The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13: Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2
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KUOMINTANG FACTIONS 141
likewise threatened
to
oust members
of
the local elite from positions that
assured them power, preferment,
and
wealth.
39
There were,
as a
result,
fundamental contradictions between the interests
and
goals
of
the regime
and
of
these landlords.
During the Nanking decade, however, the conflicts generated
by
those
contradictions were usually muted
and
localized, because
the
regime's
attention was then focused much more
on the
Communist
and
Japanese
problems than
on
questions
of
local administration.
The
relationship
between
the
government
and the
local elites during this decade might
therefore
be
described
as
mutual toleration
and
limited cooperation.
But
to baldly ascribe a class character to the Nationalist regime, without noting
its important differences with
the
landlords
and
capitalists, conceals
its
fundamental nature.
For the
regime
was
dependent, first
of
all,
on the
support
of the
military. From that fact,
all
else followed.
It was not in
any basic way accountable
to
this
or
that social-economic class
or
indeed
to any forces outside
itself.
It
was,
in
many respects, its own constituency.
This
is a
basic reason why
the
regime's modernizing
and
developmental
impulses were
so
weak;
why the
Nationalist bureaucracy could
be
sustained
so
long despite
its
corruption
and
administrative lethargy;
and
why the regime could perpetuate itself with so few new faces
or
new ideas
for over
two
decades. Some members
of the
regime were,
of
course,
enlightened, dedicated,
and
competent.
Too
many, however, took
advantage
of
the institutional character
of
the regime
to
maximize their
own power, prestige and wealth rather than to strive for the national good.
KUOMINTANG FACTIONS
In this kind
of
regime, which was customarily free
of
the constraints
of
public opinion
and
which tolerated
no
meaningful political activity that
it did
not
control, the competition
for
political power was conducted
not
in society at large but within the councils of the regime
itself.
And, because
the distribution
of
political authority
was
determined less
by
formal
chains-of-command than
by the
personal decisions
of
Chiang Kai-shek
or
one of his
favoured aides, allocation
of
power
was
determined
inordinately by personal influence.
It
was a common practice, for example,
for
a
new minister
or
bureau chief to dismiss
the
previous employees
in
that office
and to
replace them with
his
cronies
and
supporters.
The key
to political success, therefore,
lay
less
in the
possession
of
technical
» Geisert, 'Power
and
society', 167-24Z; Philip
A.
Kuhn, 'Local self-government under
the
Republic: problems
of
control, autonomy,
and
mobilization',
in
Frederic Wakeman,
Jr. and
Carolyn Grant,
eds.
Conflict and control in late imperial China, 284-98.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
142 THE NANKING DECADE I927-I937
expertise than
in
the maintenance
of
personal relationships with leaders
of the regime. Factionalism,
in
other words, was the principal medium
for political struggle.
Factions proliferated. There were, for example, the factions of Wang
Ching-wei, T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung,
Ho
Ying-ch'in, Chu Chia-hua,
Sun Fo
-
the list goes
on
and on. The largest factions, however, and
those which were generally the most influential
in the
policy-making
process, were the CC clique, the Political Study clique, and the Whampoa
clique.
r
The CC clique coalesced around the brothers Ch'en Kuo-fu and Ch'en
Li-fu. Bound
to
Chiang Kai-shek by extraordinarily close personal and
emotional ties
-
they were nephews
of
Ch'en Ch'i-mei, who, until
his
assassination by Yuan Shih-k'ai
in
1916, had been Chiang's mentor and
father-figure
-
the two Ch'en brothers after 1926 directed the organiza-
tional operations
of
the Chiang-dominated Kuomintang.
In
June 1927,
they first created the secret organization that became known as the CC
clique (CC-hsi)-a term that was thought
to
represent either 'Central
Club'
or
the 'two Ch'ens'. The actual name
of
the organization may,
instead, have been
the
Ch'ing-pai-she (lit. Blue-white society)
or the
Kuo-min-tang chung-shih t'ung-chih-hui (Kuomintang loyal-and-faithful
comrades' association), although details of the clique's names, structure,
and operations remain obscure.
