do not necessar-

ily share type-identical environments. Hence,

shape, but not fitness, supervenes locally on phys-

ical properties. However, fitness does supervene

globally on physical properties. When all the phys-

ical facts of this world are duplicated so that mo-

lecular twins will also be located in type-identical

habitats, then physical duplicates must share ex-

actly the same degree of fitness.

Clearly, local supervenience is the stronger of

the two supervenience relations. Properties that

are locally supervenient must also be globally su-

pervenient, but not vice versa. Conversely, many

more properties turn out to be dependent on

lower-level properties when considered under

broad conditions of global supervenience than

when they are considered in local isolation, so to

speak, regardless of context. Thus it can easily be

seen that if we duplicate all the physical facts of

the entire universe down to the minutest details of

the distribution of microphysical properties in

space and time (and we do nothing else), then all

the biological facts of our world will be duplicated

as well. Since the physical “recipe” of our world

fixes all its objects, including the way they move

and function and the way they physically interact,

it, in effect, also fixes the biological facts. Even

God could not have created a world that was phys-

ically identical to ours but biologically distinct.

There simply is no logical space for the biological

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facts to vary independently of the physical facts of

our world when considered in toto. Furthermore,

since this holds for any logically possible physical

duplicate of our world, it follows that biological

properties logically (globally) supervene on physi-

cal properties.

This is a remarkable result. One may well

wonder whether under such broad conditions of

global supervenience there can be any property at

all that could fail to supervene on the (micro-)

physical facts of an entire world. If not, physicalist

materialism would carry the day. This brings us to

the second distinction mentioned above, the dis-

tinction between logical and natural superve-

nience. This is the more interesting distinction be-

cause it leads straight into highly controversial

territory. Generally speaking, B-properties natu-

rally supervene on A-properties if any two natu-

rally possible situations with the same A-properties

also have the same B-properties. In other words, in

the case of natural supervenience, the B-facts are

nomologically, though not logically, implied by the

A-facts. That is to say, in possible worlds that are

governed by the same natural laws as the actual

world, the A-facts naturally necessitate the B-facts

(assuming natural supervenience). Clearly, natural

possibility is much stricter than logical possibility.

For example, a (stable) cubic kilometer of ura-

nium-235 is logically, but not naturally, possible.

The critical question then is: Are there any (higher-

level) properties that accompany the physical facts

in all naturally possible worlds without being fixed

by the physical facts in all logically possible

worlds? And the controversial answer given by

some philosophers is: Consciousness is such a

property. On the one hand, they argue, conscious-

ness at least naturally supervenes on the physical

facts because any two physically identical creatures

in the natural world will presumably have qualita-

tively identical phenomenal experiences. Never-

theless, these philosophers go on to argue, con-

sciousness fails to supervene logically on the

physical facts of our world. Here they appeal to

two famous thought experiments. It seems entirely

conceivable that a creature physically identical to a

conscious creature might lack consciousness alto-

gether (like a zombie), or might have experiences

qualitatively very different from ours (they might

have so-called inverted qualia, so that, for exam-

ple, they might have our sensation of phenomenal

red when looking at the sky). Therefore, if these

two intuitions hold, materialism is false. A full ac-

count of the physical facts of our world, including

a specification of the minutest details of the distri-

bution of its microphysical properties over space

and time, would yet leave entirely undetermined

the quality, even the existence, of the phenomenal

properties of our world.

Principle of multiple realizability

As discussed above, supervenience may yield on-

tological dependency relations of varying degrees.

