The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368

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CHANGES

INTERNAL GOVERNMENT

<pi

racy. In this instance, the empress dowager herself underwent this ritual, not

once

but no

fewer than three times, twice

984 and again

986. Later

dowager regents also participated

the same ritual of installment in office.

The empress dowager was

capricious tryant

but a

ruler who deeply

understood the realities of power and the art of governance and

who was

always

willing to listen to advice. She won the deep loyalty of

Liao

officials, Khitan

and Chinese

alike.

She was

not only an accomplished civil administrator; in the

pattern of A-pao-chi's empress (the Ying-t'ien empress dowager) she

was also a

military commander, heading her own

ordo,

which could field ten thousand

cavalry.

Even when Ch'eng-t'ien was over sixty

1005 she commanded

armies in the field against the Sung. The

Liao shih

sums up her achievement

aptly: "Sheng-tsung may be considered the most successful of the Liao emper-

ors;

most

his success must

attributed

his mother's instruction."«

The reign of Sheng-tsung was the crucial period in the development of the

Liao.

Between 983 and 1031 a series of bloody and protracted wars stretched

Khitan military capacity

to its

limits and ended not

total victory

but in

agreed settlements and an international equilibrium that ended

century of en-

demic warfare and instability in northern Asia. The settlement with the Sung

in 1005 and the stalemate with Kory6 in 1019-20 marked the end of large-

scale warfare with Liao's major neighbors. Internally, too, the reign saw the

final peaceful assimilation of

the

Hsi, the suppression of a serious rebellion by

the peoples of Po-hai, and the pacification of the northwestern tribes. Only the

problem of Liao's relations with the emergent state of Hsi Hsia and the contin-

uous trouble with the Jurchen tribes remained to upset the international equi-

librium during the next reigns. These events produced a balance of power

northern Asia that lasted until the second decade of

the

twelfth century. They

took

place

the same

time

did

the

fundamental

changes

that

were

transform-

ing the Khitan state from within.

is with these changes, which imposed a

new degree of Chinese influence on the administration, that we shall

first

deal.

CHANGES IN INTERNAL GOVERNMENT

The

examination system

There had been some haphazard examinations of candidates

for

official service

as early

T'ai-tsung's reign,

but

nothing regular

systematic was done

42 LS, 31, p. 367; 35, p. 404.

LS,

71,

1202. Her elder sister Hu-lien, who was married to Yen-sa-ko, Sheng-tsung's great-uncle,

was also

successful military commander. After Yen-sa-ko's death, she undertook, at the head of his

ordo,

a pacification campaign against the Tsu-pu tribe in the far northwest, where she founded the fortress city

ofK'o-tun in the Orkhon region. See LS, 13, pp. 145,149. In 1006 she was imprisoned for being part of

a conspiracy, the details of which are obscure. She died in 1007 in confinement. See LS, 14, pp. 162—3;

Yeh Lung-li, comp., Ch'i-lan

too

chih (Shanghai, 1985), 13,

142 (hereafter cited as CTKC).

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

92 THE LIAO

until the reign of Ching-tsung when in 977 an examination hall had been

established in the Southern Capital.

The first regular

chin-shih

examination

was held in

988,

and they continued to the end of the dynasty, at first

annually, as under the T'ang, and then at more irregular intervals. At first

each examination produced only one or two candidates; but after about

A.D.

1000 from twenty to forty candidates, sometimes more, were passed at each

examination.

Not all these

chin-shih

were employed: Later, under the Chin

the government claimed that their Liao predecessors had given posts only to

two or three out of every ten graduates.

Perhaps the practical success of the

examinations in producing a highly literate elite among the Chinese officials

was at first less than their symbolic significance as the public adoption of

one

of the normative activities of a regular Chinese dynasty,

and one that

enshrined Chinese values.

Sons and grandsons of high Chinese officials of the Liao also enjoyed the

hereditary privilege of entry to office (yin) as under the T'ang, and such

entrants generally enjoyed better prospects than did graduates. This practice

fitted with the Khitans' widespread traditional use of hereditary succession

(shih-hsiian)

to office. Many offices were reserved for members of specific

lineages of the Yeh-lii and Hsiao clans. Khitans were debarred from taking

the Chinese examinations. Shortly after Sheng-tsung's death a prominent

scholarly member of the imperial clan, Yeh-lii Shu-chen, was given two

hundred lashes for allowing his precocious son to sit illegally for the

chin-shih

examination.

