The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 12: Republican China, 1912-1949, Part 1
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THE DICTATORSHIP 243
ing on the dissolution of local self-government bodies, concluded that
the order would 'affect, pecuniarily and from the point of view of their
local prestige, a vast number of petty gentry and bourgeois throughout the
country, and will range them on the side of his enemies.'
4
" Though
muffled by the terror, Chinese voices confirming this judgment were
audible.
The pattern of Yuan's administration was an escalating effort to restrict
areas of autonomy in the society. Press censorship was fortified and
generalized by law in 1914, after two years of freedom from any central
controls (though local governments had occasionally suppressed local
press critics). Chinese chambers of commerce were put under new
regulations, increasing their subservience to political authority. The
Chinese Post Office submitted the mails to police surveillance. Thousands
of plainclothesmen and informants sought out dissent. Railway passengers
were carefully scrutinized and their luggage searched upon suspicions of
treason. Within the rather severe technical limitations of staff and effi-
ciency, Yuan's regime was acquiring the attributes of a singularly re-
pressive police state.
By such means was the widespread movement towards an elite-based
political liberalism dealt wounds from which it never fully recovered. In
setting out the philosophical guidelines for the architecture of the dic-
tatorship, Yuan spoke as follows in December 1913:
Nowadays, the word 'equality' is in all men's mouths, but equality only means
that all men are equal in the sight of the law. It does not imply that distinctions
of rank are to be obliterated and that each man may be a rule unto himself in
negation of the law. . . . 'Liberty' is another beautiful modern expression, but
it
is
limited to the bounds of
the
law, within which men are free. Such a thing as
unrestricted liberty does not exist. Those who have advocated equality and
liberty without enquiring whether sanction was extended to a reign of licence
knew perfectly well that such things must not
be:
they made use of stately catch-
words as a rallying cry for furthering rebellion. . . . Again, 'republic' is an
elegant expression, but what foreigners understand by this term is merely the
universal right to a voice in the country and not that the whole nation must
needs interfere in the conduct of government. What possible result save the
direst confusion could ensue from such interference
?
As to the term 'popular
rights',
it comprises the right of representation and the suffrage, besides the
supreme privilege of electing the president; it must not be understood to in-
clude the conduct of administration.
41
The tone is more familiar to modern Western experience than it is to
40 John Jordan, Peking (9 Feb. 1914), FO 228/1883.
41 'Inaugural address of president to the Council of Government.' See
Supra,
f.n. 19 for
a
com-
ment on this source.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
244 THE ERA OF YUAN SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6
the Confucian conservatism of the nineteenth century. Yuan was resisting
the consequences of a new, participatory, radicalizing nationalism -
something with which Tseng Kuo-fan had not had to contend. At the
same time, he was accepting some of its premises and goals. He was part
of its conservative wing.
The dictatorship's programmes reflected this mixed reaction to twen-
tieth-century Chinese nationalism. Existing elected assemblies were
abolished, but the importance of popular representation was acknowl-
edged. Yuan ordered planning for a new design, both locally and nation-
ally. When Yuan died two-and-a-half years later, none of this plan had
been put into effect. But from the numerous preparatory regulations, it
was apparent that the emphasis was on subordination to official guidance
and on an electorate much reduced from the number of voters in 1912
and 1913. A constitutional order, legal procedure, popular sovereignty
and representative assemblies were all acknowledged as crucial for China's
modernization, a much desired goal. In Yuan's view, however, they
should be effected in ways that augmented, rather than diminished, the
authority of the central state and the stability of the social order.
Elaborate efforts to revive the flow of revenue from the localities to
Peking met with some success. By the time of the outbreak of the First
World War in Europe, the Peking government had attained a bare fiscal
self-sufficiency, obviating the need for further foreign loans (which in
any case would be scarce in war-time). One could argue that Yuan's dan-
gerous strategy of 1913 had worked: accepting foreign funds, with their
humiliating conditions, to bring administrative unity to the country, thus
laying the basis for fiscal independence. The fallacy in this scheme lay in
the optimism that the domestic political price for all these outrageous
acts need not be paid. When the bill was presented, the apparent fiscal
achievement of 1914 and 1915 crumbled, leaving only the humiliating
conditions Yuan had put his signature to in 1913.
