The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368
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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 291
code remained
in
force for the Chinese population
in
the newly conquered
territories. It was formally abrogated only in 1271, the year when the Mongo-
lian ruler Khubilai adopted the dynastic name of Yuan. In sum, the legal
development under the Chin from unlimited vendetta to
a
preponderantly
Chinese system after 1202 must
be
seen as
a
parallel to Jurchen societal
evolution from an unstructured clan society to a multinational state modeled
on Chinese precedents. It could perhaps be said that the controlled harshness
of Jurchen justice was, over the years, replaced by the uncontrolled harshness
inherent in the traditional Chinese legal systems. The formal abrogation of
the T'ai ho code therefore marks the end of an important transitional period
in the legal history of northern China.«
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
Agriculture and pastoralism
Land, under the Chin, was in principle a commodity that could be inherited,
sold, or mortgaged, and there were no general prescriptions regarding what
the individual farmer or tenant had to grow, except for mulberry trees. The
military colonies had
a
special status, and sometimes
it is
not quite clear
whether our sources are speaking of land tenure in general or are referring to
the meng-an mou-k'o land.
In
addition
to
the lands
in
private hands,
the
government owned a considerable proportion of the arable land. Either these
fields were regarded
as
public fields,
or
they were attached
to
offices
to
provide the officeholders with income in kind. We have no exact figures
for
the relative proportions of privately held land, meng-an mou-k'o land, and
government lands, only some stray indications. For example,
in
1221
roughly one-quarter of the arable land in Honan belonged to the government
in one
or
the other form. Also, all lands near the Great Wall, near other
fortifications, and alluvial lands
on
the banks
of
the Yellow River were
considered to be government property. This large reserve of land in the hands
of the government was mostly used for distribution to military colonists, but
ordinary farmers were also encouraged to apply for
a
grant of government
land if it were uncultivated or untenanted. After the disasters
of
1214—16,
over half a million military colonists sought refuge in Honan and Shantung
and applied for government land there.
It
seems that land was frequently
45 As yet there exists no comprehensive study of the Chin legal system in a Western language. A standard
account is given by Niida Noburu in Chugoku
hosei
shi ktnkyu: Keiho (Tokyo, 1959), pp. 453-524.
Equally useful is the study by Yeh Ch'ien-chao, Chin lii
chih yen chiu
(Taipei, 1972). For early Jurchen
legal customs, see also Herbert Franke, "Jurchen customary law and the Chinese law of the Chin
dynasty," in State andlawin East Alia: FestschriftKarlBiinger, ed. Dieter Eikemeier and Herbert Franke
(Wiesbaden, 1981), pp. 215—33.
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292 THE CHIN DYNASTY
extorted from its legal owners by government agencies or by Jurchen
grandees, because laws were repeatedly passed against such abuses.
The standardized land allocation policy of earlier centuries (which had
lasted until the early and middle T'ang period) no longer existed under the
Chin, except in the case of
the
military colonies. For these, a
fixed
quota was
set for the allotment of land, which varied according to the times and the
locality. The normal allotment for an adult individual was, under Shih-
tsung, 4
ch'ing,
4
mou (1 ch'ing
is roughly equivalent to 14.34 acres,
1 mou
to
0.14 acres) plus three plow-oxen. A limit for the number of oxen (and,
consequently, the amount of land) was introduced as well, but it seems that
this was valid only in cases of new allotments or the redistribution of lands
and cattle, because a huge disparity had developed over the years between
poor and rich military colonists, just as among the nonmilitary farming
population. We know that in 1183 the military colonists owned around
1,690,3
80 ch
'ing
of
land.
This was a considerable percentage of
the
total land
under cultivation in the Chin state. The total of cultivated lands can be
figured only indirectly through the tax figures. Land tax was 10 percent of
the yield. A high-class field yielded 1.2 shih (1 shih equals approximately
599.4 liters) per
mou,
a middle-class field 1 shih, and a low-class field 0.8
shih.
In 1171 the annual income from land tax was about 9 million
shih
of
grain. If we take the average yield of
1
shih per
mou
as our basis, the total
taxed lands must have amounted to something like 900,000
ch'ing,
or well
over 13 million acres. Although our figures for 1171 and 1183 are separated
by twelve years, we can therefore conclude that in the golden age of Shih-
tsung the greater part of
all
cultivated lands was in the hands of the military
colonists.