The son was, nevertheless, employed and later gained prefer-

ment because he was also able to prove his mastery of a true Khitan skill,

archery,'

by killing three hares with three successive arrows. The subjects set

for the Chinese examinations also sometimes had a distinctive Khitan flavor:

In 1036 the

chin-shih

candidates had to compose their rhyme prose

(fu)

on the

subject "shooting thirty-six bears in a single day"!'

Systematic keeping of historical

records

Before Sheng-tsung's time there seem to have been court diarists, and some

historical, or rather legendary, works had been commissioned. In 941 an

44 LS, 8, p. 64.

45 LS, 12, p. 133.

46 See the table in Wittfogel and Feng, pp. 491—2.

47 T'o-t'o et al., eds., Chin shib (Peking, 1975), 51, p. 1129 (hereafter cited as CS).

48 For a good summary of this problem, see Wittfogel and Feng, pp. 454—64.

49 LS, 89, p. 1351.

50 Both he and his father were skilled writers in Chinese, and the son Yeh-lii P'u-lu is said also to have

been able to read the difficult large Khitan script by the age of six. His father was also one of the

officials who advocated granting surnames to Khitan in addition to the Yeh-lii and Hsiao clans.

51 LS, 18, p. 217.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

CHANGES IN INTERNAL GOVERNMENT 93

official record was compiled of the legends surrounding the dynastic founder

Ch'i-shou khaghan,'

and under T'ai-tsung the Ch'i

hsien chuan

(Biographies

of the seven worthies) was written."

By Sheng-tsung's time there was already a Historiographical Office and a

director of

the

national history. In 991 they presented the first Liao veritable

records

(shih-lu),

with those for Ching-tsung's reign taking up twenty chap-

ters.

The director Shih Fang was rewarded in traditional style.'* We know

also that during Sheng-tsung's reign a daily calendar

(jih-li),

the preliminary

draft from which a later veritable record would be written, was already being

compiled, as in 1003 the officials were warned not to include trivial matters

in it." Rules on which matters should be reported for inclusion were made in

1011.

By the next reign in 1044 we find as head of the Han-lin Academy

and compiler of the national history one of the most remarkable scholars of

the period, Hsiao Han-chia-nu,'

who translated a variety of Chinese histori-

cal works into Khitan

and also began the compilation of veritable records

for earlier reigns together with two venerable Khitan scholars, Yeh-lii K'u-yii

and Yeh-lii Shu-ch'eng.'

It appears that in 994 the Liao produced their own calendar for the first

time.

Codification

of law

The gradual sinification of the Liao empire in the 980s that these develop-

ments exemplify was also marked by a series of legal measures that attempted

to codify in Chinese style the confused and anomalous laws of the early

period, when unwritten Khitan customary law had been applied to the

Khitan and other tribal peoples and T'ang codified law was applied to the

Chinese. The new emphasis on Chinese law as the standard applicable to all

subjects seems to have been directly attributable to the influence of the

empress dowager, who informally decided, on the basis of

Chinese

law alone,

all disputes brought before her.

52 LS,

p. 49.

53 LS, 77, p. 1259.

54 LS, 13, p. 141.

55 LS, 14, p. 158.

56 LS, 15, p. 169.

57 For his biography, see LS, 103, pp. 1445-50.

58 LS, 103, p. 1450.

59 LS, 103, p. 1450; LS, 104, pp. 1456—7.

60 LS, 42, p. 518.

61 See Wang Ch'eng, Tung lu shih liieh; repr. in vols. 11—14 of

Sang

shih tzu liao ts'uipirn, 1st series, ed.

Ch'ao T'ieh-han (Taipei, 1967), 123, p. 1899; and the notice of the empress dowager's death in Li

Tao et al., comps., Hsu tzu

chih

t'ung

Men

ch'angpien

(Peking, 1980), 72, pp. 1645—6 (hereafter cited

as HCP).

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

94 THE LIAO

In 983 the T'ang legal code that had been presented by the administration

of the Southern Capital was ordered to be translated into Khitan for use by

the officials of the Northern Administration.