But how do things stand with respect to the other

philosophical benefit reputedly reaped from this

recently developed notion of supervenience, that

of barring reducibility? This becomes apparent

when one focuses on the converse relation implied

in the definition of supervenience. Assuming su-

pervenience, while two situations cannot differ in

their B-properties without a corresponding differ-

ence in their A-properties, the converse does not

hold. That is to say, type-identical B-situations may

be realized by an indefinite variety of type-

different A-situations. In other words, the notion of

supervenience brings in its wake an important

corollary notion, that of multiple realizability. And

again, this feature holds special interest for the phi-

losophy of mind because multiple realizability is

just what we expect in the mental realm. Pain in

humans may be realized by C-fibers firing, while in

dolphins it may be realized by D-fibers firing with-

out ceasing to be just another simple instance of

pain. Indeed, the situation may be vastly more di-

verse and confusing at the physical level than this

example suggests: Your headache may be physi-

cally realized differently from mine, as, for that

matter, may my headache today versus my

headache tomorrow. Similarly, the property of

being a monetary transaction, which is a unitary

concept at the level of economics, may be physi-

cally realized by a wide variety of physical events

lacking any perspicuity or explanatory integrity at

the level of physics. Accordingly, the predicates of

a given special science will only map onto predi-

cates of physics that are at best wildly disjunctive.

Thus, inasmuch as supervenience entails multiple

realizability, higher-level supervening properties

turn out to be irreducible. In psychology, in par-

ticular, it has been argued, there cannot be any

type-type identities between mental properties and

the physical properties realizing them. Nor, conse-

quently, is there any room for strict psychophysical

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laws so as to reduce psychology to neurophysiol-

ogy and ultimately to physics. In general, superve-

nient properties, in spite of being ontologically de-

pendent upon their subvenient base properties,

retain their ontological and explanatory autonomy.

Principle of multiple supervenience

The above argument for irreducibility appealed to

supervenience in connection with the corollary no-

tion of multiple realizability. More recently, how-

ever, supervenience has also been invoked in an

antireductionist line of argument deemed to be

more effective, in which the crucial corollary no-

tion was not multiple realizability but rather multi-

ple supervenience. An analogy with dispositional

properties may clarify the point. Usually one and

the same categorical base may “realize” more than

one disposition. Even so, only one of those will be

causally relevant for a given event. Thus, Sally’s

death is related to the electrical conductivity of her

aluminum ladder. But the categorical base thereof

(the cloud of free electrons permeating the metal)

also “realizes” such diverse dispositions as the ther-

mal conductivity or the opacity of the metal.

Clearly, the correct explanation for the tragic acci-

dent would be the one that cited the relevant dis-

position, not just the categorical base property.

Thus explanations couched in terms of superve-

nient properties (dispositional or otherwise) can-

not be reduced to explanations citing no more

than the corresponding base properties. But the

important point in this context is that the irre-

ducibility in question clearly does not consist in the

fact that these higher-level properties may be mul-

tiply realizable, but precisely in the opposite fact

that a given categorical base property does not

identify which of the higher-level properties real-

ized is explanatorily relevant in a given case. In

other words, it is not multiple realizability but

rather multiple supervenience of macroproperties

onto one and the same subvenient categorical base

that necessitates citing that supervenient property,

which is responsible for the given effect. Similarly,

if the aluminum ladder had been exposed to the

heat of the sun for a while, it would have been the

thermal conductivity, not the electrical conductiv-

ity, that would have been causally responsible for

Sally’s burning her feet, as the case might have

been, even though either disposition is realized in

the very same categorical base. Thus the special

character of higher levels of organization in nature

can be vindicated in principle, and perhaps even

more effectively, by invoking multiple superve-

nience in addition to the more conventional appeal

to multiple realizability. Such hierarchical levels

necessitate the need for macroexplanations with

the causal depth and the theoretical appropriate-

ness corresponding to the grain of the explanatory

level in question.

In sum, supervenience affords the insight that

macrocausation is a real force in nature at multiple

levels of existence. Consequently, downward cau-

sation may be assigned a stable place in our picture

of how the world is organized without upsetting

our conception of the various domains of physics

as constituting a closed and complete system of

physical events at the physical level of description.

See also CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES; DOWNWARD

CAUSATION; MIND-BODY THEORIES; MIND-BRAIN

INTERACTION; NEUROSCIENCES

Bibliography

Chalmers, David. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a

Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University

Press, 1996.

Davidson, Donald. “Mental Events.” In Experience and

Theory, eds. L. Foster and J. W. Swanson. Amherst,

Mass.: 1970.

Fodor, Jerry A. “Special Sciences.” Synthese 28 (1974):

77–115.

