The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368

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FOREIGN EXPANSION 443

ally inflicted on Chinese peasants. After these raids, the nomads would

simply flee into the vast open spaces of the Central Asian steppes or deserts

and evade the pursuing armies of the sedentary peoples. Such attacks imper-

iled the long-distance caravan trade across Eurasia that Khubilai sought to

foster and that required secure towns and oases in Central Asia. If hostile

groups controlled these essential halting places, they could disrupt this

commerce.

Khubilai's cousin Khaidu represented the Mongolian nomadic values that

threatened the increasingly sedentary Mongolian dynasty in China. Khaidu

enjoyed the life of the nomad and lord of pastoral herdsmen, not the life of

the governor and ruler of peasants. His habitat was the open spaces, not a

grand palace in a populous capital city. He favored the pastoral nomadic

society rather than the sedentary agricultural society ruled by a central govern-

ment and staffed by a bureaucracy. The Chinese sources unfairly portray him

as a plunderer and a treacherous renegade. But he did not intend either to

destroy the flourishing towns in the region or to dismantle their commercial

bases.

In fact, Khaidu actively discouraged the pillaging of the Central Asian

oases and must have instructed his underlings not to harass their inhabitants.

Instead, he levied taxes on the towns, and the revenues he derived were used

to support his forces. Nonetheless, he appeared to be the defender of the

Mongolian heritage that, in his view, Khubilai had betrayed.

The precise date of the onset of hostilities between Khubilai and Khaidu is

difficult to establish. As early as 9 July 1266, Khubilai had appointed his son

Nomukhan as pet

p'ing

wang (prince of the pacification of the north), intend-

ing that the young man take charge of the military affairs of north China and

prevent incursions onto the soil of northwest China. Yet five years elapsed

before Khubilai actually assigned his son to the Central Asian outpost of

Almalikh (modern Huo-ch'eng, Sinkiang), to protect that region from

Khaidu's incursions. Khubilai also erred grievously in sending several cous-

ins of Nomukhan's to accompany him, for they all engaged in bitter disputes

that impeded the expedition and finally led to its failure.

Nomukhan made little progress in crushing the dissidents in Central Asia.

He succeeded in developing supply lines for his troops, but he could not

readily engage the enemy. Khaidu's forces organized guerrilla-like operations

against his troops but would not fight traditional battles. Whenever they

found themselves outnumbered or in distress, they simply fled into the

41 The hostile Chinese views of Khaidu may be found in K'o Shao-min, Hsin Yuan sbib (Tientsin, 1922;

author's and revised ed., Peking, 1930); repr. in Erhshih wushih, ed. Erh shin wu shin k'an hsing wei

yuan hui (Shanghai, 1935; repr. Taipei, 1962-9; and other recent facsimile reprints), p. 6850; T'u

Chi, Meng-um-trh sbib chi (Taipei, 1962), 74, pp. 6a~7b; Shao Yiian-p'ing, comp., Yuan sbib Itipitn

(1699;

repr. Taipei, 1962, 1968), pp. 1595-7.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

444 THE REIGN OF KHUBILAI KHAN

steppelands or desert, terrain with which they were familiar. Nomukhan's

forces were frustrated because they could not easily pursue the highly mobile

guerrilla forces and engage them in combat. To break the deadlock, in 1275

Khubilai sent his wife's nephew An-t'ung (1245-93), a capable and promi-

nent figure who was at that time right prime minister

(yu

Ch'eng-hsiang),

assist Nomukhan.

arriving

Nomukhan's encampment, An-t'ung

quickly recognized that factionalism divided the various princes on the expe-

dition and was hampering effective operations. By siding with Nomukhan,

however, he too became embroiled in these disputes.

In late 1276, the princes who accompanied Nomukhan plotted to sabotage

his expedition. The conspirators, who included two of Arigh Boke's sons and

one of Mongke's sons, seized Nomukhan and delivered him to the khan of the

Golden Horde of Russia, and they turned over An-t'ung to Khaidu.