40
Using
the
Organization Department
of the
Kuomintang
as
their
institutional base, the Ch'en brothers placed adherents throughout the
party and governmental apparatus, particularly in the middle and lower
strata
of
those organizations.
In
this way,
the CC
clique became
a
dominating influence
in
the civilian branches of the regime, controlling
much
of
the bureaucratic administration, educational agencies, youth
organizations
and
labour unions.
The
clique also controlled various
publications, such as the
Shih-shihyueh-pao
(Times monthly) and
Wen-hua
chien-she
(Cultural reconstruction), and operated the Kuomintang's Central
Bureau
of
Investigation and Statistics (Chung-yang tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi
chii) which was one
of
Chiang Kai-shek's two principal secret police
organizations.
By contrast with the civilian oriented CC clique, the Whampoa clique
(Huang-p'u hsi) was formed preponderantly of military officers, but it too
had broad political concerns that potentially
at
least touched all aspects
of national life. Loosely defined, the Whampoa clique denoted the former
40
Ch'en Tun-cheng,
Tmg-luan
ti
bui-i
(Memoirs of upheaval), 29; Ch'en Shao-hsiao,
Hei-aang-lu
(Records
of
the black net),
290-1.
Ch'en Li-fu, however, denied the existence
of
such
an
organization. See
Shu-wen,'
Ch'en
Li-fu t'an
CC'
(Ch'en Li-fu chats about the
CC),
Hsin-wcn
fim-ti
(News world), 20 (1 Feb. 1957) 15.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
KUOMINTANG FACTIONS 143
faculty and students of the Whampoa Military Academy, who maintained
strong bonds of loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek. The faction thus defined had,
however, no organization, and some of the members - such as Ho
Ying-ch'in, Ch'en Ch'eng and the younger officers
—
were bitterly
antagonistic one to the other. The operative nucleus of the Whampoa
clique, therefore, at least during the period 1932-8, was a tightly
disciplined, clandestine organization known popularly as the Blue Shirts
(Lan-i she).
The Blue Shirts were organized in early 1932 by a small group of young
military officers, former students of Chiang Kai-shek in the Whampoa
Military Academy, who were alarmed by the condition of the nation and
of the Kuomintang movement. The Japanese were invading Chinese
territory; the Communists survived in the interior despite repeated
annihilation campaigns against them; and, perhaps most alarming,
members of the Nationalist movement had become corrupt and were more
concerned about enhancing their power than they were about attaining
the goals of the revolution. That
is,
in the Blue Shirts' view, the revolution
had failed and the nation lay in peril.
With Chiang Kai-shek's consent, financial support, and at least formal
leadership, these young officers - represented, for example, by Ho Chung-
han, Tai
Li,
Teng Wen-i and K'ang Tse - created
a
pyramidal organization
comprising three basic levels. At the top, the dominant leadership
constituted the Li-hsing she (Vigorously-carry-out society); the middle
echelon was named the Ko-ming ch'ing-nien t'ung-chih hui (Revolu-
tionary youth comrades association); and the foot-soldiers of the
movement, drawn from lower levels of the army, from students and from
governmental agencies, were organized into the Chung-hua Fu-hsing she
(Chinese revival society). In reaction against the disarray and poor
discipline of the Kuomintang, the Blue Shirts stressed the need for
absolute, unquestioning obedience to the leaders of the organization.
Frugality, incorruptibility and secrecy were also emphasized.
Progressively, as a result of the growing power of Mussolini's Italy and
Hitler's Germany, fascist doctrines became attractive to the Blue Shirt
leaders. Chiang Kai-shek, too, made extensive efforts to learn about Nazi
methods of organization and operation and in about 1935 he reportedly
declared to a gathering of Blue Shirts, 'Fascism...is a stimulant for a
declining society.' 'Can Fascism save China? We answer: yes. Fascism
is what China now most
needs.