Generally, the punishments

specified in T'ang law were less harsh than those under Khitan customary

usage, and T'ang law was more systematic and rational. Another indication

of the supremacy of Chinese law was a ruling in 994 that any Khitan

committing one of the Ten Abominable Crimes - a purely Chinese concept,

grounded in Confucian ethical values

—

should be punished in the same way

as a Chinese would.

The compilation of a revised Chinese-style law code

was ordered in 1027,

and it was completed after Sheng-tsung's death.

The employment of Chinese law for all citizens of Liao led to a hostile

reaction among the Khitan. After Sheng-tsung's death in 1031, the new

emperor's brother, Yeh-lii Chung-yuan, prime minister of the Northern Ad-

ministration, requested that each of the five capitals set up a Khitan police

commissioner to supervise the enforcement of the laws, presumably as a

concession to the Khitans' feelings.

Sheng-tsung left an excellent reputation as a just emperor, perhaps the best

of the Liao rulers, but even he was liable to deal out arbitrary personal justice,

particularly when drunk. In 1014, as Mu-tsung had once done before him, he

instructed his ministers not to act on any decision he had taken when under the

influence of liquor but to make him review his decision the next day.

The state and

agriculture

At the end of the tenth century the Liao economy remained fragmented: The

northern tribes retained their pastoral way of life, dependent on their herds

and on marginal agriculture, but to the south the Hsi people had always

engaged in farming, as had the population of Po-hai, and after the acquisi-

tion of the Sixteen Prefectures their long-established Chinese agrarian popula-

tion became more and more the chief center of production and the most

populous part of the Khitan empire. Under Sheng-tsung the government

began to take some measures to improve communications, to encourage the

agrarian sector, and to ensure the just collection of revenues.

Throughout Sheng-tsung's reign a series of measures permitted and encour-

aged the exploitation and settlement of wastelands, whose farmers were to

become taxpayers. In some cases, land was distributed together with plow-

62 LS, 10, p. no.

63 LS, 13, p. 145; LS, 61, p. 939.

64 LS, 17, p. 201.

65 For Chung-yiian's request, see LS, 112, p. 1502. For the much-delayed implementation of the

proposal in 1044, see LS, 19, p. 230.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

CHANGES IN INTERNAL GOVERNMENT 95

oxen. Perhaps connected with these measures was a decree of 1014 ordering

that litigation not be allowed to interfere with agriculture. In 996 the

military were prohibited from hunting at improper seasons and damaging

crops.

Inspectors were sent to examine the crops and to encourage agriculture

and the planting of fruit trees. The emperor sometimes personally inspected

the harvest.

Similar measures continued until about 1070. One matter that caused

constant contention was the attempt to irrigate land in the Chinese-settled

Southern Capital circuit so as to grow rice. A proposal to do this was rejected

during Ching-tsung's reign (969-79), and a renewed ban was imposed in

1064.

In 1068, permission to cultivate rice was finally given, except along

routes used by the army. It is clear that the government's objections were

based on military considerations, as a landscape of canals and paddy fields

would have been an impossible terrain for Khitan cavalry operations.

Roads

In Sheng-tsung's early years (984-9) serious attention was given to building

roads and bridges to provide easier passage for carts and to improving the

courier system, which was essential to the rapid transmission of orders and

information.

In 1027 a strip of land thirty double paces wide on either side

of official highways was ordered to be kept cleared for security purposes.

Taxation

The history of taxation under the Khitan is all but impossible to unravel. The

tribal population had traditional obligations to provide service and pay levies

imposed by the emperor when these were needed. It seems certain, however,

that most of the government's regular revenues were levied on the settled

population of the Southern Capital circuit, where there were more tax collec-

tors than in all the Khitan territories. Taxes there were reputed, by Sung

authors at least, to have been far heavier than in the Sung empire. Labor

services on the Chinese population seem to have followed no regular pattern,

but manpower was mobilized ad

hoc,

sometimes with little regard to the

annual pattern of agricultural work.

Even in the last years of the dynasty the Liao's total revenues were not large

by normal Chinese standards. The Khitan first imposed a tax system on its

settled subjects under A-pao-chi's Chinese adviser Han Yen-hui (882—959)

in 912. They continued to impose a modified version of the two-tax system

66 Wittfogel and Feng, pp. 164-5.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

96 THE L1AO

established under the Tang, plus various surtaxes such as a levy on agricul-

tural implements, and they frequently levied manpower for corvee work.