The intensity of agriculture obviously varied from region to region. Ho-
nan, in particular the area around K'ai-feng, was the definite center of
agricultural production. In 1219, when the territory of Chin had been drasti-
cally reduced, Honan had 1.97 million
ch'ing
of arable land, of which less
than
half,
only 960,000
ch'ing,
was cultivated, certainly because of the
widespread flight of the farming population and the military insecurity in
the border areas. The total grain yield (millet and rice) in the state can be
estimated at about 90 million
shih
per annum, one-tenth of which went to
the government as land tax. The annual government expenditure in grain
was over 9 million
shih
in 1192 (7 million
shih
of millet and 2 million
shih
of
rice).
This was used for officials' stipends and army personnel. We are told
that the average grain consumption of an individual was 5
tou
per month, or
6
shih
per year. In other words, the average yield from the lands in the whole
state could just feed the population adequately, but good harvests were
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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 293
needed if a food reserve was to be built up. For food production, the Chin
state certainly could not compete with the Southern Sung, where in most
areas more than one annual harvest of rice was possible.
This precarious food situation was early recognized by the Chin govern-
ment, and great attention was paid to increasing the cultivated area by means
of irrigation, particularly during Chang-tsung's reign. Magistrates who in-
creased the irrigated area in their districts were rewarded with promotion.
Another measure for increasing the yield was terraced cultivation (small-plot
farming), meaning that mountain slopes could be farmed. It seems that all
these measures were taken relatively late and applied only locally, so that the
Chin's overall food situation did not improve radically. It explains also why
rice was one of the commodities imported from Sung into Chin.
Sericulture also played a certain role. Mulberry trees were ordered to be
planted in relation to the landed property of the farming household. We
know the figure for military colonists: One
mou
out of every forty
mou
was to
be planted with mulberry trees; another passage even mentions 10 percent of
the area as obligatory mulberry plantations. Although the great centers of
silk production were in the Sung state and silk was one of the export goods
from Sung, Chin apparently had a textile production of its own, sufficient for
most basic needs.
Cattle breeding on a large scale was concentrated in central and western
Manchuria, northern Shansi, and Kansu, including areas that now belong to
Inner Mongolia. These pasture grounds had been taken over from the Liao,
and the Liao herds had become property of the new overlords. Jurchen
officials were assigned as commissioners of herds, whereas all the minor
herdsmen were Khitan or other tribesmen. The commissioner of herds and
their staffs were recruited from the meng-an mou-k'o population, including
slaves. These officials were held responsible for the number of cattle under
their supervision (horses, camels, oxen, and sheep). If the number decreased
and more than a fixed percentage of the animals died, they would be pun-
ished and degraded; a higher-than-average increase would be rewarded. It
was regarded as a first-class result if every year the increase was 2 horses,
camels, or oxen, or 4 sheep per every 10 animals and if the death rate among
horses was fewer than 15 out of 100. The Khitan rebellion of 1160—2
reduced the herds of Chin to near extinction; of the nine herding grounds the
animal stock of five was completely broken up and appropriated by the
rebels, who had more livestock than did their Jurchen adversaries. In the
remaining four, only a small part of the herds remained. A long time was
needed to restore the former number of cattle in these regions. Finally, after
some plentiful years, in 1188 the herds had again reached a considerable size.
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294 THE CHIN DYNASTY
The government controllers then counted 470,000 horses, 130,000 oxen,
4,000 camels, and 870,000 sheep.
46
Pasturelands existed not only in the northern parts of the state but also in
the former Chinese southern provinces, although there they were much
smaller and limited by settled agriculture. In Honan, around K'ai-feng,
63,000
ch'ing
of land (only a small percentage of the cultivated land) were
used as pasture, and 35,000
ch'ing
in Shansi Province. In view of the great
importance of horses for warfare, all the horses in the state were liable to
confiscation in times of emergency. The herds of the military colonists were
normally replenished from the north so that the loss of
the
Manchurian plains
in 1215 resulted in a marked decrease of war potential.
