Telo M. European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era

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European Union and New Regionalism

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patterns. In comparison with Europe or North America, the Paciﬁc region as a

whole is a much more heterogeneous region. When looking at varying historical

patterns between EU and ASEAN, we will examine two determinants of Asian

regionalism suggested by Katzenstein (1996) in his attempt to account for the

relative weakness of the formal political institutions of Asian regionalism by a

comparison with Europe: namely, power and norms in the international system;

and the character of domestic state structures.

American power in Asia after 1945 was relatively much greater than in Europe,

and US foreign policy in Asia did not establish the principle of multilateralism

there as it did in Europe (Katzenstein, 1996). American diplomacy in Paciﬁc Asia

has overwhelmingly been bilateral and not multilateral. This has made it much

more difﬁcult for Asian states to develop broad, interlocking and institutionalized

political arrangements of the kind that have characterized the European integration

process. However, it has been argued (Acharya, 1997) that it is in fact the Asia–

Paciﬁc region’s extreme diversity, rather than America’s extreme hegemony, which

might have inhibited the emergence of multilateral institutions in the immediate

post-war period; for the Asia–Paciﬁc nations are remarkably different in terms of

their political systems, cultural heritage and historical experience.

Katzenstein (1996) notes that the comparative weakness in the institutionalization

of Asian regionalism is also attributable to the character of Asian state structures.

Some state structures are better suited than others to deal with public law and

formal institutions as the preferred vehicle for regional integration. Neither Asia

as a whole or any of its sub-regions possesses equivalents of the Europe-wide

institutions, foremost among which is, of course, the EU itself. In the establishment

of formal institutions, Asian regionalism has during recent decades experienced

a series of very slow, or even false, starts. Even the most successful institution

of Asian regional integration, ASEAN, has arguably avoided the elimination of

tariffs; until recently it was committed only to negotiating some preferential tariff

margins for member states on selected goods. One argument advanced in regard

to the slow development in Asian regionalism is that ‘only the more developed

countries appear to accept deeper forms of integration’ (Wijkman & Sundkvist

Lindström, 1989).

Also, Southeast Asia is greatly inﬂuenced by British, Dutch, French, Spanish

and US colonialism. Social forces inherited from the imperial past penetrate these

post-colonial states deeply and thus create multiple political connections in intricate

network structures. These states have inherited the colonial tradition of ‘the rule by

law’ rather than The West European tradition of ‘the rule of law’ (Katzenstein,

1996). Southeast Asian countries are constituted legally, but the relation between

state and society is governed by social rather than legal norms.

Our discussion of political heterogeneity between the EU and ASEAN is

conducted in respect of the political systems in the region, related to the deﬁnition

in most dictionaries and as deﬁned by Hanks (1986): ‘Politics refers to the study of

the ways in which a country is governed and power is acquired.’ The Paciﬁc region

is politically highly heterogeneous. The political systems in the ASEAN countries

can most appropriately be described as all composed of some form of authoritarian

capitalist or semi-democratic system, but with great differences between one

Comparison of European and Southeast Asian Integration

219

another. All the EU member countries are democratic polities, and the ASEAN

countries deﬁnitely differ far more in their political systems than do the EU member

states. For example, the political difference between Thailand and Myanmar is

far greater than the political difference among any two of the European nation

states. The stability of the most democratic nations is also fragile. Thailand gave an

example of the instability of one of the most democratic systems in the region with

the military take over of power in 2006. These differences obviously constitute a

major barrier to institutional economic cooperation. All the free trade agreements

previously established have been among countries of similar political systems.

This can be explained by the fact that political systems are closely associated with

modes of production.

An economy is the system according to which the money, industry and trade

of a country or region are organized (Hanks, 1986). We will here examine in

particular the degree of liberalization of the economy and differences in per capita

income. The high degree of heterogeneity in the Paciﬁc region makes formal

economic cooperation difﬁcult, because it greatly increases the transaction costs

of institution-building. By contrast, non-institutional economic cooperation in Asia

has functioned well in relation to the progressive liberalization of the Southeast

Asian economies, especially in trade and investment, which has been under way

since the 1960s, accelerating since the 1980s. The informal, gradual and ﬂexible

nature of non-institutional economic cooperation makes this approach highly

appropriate as a way to open up economies while minimizing the outside shock

accompanying liberalization (Peng, 1997: 14).

