The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3: Medieval Japan
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THE MUROMACHI DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 209
ers to manage local affairs in his absence. Frequently, even the deputy
shugo was called to Kyoto, thus necessitating the appointment of a
subdeputy (shugo-matadai). As can be imagined, shugo residing in
Kyoto found it difficulty to develop a reliable chain of command
between capital and province. Vassal
shugo-dai
could play a critical role
in either expanding and safeguarding the shugo's local authority or
undermining it. The problem was especially acute in situations in
which the shugo were exercising jurisdiction over an unfamiliar prov-
ince.
In such cases, the
shugo
were often forced to depend on the head
of a prominent local family, a kokujin, to serve as deputy. In many
cases,
these families eventually turned against their Kyoto-based supe-
riors so as to grasp local military hegemony.
46
Contact between shugo and shogun was at first personal and direct.
But with the adoption of the kanrei system, the shogun's relations with
the
shugo
were mediated through the kanrei, and certain decisions were
made subject to the assembly of senior
shugo.
There was, of course, an
inherent contradiction in a procedure that put the deputy and the
assembly between the shogun and his vassal shugo. A strong-minded
shogun, like the mature Yoshimitsu or Yoshinori, resented the restric-
tions this imposed on his freedom of command. The kanrei-yoriai
system as a check on shogunal absolutism worked well up through the
time of Yoshikazu, the fifth shogun. And even the sixth shogun, the
strong-willed Yoshinori, was forced to accept from time to time the
collective will of the kanrei and yoriai.
The third shogun, Yoshimitsu, had brought the status and power of
the office to its highest level. Yet his grandiose behavior and autocratic
rule were tolerated, even admired, by the shugo, who were themselves
caught up in the heady experiences of aristocratic life in Kyoto.
Yoshimitsu's two successors retreated from this autocratic posture and
acknowledged a greater acceptance of the kanrei-yoriai system.
Yoshikazu, living with the knowledge that his father, Yoshimitsu, had
intended to pass over him as his heir, was not inclined to offer personal
leadership to the bakufu, and so died without naming his own succes-
sor. As a result, his successor was determined by lot by the Ashikaga
family council, and Yoshinori, Yoshimitsu's sixth son, was chosen.
Yoshinori was at the time a mature man of thirty-four. Early in his life,
with no apparent hope of becoming shogun, he had entered the priest-
hood, and at the time he was named shogun he was serving as chief
abbot (zasu) of the Enryakuji and head of the Tendai sect on Mount
46 Hall,
Government
and Local
Power,
pp. 227-33.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
210 THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU
Hiei. He immediately showed himself to be a leader who intended to
become personally involved in bakufu affairs. He was
a
good politician
and was determined to increase the power of
the
Ashikaga house.
Yoshinori's first move was to change bakufu administrative proce-
dures by reorganizing the Corps of Administrators
(bugyonin-shu)
and
instituting what was called the shogunal hearing
(gozen-sata).
47
Under
this procedure, briefs on policy matters were prepared by the adminis-
trators and brought directly to the shogun for decision. This meant
that in most instances the
kanrei
was not consulted, as evidenced by
the appearance of
bugyonin
directives that expressed the shogun's will
without the customary countersignature of the
kanrei.
This change
was correctly perceived as a move toward greater shogunal personal
rule.
48
Another line of action that Yoshinori pursued proved even more
disquieting, for it involved the shogun's effort at directly interfering in
shugo
domestic affairs. Using his authority to approve
shugo
appoint-
ments and inheritances, Yoshinori began to manipulate the lines of
succession among
shugo
houses so as to bring to Kyoto
shugo
more
amenable to his direction.
49
One device in particular available to
Yoshinori was his authority to enlist the lesser members of
shugo
houses into his private military force as guardsmen. Such appoint-
ments were usually of second or third sons in
shugo
families, men not
normally in line for the family headship. But as a result of
the
personal
relationship between shogun and guardsmen, the shogun was able to
intervene on behalf of those he favored to ensure their succession.
This was the motivation for a series of seemingly arbitrary actions
taken by Yoshinori that came to a head in 1441. In that year, the
shogun appeared to be taking steps to block the appointment of
Akamatsu Mitsusuke's chosen heir to the post of
shugo
in Harima and
Bizen. It was to forestall this move that Mitsusuke killed Yoshinori
while the shogun was being entertained in the Akamatsu residence in
Kyoto. This incident, known as the Kakitsu affair, marks a turning
point in Muromachi bakufu history. That a prominent
shugo
could
murder the shogun who was a guest in his own house was disquieting
enough but that the murderer could survive the incident and return to
his provincial base without suffering an immediate punitive attack
47 Kuwayama, with Hall, "Bugyonin," in Hall and Toyoda, eds., Japan in
the Muromachi
Age,
pp.
