The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 12: Republican China, 1912-1949, Part 1
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FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
I2
3
TABLE 27
Balance
of
international
payments, 190}, ipjo, 19JJ
(mil/ions
Chinese
f)
1903 1930
1935
Current out-payments
Merchandise imports
Specie imports
Service of foreign loans
Chinese expenditures abroad
Remittances of foreign enterprises
and other profits
Total
Current in-paymentt
Merchandise exports
Specie exports
Foreign expenditures in
China
Overseas remittances
Total
Capital in-payments
New foreign investments
in China
Unaccounted for
492
58
69
7
35
661
374
Ji
81
"4
620
4J
—
1
1,96;
IOI
III
3
127
1.417
1.476
48
218
316
2,058
202
-M7
1,129
—
108
55
55
1.347
662
357
150
260
i.4»9
140
222
Source:
Li
Choh-ming, 'International trade',
in H. F.
MacNair,
ed.
China, JOI.
then noticeably accelerated from 1919 to 1931. Measured in terms of
quantity rather than value, trade grew somewhat less rapidly. Imports
were fairly steady in the last two decades of the nineteenth century; from
1900 there was a steady upward trend broken only by the disruptions
resulting from the First World War which, we have noted, allowed
some leeway for the growth of Chinese industry. Exports grew steadily
from about 1907. Available data indicate that the trend in the simple terms
of trade was against China (see table 26), but this would only be signi-
ficant to the degree that the Chinese economy was linked to the world
market as a result of expanding foreign trade. In the case of China that
linkage was of less importance than in many other 'underdeveloped'
countries.
In all the years of the republic, as had been the case since the 1880s,
China's foreign trade was marked by an import surplus, and the current
account balance was consistently unfavourable. China's ability to sustain
merchandise imports in excess of merchandise exports to a large extent
appears to have been due to remittances from Overseas Chinese, which
year after year flowed back to the homeland, as well as to new foreign
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
124 ECONOMIC TRENDS, 1912-49
TABLE 28
Composition of foreign trade
(per
cent current value)
Imports
Cotton goods
Cotton yarn
Raw cotton
Rice and wheat
Wheat flour
Sugar
Tobacco
Paper
Kerosene
Petroleum
Transport materials
Chemicals, dyes and pigments
Iron,
steel
and
other metals
Machinery
All others
Exports
Silk
and
silk goods
Tea
Beans
and
bean cake
Seeds and
oil
Egg
and egg
products
Hides,
leather and skins
Ores
and
metals
Coal
Cotton yarn
and
cotton goods
Raw cotton
All others
1915
•93
12.7
<>•)
3-3
1.8
6.4
2.9
••}
4-S
—
0.8
5.6
5-3
1-4
34.2
100.0
*S-3
8.4
12.0
7.8
"•4
6.0
3-3
1.6
0.6
4.0
29.6
100.0
1916
14.1
12.4
1.6
6.6
0.2
7'
5.8
1.8
6.2
0.2
4.0
4.1
!••
••3
29.5
100.0
22.3
9.0
9-3
8.4
2.6
6.0
6.3
1.2
0.8
3.6
3°-5
100.0
1920
21.8
10.6
*-4
0.8
o-i
5*
4-7
1.9
7'
0.4
2.6
6.4
8-3
3*
24.3
100.0
18.6
1.6
13.0
9.1
4.0
4-3
3-2
*-3
'•4
••7
40.8
100.0
1925
16.3
4-4
7-4
6.8
1.6
9-5
4.1
2.0
7-o
0.9
1.9
5.6
4-7
1.8
26.0
100.0
22.5
2.9
15.9
7-9
4-3
4.0
2.9
2.6
2.0
3.8
31.2
100.0
• 928
14.2
1.6
5-7
5-7
2.6
8.3
J-1
2-4
!•*
i-4
i-3
7-5
S-4
1.8
30.8
100.0
18.4
3-7
20.5
5-8
4-4
S-4
2.1
2.9
3.8
5-4
29.6
100.0
1931
7.6
0.3
12.6
10.6
2.0
6.0
4-4
3-2
4-5
1.8
2
-3
8.0
6.2
3-1
27.4
100.0
'3-3
3.6
21.4
8.4
4.1
4.1
1.6
3°
4-9
2.9
3*-7
100.0
1936
1-5
0.2
3.8
4.1
o.J
2.2
1.8
4->
4*
4.1
5.6
10.8
13.2
6.4
37-5
100.0
7.8
4-3
••3
18.7
5-9
5-7
7-7
1.6
3°
4.0
40.0
100.0
Source: Yu-Kwei Cheng, Foreign trade
and
industrial
development
of
China,
32, 34.
investment.