Fiscal success was achieved by the dictatorship not just with the help
of central bureaucratic control over the country, but also by the severe
retrenchment of several expensive reforms. Various programmes, initiated
through the official nationalism of the last years of the Ch'ing and greatly
expanded under the liberal nationalism of the first two years of the re-
public, were either cut out or reduced. Among them were the self-govern-
ment bodies, whose fate has just been discussed. The new judiciary, with
its courts and judges separate from the executive organs of government,
was pared down drastically, but not eliminated. The modern police lost
much of their funding. Most dramatically, successor units of the late
Ch'ing's modernized New Army, which ballooned after the 1911 Revolu-
tion, were reduced in size and budget in many parts of the country. Yuan's
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE DICTATORSHIP 245
Peiyang detachments were favoured, but not exempted. All this budget-
cutting served the cause of eventual national independence from foreign
creditors, but it also betrayed the reformist expectations of nationalists.
A partial exception to the rule of retrenchment was education. Yuan
frequently delivered homilies on the importance of an educated citizenry.
'The prosperity and strength of a country hinges upon advancement
in the virtue, knowledge and physical strength of the people. If we desire
to improve the people's standards in these three respects, we must empha-
size citizen education.'
42
The programmatic application of these thoughts
was special attention to the spread of citizens' schools (kuo-min
hsueh-
hsiao),
a four-year lower primary system, free of charge for all. Although
universalization of education was only a distant goal, the incidence of
such schools, which drew upon local financing, seems to have increased
during the dictatorship.
The totality of Yuan's educational policies was complex and various.
The Ministry of Education under T'ang Hua-lung, a veteran leader of
Hupei's provincial assembly, wanted the teaching of classics at the pri-
mary level limited to selections of passages, with the implication that the
purpose was linguistic and literary, not moral, training. Yuan insisted on
incorporating the whole of the
Mencius
into the lower primary school
curriculum. He also authorized a pilot project of literacy instruction in
romanized Chinese for adults. While the bottom rung was expanding,
higher reaches of the school system suffered retrenchment during the
dictatorship. Yuan was solicitous of elite needs by adding a small 'pre-
paratory' channel upwards for the culturally privileged. Overall, his
administration's approach to education was conservative but reformist,
and less favourable to gentry aspirations (focused on the higher levels in
the system) than had been the liberal republic of 1912 and 1913.
Since explanations of this period have often dwelt upon Yuan's evil
character and the reactionary quality of his politics, discussion of the
actual policies of the dictatorship is rarely to be found. One faces the
revisionist's temptation to reverse all judgments. But that cannot be
justified; the hostile characterizations have been based on certain irre-
ducible facts. One could expatiate upon other reformist aspects of the
dictatorship - the encouragement of economic development, for example,
and the advantage taken of the natural protectionism afforded by the
First World War.
4
' Still, in the end, attention must return to the brutality
42
Chmg-fu
kung-pao,
956 (6 Jan. 1915) 9.
43 An appreciation of Peiyang contributions to capitalist development under the dictatorship
occurs in Kikuchi Takaharu,
Chugoku
minzoku
undo
no
kihon
kozS
—
taigai
boikotto no
kenkyu
(Basic structure of the Chinese national movement: a study of anti-foreign boycotts), 154-
78.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
246
THE ERA OF
YUAN SHIH-K'AI,
I 9 I
2-1
6
of the regime and its fundamental failure. Foolishly, Yuan tried to coerce
responsiveness. This was foolish because
it
was
an
impossible task and
because
it
evoked
an
opposite reaction, both from those elite sectors
of
the society most likely
to
support him and, eventually, from
his own
lieutenants and collaborators.
Yuan was sensible
of
the limits
of
coercion. He avowed the need
for
constitutionalism and representation. But instead
of
rapidly reviving the
participatory aspects
of
the liberal republic,
he
tried
to
compensate
by
selected retrievals from imperial politics. The results were disastrous
for
him and his policies.
YUAN'S MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT
As President Yuan Shih-k'ai surveyed the results
of
the dictatorship,
he
had
to
contemplate the question: what was missing? Once the country's
administration
had
been unified,
why did
people
not
jump when
he
clapped; rally when he called
?
Where was the strength that was supposed
to accompany centralization
?
Why was China still so weak before foreign
power?