Kim, Jaegwon. “Supervenience.” In A Companion to the

Philosophy of Mind, ed. Samuel Guttenplan. Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994.

Meyering, Theo C. “Mind Matters: Physicalism and the Au-

tonomy of the Person.” In Neuroscience and the Per-

son: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, eds.

Robert Russell; Nancy Murphy; Theo C. Meyering;

and Michael Arbib. Berkeley: Vatican Observatory and

Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1999.

Savellos, Elias E., and Yalcin, Ümit D., eds. Superve-

nience: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 1995.

THEO C. MEYERING

SYMBIOSIS

The term symbiosis, from the Greek words syn (to-

gether with) and bios (life), refers to different kinds

of organisms living together in ongoing physical

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association. Although symbiosis is a fundamental

biological relationship, it was a disputed concept

until the late 1800s, and the term was only first

used in 1878. Its role in ecology and evolutionary

theory is still developing.

Biologists recognize several variations of sym-

biotic association. Obligate symbiosis, such as the

tropical reef relationship between Zooxanthellae

algae and the coral they inhabit, is necessary for

the survival of one or more partners. Facultative

symbionts are optional; in tidepools, some sea

anemones have green flecks of algae growing in-

side them, while neighboring anemones do not.

Endosymbiosis occurs when one species lives in-

side another, as cellulose-digesting bacteria inhabit

the gut of herbivores. Ectosymbiosis, which does

not involve internalization, occurs when, for ex-

ample, birds or fish clean larger species. Finally,

there is a range of interactive impacts. In mutual-

ism, both species benefit; all the above and what

is perhaps the first-described case, the algae-fun-

gus association that forms lichens, are examples of

mutualism. Commensalism involves advantage to

one species and neutral impact on another. Para-

sitic symbiosis benefits one species at a cost to an-

other. Some biologists use the term symbiosis only

for mutualistic associations, although scholarly lit-

erature and popular textbooks are ambiguous on

this point.

Symbiosis was catapulted to prominence in

evolutionary theory by the notion that mitochon-

dria and chloroplasts (internal organelles within

cells) originated through the endosymbiotic inter-

nalization of simpler prokaryotic cells. This theory

has been championed by Lynn Margulis, who de-

veloped the serial endosymbiosis theory, which at-

tempts to account for the successive development

of all eukaryotic cells (cells with nuclei), through a

sequence of unions between various prokaryotic

bacteria (non-nucleated cells). While some details

of serial endosymbiosis theory are still debated, the

endosymbiotic origin of eukaryotes is found in vir-

tually all textbooks.

Symbiosis theory has been extended in several

profound but controversial ways. The notion of

symbiogenesis suggests that symbiosis contributes

significantly to the origin of novel traits and new

species. Traditional Darwinian theory argues that

speciation occurs by natural selection operating

on random genetic mutations. Symbiogenesis

posits that the symbiotic union of diverse genetic

information is a source of creative novelty on

which selection acts. Some symbioses, such as

lichens, result in an altogether different kind of or-

ganism. Moreover, instead of the win-lose scenar-

ios of competitive individual selection, symbiogen-

esis may more readily create win-win cooperative

scenarios that entail new capabilities and re-

sources. Symbiosis as a major evolutionary mecha-

nism has significant though still debated implica-

tions, especially for notions of cooperation and

complexity in evolutionary history.

Another provocative extension of symbiosis

theory entails the scale at which symbiotic associ-

ations are conceived to exist. Traditional examples

of symbiosis involve individual organisms in phys-

ical association with other individuals: for example,

a plant and the nitrogen-fixing fungi in its roots.

However, one could think of symbioses as involv-

ing groups of organisms, such as oxygen-breathing

animals and oxygen-generating plants in a pond

community. In principle, this could be extended to

communities interacting in an ecosystem, or global

ecosystems interacting with each other on a plan-

etary scale. James Lovelock’s notion of Gaia holds

that the entire living world, or biosphere, interacts

to regulate water, atmospheric gasses, pH, and

temperature. Margulis and others suggest that this

reflects the symbiotic integration of life into a

global superorganism.