Their

captors detained the two men for almost a decade but did not harm them.

The conspirators were disappointed, however, to discover that Khaidu equivo-

cated on an alliance with them; he did not want them in his domains. Shortly

thereafter, they migrated to what they perceived to be a safer location, the

Mongolian steppe. Eventually, both the khan of the Golden Horde and

Khaidu, unable to raise

ransom for the two captives and seeing no gain

from continuing to detain them, released Nomukhan and An-t'ung. Khubi-

lai warmly greeted his son and his nephew when they returned in 1284 and

once again granted them their old positions and titles.

Khubilai had not been idle during the decade that elapsed between the

seizure and release of Nomukhan and An-t'ung. On learning of

the

capture of

Nomukhan, he had dispatched Bayan, his ablest and most renowned general,

to retrieve his son. Bayan, who had just returned from his extremely success-

ful campaigns against the Southern Sung dynasty, was repeatedly frustrated

in his efforts. Like Nomukhan

himself,

Bayan was unable to engage the

enemy,

Khaidu's forces continually eluded

his

troops. Nomukhan's

leaderless troops also made some valiant attempts to free Khubilai's son, but

they too failed to secure his release.

Khubilai eventually acknowledged that he could not control Central Asia

and was compelled to accept Khaidu as the de facto ruler of

the

area. Even his

most prominent general had been unable to extend Khubilai's suzerainty into

Central Asia. Admitting his failure, he reluctantly relinquished his position

in the steppelands and oases of the region. He retreated to the more defensi-

ble confines of Chinese settlement, allowing Khaidu free rein beyond these

villages. Yet he could not prevent Khaidu from raiding these villages, which

had been his primary objective. The difficulties he encountered were that the

42 Boyle, The

successors

Genghis

khan, p. 266.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES 445

supply lines required to maintain his armies and the friendly local inhabit-

ants were long and fragile; that the constant harassment and elusiveness of

the nomads irritated and intimidated his soldiers and allies alike; and that

the self-sufficiency he sought to achieve for the oases and towns in the region

was never realized. In short, Khubilai's foray into Central Asia had achieved

nothing.

He was more successful in resisting challenges in Mongolia. The conspira-

tors who had betrayed his son Nomukhan had moved to Mongolia and

planned an attack against the traditional Mongolian capital at Khara

Khorum. Khubilai and his government were much better prepared to cope

with such a threat in Mongolia than they were farther west. They had, for

some time, encouraged agriculture in the regions around Khara Khorum, by

remitting taxes and disseminating knowledge of more advanced farming

techniques to the local people.43 They had also founded postal stations to

provide a strategic and commercial link with the new Mongolian capital in

north China and had sent craftsmen to help the natives develop their own

artisan class. Such measures had gained for them the support of the local

people, who thus cooperated in the campaigns against the rebellious princes.

Early in 1279, Khubilai's troops launched an expedition to crush the dissi-

dents.

With the help of the local people, they defeated and captured the

princes within a few months. By the end of the year, Mongolia had been

preserved as part of Khubilai's domain.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES

While engaged in the conquests of southern China and Korea and the pacifica-

tion of Inner Asia and Mongolia, Khubilai was not unmindful of the difficul-

ties he faced in north China. The China that he sought to rule in 1260

confronted serious problems that he needed to address. It had not truly

recovered from the destruction caused by the Mongolian conflicts with the

Chin dynasty from 1211 to 1234. Its peasants were uncertain about the

intentions of their Mongolian rulers. They needed to be reassured that their

lands would neither be confiscated nor would arbitrary and exorbitant taxes

be imposed on them. But the succession struggle with Arigh Boke and the

conflict with the Southern Sung hampered commerce, and the lack of an

accepted legal code caused great confusion. The system of education was

in disarray because the civil service examinations, the focus of formal educa-

tion in China, had been suspended. The formal religions could not gauge

43 John Dardess, "From Mongol empire to Yuan dynasty: Changing forms of imperial rule in Mongolia

and Central Asia,"