'
4I
As a result of this fascination with the
apparent successes of fascism in Europe, the Blue Shirts likewise
41
'Ranisha no soshiki to hanman konichi katsudo no jitsurei' (The organization of the Blue Shirts
and examples of anti-Manchukuo, anti-Japanese activities), in Kanisba ni kanturu Sbiryo
(Materials on the Blue Shirts), 11.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
144 THE NANKING DECADE 1927-1957
propounded ultra-nationalism,
the
cult
of
the Leader, elimination
of
liberalism and individualism, and the ' militarization' of society.
The Blue Shirts became highly influential during
the
1930s. They
dominated political training within
the
army, thus helping
to
assure
Chiang Kai-shek
of
the continuing support
of
that ultimate source
of
political power. The Blue Shirts also became involved in various civilian
activities, such as the schools, the Boy Scouts and the
police.
They provided
many, perhaps most, of the cadres of the New Life movement. And they
also operated
the
much feared Military Bureau
of
Investigation
and
Statistics (Chiin-shih tiao-ch'a t'ung-chi chii) under Chiang Kai-shek's
Military Affairs Commission. This secret police organization, headed by
Tai
Li,
conducted intelligence operations against Chiang Kai-shek's
putative enemies (who ranged from the Japanese and the Communists
to corrupt officials and even political rivals within the Kuomintang).
It
was involved in press censorship.
It
was also responsible for many of the
most notorious assassinations during the decade, such as that in 1934 of
Shih Liang-ts'ai, editor of Shanghai's leading newspaper,
Shen-pao.
In contrast to the CC and Whampoa cliques, the Political Study clique
(Cheng-hsueh-hsi) was all head and no tail; its members were each men
of prominence, but
it
had no following among the rank-and-file
of
the
regime.
It had no
organization
or
clear-cut leadership,
but
consisted
informally
of a
group
of
friends,
or
friends-of-friends,
who
shared
generally similar political views. Two of the clique's foremost representa-
tives,
Huang
Fu and
Chang Ch'iin, were sworn-brothers
of
Chiang
Kai-shek,
a
relationship which in China signified the closest possible
tie
of loyalty outside
the
family. Probably
in
large part through this
relationship, the Political Study clique became enormously influential
in
Chiang Kai-shek's coterie of advisers and leading administrators. On the
recommendation
of
Huang
Fu
and Chang Ch'iin,
for
example, Chiang
Kai-shek in 1932 appointed Yang Yung-t'ai as his secretary-general in the
headquarters
of
the Military Affairs Commission. From that position,
Yang
—
until he was assassinated
in
1936
—
was one
of
the two
or
three
most powerful political figures in the nation. Other members of the clique
included Wang Ch'ung-hui, Hsiung Shih-hui, Wu Ting-ch'ang, Chang
Kia-ngau, Weng Wen-hao and Huang Shao-hung.
To
name these and
other members
is to
list many
of
the leading figures
in
the nation and
in
the
regime. Significantly, however,
the
relationship
of
these clique
members
to the
Kuomintang was,
at
best, tenuous. Huang
Fu, for
example, steadfastly refused even to become a member of the party. They
were less politicians than they were specialists
-
economists, industrialists,
bankers, publishers, intellectuals
-
who adhered to no ideological doctrine
but stood instead for technical expertise and bureaucratic professionalism.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
KUOMINTANG FACTIONS I45
The relations among these several factions were complex. Each of them
publicly expounded the doctrines of Sun Yat-sen; each supported Chiang
Kai-shek as the leader of the regime. At the same time, their dealings with
each other were sometimes exceedingly strained, because they were the
principal vehicles in the intra-party struggle for power. Ch'en Kuo-fu and
Ch'en Li-fu, for example, were extremely jealous of the Political Study
clique's position in the civilian apparatus and competed with them for
bureaucratic office. The Blue Shirts viewed the others as corrupt civilian
politicians, and were particularly hostile to the CC clique, because the
political, educational and intelligence operations of the two factions
overlapped, thereby generating intense frictions.
