Van Huyssteen J.W. (editor) Encyclopedia of Science and Religion

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involved. This is especially true of evolution. In

discussing the idea of selection, it is convenient to

make a three-fold distinction between the fact of

evolution, the path of evolution, and the theory or

mechanism of evolution.

The fact of evolution

The fact of evolution is simply the idea that all or-

ganisms, living and dead, came into being by a

long developmental process, governed by natural

laws, from organisms of a different, probably much

simpler, kind. The fact of evolution includes the

belief that the original organisms themselves de-

veloped by natural processes from inorganic mate-

rials. If one wanted to extend from the biological

to the cosmological, one would see the fact of evo-

lution as including all developmental change from

the time of the Big Bang.

Claims for the fact of evolution were first

mooted in the seventeenth century with the exten-

sion of Newtonian ideas from the mere running of

the universe to its supposed development through

natural laws. It was later argued—by, among oth-

ers, Immanuel Kant—that this happened in a reg-

ular fashion as suns and planets were formed from

gaseous nebulae. Biological evolutionary ideas

began to appear towards the end of the eighteenth

century. A prominent exponent in England was the

physician and naturalist Erasmus Darwin, grandfa-

ther of Charles Darwin; in France a little later the

chief advocate of the idea was the biologist Jean

Baptiste de Lamarck.

The evidence offered for evolution (then more

generally called transmutation) tended to be an-

ecdotal. A major reason why few endorsed the

idea with enthusiasm was that it was seen to be a

reflection of the ideology of progress—upward

change in the human social world, and upward

change in the history of life, from “monad” to

“man.” Critics, like the father of comparative

anatomy, the French biologist Georges Cuvier,

found the idea religiously offensive less because it

clashed with literal interpretations of the Bible than

because of its underlying philosophy of progress.

Such a world picture, in which humans can make

the difference unaided, was at odds with the Chris-

tian notion of providence, where all depends on

God’s grace. Although by the mid nineteenth cen-

tury religious worries were still much in evidence,

Charles Darwin met this challenge head on in the

Origin of Species (1859), the groundbreaking work

in which he introduced his theory. Darwin was not

the first to argue for the fact of evolution, but by

marshaling so much evidence from paleontology,

embryology, geographical distributions, and more,

he made the fact of evolution empirically plausible

and no longer reliant on an underlying social phi-

losophy for acceptance.

The path of evolution

The path of evolution, or phylogeny, is simply the

history of the past as given in the fossil record and

as can be discerned indirectly from anatomical and

embryological causes and, increasingly, molecular

evidence. Thanks to various sophisticated meth-

ods of dating, researchers can say that the uni-

verse itself is (since the Big Bang) about fifteen bil-

lion years old, that the Earth is about 4.5 billion

years old, and that life first appeared on the planet

about 3.75 billion years ago. Complex life began

with the Cambrian explosion about six hundred

million years ago; the Age of Mammals began

about sixty-five million years ago (although the

first mammals go back two hundred million years);

the first known ancestors of humans are about

four million years old (upright but with ape-sized

brains); and, depending on how one measures

things, the modern human species Homo sapiens

is between five hundred thousand and a million

years old.

Traditionally, life is pictured as a tree with con-

temporary organisms at the ends of the upper

branches. However, Lamarck and some other early

evolutionists thought that life developed upwards

in separate but parallel lines, with variations laid

over these. Alternatively, some researcher believe

that viruses may carry genes from one line to

other, very different, lines, so perhaps a better pic-

ture is that of a net. Paradoxically, the main out-

lines of the history of life were worked out in the

first part of the nineteenth century, primarily by

those who did not subscribe to evolution, and only

later was the process of life given an evolutionary

interpretation.

The theory or mechanism of evolution

The theory or mechanism of evolution has gar-

nered many hypotheses. Notorious before Darwin

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was Lamarck’s idea of the inheritance of acquired

characteristics, which had not originated with him;

Erasmus Darwin had accepted it, as did Charles

Darwin much later. In the Origin of Species, Dar-

win described the mechanism that is generally ac-

cepted as the chief force for change: natural selec-

tion. More organisms are born than can survive

and reproduce, leading to a struggle for survival

and, more importantly, reproduction. Given natu-

rally occurring variation, and the fact that those

that survive will tend on average to be different

from those that do not, there will be a differential

reproduction, natural selection. In time this leads

to full-blown evolution, and evolution of a partic-

ular kind, for selection produces organisms with

adaptations. The eye and the hand come naturally

as a result of Darwin’s causal process.