lAonumtnta

Serica,

30 (1972—3), pp. 143—60.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

446 THE REIGN OF KHUBILAI KHAN

Khubilai's and the Mongols' policies toward them. The Buddhist hierarchy

recognized that Khubilai was sympathetic, but the Taoists did not know

whether the new government woud discriminate against them. The Confu-

cians worried that the Mongols would abandon the traditional court rituals

and would downgrade the status of scholars. Perhaps most important,

Khubilai's Chinese subjects were concerned about their position. They would

surely be excluded from certain high offices, but would they be discriminated

against in other ways?

Khubilai needed to respond to such questions and to deal with these

problems if he wished to create order in Chinese society. The government

agencies that he had formed were valuable mechanisms, but they required

direction. Khubilai had to articulate the political, social, and economic

policies that he meant them to implement. He had to disclose his plans for

ruling rather than merely exploiting China, and his officials might then

emulate and assist him in seeking to govern the sedentary civilization. Some

scholars have wondered about Khubilai's own involvement in the decisions

that charted the course for the early years of his reign. Did he take an active

role in devising the policies and programs pursued during this time? Or did

his Chinese advisers merely present him with proposals that he, with little

reflection, then adopted? To be sure, Khubilai did not originate many of the

policies that were subsequently implemented. Yet he did not sit back and

simply await proposals. He actively solicited suggestions. One of his officials

quotes him as saying: "Those who present memorials to make proposals may

present them with envelopes sealed. ... If the proposals are useful, the

Court will liberally promote and reward the persons who make the propos-

als."

Wang Yiin, a contemporary observer, tells us that Khubilai partici-

pated in the deliberations at court. In the space of a week in May 1261, for

example, Wang had three audiences with Khubilai to discuss governmental

affairs.

Before embarking on a planned, orderly program to define and clarify his

social, political, and economic ideals, Khubilai was required to relieve the

misery of the people in north China. The wars preceding the Mongolian

takeover caused much destruction and enormous loss of life in north China.

Such devastation clearly entailed great suffering for the survivors. In the first

few years of his reign, Khubilai repeatedly responded to appeals for assistance

and tax exemption from numerous regions in his domains. The Chinese

44 Lao Yan-shuan, "The Chung-t'ang shih-chi of Wang Yiin: An annotated translation with an introduc-

tion"

(Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1962), p. 34.

45 Ho Ping-ti, Studies

the

population

of China, 1368-1953 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 258; see John

Langlois's brief remarks on this demographic problem in the introduction to China

under Mongol

rule,

p. 20.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES 447

sources record that he often waived or reduced taxes on areas that were

experiencing economic difficulties. He also provided paper money, grain,

and clothing to villages afflicted by natural disasters.

Together with such

immediate measures, however, he also needed to develop a long-range pro-

gram for China's economic recovery.

One of the pivots of such a program was the encouragement of agriculture.

In 1261, Khubilai founded the Office for the Stimulation of Agriculture

(Ch'iian-nung ssu) which, in turn, selected men knowledgeable in agronomy

to help the peasants make the best use of their land. The office submitted to

the central government annual reports on agriculture, sericulture, and water

control projects. Khubilai eventually organized a large bureaucracy to pro-

mote the more efficient and productive use of the land. He ordered the

construction of granaries to store surplus grain as insurance against shortages

of food in bad times. His concern for his sedentary subjects was demonstrated

in an edict of 1262 that prohibited the nomads' animals from roaming in the

farmlands. He did not want his own Mongolian people to encroach on and

perhaps cause additional damage to the valuable territory of the peasants.