58-61.
Tsuikaho numbered 183, 184, 189, and 190 to 197 issued in 1428 dealt with this
issue.
48 Imatani Akira, Sengokuki
no Muromachi bakufu no
seikaku,
vol. 12 (Tokyo: Kadokawa shoten,
1975)5 PP- 154-6- 49 Arnesen, Ouchi
Family's
Rule, p. 187.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU 211
implies that there were strong feelings of sympathy for the Akamatsu
leader's actions.
50
Mitsusuke, however, was finally chastized. Having
fortified himself in his provincial headquarters, he fought to the finish
against a shogunal army led by the Yamana, the
shugo
of several nearby
provinces. The Yamana invasion was not in reluctant compliance with
bakufu orders, for the Yamana had long coveted the Akamatsu prov-
inces of Mimasaka, Bizen, and Harima. As expected, the Yamana
received these provinces as a reward for Mitsusuke's destruction.
The Kakitsu incident brought an end to a brief period of what some
have called "shogunal despotism." But the weakening of shogunal
power did not lead to a return to kanrei-shugo council ascendancy
either. As a result of Yoshinori's meddling, one of the three kanrei
houses, the Shiba, was greatly weakened, and the house served as
kanrei only once in the ensuing years. In the aftermath of the Kakitsu
incident, competition over the post of kanrei was largely confined to
the Hosokawa and Hatakeyama houses. Moreover, the nature of the
post itself changed. After 1441, the post of kanrei carried little of its
former responsibility of supporting the shogun and mediating with the
shugo.
Rather, the post was regarded as a means to exercise private
influence over the bakufu. Because such influence could result in
tangible benefits to both the kanrei and his favored
shugo,
there was a
tendency for the shugo houses to divide into factions behind the two
remaining kanrei houses. How this situation led to the weakening of
the bakufu power base became clear during the time of Yoshimasa, the
eighth shogun. But before I turn to the events of this period, I shall
discuss in more detail the bakufu rule.
THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU: INSTRUMENTS OF
ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT
The Kemmu shikimoku, by announcing the Ashikaga's intent to follow
in the footsteps of the previous regime, implicitly laid claim to what-
ever powers that had accrued to the post of shogun under the Ho jo
regents. By 1350, the Ashikaga government had assumed a reasonably
stable form in which many of the organs of administration bore the
same names as used by the Kamakura shogunate. But identity in name
did not necessarily mean identity in function. The Ashikaga leaders
approached quite pragmatically the task of building a bakufu.
50 Sugiyama Hiroshi, "Shugo ryogokusei no tenkai," in Iwanami koza Nihon rekishi (chusei 3)
(Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1963), pp. 109-69.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
212
THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU
Takauji
•
(shogun)
- shitsuji
-
(manager)
Tadayoshi
'
• hyojo
•
samurai dokoro
(board
of
retainers)
onshokata
(office
of
rewards)
• andokata
(office
of
land titles)
"—
hikitsukekata
(office
of
adjudicants)
• zenritsu-kata
(commissioner
for Zen
and Ritsu monasteries)
- kantobugyo
(office
of
court
appointments)
- monchujo
(office
of
records)
Figure 4.2 Organization
of
the bakufu, 1350. (Solid horizontal line
indicates formal authority relationship; solid vertical line, a more
or
less equal formal status;
and
dashed line,
an
informal equality
or
division of authority.)
As
of
1350, when Tadayoshi
was
still working closely with
his
brother, the organization
of
the bakufu followed the form outlined
in
Figure 4-2.
5
' Sato Shin'ichi
has
emphasized
the
importance
of the
division
of
responsibility that
had
been worked
out by the
Ashikaga
brothers.
52
Takauji, the elder brother, as shogun and head
of
the
buke
estate, assumed the direction
of
the bakufu organs dealing with such
functions
as the
appointments
to
military posts,
the
distribution
of
rewards for military service, the enlistment of vassal followers, and the
management
of
Ashikaga lands. Sato described these powers
as
basi-
cally feudal. By contrast, Tadayoshi was
in
charge of what Sato called
the more "bureaucratic,"
or
administrative and judicial, functions of
government. Under Tadayoshi was organized the deliberative council,
consisting
of
selected professional bureaucrats,
and a
number
of of-
fices that kept land records, adjudicated lawsuits,
and
handled rela-
tions between
the
bakufu
and the
imperial court
and the
religious
orders.