The
crises
in
foreign affairs during Yuan's presidency ended
uniformly in a Chinese retreat. Outer Mongolia and Tibet remained largely
lost
to
European protection. He failed to effect any recovery, whether he
signed agreements,
as
he did with Russia over Outer Mongolia
in
1913
and 1915, or whether he refused to, as he did with Great Britain after the
Simla Conference over Tibet in 1914. Meanwhile, a foreign hand had been
inserted into
the
Salt Administration. Railway concessions proliferated.
The foreign powers refused to renegotiate the
tariff.
The most humiliating
result emerged from
the
Sino-Japanese negotiations begun
in
January
1915.
In
May, Yuan capitulated
to
Japan's modified, final version
of
her
famous Twenty-one Demands. Yuan's implicit diagnosis
of
the disease
behind these symptoms
of
inadequacy was imperial under-nourishment:
the emperor was missing.
We may reasonably wonder how anyone could arrive at this conclusion
so soon after the Ch'ing monarch had been so easily deposed. The am-
biguity
of
the 1911 Revolution
is
one key
to
this line
of
thinking. One
could after all take the revolution as anti-Manchu
at
the core, rather than
anti-monarchical. From this point
of
view,
the
republic was merely
a
fortuitous consequence of the absence of an obvious Han replacement for
the overthrown Manchu monarch. There were those in Yuan's entourage
who had from the beginning desired the republic
to be
only
a
stopgap,
until the time was ripe for Yuan's enthronement.
The most cogent rationale
for a
revived monarchy was
the
evident
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
YUANS MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT 247
fact that the republic had failed to win the hearts of the masses. We have
noted the pro-Ch'ing slogan of White Wolf's bandits in 1912. Although in
some provinces the new revolutionary order had emerged with an impor-
tant non-elite, popular engagement, within
a
few months these popular
forces (such as secret societies) were cut
off
from the sources
of
power.
When they resisted, they were brutally suppressed.
Perhaps more typical were the circumstances portrayed
by Lu
Hsun
in his characterization
of
the 1911 Revolution
in
'The true story
of
Ah
Q' written
a
decade later. From his position
at
the lowest social level
in
his village, Ah Q is initially attracted by the vision of a possible upheaval.
But his disappointment is profound as he observes instead how represen-
tatives of the old, classically-educated elite and the new, foreign-educated
elite collaborate in taking over the revolution for themselves. When Ah
Q
tries
to
join, he is told
to
clear out. He angrily charges, 'So no rebellion
for me, only
for
you, eh?' The accuracy
of
this analysis
is
underscored
when Ah Q is executed by representatives of the revolution for robbery
-
a
robbery he did not commit, though he had wanted
to.
44
The theme
of
popular exclusion from the revolution, and consequent
alienation from the republic,
is
vividly stated
in
Lu Hsun's short story.
In keeping with this genesis, the republic continued the exclusion of the
masses from
all the
invigorating participatory institutions
of its
early
liberal phase. Quite apart from formidable problems
of
communication
and unfamiliarity with republican institutions, there was little reason even
for those common folk who did glimpse the new order to see
it
favoura-
bly. Insofar as monarchical arguments rested
on
the strangeness
or
un-
popularity
of
the republic among the masses, the arguments were pro-
bably sound.
The arguments weakened when they proposed
the
revival
of the
monarchy as a remedy
-
as an instrument to knit government and people
together. There had been no determined popular defence of the monarchy
when
it
fell during the 1911 Revolution. The occasional appearance
of
pro-Ch'ing slogans, such as those of White
Wolf,
before the Second Re-
volution seem better understood as complaints against the social leanings
of the republic than as instant nostalgia
for
emperors.
In
any case, how
were the people to be reached with
a
resuscitated monarchical message
?
The provincial and local elites, many
of
whom had learned
to
enjoy re-
publican privilege, would be indispensable allies in the effort. Why should
they cooperate
?
A further argument for monarchism, particular to the time of the deci-
44 Gladys Yang, ed. and trans. Silent
China:
selected writings
o/Lu
Xun, 4Z-58.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
248 THE ERA OF
YUAN
SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6
sion for it in mid 1915, had to do with foreign affairs and was, by its
nature, not publicly presented. One of Yuan's intimates wrote of it at the
time,
and the British minister in Peking understood it to be a factor in
the tenacity of the movement.