Conclusion

In the years subsequent to the publication of Dar-

win’s Origin, there have been a multitude of puta-

tive alternatives to Darwinian selection, including

orthogenesis (a life force driving things), muta-

tionism (major one-step changes), genetic drift

(randomness), and molecular drive (DNA has its

own built-in ways of change); none has estab-

lished itself as a full and genuine rival to natural se-

lection. This is not to say that all controversy is

therefore quelled. Apart from the question of

whether selection can be applied profitably to such

issues as the origin of life, there are also questions

about the form that life’s history will take given se-

lection as the main mechanism of change. Will it

be smooth and gradual (phyletic gradualism), as

supposed by Darwin and his followers, or will it be

jerky and abrupt (punctuated equilibria), as sup-

posed by some leading paleontologists, notably

Stephen Jay Gould? Controversy about these is-

sues, however, should not be taken as controversy

about other matters. The fact of evolution is firmly

established, the main outlines of the path of evo-

lution have been worked out and details are being

filled in (for example, that birds are descended

from dinosaurs), and selection is taken to be the

major mechanism of change even though there are

debates about its applicability and its precise re-

sults and consequences.

Evolution as fact, path, and theory is a thriving

part of the biological sciences, and it is also seen to

have extensions and implications for thinking

about many other parts of human experience. So-

cial scientists are increasingly turning to evolution-

ary ideas to flesh out their understanding of human

nature and society; philosophers have (after many

hesitations) begun to see how evolution, selection

even, can profitably deepen their understandings

of epistemology (theory of knowledge) and ethics

(theory of morality); novelists and poets use evo-

lutionary themes to illuminate aspects of human

understanding and motivation; linguists turn to

Darwinism for help in grasping the developments

of languages; and so it is in many other subjects

and disciplines. Although there is still much oppo-

sition to evolutionary ideas on various religious

fronts, there is realization by theologians and his-

torians that the old story of the warfare between

science and religion was much overblown, and

many see evolution as an aid to faith and under-

standing rather than a hindrance.

See also AUTOMATA, CELLULAR; COMPLEXITY

Bibliography

Dawkins, Richard. The Blind Watchmaker: Why the Evi-

dence of Evolution Reveals a Universe without Design.

New York: Norton, 1986.

Dembski, William. No Free Lunch: Why Specified Com-

plexity Cannot Be Purchased Without Intelligence.

Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

Fogel, Lawrence. Intelligence Through Simulated Evolu-

tion: Forty Years of Evolutionary Programming. Som-

erset, N.J.: Wiley, 1999.

Holland, John. Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Sys-

tems: An Introductory Analysis with Applications to

Biology, Control, and Artificial Intelligence (1975).

Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992.

GREGORY R. PETERSON

EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTING

See EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHMS

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EVOLUTIONARY

EPISTEMOLOGY

Evolutionary epistemology widens the scope of

traditional epistemology by inclusion of considera-

tions of the evolutionary origins of human cogni-

tive capacity. The roots of evolutionary epistemol-

ogy extend back to Charles Darwin’s idea of

natural selection, set forth in 1859, and to subse-

quent vivid discussions of the evolutionary origin

of human rational capacity put forth by Darwin’s

followers. Contemporary evolutionary epistemol-

ogy is based on the work of three seminal thinkers:

Karl Popper, Konrad Lorenz, and Jean Piaget. Evo-

lutionary epistemology is an interdisciplinary and

constructive theory that aims to unite philosophical

views on human knowledge with theories of both

human origin and life in general.

Program

Evolutionary epistemology suggests that human

cognitive capacity is the result of evolutionary de-

velopment and can be understood only with the

help of evolutionary theories that describe the de-

velopment of this capacity. In fact, evolution itself

is understood as a cognition-gaining process: Thus,

Gerhard Vollmer suggests that “knowledge is an

adequate reconstruction of the outside structures in

the subject, and cognition is the process leading to

knowledge” (p. 70). Consequently, knowledge can

be seen as a tiered phenomenon: On each level,

only those responses “fitting” their environment

are retained for the future. On the genetic level of

knowledge, basic information about the environ-

ment is captured in the physical construction of the

body by natural selection of those characteristics

fitting the environment. A second level is precon-

scious cognition, which includes reflex-based re-

sponses to sudden environmental changes. The

third level is that of rational knowledge, in which

a person’s reaction to the environment is guided

by rational judgment.