There was a salt monopoly levied on both coastal salt and the product of

inland salt lakes. There was also a tax on liquor and ferments, and various

merchant taxes were levied on market transactions and goods in transit.

During the reign of Sheng-tsung there were no new developments, but the

expenses of the many campaigns clearly brought about some

financial

strain.

In 991 there was a land survey

and a general census was taken for the first

time,

and in 997 a census was taken of the tribal population of the various

ordos.

In the 990s the government repeatedly readjusted taxes in various

ways:

In 991, inspectors from the north were sent to the region around

Peking to look into the evasion of taxes and corvee duty.

In 994, the

government ordered that an "equitable" system of

taxes

be established.

It is

unclear what this meant; certainly by the end of Sheng-tsung's reign great

inequities still existed, and

his successors ordered a new reassessment.

995 the taxes of

some

areas were further increased, and in 997 the taxes of the

Southern Capital circuit under the new system were reduced because they had

become intolerable.

In 998 further concessions followed,

and in 1002 the

southern areas were again given tax exemptions, and trade taxes were cut.

The settlement with Sung in 1005 immediately reduced the strain on the

Liao finances. The annual subsidy paid by the Sung government was the

equivalent of a considerable proportion of the Liao's total revenues. But in

the next few years new trade taxes were imposed, and the extraordinary levies

continued.

Coinage

The Khitan had made copper cash even before the time of A-pao-chi, and

sometime in T'ai-tsung's reign (927—47) an official was appointed to control

the minting of cash and iron production. Shih Ching-t'ang, founder of the

puppet Chin regime (936-46) and a loyal vassal of the Khitan, had supplied

large amounts of copper cash to help the Liao economy. But during Shih-

tsung's reign, the Sung captive Hu Chiao reported that silk, rather than

cash, was the main form of currency even at the capital.

At first the Khitan

67 LS, 13, p.139.

68 LS, 13, p. 149.

69 LS, 82, p. 1290.

70 LS, 13, p. 145.

71 LS, 59, p. 925.

72 LS, 13, p. 148.

73 ". 13. PP- !49-5°-

74 LS, 14, p. 157.

75 Ou-yang Hsiu,

Hsin

Wu-taishib,

73, p. 906;

LS,

37, p. 441.

Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008

CHANGES IN INTERNAL GOVERNMENT 97

depended heavily on coin imported from China, and large numbers of Sung

cash have been found in what were Liao territories. The general use of

metallic coin and the serious minting of cash began only at the end of Ching-

tsung's reign with the issue of the Ch'ien-heng coinage in 982.?

Another

new minting, the T'ung-ho coinage, began in 983 at Sheng-tsung's acces-

sion. A large addition to the stock of coinage came in 996 when a huge cache

of copper coin hidden almost a century before near Peking by Liu Jen-kung,

the former governor of Lu-lung, was discovered. In 1021 a new T'ai-p'ing

coinage was minted, and by the end of Sheng-tsung's reign there seems to

have been an adequate supply.

Large amounts of Sung coin circulated in

Liao territory. But the quantities of coin mentioned in our sources are still

very small in comparison with those of T'ang or Sung. After Sheng-tsung's

time the use of money greatly increased, but the minting of coin failed to

keep up with demand.

By 1055 a crisis in the supply of money seems to have developed. Counter-

feiting and trade in copper and iron were strictly regulated, and the export of

metals to the Uighurs and Mongols was prohibited.

From 1056, coinage

was for the first time manufactured in the Eastern Capital.

For the rest of

the eleventh century, although new coinages were minted in 1055, 1065,

1074,

1084, 1102, and 1112 and although even the Koryo records speak of

the widespread use of copper cash in Liao, there seems to have been little

control over the quality of the money in circulation. The crude quality of

surviving examples of Liao cash bear this out. By the 1070s the traditional

official reactions to a cash shortage

—

the prohibition of the manufacture of

copper implements (1084) and bans on exports of metals

and of cash

(1088)

—

begin to appear. In 1090 Su Ch'e, who was sent as an envoy to the

Liao,

reported that all the coin circulating there was Sung copper currency.

By the early twelfth century, government expenditures began to far outstrip

both revenue and the production of coin, and the dynasty ended with a

serious money shortage.