45
This was the use of the monarchy against
Japan. After the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty of May 1915, the
fear of further Japanese demands on China remained lively in Peking.
Japan had not got all she had asked, and the European war left China
without the saving balance of avarice that kept any one power from
grasping for the whole. It was apparently believed, at least by Yuan
Shih-k'ai, that the switch to a monarchy would keep the Japanese, with
their own monarchical proclivities, at bay until the war ended.
Ambition for himself and his descendants, the key to Yuan's monar-
chism in the view of his detractors, was surely present. Chinese history
had bequeathed a compelling imperial tradition. There is no way com-
paratively to weigh the personal and the political components in Yuan's
decision to tap that tradition. Similarly, his slowness in recognizing its
futility can be attributed equally well to the blindness of ambition or a
stubborn commitment to
a
particular analysis of China's condition.
Yuan's predisposition to revive traditional political ceremonies and
symbols was evident from the beginning of his dictatorship. He seemed
not to want merely to retreat into the past. Rather, he determinedly
combined old and new, blending republican and imperial styles to accom-
modate, or beguile, a mixed constituency of the modernized and the
benighted. In 1914 he celebrated both Confucius and the Wuchang
uprising of 10 October 1911. He praised science and its purgation of
superstition; and he led the country in the worship of Heaven, somewhat
popularizing an ancient imperial prerogative by inviting all to participate.
In August 1915a campaign to declare Yuan emperor was launched, with
the president's implied blessing. And yet the emperor was to be elected
(the process turned out to be formalistic) and the monarchy was to be
constitutional.
Perhaps as remarkable as Yuan's ill-fated lurch at dynastic immortality
was its cool or hostile reception among the country's leading citizens.
Hardly anyone seemed to be beguiled by Yuan's political blends of old
and new. The centralized bureaucratic administration of the dictatorship
was working well enough in 1915 so that power-holders everywhere fol-
lowed instructions. Civilian and military provincial chiefs dutifully
45 Chang I-lin,
Hsin-t'ai-p'ing-shih chi
(Collection of Chang I-lin's works), reprinted in Shen
Yun-lung, ed.
Chin-tai Chung-kuo shih-liao ts'ung-k'an
(Library of historical materials on
modern China), vol.
8
(Taipei,
n.d.),
38-42. John Jordan, Peking
(20
October
1915),
Jordan
Papers, FO 3
50/13.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
YUAN
S
MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT 249
petitioned Yuan to ascend the throne. The appearance of general accept-
ance of the monarchy was, however, deceiving. Just beneath the surface
dissent was rampant.
Yuan's revolutionary enemies, of course, had long been warning that
the president had imperial intentions. The leaders of the Second Revolu-
tion, like Sun Yat-sen, were mostly in exile and politically divided. But
their opposition to the monarchy was automatic, a continuation of their
opposition to Yuan's rule.
Less predictable was the disaffection of political leaders who, though
not part of Yuan's entourage during his years as a Ch'ing official, had
worked with him in opposing the KMT and establishing the dictatorship.
Among them was Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who had supported a reformed
Ch'ing monarchy before and during the 1911 Revolution and had served
in the cabinet during the first months of the dictatorship. He responded
to the announcement of Yuan's monarchical movement by publishing
forthwith a devastating broadside against it.
Even among the longest-standing of Yuan's associates there was sub-
stantial drawing back and foot-dragging at the beginning, followed even-
tually in a few cases by overt opposition. Conspicuous in this tendency
was Feng Kuo-chang, who had worked under Yuan's leadership since
the Sino-Japanese war in building the modernized Peiyang Army and in
1915 was military chief in Nanking. The most prominent of Yuan's
military associates from the 1890s was Tuan Ch'i-jui, who had been army
minister from the beginning of the republic. More than one policy dif-
ference with Yuan had led to Tuan's withdrawal in May 1915. He refused
various pleas for his return to office as long as Yuan persisted on his
monarchical course. Most military and civilian officials were preoccupied
as usual with covering their flanks, but active supporters of Yuan's
monarchy were fewer than members of his own political machine who
expressed their distaste for this
demarche.