Ideological and policy differences, significantly, were not the main cause
of these frictions. Although the differences between the factions would
frequently be expressed in terms of policy orientations, the fundamental
issue was power and position. The Blue Shirts and the CC clique expressed
differences, for example, on how to implement Sun Yat-sen's Principle
of Economic Livelihood. A former Blue Shirt leader admitted, however,
that 'any [factional] struggle is not a struggle resulting from differences
of policy, but is a struggle for the rice bowl'.
42
Chiang Kai-shek knew of these intra-party conflicts, but unless they
threatened to erupt into violence
—
as one did in 1934 between the Blue
Shirts and the CC clique
—
he did not intervene. Indeed, he appears
actually to have fostered the competition among the factions. For the
struggle among factions prevented any one of them from becoming overly
powerful. Chiang thus assured his supremacy over all of them.
Nationalist rule has customarily been labelled 'conservative'. This is
misleading, however, for leaders of the regime were in fact intensely
dissatisfied with the status quo, and they envisioned drastic, even ' radical',
departures from China's existing condition of national decrepitude. They
admired, for example, the scientific and industrial progress of the West,
and they aspired to employ Western technology to improve the economic
well-being of the Chinese people. They wished also to restructure the
Chinese socio-political order. The model for Chiang Kai-shek's ideal
society lay not in the Chinese past, but in the specifically militaristic aspects
of Japan, Italy and Germany. He recalled his student days in a Japanese
military academy, and declared that the rigorous barracks discipline there
represented precisely his ideal for Chinese society as a whole.
43
He thought
that fascist Italy and Germany fulfilled that ideal.' In fascism,' he declared
42
Interview with Liu Chien-ch'un, Taipei,
27
May 1969.
43
Chiang Kai-shek,' Hsin-sheng-huo yun-tung chih yao-i' (Essentials
of
the New Life movement),
Chiang tsung-fung ssu-bsiangjen-lun cbi (Collection
of
President Chiang's thoughts and speeches),
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
146 THE NANKING DECADE 1927-1937
admiringly, 'the organization, the spirit, and the activities must all
be
militarized... In
the
home,
the
factory,
and the
government office,
everyone's activities must be the same as in the army...
In
other words,
there must
be
obedience, sacrifice, strictness, cleanliness, accuracy,
diligence, secrecy... And everyone together must firmly
and
bravely
sacrifice for the group and for the nation.'
44
It was precisely this image of a militarized society, strictly disciplined
and unconditionally obedient to the Leader's will, that Chiang aspired to
re-create
in
China. These were
the
goals
of his
vaunted New Life
movement, inaugurated in 1934, which he regarded as providing the basic
cure
for
China's ills. 'What
is the
New Life Movement that
I
now
propose?' Chiang asked. 'Stated simply, it is to militarize thoroughly the
lives of the citizens of the entire nation so that they can cultivate courage
and swiftness, the endurance of suffering and
a
tolerance for hard work,
and especially the habit and ability of unified action, so that they will
at
any time sacrifice for the nation.
>4S
Patently, his image of fascism had been
translated virtually intact into the New Life movement.
Chiang Kai-shek
and the
Nationalist leaders also, however, paid
obeisance
to
the ethics of Confucianism, and
it
was this that convinced
many observers that the Nationalist regime was actually
a
conservative,
even reactionary, force. Customarily, for example, Chiang declared that
the goals
of
the New Life movement were the Confucian virtues
of
//',
/,
lien
and
cb'ib,
loosely translated as social propriety, justice, integrity, and
sense of self-respect. He greatly admired the great conservative, Confucian
officials
of
the late Ch'ing dynasty, Tseng Kuo-fan and Hu Lin-i. And,
under
his
aegis, the official worship of Confucius was restored; Confucius's
birthday was proclaimed a national holiday; and study of the Confucian
classics by students and military officers was encouraged.