Khubilai also sought to help the peasants organize themselves for eco-

nomic recovery. In 1270, he gave official standing to the organizations

known as

she,

composed of about fifty households under the direction ofashe-

chang, or village leader, to stimulate agricultural production and to promote

reclamation. Khubilai gave the

she

the mandate of properly farming, plant-

ing trees, opening up barren areas, improving flood control and irrigation,

increasing silk production, and stocking the lakes and rivers with fish.

Khubilai and his advisers conceived of the she as self-help organizations for

the peasants, but they also intended to graft other functions onto them. They

hoped to use the she to restore stability in the countryside and to aid in

surveillance and in the conduct of censuses.

Perhaps the government's most innovative objective was to employ the

new organization to promote universal education. Each she was entrusted

with the task of setting up schools for the children in the villages. The

peasant children would attend the schools when little labor was required on

the farms. The chronicles of the period make grandiose claims for this

educational system. By 1286, there were, according to the dynastic history,

20,166 she schools. But this figure seems inflated, for the leaders of the she,

recognizing what was expected of them, probably exaggerated their reports

46 For some of these relief efforts, see YS, 4, pp. 70—1; 5, pp. 83—6; 6, pp. 113—14.

47 Ta Yuan

Is'ang

k'u chi (Peking, 1936), pp. 1—3; Paul Ratchnevsky, Un

code

Yuan

(Paris, 1937), vol.

pp. 189—90.

48 Inosaki Takaoki, "Gendai shasei noseijiteki kosatsu,"

Toyoshi

kenkyu,

15 (July 1956), pp. 6—10; Yang

Ne,

"Yuan tai nung ts'un she chih yen chiu," Li shih

yen

chiu, 4 (1965)4, pp. 117—34.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

448 THE REIGN OF KHUBILAI KHAN

to the central government, conveying an image of a growing number of

schools. The vision of a universal education system was certainly never ful-

filled; indeed, there is little evidence that

she

were ever organized throughout

China.

Yet this vision reveals that Khubilai and his advisers embraced the

concept of a literate peasantry whose interests the government would serve.

No longer would the Mongolian rulers of China concern themselves exclu-

sively with the nomads. The peasants also would receive a fair share of their

attention.

An even clearer indication was the government's efforts to limit the finan-

cial burdens on the peasants. Khubilai devised a fixed, regular system of

taxation, dispensed with tax farming, and reduced the power of the appa-

nages.

Under the new system, the previously unpredictable payments that the

peasants had been compelled to make to the appanages would now be remitted

to the government and then divided equally between the appanages and the

central government. The peasants would pay annual grain taxes and would not

need to be concerned about capricious levies imposed by the appanage holders.

They would also be liable to a head tax, as were other segments of the

population, including craftsmen and clerics. Their other principal burden was

corvee obligations, which could be as onerous as taxes. Khubilai built roads

and a capital city, extended the Grand Canal, and organized a postal relay

system, all of which required vast investments of labor. Yet he sought,

throughout his reign, to limit excessive demands on the peasants and, on

occasion, waived other taxes on those called on for corvee. He could not

control all his officials, however, and some labor demands on the peasants were

unreasonable. It seems clear though that Khubilai, unlike many traditional

Mongols, did not seek merely to exploit the Chinese peasants.

Like his forebears, Khubilai cherished artisans. Unlike the traditional

Chinese, he accorded craftsmen a high status. Because the Mongols had few

craftsmen of their own, they relied on foreigners for the craft articles they

required. Khubilai thereby set up a number of offices in his government both

to organize and to safeguard the welfare of

artisans.

His household agencies,

for example, included the Bureau for Imperial Manufactures (Chiang-tso

yuan),

which was charged with providing jewelry, clothing, and textiles for

the court. To win the artisans' allegiance, Khubilai enacted favorable regula-

tions.

The government offered them fairly good salaries, rations of food and

clothing, and exemptions from corvee labor. It also permitted them to pro-

49 See Herbert F. Schurmann,

Economic structure

of the Yuan dynasty:

Translation

chapters

g$ and 94 of the

Yuan shih, Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies, vol. 16 (Cambridge, Mass., 1956; repr. 1967), p.