All
available estimates
of
China's balance
of
international
payments, however, include
a
substantial amount 'unaccounted
for'
even
after remittances
and
investment are considered.
The
estimates
in
table
27
for 1903, 1930,
and
1935
are by H. B.
Morse,
C. F.
Remer,
and the
Bank
of China respectively.
In
the mid
nineteenth century China's principal exports
had
been silk
and
tea.
They accounted
for
92 per
cent
of the
total
in
1871, dropped
to
about
80 per
cent during the 1880s,
to
approximately 50
per
cent
in
1898,
and thereafter continued
to
decline
as
table
28
indicates. While they
continued
to
be predominantly natural resource products, China's exports
were considerably diversified
in die
course
of
the twentieth century.
The
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FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 125
principal new export was the soy-bean and its products, grown largely in
Manchuria. Of increasing importance, too, were the export of iron ore and
coal
to
Japan, and the shipment
of
cotton yarn
to
Japan by Japanese-
owned spinning mills in China.
Until the 1890s when it was surpassed by cotton cloth and yarn, opium
was the most important import into China. In about 1900 cotton cloth and
yarn constituted 40 per cent of total imports. The growth of Chinese- and
foreign-owned textile mills
in
China led
to a
decline
in
cotton textile
imports. To supply these new mills, however, China became a significant
importer of raw cotton. By 1936 domestic cotton output was almost able
to meet the demand; but in the post-1945 period raw cotton was again
critically short, testifying both to the decline of agricultural production
and to the disruption of transport by the civil war. In general, the pro-
portion of industrial raw materials and equipment in total imports grew
steadily but very slowly, while such manufactured consumer goods
as
textiles, cigarettes and matches declined. In the late 1920s and early 1930s,
rice,
wheat and wheat flour climbed
in
importance among imports but
then fell again with economic recovery
in
1935 and 1936. Rural and
especially urban population growth, lagging agricultural output, and poor
transport made the task
of
feeding China's urban population always
a
difficult one.
Table 29 shows the proportions
of
China's trade with her leading
suppliers and customers. There was
a
gradual diversification
of
trade
between 1906 and 1936 as the growing percentage attributable to 'others'
indicates (the apparent sharp drop
in
imports from Hong Kong is the
result of a new invoice system, introduced in 1932, intended to identify
the actual national origin
of
goods shipped
to
China through Hong
Kong).
Great Britain, Japan and the United States were China's principal
trading partners. Japanese trade was predominant
in
Manchuria and
North China and smallest
in
the south. The reverse was true of Great
Britain. American trade, which exceeded that
of
all other countries
in
the mid 1930s, was concentrated in Central China. The decline in Japan's
share after 1931 is to some degree a measure of
the
effectiveness of Chinese
boycotts following the 'Mukden incident'.