This traditionalism
of
the Nationalist regime was comparable
to
the
classicism promoted in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Confucianism, that
is,
was not propounded as a goal in
itself,
but as
a
moral ingredient that
would contribute to the cohesiveness of the Chinese people as they moved
forward
to a
new society.
It
provided,
as a
member
of
the CC clique
asserted,
a
'central
belief,
without which the Chinese people became
politically anarchic
and
morally confused.
46
Thus, Chiang Kai-shek
frequently spoke
in
the idiom
of
Chinese tradition. Indeed many
of
his
44
[Iwai Eiichi], Runisba
ni
kansuru
cbosa
(An investigation
of
the Blue Shirts), 37-8.
45
Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang tsmg-tung sm-bsiangyen-lim cbi, 12.111.
On
the New Life movement, see
Arif Dirlik,' The ideological foundations of the New Life movement: a study in counterrevolution',
JAS 34.4 (Aug. 1975) 945-80; Eastman, Abortive revolution, 66-70.
46
Fang Chih, 'Min-tsu wen-hua
yu
min-tsu ssu-hsiang' (National culture and national thought),
Wen-bua cbitn-sbe (Cultural reconstruction),
1.2
(10 Nov. 1934)
20.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE NATIONALISTS I47
methods
and
outlooks
-
such
as his
stress
on
traditional morality,
his
conception of the political utility of education, and his elitism
-
did reveal
that
his
vision
of
the modern world
was
limited.
But his
political goal,
that
of
a thoroughly regimented society, bore
no
resemblance
to
China's
Confucian past.
He was a
would-be totalitarian, aspiring
to
extend
the
controls
of his
regime down
to the
local level,
and to
subordinate
the
individual
and all of
society
to the
regime
to a
degree that emperors
of
the Ch'ing dynasty had not even dreamed
of.
This was
not a
conservative
ideal,
for it
differed fundamentally from either
the
ideals
or
realities
of
the past.
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE NATIONALIST REGIME
There exists
no
consensus regarding Nationalist achievements during
the
Nanking decade. Some historians have concluded that
the
Nationalists
established a fundamentally sound system
of
rule and laid the foundations
upon which
a
strong, democratic
and
prosperous nation could
be
constructed
-
although this promising beginning
was
aborted
by the
onslaught
of the war
with Japan
in 1937.
Others contend that
the
government established
by the
Nationalists
was
corrupt
and
inefficient,
that the Nationalist leaders did not comprehend the problems confronting
them,
and
that they were ignorant
of
alternative political
and
economic
strategies available
to
them. Accordingly,
in
this view,
the
regime
was
doomed
to
failure even
if the
Japanese
had not
launched their
war of
aggression.
47
These issues
are
passionately debated. They
are
perhaps irresolvable,
because what would have occurred
had the
Japanese
not
attacked
is, by
its very nature, unprovable. Two facts, however, are clear. First, the task
confronting
the
Nationalists
-
namely, reversing
the
tide
of
national
disintegration
-
was gargantuan. Second, the circumstances under which
they attempted the task were extraordinarily uncongenial
to
successful
or
rapid solutions. Economic depression, foreign invasion
and
civil strife
-
conditions that were largely beyond
the
control
of the
Nationalists
-
militated against
the
implementation
of
meaningful reforms. They were,
moreover, allotted only about
six
years
in
which
to
accomplish those
reforms, because
the
first four years
of the
Nanking decade
had
been
devoted chiefly
to
securing
the
regime
in
power.