47-

50 Aritaka Iwao, "Gendai no nomin seikatsu ni tsuite," Kuwaiara Hakushi ianreii

kinen Toyoshi

ronso,

ed.

Kuwabara Hakushi kanreki kinen shukugakai (Kyoto, 1934), pp.

951—

!•

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES 449

duce articles for sale as long as they fulfilled their annual quotas for the court.

In return for these privileges, however, the court mandated a hereditary

artisan class. By the late thirteenth century, about 300,000 families were

classified as artisan households and could not detach themselve from this

designation. Despite this restriction, craftsmen, in general, profited from

Mongolian rule in China.'

Merchants were perhaps the group that benefited the most from Khubilai's

policies. Chinese dynasties had imposed numerous restrictions on merchants

because the Confucian scholar-officials disapproved of trade. Khubilai did

not share this bias, however, and in fact accorded merchants high status.

Ortogh, or merchant associations composed primarily of Muslims, received

government support. During the early years of the Mongolian conquests, the

ortogh

had provided badly needed loans to the Mongolian nobility. In 1268,

Khubilai, as a reward, created the "General Administration for the Supervi-

sion of the

Ortogh"

to lend money at low interest to the

ortogh.

The

ortogh

used

this money principally to finance trade caravans. Taxes on the commercial

transactions of the ortogh and of Chinese merchants amounted to the low

figure of

3'/

}

percent.'

To facilitate trade and to promote the welfare of the merchants, Khubilai

instituted the use of paper currency on a wider scale than at any other earlier

period in Chinese history. In 1260, Khubilai issued three types of currency,

but the Chung-t'ung

yiian-pao-ch'ao,

backed by a silver reserve, prevailed over

the others and gained the confidence of the Chinese. The court's willingness

to accept taxes in paper money instilled trust in the new currency. The

stability of the currency helped foster trade and thus promoted the interests

of the merchants. The system operated well until 1276, for the governmennt

kept tight controls on the amount of paper notes printed. In 1260, the court

printed paper money to the face value of 73,352 ting (silver ingots), and by

1265,

the amount had gradually increased to 116,208 ting.™ In 1276, the

court, faced with staggering expenses for the military campaigns in southern

China and Japan, dramatically expanded the sum it printed to

1,419,665

ting. The revenues derived from the successful conquest of southern China

nevertheless permitted the court to keep inflation under control.

Khubilai's government also assisted trade and merchants by improvements

in the system of transport. The extension of the Grand Canal to the Mongo-

51 Chii Ch'ing-yiian, "Yuan tai hsi kuan chiang hu yen chiu: Chih jen wei Yuan tai kuan chii chiang hu

shih nu li te jen men," Shih huoyueh k'an, i (1935), pp. 367—407; compare the abridged translation

by John de Francis and E-tu Zen Sun, "Government artisans of the Yuan dynasty," in

Chinese

social

history:

Translations

selected studies

(Washington, D.C., 1956), pp. 234-46.

52 Morris Rossabi, "The Muslims in the early Yuan dynasty," in China under Mongol rule, ed. John D.

Langlois, Jr. (Princeton, 1981), pp. 282—3.

53 YS. 93. PP- 2371-2.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

45O

THE

REIGN

KHUBILAI KHAN

lian capital

north China and

the

construction

roads were two

these

notable achievements. Marco Polo was greatly impressed

these roads and

wrote:

He [Khubilai} has had trees planted there beside the ways on either side two or three paces

distant the one from the other . . . the great khan has had this done so that each may see the

roads, that the merchants may be able to rest there in the shade, and that they may not lose the

way.

The most remarkable improvement

transport involved the postal relay

system. China

had had

postal stations

and

relays

least since

the Han

dynasty,

but the

Mongolian rulers vastly extended

the

system.