Hunting, which had been one of the main occupations of the primitive
Jurchens, became more and more the sport of the ruling minority when the
court as the center of the state was moved south. Originally the Chin
emperors until Hai-ling wang's time imitated Khitan customs by holding
hunts in all the four seasons: fishing and hunting wild geese in spring, deer
in autumn, and tigers in winter. These seasonal expeditions, however, were
no longer possible after the capital had been moved to Peking because it
was felt that these large-scale battue hunts would interfere with agriculture.
So hunting expeditions were limited to one month in winter. Also, for the
military colonists, hunting was limited to two periods of ten days each
winter.
Manufacture
and
crafts
Although our usual sources do not inform us specifically, we can safely
assume that the arts and crafts of the civilian population in the former Sung
territories of Chin continued to be the occupation of many inhabitants of the
towns. The social structure of Chinese society under the Chin certainly
changed more at the top than at the bottom and intermediate levels, and the
same must have been true for the economic activities of the Chinese. We are
much better informed about government manufacture and the production of
commodities for which a state monopoly existed. These monopoly goods
were salt, wine, yeast, vinegar, tea, incense, alum, cinnabar, tin, and iron.
These were partly, as in the cases of salt and wine, produced under govern-
ment supervision and traded through government agencies, or as with tea
and cinnabar, they could be imported and sold only with a government
license.
46 The number of horses in the Chin state was less than half the number the Liao had had one century
earlier in 1086, when one million horses were counted in a cattle census (LS, 24, p. 291).
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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 295
The most important commodity from the fiscal point of view was salt. The
center of salt production was in Shantung, mostly the production and market-
ing centers that had already flourished under the T'ang. There were also some
salt pools and lakes in Manchuria and Mongolia that produced salt for local
consumption, but even their small yields had already been taxed under the
Liao.
Salt production was extended when the Jurchen forces conquered the
Chinese Central Plains, and new monopoly offices had to be established.
Altogether seven administrations controlled the production and distribution
of salt; those in Shantung brought in the greatest profit. Salt was sold only
against vouchers (for large quantities) and tickets (for smaller quantities),
which had to be officially endorsed. The weight measures (cases and bags)
differed by region. We have some figures on the retail price of salt: It varied
between thirty and forty-three copper cash per Chinese pound {chin). With
this we may compare the price for one tou (approximately six liters) of rice in
approximately the same period (around 1180): three hundred copper cash. In
other words, if measured by weight, salt was almost as expensive as rice.
47
Retail trade was sometimes in the hands of local tycoons who made a
business out of monopolizing the local market, to the detriment of small
shopkeepers and peddlars. This was made possible because the salt vouchers
and tickets were transferable instruments like bank checks or paper money
and were not personalized or rationed. But despite these encroachments by
private money-makers, the government made an enormous profit from the
salt monopoly. The annual proceeds from salt were fixed by a quota system
that regulated production and sales figures and furnished the biggest item of
money income in the national budget. The annual quota before 1198 had
been not less than 6,226,636 kuan, or strings of a thousand cash. This was
later raised to 10,774,512 kuan, a sum that accounted for almost half of the
money revenue.
Another commodity produced in government shops was wine. A wine
monopoly was introduced by former Sung officials along with other fiscal
institutions in 1125. Private wine production was prohibited, just as private
salt production and trading was. The wine monopoly also followed the quota
or, rather, target system, but the few figures in our sources show that the
proceeds from wine were far below those from salt. The chief monopoly office
was in the Central Capital, Peking; it yielded only a few hundred thousand
47 There is little information on retail prices under the Chin dynasty. Only some scattered data on prices
can be found; for example, some prices are given in Lou Yao's (1137—1213) description of a Sung
embassy to the Chin in 1169—70, the
Pei
hsingjih lu (TSCC ed.). In a Chin prefecture! town near the
border, Lou Yao had to pay 210 cash for one pound of wheat flour, 120 cash for one peck
(tou)
of millet
or some other grain, and 240 cash for one peck of rice (Pei hsingjih lu, shang, p. 12b). For one bolt of
good silk, the price was 2,500 cash in Hopei; for one ounce of floss silk, 150 cash. Horses were even
more expensive than a first-class donkey, which cost 40,000 cash (Pei hsingjih lu, hsia, p. 8b).