The outstanding achievement
of the
Nationalists
was to
reverse
the
trend toward territorial disintegration. When they seized power
in
1927,
47
Studies that are generally favourable
to the
Nationalists arc Domes and Young; less favourable
are Hung-mao Tien and Eastman,
all
cited above.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
148 THE NANKING DECADE 1927-I937
they controlled only Kiangsu, Chekiang, and part of Anhwei. As a result
of the civil wars
in
1929-31,
the central government forces cowed the
provincial militarists, thus guaranteeing
the
existence
of
the Nanking
government, but the writ
of
the central government
in
1931 was still
restricted to a constellation of provinces, or parts of provinces, in central
China (most notably
in
varying degree
in
Chekiang, Kiangsu, Anhwei,
Honan, Kiangsi, Hupei and Fukien).
48
Nanking's effective authority expanded rapidly, however, after Chiang
Kai-shek's fifth annihilation campaign against the Communists. A central
premise
in
Chiang Kai-shek's strategic thinking was that, before China
could repulse the Japanese aggressors,
it
must be unified internally. 'The
Japanese,' he liked to say,'
are like a
disease of the skin, but the Communists
are like
a
disease of the heart.' To cure this disease of the heart, Chiang,
in October 1930, immediately after his victory over the Yen Hsi-shan
Feng Yii-hsiang rebellion, had launched his first annihilation campaign
against the Communists
in
Kiangsi.
The Communists, however, employing
the mobile tactics of guerrilla warfare, repulsed the Nationalist attackers
by
1
January 1931. Other annihilation campaigns followed. But not until
the fifth annihilation campaign
of
1933—4 —in which Chiang employed
about 800,000 troops, was advised by German and Japanese advisers, and
augmented his military offensive with
a
stringent economic blockade of
the Communist areas
-
did
he
gain
a
nearly decisive victory over
the
Communists. The Communists, defeated militarily and suffering incredibly
from shortages of food and especially salt, summoned their last reserves
of strength and courage, broke out of the Nationalist encirclement, and
in October 1934 commenced what was to become the Long March.
The Long March, which has become
a
legend
in
the history
of
the
Communist Revolution, provided Chiang Kai-shek with an unprecedented
opportunity
to
inject
his
military forces
and
political power into
the
provinces of South and West China. Pursuing the retreating Communists,
Chiang's well-equipped armies entered Hunan, Kweichow, Yunnan and
Szechwan. The provincial militarists, feeling endangered by the presence
of
the
Communists, welcomed
the
Nationalist armies-not whole-
heartedly, because these too threatened their provincial autonomy, but as
the lesser of two evils. Chiang Kai-shek fully exploited the opportunity.
For, once Chiang's bandit-suppression army had entered
a
province, his
agents began imposing 'reforms' designed to break down that province's
isolation.
In
Szechwan, for example, the garrison areas
{fang-ch'it),
which
had been the military and economic bases
of
operations
of
the several
Szechwanese warlords, were abolished, and
a
more centralized system of
48
Domes, 486.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE NATIONALISTS I49
provincial administration was instituted. A massive road-construction
programme, designed to integrate the province politically and militarily
with the rest of the nation, was launched. Szechwan was also drawn into
Nanking's economic orbit as a result of the widespread use of Nationalist
currency (Ja-pi) in place of the several currencies that had been issued by
various banks in the province.
49
Prior to the war with Japan, such reforms
as these had attenuated, without breaking, the south-west provinces'
accustomed independence, and the local authorities continued to strain
against the tightening tentacles of the central government. In the spring
of 1937, for example, relations between Chiang and Liu Hsiang, the
dominant warlord in Szechwan, became so tense that a renewed outbreak
of civil war was narrowly avoided. As a result of Chiang's anti-Communist
campaigns of 1934-5, however, the autonomy and political manoeuvr-
ability of the provincial militarists in Hunan, Yunnan, Kweichow and
Szechwan had been sharply reduced. And the power and prestige of the
Nanking government had been commensurately enhanced.