Lorenz used these principles of evolutionary

epistemology to critique the Kantian concept of a

priori: If cognition is a capacity acquired through

the evolutionary process, it is, to any given indi-

vidual, ontogenetically a priori. However, the ori-

gins of human cognitive capacity and knowledge

as products of evolutionary processes reach back

to nonhuman ancestors, and in that sense should

be viewed as phylogenetically a posteriori. Thus,

human cognitive functions are shaped by the envi-

ronment that is known. Furthermore, human

knowledge, including its a priori component, is

provisional: It is neither infallible nor arbitrary. Its

success lies in examining the long-term “fit” be-

tween the world and physical/mental appropria-

tions to the world, as found in neural and mental

structures of the knowing subject. Therefore, evo-

lutionary epistemology subscribes to hypothetical

realism, a special type of realism which claims that

human knowledge of the external world is a well-

founded and reliable hypothesis about external re-

ality. While it is possible to see the parallel be-

tween biological evolution and conceptual

evolution (the later being the evolution of ideas) as

literal, the real strength of evolutionary epistemol-

ogy is in applying it analogously to all processes

involved in the acquisition of knowledge.

Such an extension was established by Karl

Popper. His philosophy transforms the principle of

elimination of “unfit hypotheses” about reality (oc-

curring on the planet since biological evolution

began) to an abstract level of scientific hypotheses.

The resulting system claims to provide the basis for

the objectivity of knowledge: While social circum-

stances influence the expressions of beliefs, the be-

liefs themselves are not caused by these circum-

stances alone but have an objective component.

These principles of selective retention of fit-

ting structures, both physical and mental, lead to a

very high efficiency in the entire cognition-gaining

process: Only successful variations are retained,

thereby becoming a basis for future selective

processes. Cases where blind chance seemingly

operates in evolutionary processes are in the sys-

tem of nested hierarchies, preselected by past suc-

cesses. These principles are applicable to all levels

and forms of knowledge-gaining processes, but at

the same time do not allow for the reduction of

culture to biology. What is emphasized is the par-

allel to knowledge-gaining processes in biological

and cultural evolution.

Consequently, evolutionary epistemology is ca-

pable of examining the formal structure of any kind

of human knowledge, including areas traditionally

barred from scientific study, such as religions. Don-

ald T. Campbell suggests that, from a scientific

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point of view, human sociocultural inheritance is as

reliable as biological inheritance.

Impact on science and religion

Campbell’s proposal was theologically appropri-

ated by Ralph Wendell Burhoe, who attempted to

employ the ideas of evolutionary epistemology to

relate scientific and religious thought. For Burhoe

there is, in principle, no difference between the

discernment of the validity of religious beliefs and

the discernment of the validity of scientific claims:

Knowledge in both areas is acquired through

methods described by evolutionary epistemology.

Therefore, natural sciences should no longer claim

methodological and epistemic superiority over re-

ligion. Burhoe, however, went even further, stating

that “religious belief systems characteristically in-

volve man’s relation or adaptation to some ulti-

mate realities” (p. 30). Implicitly, such a claim

points to the reality of God: If one presupposes

that selection processes take place through con-

frontation with reality, and result in the acquisition

of information about selecting reality, then “adap-

tation to ultimate reality” can be translated into “ac-

quisition of knowledge about an independently

existing God.”

Theologically, evolutionary epistemology rep-

resents an important new methodological tool.

While it does not fall into the trap of natural theol-

ogy by attempting to argue about God on the basis

of knowledge of the world, it advocates that the

acquisition of religious knowledge follows the

same principles as the acquisition of knowledge of

the material world. Since the reliability of cognitive

claims is based on the methods used to derive

them, religious claims are no longer epistemically

inferior to any other kind of knowledge.

Critiques

Critics of evolutionary epistemology argue that

survival and reproduction are the only ends of

evolutionary development, and that selected

knowledge is not true information about reality but

merely a situationally successful resolution of a

given situation. The success of such a solution is

understood by these critics without relating it to re-

ality. While it is correct that knowledge-gaining

processes described by evolutionary epistemology

do not lead to true knowledge but rather to truly

reliable hypotheses, this charge is based on the

faulty presupposition that long-term solutions

based on evolutionary selection could result from

false assessments of external reality.