Why should those who had contributed their services to the dictator-
ship resist Yuan's monarchy to one degree or another? Some perhaps
felt that their own ambitions would suffer if the top were clogged by a
permanent court. But such considerations could count with only a very
few, if any. A more general source of unease was the injunction of Con-
fucian morality that one should not serve two lords. For the former Ch'ing
official this prohibition applied more strongly to Yuan as emperor than
as president. At the other extreme, there were those who felt that the
imperial mode was out of style and were embarrassed by its reactionary
implications. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao argued that the monarchy was not neces-
sary - it would add nothing to the president's existing powers - and that
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
250 THE ERA OF
YUAN
SHIH-K'AI,
I 9 I 2-1 6
it was in any case a dead institution, with no power to evoke awe and
obedience.
Beneath this array of feelings and arguments against Yuan's monarchy
one detects an underlying disillusionment with Yuan's leadership. For
those who had supported the policies of the dictatorship it was difficult
to admit that these policies had produced disappointing results. But
those who left Yuan's camp to resist his monarchy found themselves
espousing just those political forms that the dictatorship had condemned.
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, for example, later testified that he had become disil-
lusioned with Yuan's rule before the monarchical movement."
6
Although
he had enthusiastically led the dictatorship's campaign to subordinate
provincial authority to the centre, he found himself in 1916 as leader in a
campaign explicitly calling for federalism. 'The province has long been
the basic unit in Chinese polities', Liang noted in March 1916, and he
might as well make the most of it.
47
Feng Kuo-chang and Ts'ai O (a
collaborator in the dictatorship who became a leader in the armed cam-
paign against Yuan) made similar political somersaults.
Yuan's centralizing policies had not worked. His substantial surrender
before Japan's Twenty-one Demands was the latest and most persuasive
evidence. In a curious way, Yuan's monarchical scheme was scapegoated
for political failures in which many had shared. So when Yuan abandoned
his monarchical scheme in March 1916 and resumed the presidency he
did little to dampen the flames of opposition.
More speculatively, we may surmise that the mood of the elite in the
country as a whole had turned against the dictatorship. Such a mood
would at least be understandable in the light of Yuan's policies of harsh
suppression of the favoured party of the restricted electorate of 1912 and
1913,
and the dismantling of assemblies that gave the broad social elite a
direct voice in the political process. The prevalence of this mood would,
through its influence on administrators, help account for widespread
official disaffection at an early stage in the monarchical moment. It would
also explain why the movement against Yuan, led in part by defectors
from the dictatorship, found it politic to champion programmes of con-
stitutionalism, representative government, and federalism that harked
back to the liberal phase of the republic.
48
The armed effort to oppose Yuan's monarchy and then unseat him had
several parts, which were never consolidated. Associates of Sun Yat-sen,
46 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 'Yuan Shih-k'ai chih chieh-p'ou' (An analysis of Yuan Shih-k'ai), Ying-
ping-shih aen-chi (Collected essays from the Ice-drinker's Studio, Taipei, i960), 12. 54.9.
47 Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, 'Ts'ung-chiin jih-chi' (Diary of my military enlistment), in Tun-pi chi,
124-5.
48 Pai Chiao, Yuan Shih-M'aiyii
Chung-hua
min-kuo, 326.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
YUAN
S
MONARCHICAL MOVEMENT 2JI
notably Ch'en Ch'i-mei, Chii Cheng and Chiang Kai-shek, organized from
their bases abroad various assaults along the coast. In November 1915
Yuan's military representative in Shanghai was assassinated. In early
December a warship in the same city was temporarily seized in a failed
attempt to win the navy for an uprising. Sun's largest project, under the
aegis of his new, highly disciplined Chinese Revolutionary Party, was
the creation of a small army in Shantung and an effort, with local allies,
to take the provincial capital for the revolution in the spring of 1916.
Obvious dependence on Japanese money and protection undermined
the significance of the ability of this force to hold positions along the Japa-
nese railway line in Shantung.
The central event in the anti-Yuan campaign was a concerted military
uprising based in Yunnan, where no Peiyang troops were stationed. Sun
Yat-sen's new party played no direct part in the Yunnan uprising, whose
cohesiveness derived from a shared experience in building the Yunnan
Army. This army was first formed in the last years of the Ch'ing as part
of a national, modernized military force. The results in Yunnan were
particularly good, and some of China's best trained young officers par-
ticipated. One of them was Ts'ai O, originally from Hunan, who headed
the post-revolutionary provincial government before accepting central
government posts in late 1913. Ts'ai outspokenly advocated a centralized
national polity and was prominently involved in the suspension of repre-
sentative assemblies in 1914. But he became disillusioned with Yuan.