See also COMPETITION; EVOLUTION, BIOLOGICAL

Bibliography

Margulis, Lynn. Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution.

New York: Basic Books, 1998.

Paracer, Surindar, and Ahmadjian, Vernon. Symbiosis: An

Introduction to Biological Associations. New York:

Oxford University Press, 2000.

Sapp, Jan. Evolution by Association: A History of Symbio-

sis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Seckbach, Joseph, ed. Symbiosis: Mechanisms and Model

Systems. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 2002.

JEFFREY P. SCHLOSS

SYMMETRY

In the most general sense, symmetry can be de-

fined as a property that an entity has whereby it

preserves some of its aspects under certain actual

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or possible transformations. A sphere is symmetri-

cal because a rotation about its axis preserves its

shape. A crystal structure is symmetrical with re-

spect to certain translations in space. The existence

of symmetries in natural phenomena and in human

artifacts is pervasive. However, nature also displays

important violations of symmetry: Some organic

molecules come only or predominantly in left-

handed varieties; the bilateral symmetry of most

organisms is at best only approximate.

The general concept of symmetry applies not

only to objects and their collections, but also to

properties of objects, to processes they may un-

dergo, as well as to more abstract entities such as

mathematical structures, scientific laws, and sym-

bolic and conceptual systems, including mythology

and religion. Symmetry symbols pervade ancient

cosmologies. Thus the concept of axis mundi (the

world axis) is a famous mytho-poetic archetype ex-

pressing the idea of centrality in the arrangement of

the Cosmos. Whether axis mundi is represented as

a sacred mountain, tree, or ladder, it invariably sig-

nifies a possibility for humans to connect with

heaven. The central image of Christianity, the cross,

belongs in the same broad category, as far as its

symbolic connotations are concerned. The concept

of triadicity so essential to many religions is closely

linked to symmetry considerations.

The abstract notion of symmetry also lies at the

very foundation of natural science. The fundamen-

tal significance of symmetries for physics came to

the fore early in the twentieth century. Prior devel-

opments in mathematics contributed to this. Thus,

in his Erlangen Program (1872), the German math-

ematician Felix Klein (1849–1925) proposed inter-

preting geometry as the study of spatial properties

that are invariant under certain groups of transfor-

mations (translations, rigid rotations, reflections,

scaling, etc.). Emmy Noether (1882–1935) applied

Klein’s approach to theoretical physics to establish

in 1915 a famous theorem relating physical conser-

vation laws (of energy, momentum, and angular

momentum) to symmetries of space and time (ho-

mogeneity and isotropy). By that time, Albert Ein-

stein’s (1879–1955) Theory of Relativity had engen-

dered the notion of relativistic invariance, the kind

of symmetry all genuine physical laws were ex-

pected to possess with respect to a group of coor-

dinate transformations known as the Lorentz-

Poincaré group. With this came the realization

that symmetry (invariance) is a clue to reality: Only

those physical properties that “survive” unchanged

under appropriate transformations are real; those

that do not are merely perspectival manifestations

of the underlying reality.

With the development of particle physics the

concept of symmetry was extended to internal de-

grees of freedom (quantum numbers), such as C

(charge conjugation, the replacement of a particle

by its antiparticle) and isospin (initially the quan-

tum number distinguishing the proton from the

neutron). Along with P (parity, roughly a mirror re-

flection of particle processes) and T (time-reversal

operation), these were long believed to be exact

symmetries, until the discovery in 1956 of C- and

P-symmetry violations in certain weak interactions,

and the discovery in 1964 of the violation of the

combined CP-symmetry. However, theoretical con-

siderations preclude violation of the more complex

CPT-symmetry.

The emergence of quantum electrodynamics

(QED), the first successful quantum relativistic

theory describing the interaction of electrically

charged spin-1/2 particles with the electromagnetic

field, made the notion of gauge symmetry central

to particle physics. The exact form of interaction

turns out to be a consequence of imposing a

local gauge invariance on a free-particle

Lagrangian with respect to a particular group (U(1)

in the case of QED) of transformations of its quan-

tum state. Extending this principle to other interac-

tions led to the unification of electromagnetic and

weak forces in the Weinberg-Salam-Glashow

theory on the basis of the symmetry group

SU(2) × U(1) and to quantum chromodynamics (a

theory of strong quark interactions based on the

group SU(3)), and eventually paved the way for

the ongoing search for a theory unifying all physi-

cal forces.