Other critics lament that evolutionary princi-

ples are inherently egoistic and, consequently, that

the realm of ethics and religion can not be de-

scribed by evolutionary epistemology. This criti-

cism is, again, based on the faulty presupposition

that evolution’s primary value is mere survival.

Evolutionary epistemology, however, redefines

evolution as a knowledge-gaining process that

makes the outcome of the evolutionary process

dependent upon what has been retained and what

is learned.

Recently, the findings of evolutionary episte-

mology have been confirmed by new trends in

several disciplines. The most promising discipline

is evolutionary psychology, along with new studies

in human development and paleontology. While

the slowly emerging picture of human cognitive

ability seems to be inviting theology as a dialogue

partner, advances made during the last two

decades of the twentieth century suggest that the-

ology will benefit greatly from including evolution-

ary epistemology among its methodological tools.

See also EPISTEMOLOGY; EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS;

VOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY; HYPOTHETICAL REALISM

Bibliography

Burhoe, Ralph Wendell. “Natural Selection and God.”

Zygon 7 (1972): 30–63.

Campbell, Donald T. “On the Conflicts Between Biological

and Social Evolution and Between Psychology and

Moral Tradition.” Zygon 11, no. 3 (1976): 167–208.

Elman, Jeffrey L.; Bates, Elisabeth A.; Johnson, Mark H.;

Karmiloff-Smith, Annete; Parisi, Domenico; and Plun-

kett, Kim. Rethinking Innateness: A Connectionist

Perspective on Development. Cambridge, Mass.: Brad-

ford Books, 1996.

Lorenz, Konrad. “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori in the

Light of Contemporary Biology.” In Learning, Devel-

opment, and Culture, ed. Henry Plotkin. Chichester,

UK: Wiley, 1982.

Mithen, Steven J. The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive

Origins of Art, Religion, and Science. London:

Thames and Hudson, 1996.

Piaget, Jean. Biology and Knowledge. Edinburgh, UK: Ed-

inburgh University Press, 1971.

Popper, Karl Raimund. Objective Knowledge: An Evolu-

tionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.

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Vollmer, Gerhard. “Mesocosm and Objective Knowledge:

On Problems Solved by Evolutionary Epistemology.”

In Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Episte-

mology: Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowl-

edge, ed. Franz M. Wuketits. Dordrecht, Netherlands:

D. Reidel, 1984.

TOMAS HANCIL

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS

The term evolutionary ethics refers to three differ-

ent fields of inquiry that share a concern for the re-

lationship between ethics and evolutionary theory.

First is the question of how the human capacity for

ethics could have arisen through natural selec-

tion—the evolution of ethics. Second is the issue of

how the process of evolution appears to exacer-

bate the problem of natural evil and theodicy—the

ethics of evolution. Third is the question of what

implications Darwinian theory has for ethical un-

derstanding and whether it is possible to derive an

ethical system from evolutionary biology—ethics

from evolution.

Evolution of ethics

Charles Darwin (1809–1882) speculated on, but

did not resolve, the question of how ostensibly

sacrificial social cooperation, and especially

human morality, could be established by natural

selection, which entails the preferential transmis-

sion of biological characteristics that confer repro-

ductive advantage to their possessor. In the 1970s,

breakthroughs in the application of Darwinian

theory to animal social behavior by the emerging

discipline of sociobiology shed light on this prob-

lem through the notion of reciprocal altruism, sug-

gesting that organisms sacrifice for others in pro-

portion to the likelihood of a compensatory

return. Some species, such as social insects,

achieve high cooperation in large group sizes, at

the cost of rigid and therefore predictable behav-

iors. Other species, such as nonhuman primates,

can achieve high cooperation with significant be-

havioral flexibility, within the constraints of small

group sizes where relational history can be moni-

tored. Human morality is widely viewed as facili-

tating the unique capacity for significant coopera-

tion in the context of both high behavioral

flexibility and large group sizes. Morality not only

urges us, but in a sense enables us, to be kind to

strangers.

Far from settling the biological origin of ethics

however, these notions have stimulated vigorous

debate. One controversy is over whether ethical

behavior can be understood as invariably benefit-

ing the actor’s or others’ reproduction; that is, is

morality an individual or group level adaptation?