The ultimate fruit of the anti-Communist campaign did not ripen until
1936 when Kwangtung was finally and completely brought under the
control of the central government. Although Kwangtung had been the
revolutionary base of the Kuomintang prior to the Northern Expedition,
it had never been effectively incorporated into the political and financial
system of the Nanking government. Especially since 1931, when the
militarist Ch'en Chi-t'ang became provincial chairman, Kwangtung had
conducted its affairs virtually without reference to the central government.
Ch'en, together with Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, leaders of the
Kwangsi faction, in late 1931 had established the South-west Political
Council and the South-west Headquarters of the Kuomintang Central
Executive Committee. These governmental and party organs formed the
basis of a formidable regional coalition against Nanking, uniting the rich
economic resources of Kwangtung with the military expertise and fighting
qualities of Kwangsi. The political challenge of this coalition against
Nanking was enormously enhanced by the participation of Hu Han-min,
the party's leading theoretician and venerated elder (albeit only fifty-two
years old in 1932), who imparted to the so-called South-west separatist
movement a legitimacy that other anti-Chiang movements had lacked. For
some five years, Chiang Kai-shek had endured the taunts and criticisms
of Kwangtung and Kwangsi, because they were a formidable political and
military power and more especially because they lay protected behind a
buffer formed by the semi-autonomous provinces of Fukien, Hunan and
40
Robert A. Kapp,
S^ecbwan
and
the Chinese
Republic: provincial militarism and central power,
ipu-rfjf,
99-120.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
15° THE NANKING DECADE I927-I937
Kweichow. As a result of his pursuit of the Long March, however, Chiang
by late 1935
had
eliminated that buffer. Chiang was also assembling
troops near
the
Kwangtung-Kwangsi borders, constructing airfields
in neighbouring Hunan, and rushing
the
Hankow-Canton railway
to
completion.
In May 1936,
Hu
Han-min suddenly died,
and
Chiang seized
the
occasion of Hu's funeral to throw down the gauntlet to the Kwangtung-
Kwangsi leaders, demanding that they
now
submit
to the
central
government. The ultimatum was rejected, and the South-west authorities
in early June began moving their troops northward into Hunan province.
Their purpose was avowedly
to
fight the Japanese aggressors
in
North
China. Chiang inferred, however, probably correctly, that Ch'en Chi-t'ang
and
the
Kwangsi leaders were planning
to
attack,
in an
attempt
to
overthrow the Nanking government.
Chiang Kai-shek's genius for political manipulation shone at its brightest
in this kind
of
situation. On the one hand, he bribed the Cantonese air
force, causing it in July to defect
en masse
to the central government. Then,
with a combination of military threats and offers of alternative official posts
to the rebel leaders, Chiang brought about the collapse
of
the rebellion
in September. As
a
consequence, Kwangtung,
for
the first time
in
the
Nanking period, was brought under the effective administration
of
the
central government. Kwangsi, which retained some vestiges of
its
former
autonomy, was subdued, no longer in
a
position to challenge Nanking.
By late 1936, therefore, Chiang Kai-shek had consolidated political
control over the greater part of the nation
-
only seven
of
the eighteen
provinces in China proper continued to be essentially autonomous
-
and
he had thus laid the foundation for a viable political system. Yet he had
attained his control
at
enormous cost. Not only had his strong reliance
upon armed force cost the nation heavily in terms of the destruction of
life and property,
but it
had diverted the regime's attention from
the
exigent demands
of
social, economic
and
political reform. Chiang's
advisers sometimes warned him against relying excessively
on
force
to
attain political ends.
In
introspective moments
he
even admitted this
failing. He was, however, a soldier, and alternative strategies of attaining
national unity seem never
to
have engaged his interest. He might,
for
example, have contented himself with merely the nominal allegiance of
the various provincial militarists, and then have endeavoured
to
create
a model of political, economic and social reform in the areas that he did
control. Doing this
he
might have avoided the bloody and costly civil
wars,
established economic
and
fiscal stability,
and
developed
the
administrative and technical expertise that would serve him when other
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008