The question remains of the overall consequences for China's economy
of the patterns of foreign trade and investment just described. We have
been categorical
in
stating that
in
aggregate terms they bulked much
smaller than
in
many other 'underdeveloped' economies. Yet
to
many
Chinese and foreign observers these were the most critical influences
shaping the course
of
modern Chinese history. The difficulty here, we
suggest,
is
one
of
precipitating out purely economic factors from the
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126
ECONOMIC TRENDS, 1912-49
TABLE 29
Distribution of foreign trade among
trading
partners
(per cent current value)
Imports
from:
Great Britain
Hong Kong
Japan and Taiwan
United States
Russia
France
Germany
Others
Exports to:
Great Britain
Hong Kong
Japan and Taiwan
United States
Russia
France
Germany
Others
1906
18.4
33.8
•4-3
10.4
O.I
1.0
4.0
18.0
100.0
5.6
35°
14.1
10.9
7-9
10.7
2-4
'3-4
100.0
1913
16.5
29.3
20.4
6.0
5.8
0.9
4.8
18.3
100.0
4-i
29.0
16.2
9-3
11.1
10.1
4-*
16.0
100.0
1919
9-S
22.6
36.3
16.2
2.1
—
12.8
100.0
9.1
20.8
30.9
16.0
3-4
5-4
—
14.4
100.0
1927
7-3
20.6
28.4
16.1
2.2
1-4
3.8
20.2
100.0
6.3
18.5
22.7
13-3
8.4
5-6
2.2
23.0
100.0
1931
8.3
M-3
20.0
22.2
1-7
••!
5.8
25.2
100.0
7-
1
16.3
27.4
13.2
6.0
3-8
*•)
23-7
IOO.0
1936
11.7
1.9
16.3
19.6
O.I
2.0
15.9
32.5
100.0
9.2
I).I
14.5
26.4
0.6
4-3
5-5
24.4
100.0
Source:
Yu-Kwei Cheng,
Foreign trade and industrial development
of
China,
20, 48-9.
complex mixture that was the foreign impact upon twentieth-century
China.
12
' China was changed by her modern encounter with the West,
and it was the hope of economic gain which first brought the foreigner
and his ways to the Middle Kingdom. Foreign economic activity was
largely responsible for calling forth a small modern sector of Chinese-
and foreign-owned trading and manufacturing enterprises on the fringe
of the Chinese empire. But the Chinese economy as a whole underwent no
significant transformation; at best there occurred only a 'partial develop-
ment'. The large foreign role in the modern sector of the economy was
based on an artificially low tariff and the privileges of extraterritoriality,
was supported by highly-developed industrial economies at home, and
was abetted by the siphoning off of capital in indemnity and loan payments
to foreign creditors. But all this cannot be made to bear more than a
part of the obloquy for China's economic stagnation. To assert more than
this is to obscure the ideological and political disequilibrium which was
the most profound consequence of the impact of the West, and which for
izj See A. Feuerwerker, 'The foreign presence in China', ch. 3 of this volume.
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FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT llf
decades obstructed the emergence of a new political integration capable
of replacing the Confucian imperial pattern of the past and taking advan-
tage of the possibilities of economic development inherent in modern
industrial technology.
The Chinese economy, in the years covered by this chapter at least,
did not occupy centre stage in the unfolding of the drama of Chinese
history. It was only one of the supporting cast - with a few choice lines
perhaps - waiting on the words of emperors, bureaucrats, diplomats,
generals, propagandists, and party organizers.
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CHAPTER
3
THE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN CHINA
The foreign establishment in early republican China had many facets:
territory, people, rights established by treaty or unilaterally asserted,
armed force, diplomacy, religion, commerce, journalism, freebooting
adventure, racial attitudes. The pages that follow describe briefly the di-
mensions of each of the principal guises in which the foreigner impinged
upon the polity, economy, society and mind of China. The physiological,
intellectual and spiritual results of the foreign presence are still beyond our
capacity to summarize.
THE FOREIGN NETWORK
Unlike India, South-East Asia (except Thailand) and most of Africa,
China was not partitioned and ruled by the alien powers which imposed
themselves upon the weakened Ch'ing empire in the last half of the
nineteenth century. China was too big for any one power to swallow, and
seemed too dazzling a prize for a satisfactory division of shares to be
worked out. Consequently China's sovereignty was impaired, but it never
came near to being vanquished. The foreigner had always to acknowledge
that there was a Chinese authority, central or local, with which he had to
contend. In some parts of China's territory, however, that authority was
formally reduced, even ceded, in the interests of foreign claimants and as
a consequence of demands to which China acceded only because she was
too weak to refuse. These were variously treaty ports, concessions,
leaseholds and spheres of influence.