Extending the influential ideas of George Williams

and Richard Dawkins, in his seminal work, The Bi-

ology of Moral Systems (1987), Richard Alexander

maintains that moral acts, even those not directly

paid back, benefit the individual by indirect reci-

procity or reputational enhancement. We are as

morally good as it takes to enhance our social

standing, and conscience is a reputation alarm that

goes off when we are cheating in a way likely to

get caught. Conversely, David Wilson and Christo-

pher Boehm argue that human evolution has es-

tablished the capacity for moral acts that entail un-

compensated personal sacrifice and benefit the

group relative to competing groups.

Another debate waged both within and outside

evolutionary biology involves the question of

whether morality is adequately explainable by nat-

ural selection at all. One view considers morality

not as an evolutionary adaptation but as a byprod-

uct of other biologically adaptive capacities, such

as intelligence and the capacity for group cooper-

ation. Another position, coevolutionary or hierar-

chy theory, views moral systems and other higher

cognitive functions as influenced by nongenetic

evolutionary processes that are not constrained by

natural selection. Proponents reject genetic reduc-

tionism and affirm both genuine moral freedom

and radical outgroup sacrifice. Scientific and theo-

logical critics maintain it is dualistic, even Gnostic,

in viewing beneficence as a nonmaterial imposi-

tion on an innately selfish human biology. These

disputes mirror longstanding theological differ-

ences over embodiment and the work of grace.

Ethics of evolution

In his 1893 Romanes lectures, Thomas Henry Hux-

ley (1825–1895) reflected on the relationship be-

tween natural evil and evolutionary ethics. While

natural evil is considered by many religious and

wisdom traditions, evolutionary theory has been

viewed as intensifying the quandary in three ways.

First, it extends the temporal and biological scope

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of suffering and death. They become primal fea-

tures rather than post-hoc additions to creation;

moreover, death ravages not only individuals but

also entire species, previously considered fixed in

divine providence. Second, the role of natural evil

changes from an ancillary intrusion upon God’s

mode of creation to the central driving force of the

process itself. The very engines of creation seem to

be the competition and selective carnage of natu-

ral selection. Third, not just the process but the

products of natural selection raise ethical ques-

tions: In many representations, the Darwinian pic-

ture of the world is colored by dominant hues of

self-interest and an utter absence of natural benef-

icence. A century after Huxley, George Williams ar-

gued that evolutionary theory and sociobiology

paint an even bleaker picture.

Some theodicies respond to this view of the

world by affirming eschatological extrapolations of

evolutionary progress. Others criticize the picture

itself. Darwin maintained death was most often

swift, and selection favored pleasure over pain in

behavioral motivation. Moreover, natural selection

is actually not driven by selective mortality, but by

differential fecundity. Finally, symbiotic coopera-

tion may be as important in evolution as competi-

tive displacement. Whether the most apt metaphor

for evolution is “nature is red in tooth and claw” or

“exuberant in youth and bough” is an object of on-

going debate, and the controversy itself has signif-

icant theological implications.

Ethics from evolution

The relationship of evolution to ethical theory is

debated along two main lines. First is the metaeth-

ical question of whether a naturalistic origin of

ethics makes divine command theory, or any form

of moral realism, untenable. Michael Ruse argues

that evolution entails moral relativism because

what seems right is merely what happens to work

in conferring reproductive success. Conversely,

Nancy Murphy and some process thinkers argue

that the universe operates in such a way that what

works actually tends toward the right and good.

Another controversy involves the normative

ethical question of whether evolution can inform

moral understanding. Advocates of this view, such

as Ruse and natural law proponent Larry Arnhart,

argue evolution can contribute, first, by elucidating

what is biologically impossible in light of natural

selection and therefore errant to command. Ruse

thus claims the New Testament’s radical love com-

mand is biologically perverse. Second, if we un-

derstand the evolutionary function of human be-

havioral traits, we can discern what is most likely

to facilitate or subvert fulfillment, and therefore in-

form ethical judgments. Critics argue that limiting

our ethical vision to what conforms with prevailing

views of the natural dismisses the work of grace in

redeeming, or moral imagination in reforming, na-

ture. Especially since the evolutionarily natural

may not be so good, we are cautioned to avoid the

naturalistic fallacy of attempting to infer a moral

ought from a brute is. Furthermore, evolution-

based ethics cannot adjudicate between conflicting

impulses: If the function of all behavior is repro-

ductive advantage, then slavery is not ethically

preferable to benevolence, assuming both sustain-

ably maximize fitness. Huxley’s Evolution and

Ethics (1894) made these criticisms of Herbert

Spencer’s (1820–1903) evolutionary ethics, and the

debates continue to this day.