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296 THE CHIN DYNASTY
kuan annually. It is clear that the law prohibiting private wine making was
frequently disobeyed, particularly in the Jurchen grandees' households. On
the other hand, some exemptions from the law were legal, such as the
production of wine for special occasions like marriages and funerals. Yeast
was treated like wine from the fiscal point of view; it was subjected to the
monopoly laws mainly because it was an indispensable ingredient for making
wine. A curiosity is that yeast formed a part of an official's salary in kind,
which also points to private wine making on a large scale.
Like other Chinese dynasties the Chin had many government workshops.
These produced military weapons and such consumer goods as textiles and
embroidery. Printing offices were also run by the government. The govern-
ment workshops could recruit skilled labor from the population, because in
principle every artisan was registered and liable to labor conscription.
Whereas we are not well informed about labor conditions in nongovernment
industries, we do have detailed figures for industrial wages in the state-run
workshops. For example, conscripted workers in the arsenals received daily
100 copper cash and about one liter of
rice;
printers were better paid, with a
daily allowance of 180 cash and gifts of textiles. Foremen and supervisors
received correspondingly more, according to a
fixed
wage-schedule.
Surprisingly, mining was largely left to private enterprise. There were
foundries for gold, silver, copper, and iron. In earlier reigns, gold and silver
production was taxed but became tax exempt under Shih-tsung. In 1192 the
silver smelteries were again taken under government management. An iron
monopoly was introduced rather late, after the loss of Manchuria and the
Peking region to the Mongols in 1219. Metal and coal mining seems to have
been quite highly developed under the Chin.
48
To the silver mined in north-
ern China (chiefly in Hopei) must be added the considerable import of silver
into the state through the annual payments from Sung, so that the govern-
ment treasuries were able to hoard considerable amounts of
silver.
Gold and
silver were, however, like all other commodities, subject to a commercial tax
introduced in 1180. We do not have figures that would allow us to compute
the commercial turnover for the whole state in a given year, but we do have
such figures for the region of Peking. Gold and silver sales were taxed ad
valorem
at 1 percent, other commodities at 3 percent. For gold, this rate was
later raised to 3 percent, and for other commodities, to 4 percent. The
figures available allow us to calculate the total industrial and commercial
turnover for Peking in 1196 at over seven million
kuan,
a rise of one-third if
48 A detailed description of the coal and mining industries is given in Robert Hartwell, "A cycle of
economic change in imperial China: Coal and iron in northeast China, 750—1350,"
Journal
of
the
Economic
and Social History of the Orient, 10(1959), pp. 102—59.
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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 297
compared with that during the reign of Shih-tsung in the 1180s.
49
But such
figures are meaningful only if we can compare them with those of other parts
of China and their commercial turnover.
Communications and foreign trade
After their conquest of north China, the Chin could take over the existing
transport system of waterways and road networks. Communications were
vital chiefly because large urban centers like Peking depended on grain
transport for food. The situation was better in K'ai-feng because this city was
situated in the midst of a densely cultivated surplus area. The waterways
were much more important than road transport, and there was a large net-
work of canals and riverways in Honan, Shantung, and Hopei. The northwest-
ern provinces had to rely more on road transport. Although roads linked the
prefectural and county towns in all parts of the state, road transport was more
expensive than water transport. We know the exact figures for the transporta-
tion costs of grain, rice, salt, copper coins, and other commodities. They
show that road transport for some of these goods was up to two or three times
more expensive than water transport. Road transport costs also differed ac-
cording to whether the road went through flat or mountainous country and
also according to the season; the wages for porters were higher in summer and
autumn than in winter or spring. They were still low enough, being 90 and
114 cash per day, respectively.
All these figures are for government transportation of taxes in kind and
local tributes or proceeds from government trade, but they give an indication
of the relative costs of water and road transport. Road transport for private
traders and their caravans was limited to coolies and ox carts because they
were forbidden to use horses for transportation. Government-owned boats
and whole flotillas could be hired on a long-term lease over several years.
Although the hiring costs were equal to the value of goods transported,
payment could be stretched over five years or more. The hire was highest
during the first year (20 percent), so that the goods became more expensive
by one-fifth through transport costs alone.