The

postal

stations were designed

for

the transmission and delivery of official mail,

but

they were also available

traveling officials, military men, and foreign state

guests, aided

the transport of foreign and domestic tribute, and facilitated

trade. They were

not

intended as hostels

for

merchants,

but

they came

to be

used

such

and

were vital links

in the

networks

foreign

and

domestic

commerce. By the end of Khubilai's reign, China had more than 1,400 postal

stations, which

turn

had at

their disposal about 50,000 horses,

1,400

oxen, 6,700 mules, 4,000 carts, almost 6,000 boats, over

200

dogs,

and

1,150 sheep.

The

individual stations were anywhere from fifteen

forty

miles apart,

and

the attendants worked

the stations as part of their corvee

obligations.

In an

emergency,

the

rider-messengers could cover

up to 250

miles

day to deliver significant news,

remarkably efficient mail service for

the thirteenth, or any other, century. Despite abuses by officials, merchants,

and attendants, the postal system operated efficiently, a fact to which numer-

ous foreign travelers, including Marco Polo, attested.'

All

these developments demonstrated Khubilai's concern

for

merchants

and

his

efforts

encourage trade. Unlike many Chinese, Khubilai

and his

Mongolian supporters were

not

biased against traders.

The

evidence from

contemporary observers indicates that during Khubilai's reign, the Mongols

did indeed succeed: Merchants did prosper. Marco Polo, for example, writes:

"I believe there is not a place

the world to which so many merchants come

and that dearer things and

greater value and more strange come into this

town

. . .

than into any city

the world."

Other occupational groups fared better under Khubilai than under

the

Chinese emperors. Physicians were one such group that benefited from Mon-

54 Moule and Peiliot, Marco Polo,

vol. I, pp.

248-9.

55 Yuan

Chi

(Kuo-fan), Yuan shihym chiu lun chi (Taipei, 1974),

p. 243.

For

comprehensive study

the postal relay system,

see

Peter Olbricht,

Dai

Postwesen

China

unter

der

Mongolenhenschaft

13,

und

14.

Jahrbundert (Wiesbaden, 1934).

56 Moule and Peiliot, Marco Polo,

vol. 1, p. 246.

57 Ibid.,

pp.

235-7.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICIES 451

golian rule. As a pragmatist, Khubilai valued medicine and accorded doctors

a higher social status. He established branches of the Huang-hui ssu (Impe-

rial Hospitals), staffed primarily by Muslim doctors, in K'ai-p'ing and in

north China to care for the court. Mongolian officials consulted Muslim

physicians, and thirty-six volumes of Muslim medicinal prescriptions were

added to the Imperial Library.

Khubilai also set up an Imperial Academy of Medicine (T'ai-i yuan) which

specified the criteria for selecting instructors of medicine, supervised the

training of physicians and the preparation of medical texts, devised the

examinations to certify doctors, and took charge of all physicians and pharma-

cies.

It weeded out unfit doctors as well as ensuring that those candidates

who failed the examinations would not practice. As Joseph Needham points

out, "There was a general move ... to raise the intellectual standing of the

physicians."'

In this effort, the court founded four major medical schools in

the capital, all of which were influenced by Persian medical practices.

These efforts bore fruit, for medicine attracted members of the Chinese

elite in greater numbers than earlier dynasties did. The court did not disdain

the medical profession, and the elite began to regard it as a useful and

lucrative occupation that offered access to influence through the doctor's

patients and conformed to the Confucian emphases on righteousness and

altruism. Physicians often received exemptions from corvee labor, another

attraction for those considering a medical career.

Khubilai also valued scientists and sought to promote their work. He

offered them financial support and attempted to elevate their status in Chi-

nese society. Learning that the Persians had made sufficient scientific discover-

ies,

he invited the astronomer Jamal al-Dln to China to expound these

innovations. Arriving at the court in 1267, Jamal al-Dln brought along

sundials, an astrolabe, a terrestrial globe, a celestial globe, and a new and

more accurate calendar, known to the Chinese as the Wan nien li. Four years

later, Khubilai founded the Institute of Muslim Astronomy (Hui-hui ssu

t'ien chien) to recruit and attract Persian and Arab astronomers to his court.