See also ECOLOGY, ETHICS OF; EVOLUTION,

IOCULTURAL; EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY;

ATURE; NATURE VERSUS NURTURE; SOCIOBIOLOGY

Bibliography

Alexander, Richard D. The Biology of Moral Systems. New

York: De Gruyter, 1987.

Arnhart, Larry. Darwinian Natural Right: The Biological

Ethics of Human Nature. Albany: State University of

New York Press, 1998.

Boehm, Christopher. “How, When, and Why Did the

Unique Aspects of Human Morality Arise?” In Evolu-

tionary Origins of Morality: Cross-Disciplinary Per-

spectives, ed. Leonard D. Katz. Bowling Green, Ind.:

Imprint Academic, 2000.

Dawkins, Richard. The Selfish Gene (1976), rev. edition.

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Huxley, Thomas H. Evolution and Ethics and Other Es-

says. New York: Appleton, 1894.

Murphy, Nancy, and Ellis, George. On the Moral Nature of

the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics. Min-

neapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1996.

Nitecki, Matthew H., and Nitecki, Doris V. Evolutionary

Ethics. Albany: State University of New York Press,

1993.

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Ruse, Michael. “Evolutionary Theory and Christian Ethics:

Are They in Harmony?” Zygon 29, no. 1 (1994):

5–24.

Sober, Elliott, and Wilson, David Sloan. Unto Others: The

Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Lon-

don and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,

1998.

Williams, George C. “Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics in So-

ciobiological Perspective.” Zygon 23, no. 4 (1988):

383–407.

JEFFREY P. SCHLOSS

EVOLUTIONARY

PSYCHOLOGY

Evolutionary psychology assumes that operating

beneath the surface of historical and cultural vari-

ability, the human mind is a system of functionally

specialized, developmentally constructed neural

information processors that were naturally selected

because they solved particular adaptive problems

faced during the evolution of the hunter-gatherer

ancestors of human beings. Evolutionary psychol-

ogy assumes a computational theory of mind

rooted in the information processing revolution of

the 1960s. It also draws on insights from the socio-

biology of the 1970s, which describes how “selfish”

genes, in benefiting their own replication and that

of copies amongst kin (William D. Hamilton’s “in-

clusive fitness”), direct the generation of organic

structures, including those that may incidentally

benefit the organism. With the natural selection of

species-wide characteristics, evolutionary psychol-

ogy considers sexual selection, including the ef-

fects of parental investment, and has made empir-

ical contributions to understanding the proximal

mechanisms behind mate choice, cheater detec-

tion, and language acquisition.

Evolutionary psychology avoids a collapse to

genetic determinism through its attention to devel-

opment and environment, including social interac-

tion and coevolutionary systems. Nevertheless, any

computational theory of mind may ultimately be

inadequate, and there are questions about the em-

pirical robustness of its findings.

See also EVOLUTIONARY EPISTEMOLOGY; EVOLUTIONARY

ETHICS; SELFISH GENE; SOCIOBIOLOGY

Bibliography

Hamilton, William D. “The Genetic Evolution of Social Be-

havior.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 7 (1964): 17–18.

Pinker, Steven. How the Mind Works. New York: Norton,

1997.

Wright, Robert. The Moral Animal: The New Science of

Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Pantheon, 1994.

JOHN A. TESKE

EVOLUTION,BIOCULTURAL

From its beginnings in the eighteenth century, evo-

lution—the idea that organisms are descended

through a gradual development, ruled by natural

law, from original, simple, primitive forms—was

intermingled with thoughts of culture. In fact, it is

difficult to distinguish the two, since early evolu-

tionists tended to start with a theory about culture,

generalize to the biological world, then use biol-

ogy to support beliefs about culture. In particular,

especially as represented in the writings of the

English physician and naturalist Erasmus Darwin

(1731–1802, the grandfather of Charles) and the

French biologist Jean Baptiste de Lamarck

(1744–1829), one encounters ideas about social

and cultural progress. Darwin, Lamarck, and others

promoted the belief that knowledge and society

can be improved through unaided human effort;

such ideas were read into the animal and plant

realm (monad to man, to use the popular phrase),

then read back into the human realm to support

ideas of social and cultural progress.