See also LAWS O F NATURE

Bibliography

Mainzer, Klaus. Symmetries of Nature: A Handbook for

Philosophy of Nature and Science. Berlin and New

York: Walter de Gruyter, 1996.

Rosen, Joe. Symmetry in Science. An Introduction to

the General Theory. New York: Springer-Verlag,

1995.

YURI V. BALASHOV

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SYSTEMS THEORY

Systems science emerged as a response to the

need for finding ways of understanding and deal-

ing with complexity. The expanding orientation of

systems thinking enables a quest for connections

and meaning that can expand the boundaries of

what traditionally has been considered science.

Systems thinking has been compared to Buddhism,

and evolutionary systems thinking can be appreci-

ated as the integration of the sciences with the

works of mystical and transpersonal thinkers such

as Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) in the East and Carl

G. Jung (1875–1961) and Pierre Teilhard de

Chardin (1881–1955) in the West. This convergence

of science, philosophy, and religion is manifested

in the systemic inquiry on conscious evolution and

its underlying ethic.

This entry reviews the core ideas within sys-

tems science, and in particular the development of

General Systems Theory (GST) as a cornerstone of

the systems movement. General Evolution Theory

(GET) is introduced as the natural unfolding of GST

in the study of complex dynamic systems. The

emergent view of evolution has implications for the

understanding and guidance of human systems and

can become the basis for the integration of critical

insights for science, philosophy, and religion to sur-

face a new global ethic. Having become conscious

of the evolutionary processes of which human be-

ings are a part, and with a sense of awe and re-

sponsibility, the challenge is to learn to “dance to

the rhythms of evolution” for the purposeful cre-

ation of a sustainable and evolutionary future.

The emergence of systems science

In the 1920s,a handful of scientists from different

fields became aware of the potential to develop a

general theory of organized complexity. The biol-

ogist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901–1972) formu-

lated the fullest expression of the emerging sys-

tems field in his General System Theory (GST).

According to Fritjof Capra, Bertalanffy’s work “es-

tablished systems thinking as a major scientific

movement (p. 46)” that responded to the limita-

tions of modern analytical science and enabled a

broader conception of science.

Analytical (as opposed to holistic) reduction-

ism prevailed as the most central principle of sci-

entific inquiry during the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries. Reductionism involves analysis of the iso-

lated elements of the phenomena under study and

seeks objectivity, repeatability of results, and refu-

tation of hypotheses in order “to provide explana-

tions for the new unknown, in terms of the known”

(Checkland, p. 64). However, “the emergence of

new phenomena at higher levels of complexity is it-

self a major problem for the method of science,

and one which reductionist thinking has not been

able to solve” (p. 65).

Systems science emerged from interdiscipli-

nary studies and is characterized by a diversity of

perspectives, foci, and approaches. Systems sci-

ence is not a discipline, per se, but a meta-

discipline or field whose subject matter—organ-

ized complexity—can be applied within virtually

any particular discipline. Systems science has be-

come the broader scientific area that embodies all

the thinking and practices derived from, and re-

lated to, advances in systems theory, methodology,

and philosophy. The main professional association

dedicated to the study and the advancement of this

area is the International Society for the Systems

Sciences (ISSS). When established in 1954 by von

Bertalanffy, Ralph Gerard, Anatol Rapoport, James

G. Miller, and Kenneth Boulding, it was originally

called the Society for the Advancement of General

Systems Theory.

General system theory

A system is a set of interconnected components

that form a whole and show properties that are

properties of the whole rather than of the individ-

ual components. This definition is valid for a cell,

an organism, a society, or a galaxy. Therefore, as

Joanna Macy expressed it, a system is less a thing

than a pattern. Systems thinking uses the concept

of system to apprehend the world. It “is a frame-

work of thought that helps us to deal with com-

plex things in a holistic way” (Flood and Carson,

p. 4). When formalized in explicit, conventional

and definite form, it can be termed systems theory.