If the water and road transport system was thus partly under government
management and only partly private, the courier system was for government
use only. A courier network was established very early (in 1124) in connec-
tion with the campaigns against Liao and Sung. Every fifty // a postal station
was established where fresh horses awaited the dispatch riders. During the
campaign of 1206 an express courier system was introduced; it was consid-
49
CS,
49, p. 1106.
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298 THE CHIN DYNASTY
ered very fast because the riders could cover three hundred // per day. The
horses were commandeered from the civilian population - much like the
well-known postal system under the Yiian dynasty. The same abuses were
also common under the Chin, namely, the illicit use of the state posts for
private purposes.
An important aspect of
the
communication system was the transportation
of goods to and from the established border markets with Sung, Kory6, and
Hsi Hsia. Foreign trade was an important factor in the Chin economy, which
extended beyond the annual payments from Sung. The border between Sung
and Chin did not constitute an "iron curtain," and no Great Wall separated
the two parts of
China.
Foreign trade was, therefore, now what had formerly
been domestic trade among different provinces of the same country. Although
trade between Sung and Chin had begun already on a smaller scale after the
establishment of the buffer
state
ofCh'i (which profited
accordingly),
commer-
cial relations between the two states were regularized after the treaty of 1142,
and its corollary agreements had provided licensed border markets on both
sides.
For the Sung the main center
was
the county town of Hsii-i in northeast-
ern Anhui, where the Huai River met the Pien River on which K'ai-feng was
situated. On the Chin side the center was the prefectural town of
Ssu,
but
there were other licensed centers, nine more on the Sung side and eleven on
the Chin side. One of
these was
in Shantung, perhaps for trade by oceangoing
ships.
Sung—Chin trade was interrupted only during the war of Hai-ling in
1161—5 and the revanchist war of Sung in 1206—8 and continued more or less
until the last campaign of 1217-18 and the downfall of Chin.
For both states, foreign trade was a sort of state monopoly. Unauthorized
transactions were forbidden, and Sung goods were sold to Chin merchants at
fixed prices through the government. Wholesale merchants from Sung could
not enter Chin territory, only small traders with capital or goods valued at
one hundred strings of cash or less. They needed a permit to enter Chin
territory and, after their return from Chin, a sale certificate for which the
government charged them a tax. The tax was 20 percent of the value; 2
percent more went to the government broker, and 0.4 percent as transporta-
tion cost to the coolies. The charge on the Chin side was 30 percent.
Moreover, each Sung merchant had to spend three strings of
cash,
for which
he was entitled to food and lodging. These arrangements were a source of
considerable income to both governments, but they also led to continual
attempts to evade the cumbersome legitimate procedures by smuggling.
Another reason for dissatisfaction was the bribery practiced by the market
overseers. The annual proceeds from Ssu prefecture during the Ta-ting period
(1161—
89) was 53,467
kuan;
the target was raised in 1196 to 107,393 kuan
and thereby doubled. The quota or target system implied that a certain
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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 299
amount of goods had to be traded in order to meet the quota. The largest
import item was tea. It seems that everybody in the Chin state, including the
farmers, drank tea, which of course became scarce if trade was interrupted for
some reason. Attempts to grow tea in Honan had failed, so that Chin was
dependent on imports from the Sung.
50
The annual average of imported goods in Ssu Prefecture during the Ta-ting
reign reads like a grocery store's stock: 1,000 crates of green tea, 500 pounds
each of lichees and longans, 6,000 pounds of kumquats, 500 pounds of
olives, 300 cases of dried bananas, 1,000 pounds of sappan wood (used for
dyeing), 7,000 cases of tangerines from Chekiang,
8,000
cases of oranges,
300 pounds of granulated sugar, 600 pounds of ginger, and 90 bags of
gardenia seeds (also a dye). Other goods, for which the quantities are not
given, were rhinoceros horn, ivory, and cinnabar.
51
Although the Sung had
prohibited the export of rice and copper coins to Chin, it seems that rice, as
well as cattle, was sold over the border to Chin. Chin also banned exports of
coins,
grain, iron weapons, and armor. The goods exported from Chin were
northern pearls from Manchuria, drugs like ginseng, textiles, and - if avail-
able for export - horses, although in theory the export of horses was forbid-
den. Another export commodity from Chin must have been antiquities,
because in 1157 their export was banned. The sale of antiquities to Sung can
be seen as a result of the widespread growth of art collecting among the Sung
intelligentsia. It is difficult to say whether Chin had an adverse or favorable
trade balance with Sung if all items, including the illegal border trade, are
taken together.