Three problem areas

The study of biocultural evolution presents three

problematic issues. First, there is the fact of evolu-

tion and its causes as applied to the organic world

generally. The big question concerning evolution

is the “mechanism,” and the major debate is over

the adequacy and extent of the causal process pro-

posed by Charles Darwin (1809–1882) in his Ori-

gin of Species in 1859. Does one accept, and to

what extent does one accept, the mechanism of

natural selection, according to which more organ-

isms are born than can survive and reproduce, pro-

ducing a struggle that results in a differential re-

production of the fittest, which leads to change in

the direction of adaptation? Should the mechanism

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of selection be limited or replaced? The consensus

among practicing biologists is that selection is ex-

tremely significant, and, although there is dis-

agreement, most would say that selection is by far

the most important mechanism.

A second problem concerns the application of

evolutionary theory to humans. Few scientists

today would dispute that human beings evolved,

but again there is debate about the extent to which

selection is significant, with nearly all agreeing that

it has had some significant role. The hand and the

eye, for example, are adaptations produced by se-

lection. How much and how far selection has af-

fected and shaped human behavior and thought,

however, is still a matter of (sometimes bitter) de-

bate. Some researchers, particularly those called

human sociobiologists or evolutionary psycholo-

gists, grant selection a major role in determining

human behavior and thought. Others, in particular

cultural anthropologists and those with ideologies

opposed to certain aspects of biology (a group that

often includes feminists, Marxists, and postmod-

ernists), tend to downplay the importance of biol-

ogy in shaping behavior. Most concede to biology

some role, but even here there is dispute. For ex-

ample, male and female (human) physical differ-

ences are obviously a function of biology; whether

male and female psychological and social differ-

ences are a function of biology is less clear.

A third problem is the question of cultural evo-

lution or change. There is, of course, continuity in

science or religion. Albert Einstein (1879–1955) did

not just appear, he arose out of a physics tradition

that dates back at least to Isaac Newton

(1642–1727). Christianity did not just appear but

goes back to Judaism, with introgressions of a

greater or lesser extent from Greek philosophy.

The question is whether one can develop a theory

of such change, and if so what kind of theory. In

particular, do biological theories help one to un-

derstand cultural change? Moreover, does natural

selection offer a causal insight into the way and

reasons that culture changes? From Newton to Ein-

stein, from Moses to Paul, are the processes that

rule such changes the same process that ruled the

evolution of the reptile to the bird, or the monkey

to the human being?

Assuming acceptance of the first point (evolu-

tion in general) and of the second point (evolution

of humans), then the third point (cultural evolu-

tion) becomes the critical question. If one accepts

the possibility of cultural evolution of some kind—

and it is hard not to, at least in a general sense—

then does one start with the second point (evolu-

tion of humans) and work to the third point

(cultural evolution)? Or does one jump straight to

the third point (cultural evolution)? In other words,

is cultural evolution autonomous in some sense,

sitting at the summit of the biological sciences (as

many cultural anthropologists would argue), or

does cultural evolution arise as a consequence of

human biological evolution? And returning to the

issue of causes, what role does selection play in

this process, and how does it affect one’s answer?

Nineteenth-century discussions

It is fair to say that Erasmus Darwin and Lamarck

were evolutionists, and they applied evolutionary

theory to humans, although neither was aware of

natural selection, though in Erasmus Darwin’s writ-

ings there are hints of sexual selection, the com-

petition for mates. Darwin and Lamarck were not,

however, sufficiently sophisticated in their thinking

to address cultural evolution; it is probably best to

say that they thought of cultural evolution as au-

tonomous, but fueled by the same processes as bi-

ological evolution, chiefly the inheritance of ac-

quired characteristics. Although such a view is now

known as Lamarckism, it also appeared in writings

by Erasmus Darwin. People often note that the

Lamarckian evolutionary mechanism of the inheri-

tance of acquired characteristics seems cultural.

They are right. It was taken from culture, so it is

not surprising that it can be read back to culture.