Systems theory provides a knowledge base

that goes beyond disciplinary boundaries; it seeks

isomorphism between and among concepts, prin-

ciples, laws, and models in various realms of ex-

perience; it provides a framework for the transfer

and integration of insights relevant to particular

domains of research; and it promotes the unity of

science through improving communication among

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disciplines. Bertalanffy’s General System Theory

(GST) is “a theory, not of systems of a more or less

special kind, but of universal principles applying to

systems in general” (Bertalanffy, p. 32). GST “aims

to provide a framework or structure of systems on

which to hang the flesh and blood of particular

disciplines and particular subject matters in an or-

derly and coherent corpus of knowledge” (Bould-

ing, p. 248).

General systems theorists acknowledge that

specialized knowledge is as important as a general

and integrative framework. Specific systems theo-

ries have emerged and include cybernetics, au-

topoietic systems theory, dynamical systems the-

ory, chaos theory, organizational systems theory,

and living systems theory, among others. Consid-

ered together, these specific systems theories com-

prise the systems sciences, many of which have

become known as the so called new sciences or

sciences of complexity.

General evolution theory

Following the systems tradition, General Evolution

Theory (GET) looks for isomorphisms in the pat-

terns of irreversible change over time at different

systems levels. GET postulates that the evolution-

ary trend in the universe constitutes a “cosmic

process” specified by a fundamental universal flow

toward ever increasing complexity.

Evolution manifests itself through particular

events and sequences of events that are not limited

to the domain of biological phenomena but extend

to include all aspects of change in open dynamic

systems with a throughput of information and en-

ergy. In other words, evolution relates to the for-

mation of stars from atoms, of Homo sapiens from

the anthropoid apes, as much as to the formation of

complex societies from rudimentary social systems.

The process involves periods of dynamic stability

(homeostasis), and when this stability can no

longer be maintained, the system enters a period of

turbulence—or bifurcation—when it self-organizes

into a higher level of organization, structural com-

plexity, dynamism and autonomy—or else, it de-

volves. In this way, complex open systems become

more dynamic, more in control of themselves and

of their environment, moving further and further

away from the inert state of equilibrium.

The understanding of dynamic complexity,

emergence, and self-organization manifested in

general evolutionary processes has important im-

plications for human activity systems. Ilya Pri-

gogine and Isabelle Stengers reflect on the social

threats and possibilities implied by an understand-

ing of nonlinearity by recognizing that in “our uni-

verse the security of stable, permanent rules are

gone forever. We are living in a dangerous and un-

certain world that inspires no blind confidence.

Our hope arises from the knowledge that even

small fluctuations may grow and change the over-

all structure. As a result, individual activity is not

doomed to insignificance” (Prigogine and

Stengers, p. 313).

Human science and conscious evolution

Human science makes reference to an inclusive

approach to the study of human phenomena that

uses multiple systems of inquiry, including de-

scriptive studies and prospective interventions. Ac-

cording to Marcia Salner, discussion about human

science “was once conducted on the grounds of

philosophy, professional researchers who must

face up to practical problems of social survival are

pragmatically moving toward what will work to

provide answers where no reliable guides exist.

. . . How we understand our world, how we learn

about it, how we teach the young about their place

in it, have consequences for our survival in it”

(p. 8). Only a science that is both humanistic and

systemic can deal effectively with complex human

challenges and create evolutionary opportunities

for human development in partnership with Earth.

Human science involves both systems (within

the systems field) and systemic (outside the sys-

tems field) approaches. On the one hand, it in-

volves the application of systems theories and

methodologies in order to understand, ameliorate,

and transform social systems. On the other hand,

human science also incorporates systemic and ho-

listic approaches, beyond the systems field, that

challenge traditional assumptions about knowl-

edge and science. For instance, critical theory

seeks to combine philosophy and science, idealism

and realism, and concepts and experiences to con-

front social injustice. Feminism seeks the emanci-

pation of women for the betterment of humanity as

a whole through the promotion of issues such as

sexual equality, development, and peace. Scholars

interested in qualitative research are articulating a

comprehensive epistemology for a participatory

paradigm that involves different ways of knowing.