Building of the Central Capital and

the

final

incorporation

the

Hsi

From the time of T'ai-tsung the Hsi peoples, after a series of rebellions and

Khitan punitive expeditions during A-pao-chi's reign, had finally accepted a

76 Numismatic works claim to identify earlier coinages, but some of these are of dubious authenticity.

See P'eng Hsin-wei, Chung-kuo huopi shih (Shanghai, 1958), p. 371.

77 LS, 60, p. 931; Wittfogel and Feng, pp. 181—7; Peng,

Chung-kuo huo

pi shih, pp. 370-2.

78 LS, 60, p. 931.

79 LS, 21, p. 254.

80 LS, 60, p. 931; 22, p. 270.

81 See Su Ch'e, Luan

ch'eng

chi (Peking, 1984), 42, p. 938.

98 THE LIAO

position of semi-independence within the Khitan state not dissimilar to that

of Po-hai.

They had retained their own king, who had his own officials, and

they had paid tribute as vassals, not taxes as subjects, to the Khitan govern-

ment. During the frontier wars with the Sung in the last decades of the tenth

century, during which their territory was invaded, giving them an opportu-

nity to break with the Khitan had they so wished, the Hsi people remained

almost entirely loyal. Between 994 and 997 a series of reforms by the Hsi

king's administration were enacted, and the Hsi people's former "tribute"

was discontinued. The Hsi king now became a salaried Liao official. Chinese-

style local administrative units were set up to control former Hsi territories,

and Chinese settled there to farm the rich valleys. In 1006 the former

residence of the Hsi king was designated the Khitan Central Capital (Chung

ching).

In 1007 the site was walled, and a Chinese population was moved

from Liao-tung to settle in the new city: A Liao ancestral temple was built,

together with reception hostels for envoys from Sung, Korea, and Hsia.

Further preparations were made for a visit by Sheng-tsung in 1009 and more

public buildings were constructed between 1018 and 1020.

The new capital seems to have served for some time as a cult center and a

site for receiving diplomatic missions: The Sung envoys Sung Pu and Lu

Chen visited it in 1008 and left descriptions of it, as did Wang Tseng, who

came in 1013. It had an inner and outer wall, but in Lu Chen's time it seems

to have been still largely uninhabited. Unlike the four other capitals (the

Supreme Capital, Eastern Capital, Southern Capital, and the Western Capital

that was later established in 1044 at Ta-t'ung), all of which were considerable

cities,

it remained relatively small and administered only a limited area, with

few subordinate local administrations and a small registered population,

mainly Chinese and Hsi. But its establishment finally brought the Hsi into

the Khitan state, and from the eleventh century onward they appear less and

less frequently in our sources as a separate people.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

In spite of

these

wide ranging changes in the internal politics and institutions

of the Khitan state under Sheng-tsung, the most important changes took

place in foreign relations. At his accession, the Liao were still poised on the

brink of war with the Sung, were almost isolated from the Kory6 kingdom,

82 On the position of the Hsi in the Khitan state, see Shimada, Ryochoshi no kcnkyu, pp. 8-10; Li Han

and Shen Hsiieh-ming, "Liieh lun Hsi tsu tsai Liao tai te fa chan," Sung Liao Chin shih lun tsung, 1

(1985),

pp. 277-94.

83 On the Central Capital, see Shimada,

Ryocho

shi

kenkyu, pp. 443—56.

84 IS, 14, p. 163; 16, pp. 184, 18;, 188. Ancestral temples were erected for Ching-tsung in 1019 and

for T'ai-tsu in 1020.

FOREIGN RELATIONS 99

and still suffered constant problems with their tribal dependents, both the

Jurchen

the east and northeast and the various Tangut and Mongolian

tribes

the southwest and west. By the end of his long reign, stable

interstate relations had been established with both the Sung and Kory6

courts, which led to almost a century of

peace

and stability.

Renewed hostilities

with the Sung, 986

The ignominious defeat of Sung T'ai-tsung's invasion of Liao

979 left

him avid for revenge and provoked violent reactions at the Sung court.