Later the Chinese astronomer Kuo Shou-ching (1231-1316) used the Persian

diagrams and calculations to devise another calendar, the Shou shih li, which,

with minor revisions, was employed through the Ming dynasty.

Under

Khubilai's patronage, geographers and cartographers prospered. Arab and

58 Joseph Needham, "Medicine and Chinese culture," in his Clerks and

craftsmen

in China and the West

(Cambridge, 1970), p. 263.

59 On these schools, see Jutta Rail, Die vier

grossen

Medizinschulen der

Mongolenzeit:

Stand and Entwicklung

der

chinesischen

Medezin in der Chin- und Yiian-Zeit (Wiesbaden, 1970).

60 E. S. Kennedy, "The exact sciences in Iran under the Saljuqs and Mongols," in The Saljuq and Mongol

periods, ed. John A. Boyle, vol. 5 of The

Cambridge

history ofIran (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 668-73; ^>

PP- 136; 164. PP-

452 THE REIGN OF KHUBILAI KHAN

Persian travelers and traders brought information about Asia and Europe so

that "geography in China [flourished], incorporating data on the non-Chinese

world taken from Arab sources."

' Clergy and artists were two other groups

favored by Khubilai, and his attitudes toward them will be more clearly

revealed in later discussions of religion and art.

In sum, Khubilai sought to dispense with the discriminatory practices

against occupational groups that had not fared well under the Chinese dynas-

ties.

Merchants, physicians, and scientists were accorded more benefits and

attracted more court concern, as Khubilai clearly hoped to gain their support

in ruling China. He had also pledged not to exploit the peasantry and had, in

fact, stimulated improvements in agriculture. The principal group whose

interests were undercut by the Mongols was the landed elite from whose

ranks derived the bulk of the governing scholar-official class. Khubilai and

the Mongols had displaced them as the rulers of the country. Without the

civil service examinations, the Chinese elite had few options. Some acqui-

esced and served the Mongols; others abandoned public life and became

recluses or dabbled in the arts; and still others, disgruntled with Mongolian

rule,

formed a potentially disruptive force. The Chinese elite was the major

group that felt excluded from the benefits accorded to other classes and

professions by the Mongols. Yet Khubilai and his court tried to appease them

by retaining certain government offices, the Han-lin Academy, the Director-

ate for the Diffusion of Confucian Texts, the Archives, and the Imperial

Diarists' Office, in which scholar-officials remained prominent.

The military was still another group whose relations with the court needed

definition. Khubilai's main concern was that Mongolian control of the mili-

tary not be jeopardized, and the organization and regulations he developed

reflected that objective. In 1263, he reestablished the Privy Council (Shu-mi

yuan) to supervise the Imperial Bodyguards, the

kesig

(the traditional body-

guards for the Mongolian khans), and the myriarchs (those who commanded

ten thousand troops). These units were composed mainly of Mongolian cav-

alry, and the infantry consisted principally of ethnic Chinese. All Mongolian

adult males were liable for conscription, and certain Chinese families were

designated as hereditary military households. They were exempted from half

the taxes imposed on ordinary citizens but, in return, needed to supply

themselves, occasionally a heavy financial burden.

These burdens, together

with graft, corruption, and the extortion of funds by officers from their men,

eventually led to desertions and a decline in the armed forces, but these

problems did not become troublesome until after Khubilai's death.

61 Herbert Franke, "Sino-Western contacts under the Mongol empire," Journal ofthe Royal Asiatic

Society:

Hong Kong Branch, 6 (1966), p. 59.

62 Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, The military

establishment

the

Yiian dynasty (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 16—25.