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What is common to all these alternative ap-

proaches is their holistic character and their com-

mitment to bridge theory and practice for under-

standing and transforming social realities.

Following the trend in systems science of look-

ing for theoretical and methodological comple-

mentarity, there are approaches that seek to inte-

grate the knowledge base of systems thinking,

general evolutionary processes, and human sci-

ence. Evolution, both as a scientific theory and as

a universal myth, is a powerful story for the trans-

formation of consciousness and society. The impli-

cations of this knowledge base provide rich op-

portunities for manifold inferences for social action

and research. First, humans do not need to be the

victims of change— change can happen through

humans, not to humans. Second, the future is not

probabilistic, but rather, possibilistic: Humans can

influence the direction of change through their in-

tentions and actions. Third, for the first time in

human history, human beings can experience joy

“while working for the most ambitious goal avail-

able to the human imagination: To blend our indi-

vidual voice in the cosmic harmony, to join our

unique consciousness with the emerging con-

sciousness of the universe, to fold our momentary

center of psychic energy into the current that tends

toward increasing complexity and order” (Csik-

szentmihalyi, p. 293). Indeed, science and spiritu-

ality are coming together in the ultimate explo-

ration of the meaning and purpose of human

existence: Conscious evolution—the evolutionary

phase in which a developing being becomes con-

scious of itself, aware of the processes of which it

is a participant, and begins voluntarily to co-create

with evolution.

A new global ethic

“If our society is not working well,” Lester Milbrath

reflects, “we get the message that we need to re-

think our value structure” (Milbrath, p. 67). Scien-

tists and religious leaders agree: A new global ethic

is required if human misery and irreversible dam-

age to the planet is to be avoided.

Regardless of postmodernist or relativist posi-

tions, Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi reflects on how

similar are the world’s major moral systems. He

believes that “we have to find an appropriate

moral code to guide our choices. It should be a

code that takes into account the wisdom of tradi-

tion, yet is inspired by the future rather than the

past; it should specify right as being the unfolding

of the maximum individual potential joined with

the achievement of the greatest social and envi-

ronmental harmony” (Csikszentmihalyi, p. 162).

From a systemic and evolutionary perspective, a

multilevel ethic would promote:

(1) Human actions that benefit (or at least not

harm) the individual—it must promote per-

sonal freedom;

(2) Human actions that benefit (or at least not

harm) society—it must promote social justice;

(3) Human actions that benefit (or at least not

harm) the planet—it must promote ecologi-

cal harmony.

To focus exclusively on one level corresponds

to what Carolyn Merchant has called egocentric,

homocentric, or ecocentric ethics, respectively.

The challenge is to strive for the ideal of a multi-

level ethical approach that promotes what is good

for the whole of individual humans, societies,

ecosystems, and future generations at the same

time, in order to promote sustainability in an evo-

lutionary sense. In other words, as Evrin Laszlo

proposes, to live simply and meaningfully allowing

other people and other species to live with dignity

as well, so that a favorable dynamic equilibrium in

the evolution of the biosphere can be reached and

sustained.

An important aspect of this new emerging ethic

is its process orientation. Rather than considering

morality as a set of static norms and rules, it should

be embraced as an ongoing inquiring process, a

conversation as suggested by West C. Churchman,

in which human values are neither relative nor ab-

solute. In the past, philosophy and moral inquiry

have been restricted to a privileged minority of

mainly white men. An ethical society requires that

every member of society become a lifelong learner

engaged in the ongoing ethical conversation that

purposefully informs the actions and decisions that

shape the present and the future.

Science is evolving. The convergence between

systems views and mystical views allow a more

comprehensive and meaningful articulation of the

human-as-part-and-process-of-cosmos story. This

“New Story,” as theologian Thomas Berry calls it,

can guide people in the adventure of ethically

evolving human systems.

See also COMPLEXITY; EVOLUTION; VALUE, VALUE

THEORY

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