Similar border markets existed between the Chin and Hsi Hsia. Hsi Hsia
purchased chiefly textiles and silk and exported horses and jade from Inner
Asia. Licensed markets had been established in 1141 as part of a mutual
agreement between the two states. There was also some trade with Koryo and
the Mongols, but not much is known about commercial relations with these
two nations.
Currency
The money of Chin is a good illustration of Gresham's law. Chin money plays
a great role in the history of paper money because there were several attempts
to establish a paper currency, which resulted in accelerated inflation. The
basic problem with Chin money was the shortage of copper. Copper was a
monopoly item; the manufacture and sale of copper utensils were in the
50 The economic role of trade between the Sung and the Chin was studied exhaustively by Kato Shigeshi
in his Shina ieizai shi
kosbo,
Toyo bunko ronso no. 34 (Tokyo, 1953), vol. 2, pp. 247-304.
51 CS, 50, pp. 1114-15.
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3OO THE CHIN DYNASTY
hands
of the
state. When copper began
to
become scarce, private smelting
and manufacture were allowed,
but the
government fixed
the
sale prices.
At
the beginning
of
the dynasty,
the
coins
of
Liao
and
Sung, later also those
of
Ch'i,
were used,
and it
was only
in
1157 under Hai-ling that
the
first
copper
coins
of
Chin were cast. The more the economy expanded, chiefly during
the
peaceful reign
of
Shih-tsung,
the
more acutely
the
shortage
of
copper coins
was felt.
In
spite
of
heavy punishments,
the
population began
to
counterfeit
coins,
but
these were
of
worse quality than
the
government coins.
To
meet
the shortage, iron coins were issued,
but
these were discontinued
in 1193
because they were impractical.
One
objective
of
casting iron coins, which
circulated chiefly
in the
southern provinces,
was to
stop
the
flow
of
copper
currency into Sung territory. The problem was
to
have enough copper cash
to
serve
as
legal tender throughout
the
state
for
both taxes
and
private
com-
merce. There were frequent complaints that
not
enough coins were circulat-
ing, mainly because they were being hoarded
by
private individuals.
We
know that
the
total amount
of
coins
in
circulation
in 1178 was
over sixty
million strings
of
cash
(kuan).
This
is not
much considering that the state had
then
a
population
of
over forty million people
and
that
the
economy
was
nourishing.
But
copper coins were
not the
only metal
in
circulation, because
silver ingots were
the
most common means
of
payment,
at
least
for
larger
transactions.
Paper money was first printed
in
1157, after the capital had been moved
to
Peking from Hui-ning
in
Manchuria.
It
was modeled
on
Sung paper money.
The period
of
circulation
was
limited
to
seven years, after which
the
money
was either withdrawn from circulation
or
exchanged
for new
notes.
In 1189
this limitation
was
abolished,
and
only regional restrictions were made.
The
denominations followed
the
coinage system;
the
bills were issued with
a
face
value
of
strings
(kuan)
and
cash
(wen)
and could be converted into actual cash.
The government tried
to
keep
the
amount
of
paper money issued within
reasonable limits.
The
total face value
of
notes was
not to be
more than
the
amount of cash
in
circulation.
At
the same time legislation was introduced
in
order
to
limit
the
amount
of
coin
in
private possession.
A
new
kind
of
paper money
was
introduced
in 1197,
which could
be
exchanged
for
silver.
The
government treasuries
had
hoarded
a
large stock of
silver,
a
part
of
which was cast into ingots
of
fifty ounces each. Money taxes
could
be
paid either
in
silver
or
with
the
new notes;
in
some cases half
had
to
be paid
in
silver
and
half in notes. This complicated
the
currency situation
because
the old
copper coins continued
to
circulate,
and
the exchange rate
for
these forms
of
legal tender
was
subject
to
changes.
A
further complication
was that certain kinds
of
paper money were restricted
to the
Central Capital,
Southern Capital,
and
other cities.
The
silver-based notes were
a
relatively
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