Treaty ports
'Treaty port' is a protean term. The precise limits of the
chiang-k'ou,
literally 'harbours' or 'anchorages', were matters of dispute because the
English text of the Treaty of Nanking (1842) granting foreigners the
rights of residence and trade read, more broadly, 'cities and towns'. But
there is no question that Shanghai, Canton, Foochow, Amoy and Ningpo
128
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THE FOREIGN NETWORK 129
were sea ports. By 1893, 28 additional places had been opened to foreign
trade, and during 1894-1917, 59 more, making a total of 92 by the latter
date.
Some were inland cities or places on China's land frontiers; others
were coastal ports or railway junctions in Manchuria; many were river
ports on the Yangtze or West Rivers. Collectively they were commonly
called in Chinese
shang-pu
or
shang-fou,
'trading ports'. Juridically, the
ports that were open to foreign trade fell into three categories: 'treaty
ports'
proper, that is, ports opened as a consequence of an international
treaty or agreement; 'open ports' voluntarily opened by the government
of China though not obliged to by treaty; and 'ports of call' at which
foreign steamers were permitted to land or take on board passengers
and under certain restrictions goods, but at which foreign residence was
prohibited. Maritime Customs stations were maintained at only 48 of
these 92 various places as of 1915, which suggests that many played no
significant role in China's international commerce.
At the 'treaty ports' proper China's sovereignty had been diminished
in two important respects: first, foreign nationals could reside, own
property and engage in business at these places under the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of their consuls (and might travel inland with a passport, but
could not legally, except for missionaries, reside in the interior); and
second, foreign goods, having been landed at a treaty port, were upon
one payment of the import duty (according to a tariff China did not con-
trol) exempt from all further levies if reshipped to other treaty ports.
The treaty powers forced the Chinese government to extend this tariff
privilege to the voluntarily-opened ports. However, these last were
distinguished from those treaty ports in which foreign 'concessions' or
'settlements' existed in that Chinese local officials retained exclusive
control of the municipal administration and police.
Foreign concessions or settlements were established in 16 treaty ports,
that is, specific areas were set aside for foreign residence in which local
administration (police, sanitation, roads, building regulations, and so
forth) was in foreign hands and was financed by local taxes levied by the
foreign authorities. The foreign residential areas at Tientsin, Hankow and
Canton, for example, were 'concessions'. In these places entire areas were
expropriated or purchased by the Chinese government and leased in
perpetuity to particular powers (Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan,
Russia, Belgium, Italy and Austria-Hungary at Tientsin; Great Britain,
France, Germany, Japan and Russia at Hankow; Great Britain and France
at Canton). The consul of the nation holding the concessional lease, aided
sometimes by a municipal council, was the chief official of each concession
through whom individual foreigners obtained sub-leases to particular
pieces of property.
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o
THE
FOREIGN
PRESENCE
IN
CHINA
MAP
5.
Foreign
'territory'
in
China
about
1920
The Treaty Ports
• Ports opened by 1900
© Ports opened 1900—1920
O Major cities that never
became treaty ports
HI
Foreign Leased Areas. 1898
Port Arthur and Liaotung Penin-
sula (Kwantung) (Russian)
Weihaiwei (British)
Kiaochow (German)
^
Kowloon New Territories (British)
Kwang-chow-wan (French)
Neutral zones
f
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Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
THE FOREIGN NETWORK 131
The International and French 'Settlements'
in
Shanghai consisted
of
areas set apart by treaty
for
foreign residence and trade but not leased
to the powers concerned. The Chinese authorities issued title deeds
to
the foreigners who had purchased land from the original Chinese owners.
The deeds were then registered in the foreign consulates, which in effect
granted
a
title guarantee making the transfer
of
land more certain and
enhancing the value of each property to the advantage of foreign lawyers,
missionaries
and
others who reali2ed considerable income,
as
trustee
owners. No Chinese was legally permitted
to
hold land in
a
concession,
although
in
fact many did through foreign proxy.
In
the Shanghai set-
tlements substantial amounts
of
land were held directly by Chinese and
never transferred to foreign ownership.