980 Li Fang and Hu Meng advised the emperor that the Sung empire

lacked the military capability

renew its assault on the Liao, but the

humiliation of 979 rankled among the ministers, who constantly referred to

the Khitan in colorful pejorative rhetoric as evil and uncivilized barbarians

richly deserving of chastisement. By 985 the Sung were ready to launch

another large-scale invasion, and this time they tried to form an alliance

with the Korean king for a coordinated attack on Liao "in defense of their

common civilized values."

In 986 T'ai-tsung could contain his impatience no longer and mobilized a

huge army to drive the Khitan out of the "lost prefectures." Three army

groups crossed the border simultaneously, at Yen-men and Fei-hu on the Ho-

tung border and from Hsiung-chou in western Ho-pei. The Sung armies at

first overwhelmed the border defenses and made some territorial gains. Some

of the Liao border commanders defected and surrendered to the Sung. But

the tide soon turned, as the Liao generals lured the invaders deep into their

own territories, far from their supply lines, and then surrounded and attacked

them from all sides. The Liao forces won resounding victories on all three

fronts;

the Sung suffered heavy casualties and lost large numbers of captives

and huge quantities of supplies and weapons.

The invasion was yet another military disaster for the Sung, but

also

caused serious disruption and damage in the frontier areas of Liao, where

many people fled their homes; the areas south of the Southern and Western

capitals, the main objectives of the invasion, were devastated and did not

recover for many years. However, thousands of surrendered Sung troops were

incorporated into the Liao armies, and some Sung officials and examination

graduates were absorbed into the Liao civil administration.

85 See Wang Gung-wu, "The rhetoric of a lesser empire: early Sung relations with its neighbors,"

China among equals: The Middle Kingdom and its

neighbors,

loth—iqth

centuries,

ed. Morris Rossabi

(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983), p. 53.

86 For a detailed account of the fighting, see Ch'eng Kuang-yii, Sung T'ai-tsung tui Liao

chan cheng

k'ao

(Taipei, 1972), pp. 95-161.

IOO THE LIAO

Sung T'ai-tsung and some of his court still were determined to renew

hostilities. In 988 and 989 T'ai-tsung ordered his ministers to debate the

options open to him in dealing with the Khitan. The ministers faced a tricky

task in reconciling the practical realities with their emperor's preference for

the idealistic solution of asserting Chinese superiority once and for all. A

diplomatic solution to the frontier problem was suggested, though this was

politically possible only as

"temporary expedient" in the face offorce

majeure.

But no major new campaign was planned.

Liao relations with Korea

During the final two decades of the tenth century, the Liao found themselves

embroiled in a hostile confrontation not only with the Sung but also with the

troublesome border tribes of the Jurchen, with Korea in the east, and with

the rising Tangut state of Hsia in the Ordos area to the west.

The Khitans' relations with Korea until the 980s had been of minor

importance. The critical period of the Khitan conquest of Po-hai in 926,

when conflict might have been expected, had coincided with a period of

political fragmentation in Korea. The Silla state had begun to collapse in the

last decade of the ninth century, and rebel leaders had set up three indepen-

dent states: Later Kogury6 in the north, Later Paekche in the southwest, and

a rebel regime led by Wang K6n on the west coast. In 918 Wang K6n

usurped the leadership of Later Koguryd and established the Koryo dynasty

in the north and northwest (he is known by his temple name T'aejo; r. 918—

43).

In 926 Korea was thus split among three states and quite unable to

come to the defense of

Po-hai,

even had they wished to do

so.

It was not until

935 that Silla finally surrendered to Koryo and 936 before the Kory6 king

T'aejo conquered Later Paekche and reunified the peninsula (see Map 5).

In the following decades, the Kory6 kingdom began a systematic expan-

sion and strengthening of its position in the north, establishing a new

"western capital" at P'y6ng-yang.

As the self-professed heirs of ancient

Koguryo, their rulers aimed to reconquer the territories north of

the

Taedong

River, toward the Yalu Valley. There still remained no urgent cause for

conflict with the Khitan, however, as this region was occupied by a variety of

Jurchen and other tribal peoples and by remnants of the Po-hai population.

Moreover, there was powerful opposition at the Koryd court to any territorial

expansion to the north. Many of the nobles and officials strongly believed

This

can be

followed

in the

table showing

the

establishment

of new

local administrative

centers,

some

with considerable

garrisons,

given

Chin

Wei-hsien,

Ch'i-tan

tungpei chmg

(Taipei,

1981),

pp.

79-81.