51 Imatani, Sengokuki, pp. 151-81. 52 Sato, "Kaisoki," pp. 472-86.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU
213
kanrei
-- —- —- —- —-
—
-
shugo yoriai
—- —- ——
shugo
(deputy) (council
of
shugo)
• samurai-dokoro
(board
of
retainers)
•
hikitsukeshu
(office
of
adjudicants)
shogun
————
I
hokoshu
(shogunal guards)
• mandokoro
(board
of
administration)
• monchu/o
(records office)
Figure 4.3 Changes
in
bakufu structure after Tadayoshi's expulsion,
1352.
(Lines same
as
in
Figure 4.2; double dashed line indicates
an
informal authority relationship.)
With Tadayoshi's expulsion from Kyoto
in
1352,
the
bakufu struc-
ture underwent
a
significant change, and many
of
the offices inherited
from Kamakura were either abolished
or
drastically modified
in
func-
tion. The most important such change,
as
seen
in
Figure 4.3, was
the
conversion
of
the
office
of
shitsuji
(the
bakufu's chief
of
operations)
into that of
kanrei
(deputy shogun)
and
the creation
of
the
shugo
coun-
cil (shugo yoriai).
53
The top
of
the Muromachi shogunal government was characterized
by both
a
greater direct involvement
in the
affairs
of
state
by the
shogun
and
a
more influential participation
by
the
shugo
houses
in the
decision-making process and
in the
bakufu administration.
The main bakufu offices with specialized functions were
the
Board
of Retainers
(samurai-dokoro),
the
Office
of
Adjudicants (hikitsuke-
shu),
the
Board
of
Administration
(mandokoro),
and
the Office
of
Rec-
ords
(monchujo).
Of
these,
at
the outset the Board of Retainers was
the
most important.
It
alone was headed by a major
shugo
house. Charged
with controlling
the
shogun's direct retainers,
the
Board
of
Retainers
was made responsible
for
securing
the
capital area from lawlessness
and administering the home province of Yamashiro. With the establish-
ment
of
the office of
kanrei,
the
samurai-dokoro
lost much of
its
powers
of control over
the
shogun's household retainers
and
over
the
shugo
houses. But its administrative and judicial functions
in
the capital area
continued to expand. The board,
for
instance, took over the powers of
the Imperial Capital Police
(kebiishi)
and
became
the
main police
and
53 Sato, with Hall, "Muromachi Bakufu Administration," in Hall and Toyoda,
eds.,
Japan
in
the
Muromachi
Age, pp. 47-49.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
214
THE
MUROMACHI 3AKUFU
judicial authority
in
Kyoto.
54
In
1385, moreover,
the
chief
(shoshi)
of
the Board
of
Retainers was given
the
added duty
of
serving as
shugo
of
Yamashiro Province.
It
became customary
to
rotate this assignment
among four major
shugo
houses:
the
Yamana, Isshiki, Akamatsu,
and
Kyogoku.
The actual day-to-day running
of the
Board
of
Retainers
was
dele-
gated
to a
deputy chief
(shoshidai),
appointed
by the
chief from among
his
own
private retainers. Hence
the
identity
of the
deputy changed
according
to who
served
as chief. As a
bureaucratic entity,
the
board
was given
a
certain stability
and
continuity
of
operation
by its
perma-
nent administrative
staff, a
group
of
individuals composed indepen-
dently
of the
chief
and his
deputy, drawn from
a
class
of
hereditary
administrators
or
professional bureaucrats, which will
be
described
later.
Despite
the
many important functions
of the
Board
of
Retainers,
after
the
Onin
War
(1467-77),
it
lost
its
central importance
to the
Administrative Council.
55
At
first
the
council
was
almost exclusively
concerned with
the
shogun's household
and its
fiscal management.
56
Its first chief officer was
a
hereditary administrator carried over from
the Kamakura bakufu,
a
member
of
the Nikaido house.
In
1379,
the
Nikaido were replaced
by the Ise
family,
a
line
of
hereditary retainers
who,
among other duties,
had
traditionally served
as
guardians
of the
Ashikaga shogun's heirs.
The
council came into
its own as the
bakufu's main administrative office when
the
shogun Yoshinori
be-
gan
to use it as the
organ through which
to
bypass
the
kanrei.
As the
sphere
of
shogunal government narrowed, however, this single
agency
was
able
to
handle nearly
all of
the shogunate's administrative
functions. Moreover, as the shogun found fewer
and
fewer opportuni-
ties
to
assert political initiative, procedures
in the
bakufu became
increasingly routinized under what Kuwayama Konen
has
called
the
"bugyonin
system."