After the monarchical movement was launched, he conspired with Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao and others to defy Yuan's plans. They secretly left the north
to take up their assignments.
Liang arrived in Shanghai in mid December 1915 and used his personal
prestige and literary talent to enlist more adherents to the anti-Yuan cause.
At about the same time, Ts'ai and other former officers of the Yunnan
Army returned to that province, where they joined with local officers to
lead the military campaign against Yuan. Among those returning was Li
Lieh-chiin of Kiangsi province, a veteran of the Yunnan Army and
comrade with Sun Yat-sen against Yuan in the summer of
1913.
Yunnan's
military
chief,
T'ang Chi-yao, shared with this politically disparate group
the same educational background and late Ch'ing experience in the
Yunnan Army. He joined the revolt.
These events have been best known through the writings of Liang
Ch'i-ch'ao, and something approaching a cult memorialized Ts'ai O in
later years. The importance of both men at this time is uncontested, but
the picture of a unique genesis of the Yunnan movement in Liang's
lodgings in Tientsin in the fall of 1915 is a distortion. Yunnanese army
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE ERA OF
YUAN
SHIH-K'AI, I 9 I 2-1 6
officers
on the
spot
had
secretly been discussing resistance
to the mon-
archy since September.
The
galvanizing effect
of
Ts'ai
O's
return
to
Yunnan
in
December depended upon
the
revolutionary leanings
of a
portion
of the
province's military leadership.
His
commanding presence
served
to
bring around
the
waverers
and
accelerate
the
decision
to
strike
at Yuan's forces.
49
Even
if
Ts'ai
had
never come, some sort
of
movement
would likely have erupted
in
Yunnan.
The campaign took
its
name from
a
temple
in the
provincial capital
and became known
as the
National Protection Army (Hu-kuo Chun).
Yuan
was
delivered
an
ultimatum
on 24
December
1915,
which
he
ignored.
The
movement
was
formally launched
on the
next
day. The
planners counted
on
early support from
the
neighbouring provinces
of
Kweichow
and
Kwangsi. Invading expeditions were organized
for
Szechwan, Hunan
and
Kwangtung.
The
most important
of
these,
the one
into Szechwan,
was
under Ts'ai
O's
personal command. Among
his
officers was Chu Teh, later organizer with Mao Tse-tung of the Red Army.
At first numbering about 3,000 men, this so-called First Army
of
the Na-
tional Protection movement faced Szechwan's
own
divisions
and
well-
armed Peiyang troops already present
in
Szechwan
(one of the com-
manders
was
Feng Yii-hsiang
of
later warlord fame). When Yuan
saw
the seriousness
of
what was happening,
he
ordered large reinforcements
up
the
Yangtze from Central China.
The
odds were formidably adverse
for Ts'ai
O's
expedition, even
as it
acquired
its own
reinforcements.
And
yet it
persevered, demonstrating
to the
whole country Yuan's
vulnerability. Ts'ai's force enjoyed the
esprit de corps
forged
in
the Yunnan
Army
in the
late Ch'ing.
Its
command
was
well coordinated
and
skilful.
Ts'ai's tactics were marked, according
to
Japanese military intelligence,
by attacks initiated
at
night, sophisticated
use of
terrain,
and
effective
political work with
the
Szechwan troops.
A
whole Szechwanese division
defected
to
Ts'ai's side,
and the
Peiyang troops suffered unexpectedly
large casualties.'
0
In
addition, the mobilization
of
'bandit' forces in various
49 Sutton, Provincial
militarism,
i84-91 sifts the evidence regarding the initiation of the uprising
in Yunnan in December 1915. For earlier challenges to Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's account see.
Chin Ch'ung-chi,
'
Yun-nan hu-kuo yun-tung ti chen-cheng fa-tung-che shih shui ?' (Who
was the true initiator of the Yunnan National Protection movement?), in Chou K'ang-
hsieh,
et al. eds.
Chin-erh-shih-nien
Chung-kuo
shih-hsueh lun-wen
hui-pien,
ch'u-pien:
hsin-hai
ko-
mingyen-chiu
iun-chi li-i-chi
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