Much the same can be said of later pre-Darwinian

evolutionists. However, by the mid-1850s, cultural

evolution was definitely being seen as au-

tonomous, although biology and culture were con-

sidered ultimately part of the same process, in

which things moved in Lamarckian fashion from

simple to complex, from homogeneous to hetero-

geneous. As the philosopher Herbert Spencer

(1820–1903) remarked:

Now we propose in the first place to show,

that this law of organic progress is the law

of all progress. Whether it be in the devel-

opment of the Earth, in the development

of Life upon its surface, in the develop-

ment of Society, of Government, of Manu-

factures, of Commerce, of Language, Liter-

ature, Science, Art, this same evolution of

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the simple into the complex, through suc-

cessive differentiations, hold throughout.

From the earliest traceable cosmical

changes down to the latest results of civi-

lization, we shall find that the transforma-

tion of the homogeneous into the hetero-

geneous, is that in which Progress

essentially consists. (Spencer 1857)

Spencer was not much interested in selection,

even though the idea occurred to him independ-

ently of Darwin. Others took a similar approach to

Spencer but included selection in their theories.

Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895) was probably

the first to argue that there is a struggle for exis-

tence among ideas, and the fittest win. Einstein tri-

umphed over Newton because Einstein’s ideas are

in some way better than Newton’s. For Huxley,

who invented the term agnostic, Darwin beat out

Christianity because Darwin’s ideas were better

than Christianity.

What about Darwin himself? He certainly

wrote about humans and was interested in culture.

At times he sounds as if he believed culture to be

reasonably autonomous, but one senses that he

was not convinced of this. In the Descent of Man

(1871) he is more inclined to start with human evo-

lution and then work outward and backward to

culture. Morality, for example, has biological value

because it helps keep the tribe together. Thus,

there is evolution toward a moral sense, which

then feeds back to biology because creatures that

are more moral are also more biologically success-

ful. Similarly, social practices, particularly social

sexual practices, start with biology, get encoded

into culture, and then feed back into biology. Even

capitalism can be conceived in Darwinian terms as

something that aids evolution and hence is cher-

ished and adaptive.

In general, it seems fair to say that for the cen-

tury after Darwin, the biology to culture approach

did not thrive. Thanks to the popularity of Spencer

and his followers, as well as to the rise of the so-

cial sciences and to the difficulty of understanding

the biology of behavior and thought, cultural evo-

lution was considered to be a process in its own

right. The philosopher William James (1842–1910),

for instance, takes a Darwinian approach in his

Principles of Psychology (1890), although in the

more philosophical Pragmatism (1907), he treats

culture as more autonomous. And although

Spencer is no longer highly regarded as a thinker,

and although few would subscribe to Spencer’s be-

liefs about the nature and course of evolution,

many still treat culture as Spencer did, as au-

tonomous but with causes that are analogous to bi-

ology. In fact, many follow in the steps of Huxley

in seeing selection as key to understanding cul-

tural, particularly scientific, change.

Twentieth-century discussion

Such an approach is often called evolutionary epis-

temology. Its best-known proponent was the

philosopher Karl Popper (1902–1994), who com-

bined an evolutionary approach with his own crite-

rion for distinguishing science from nonscience: fal-

sifiabilty. One starts with a problem, say a discovery

that seems not to fit with existing theory. One then

proposes an idea or hypothesis intended to solve

the problem, or more likely, one proposes a num-

ber of ideas or hypotheses. One then subjects the

ideas to rigorous testing, choosing the idea that sur-

vives or solves the problem best. All the others must

be rejected, including ideas or hypotheses one may

have held earlier. In effect, a change has occurred

through a process analogous to natural selection.

One then continues until another problem arises.

Those sympathetic to Popper’s approach in-

clude Stephen Toulmin and David Hull, the latter

having applied the approach to the eclipse of tra-

ditional evolutionary methods of biological classifi-

cation with the new cladistic approach. This is a

method of classification that uses only shared char-

acteristics as the method of classification, aiming to

represent lines of descent and nothing else.

Richard Dawkins’s theory about units of belief

called memes, which are analogous to genes, also

fits here. Dawkins believes that memes invade

brains (rather like viruses) and then multiply and

succeed in a Darwinian fashion, inasmuch as they

have good cultural adaptations. Religion, in partic-

ular, is something that Dawkins thinks has no ob-

jective truth but nevertheless succeeds because it

has good adaptations. It exploits people’s need to

belong and their need for comforting answers

about life after death and other matters.

Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), who is usually re-

garded as representing an approach to the under-

standing of science diametrically opposed to that

of Popper, also liked to think of his “paradigm”

theory of science as evolutionary. A paradigm is

proposed, and another is rejected, in Darwinian

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