57
Throughout
the
Muromachi period there were more than fifty fami-
lies
of
professional administrators available
for
service, many of whom
had served
the
imperial court
and the
Kamakura bakufu. Such fami-
lies were
now
brought into Ashikaga service because
of
their special
54 Haga Norihiko, "Muromachi bakufu samurai dokoro ko,"
in
Ogawa,
ed.,
Muromachi seiken,
PP-
25-55-
55 Imatani, Sengokuki,
p. 165. 56
Haga, "Samurai dokoro,"
p. 50.
57 Kuwayama, with Hall, "Bugyonin,"
in
Hall
and
Toyoda,
eds.,
Japan
in
the Muromachi
Age,
PP-
53-54-
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU 215
administrative skills. In time they formed the Corps of Administra-
tors,
the
bugyonin-shu.
At any one time, between fifteen and sixty
members might be assigned to the finance, justice, and administrative
organs of
the
bakufu.
58
A study of
the
fluctuating
numbers of adminis-
trators retained by the Muromachi bakufu shows that in the period
before the Onin War, the numbers reflected the shifting balance of
power between the kanrei-yoriai system and the shoguns' effort to
exert their own influence on the bakufu. Thus the fewest numbers
were in evidence under Yoshimitsu, Yoshikatsu, and Yoshimochi, all
of whom followed the
kanrei
principle.
59
Yoshinori's efforts to exert his
direct shogunal prerogative was reflected by an immediate increase in
the size of the corps. This upward trend continued until Yoshimasa's
death. Thereafter, the number of members declined, to remain at
around fifteen until the end of the Muromachi bakufu. Members of
the corps were drawn from the following eleven families: Iio, Suga,
Saito,
Jibu, Eno, Sei, Nakazawa, Fuse, Matsuda, Yano, and Ida.
The drop in staff numbers reflected, first of
all,
a loss of power by
the Ashikaga house and also a change in function. Perhaps because of
the shogun's weakening power, the administrators increasingly be-
came an entrenched and self-perpetuating group of families that, more
than any other single factor, accounted for the continued existence of
the bakufu during its last hundred years. These families became the
agents through which members of the capital elite establishment dealt
with one another. For instance, administrators serving as members of
the Office of Adjudicants were assigned specifically to handle the
affairs of important shrines like the Iwashimizu Hachiman Gu or
Tsurugaoka Hachiman Gu, and great temples like the Enryakuji,
Todaiji, Kofukuji, Toji, and Tenryuji. In other words, these heredi-
tary administrators had begun to serve as agents of these institutions in
case of litigation before the council, receiving retainer fees for serving
as their spokesmen.
60
This was obviously a profitable arrangement. To
keep it alive, it was to the advantage of all concerned to maintain the
prestige of the shogun and the efficacy of the bakufu's remaining
organs of adjudication. That this happened is revealed by the fact that
the Ashikaga's supplementary laws continued to be issued into the
58 Haga, "Samurai dokoro," p. 27; Kuwayama, with Hall, "Bugyonin," in Hall and Toyoda,
eds.,
Japan in the Muromachi Age, pp. 56-60.
59 Kenneth A. Grossberg, "Bakufu and Bugyonin: The Size of the House Bureaucracy in
Muromachi Japan," Journal of Asian Studies 35 (August 1976): 651-4.
60 Kuwayama, with Hall, "Bugyonin," in Hall and Toyoda,
eds.,
Japan in theMuronmachi Age,
p.
62.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
2l6 THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU
15 70s and that there are many records
of
action taken by the Office of
Adjudicants
in
the last decades of the Ashikaga regime.
61
But
to say
that
the
Muromachi bakufu continued
to
function until
the mid-sixteenth century
is
also
to say
that
the
scope
of
its compe-
tence narrowed.
By the
time
of the
last shogun,
the
scope
of the
bakufu's control
had
been reduced almost solely
to
the city
of
Kyoto
and
its
close environs. Control
of
Kyoto,
in and of
itself,
was an
important achievement,
and the
fact that Kyoto became subject
to
bakufu administration
was of
major significance
for the
Ashikaga
house's staying ability.
At the time the Ashikaga established their bakufu in Kyoto, the city
was still under the control
of
the civil and religious nobility. Takauji's
claim
of
chieftainship
of
the military estate gave him the authority
to
exercise military, judicial, fiscal,
and
appointment powers over
bushi
but not over the civil elite. The organs
of
imperial administration that
had been revived
by
Godaigo were soon
in
disarray. Yet the establish-
ment of the Muromachi bakufu did not automatically rectify the situa-
tion.
In Kyoto the imperial house,
the
high court nobility,
and
the great
religious institutions remained free
to
govern, through their
own
house staffs, their estates
and
other dependent groups like
the
mer-
chant and craft guilds.