By means of pressure on the Tsungli Yamen by the Diplomatic Body
in Peking
- a
formally legitimate means
to
obtain results
in
China
-
the
limits of the International Settlement, originally an area of approximately
one square mile for the combined British and American Settlements (see
volume 10, pages 238-9), were extended to 2.75 square miles in 1893 and
8.35 square miles
in
1899. The French Settlement, originally 0.26 square
miles
in
area, grew by extensions
in
1881, 1900 and 1914
to
3.9 square
miles.
Efforts in 1915 and later by the Municipal Council of the Interna-
tional Settlement and the British minister
in
Peking
to
obtain formal
approval
for
the incorporation
of
additional territory into the Interna-
tional Settlement were resisted
by the
Chinese government,
now
beginning to respond to nationalist sentiments which demanded the rendi-
tion of all foreign concessions and settlements. But by the development
and occupation of adjacent lands
-
the building of extra-concessional roads
followed by the laying of water mains and electricity cables, and ultimately
the exercising
of
taxation and policing powers
- the
'external roads
areas'
under
de
facto foreign control grew considerably between 1916
and 1925.
Exclusively foreign municipal governments were elaborated
in the
Shanghai Settlements through the medium of successive 'land regulations'
issued by the foreign consuls. The Chinese had not envisaged this munic-
ipal development when they assented to the 1842, 1843 and 1858 treaties,
but the Peking government had to accept as/a/V
accompli
what the Diplo-
matic Body, which sometimes as in 1898 substantially modified Shanghai's
proposals, presented for its formal sanction. The 1898 Land Regulations
were the last revision of the 'constitution' of the International Settlement
before 1928, when Chinese representatives were admitted
to
the Munic-
ipal Council. They provided the dominant 'taipan oligarchy' with less
formal autonomy than
it
sought because decisions
of
the annual rate-
payers' meeting remained subject to the approval of the Shanghai Consular
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132 THE FOREIGN PRESENCE IN CHINA
Body and the Diplomatic Body in Peking while the Shanghai Municipal
Council's (SMC) powers were nominally restricted. Friction between the
SMC and the Consular and Diplomatic Bodies was frequent and on
occasion open. In practice, however, the latter might criticize but usually
supported the more aggressive attitude of the Shanghai residents towards
local Chinese authority.
The Municipal Council of the International Settlement, formally only
an executive body of the ratepayers' meeting, extended its authority
steadily and acquired wide powers of government, including the power
to tax and police both foreign and Chinese residents. (No Chinese taxes
were collected in the foreign settlements in Shanghai apart from a land
tax - since the land remained Chinese territory - and the Maritime
Customs duties.) The nine SMC members were chosen by an electorate
limited to foreigners who owned land valued at not less than 500 taels
or who paid a rental of at least 500 taels per annum. These numbered
slightly more than 2,000 in the early republic, less than 10 per cent of the
total foreign population. Ratepayers' meetings, in the absence of extraor-
dinary issues, were often poorly attended. Election to the council was to
a degree managed by a small inner circle, largely British, representing
business interests. The municipal employees of the International Set-
tlement were predominately British (965 out of 1,076 in the early 1920s
not including 792 Sikhs in the police force) as were the heads of all the
principal departments - Health, Public Works, Electricity, Sewage
Disposal, Finance, the Fire Brigade, the Volunteer Corps and the Sec-
retariat of the Municipal Council.
Chinese sovereignty was theoretically intact, but in practice the con-
cessions and settlements were self-governing foreign enclaves. Within
them, in addition to the extraterritorial rights and privileges extended to
foreigners, the International Settlement authorities exercised de jacto
jurisdiction over Chinese residents who constituted the overwhelming
majority of the population but who were not accorded the right of par-
ticipation in the municipal governments. Chinese living in the conces-
sions or settlements could be arrested by Chinese authorities only with
the approval of the appropriate foreign consul. In the Shanghai Interna-
tional Settlement, civil or criminal cases between Chinese were tried before
a mixed court often dominated in practice (not by treaty right) by foreign
assessors. The right of Chinese troops to pass through the concessions or
settlements was consistently denied by the foreign municipal authorities,
who maintained that these were neutral territories with respect to China's
civil wars.
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