In
fact, these groups and organizations can
be
conceived
of as a
distinct power structure with remarkable staying
power,
to
which modern historians have applied
the
term
kenmor,
seika.
62
Essential
to
this condition
was the
maintenance
of a
secure
capital area,
a
functioning judicial process,
and a
reasonably effective
machinery
for the
delivery
of tax
payments.
The
chief instruments
available
for
this were
the
Imperial Capital Police
(kebiishi)
and the
various management systems maintained
by the
Kyoto-based head-
quarters
(honjo)
of
the major civil and religious proprietary interests.
In its early policy,
the
bakufu sought only to assist
in
maintaining law
and order
in
the capital,
in
order
to
protect the provincial interests of
the most important civil and religious proprietors. Kyoto was adminis-
tered under what was essentially a dual polity.
63
61 Kuwayama Konen, Muromachi bakufu hikilsuke shiryo shitsei,
vol. 1
(Tokyo: Kondo
shuppansha, 1980).
62 This concept, most closely associated with Kuroda Toshio,
is
best described
in
English
by
Suzanne Gay
in
"Muromachi Bakufu Rule in Kyoto: Administration and Judicial Aspects"
in
Mass and Hauser, eds., Bakufu
in Japanese
History,
pp.
60-65.
63 Prescott
B.
Wintersteen, "The Early Muromachi Bakufu
in
Kyoto,"
in
Hall and Mass, eds.,
Medieval Japan,
p. 202.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE MUROMACHI BAKUFU 217
Tension between the bakufu's Board of Retainers and the capital
police was quick to develop, especially in matters of conflicting juris-
diction. The failure of the court-maintained police to carry out their
duties effectively induced the bakufu to claim the need to increase its
police role in the capital. And the court was inclined to agree. A court
decree of 1370, noting the capital police's ineffectiveness in curbing
violence against the nobility by religious bill collectors, invited the
bakufu to provide assistance. Once the bakufu began enforcing the
court decrees, it began also to move into the court's economic affairs.
By decree in 1393 the bakufu took over the collection of dues from
brewers and moneylenders.
The bakufu relied on several types of personnel to enforce its will.
One already noted was the body of professional bureaucrats who
served as administrators. The shogun also had at his disposal armed
forces with which to ensure compliance with his decisions. Both the
kanrei and the chief of the Board of Retainers relied on their own
armed retainers to provide a military presence in the capital. Resi-
dent shugo also kept on hand contingents of a few hundred mounted
men. In addition, the shogun and the bakufu offices not headed by
shugo military houses could call on the services of a category of
personal retainers of the shogun known as hokonin (see Maps 4.4 and
4-5)-
64
Those men for whom we might use the term
guardsmen
were direct
Ashikaga retainers settled on shogunal lands
(goryosho)
and account-
able to the shogun alone. Their use was political and economic as well
as military. The largest number were from lesser branches of Ashikaga
cadet and nonkin shugo houses. Such were the Hosokawa, Hatake-
yama, Isshiki, or Shiba among the cadet houses, and the Sasaki, Toki,
Ogasawara, Ouchi, and Kyogoku, but not the Akamatsu, among the
nonkin
shugo
houses. From these houses the shogun selected individu-
als who may have borne the same surname as the main house but who
were not in line to succeed to the family headship. Another group was
recruited from houses that had long served the Ashikaga as hereditary
retainers. An outstanding family of this type was the Ise. Finally, some
members of provincial houses rose to local prominence, the kind of
military proprietor referred to as kokujin. The best known of such
appointments was the Kobayakawa of Aki Province.
65
64 Fukuda Toyohiko, "Muromachi bakufu no hokoshu," Nihon rekishi 274 (March 1971). 46-
65.
65 See the analysis of the Kobayakawa by Arnesen, "Provincial Vassals," in Mass and Hauser,
eds.,
Bakufu
in
Japanese History, pp. 106-112.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Map 4.4 Location of hokonin, 1444—9. (Shaded areas indicate num-
ber of families per province.)
PROVINCES
1
Z
3
4-
5
G
7
S
9
10
t
(S
^V
/
/
IZUMO
erp-iu
SEJT6U
OM,
11 M\\
13 KAp,'
14-
ejch
15 ^INC
16 OVMf
^-v-^
r
\5/\
17 f\l^\W/^
2£N 16 TCTOMI
\
>
5-8
-3-4
Wi
\A
I?
J
:
z
— 1
?
-/f
s /
Map 4.5 Location of hokonin, 1565. (Shaded areas indicate number
of families per province.)
f
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008