Economic disparity is the single most important barrier to formal regional

cooperation in the Asia–Paciﬁc region. It reﬂects the divergence in degree of

industrialization, technological level, labour costs, export capacity and several

other important factors. Within ASEAN there are enormous differences in per

capita income/GNP between the member states. There has been no precedent at

any time in the world history of a successful free trade agreement among countries

with great economic disparity (Peng, 1997: 15). The closest example is the General

Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT); but GATT is an organization setting rules,

rather than a real free trade area.

As we have pointed out above, Southeast Asians have their own way of

conducting economic cooperation through informal means. For instance, economic

cooperation based on the multi-tier economic division of labour is particularly

strong in Southeast Asia. Sub-regional economic groupings (like ASEAN) and

business networks are also playing very important roles in Southeast Asian

regional cooperation. Strong informal economic cooperation is an important factor

propelling regional integration in the absence of effective regional cooperative

institutions.

Cultural heterogeneity can also raise transaction costs. Culture is a concept

difﬁcult to deﬁne, but may for present purposes be said to be a particular society or

civilization, especially considered in relation to its ideas, its art, its customs or its

way of life (Hanks, 1986). In investigating cultural aspects, we consider religion

and language in the EU and ASEAN respectively.

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220

In the ASEAN countries there are six major religions – Buddhism, Taoism,

Hinduism, Christianity, Islam and Confucianism; so far at least all the EU countries

are Christian even if you have Christianity in different versions. The next round

of enlargement will, however, probably bring in Muslim countries like Albania

– let alone Turkey – and religious mixed countries like Bosnia. One may argue,

however, that even if there are many divisions within Christianity, they still fall

within one religious creed and thus EU so far in the world has manifested itself

as religiously homogenous. Also, language diversity in the Asia–Paciﬁc region

is much greater than in Europe. Most EU countries belong to the Indo-European

family of languages, with the exceptions of Finland and Hungary. The inclusion

of Bulgaria will, however, introduce the Cyrillic alphabet in addition to the Latin

and Greek. In contrast, there is a greater diversity among the ASEAN countries,

where Thailand and Singapore belong to the Chinese–Tibetan language family, and

Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei to the Malay–Polynesian. Cultural

heterogeneity also extends beyond religious and linguistic diversity to much

broader categories like consumption behaviour, business practices, and methods of

management and so on.

The formation of Asian business networks is linked with the strong East Asian

cultural tradition (Katzenstein, 1996). Confucianism, which has a strong inﬂuence in

all the major Northeast Asian societies, Vietnam and the Overseas Chinese societies,

has always placed great emphasis on human relations and personal ties. Extensive

use of personal networks is an effective way to get around barriers to business in

many Southeast Asian countries, both domestically and internationally.

This comparative analysis, comparing EU and ASEAN, can help us to identify

elements of Asian and European distinctiveness. It highlights, speciﬁcally, the

inclusive character of Asian network-style integration in contrast to the continental

European emphasis on formal institutions.

7 Conclusion

In the light of this analysis, do the changes within ASEAN and within ASEAN

countries outlined above suggest that the association will over time become more

similar to the EU?

We have in recent years witnessed tendencies on several fronts towards more

comparable development in the two regions. Firstly, the general tendency, described

above, for policy networks or communities to develop in nearly all sectors of

society in Southeast Asia, establishing in many cases formal organizations and

with increased frequencies of interaction which broaden the scope of policy

coordination. Secondly, the increase in the number of summits and formal

ministerial conferences make ASEAN more like the intergovernmental aspects of

the EU. Still, however, ASEAN is not a supranational body and it does not possess

a formal legal identity.

ASEAN involvement in policy issues, like free trade through AFTA, will

strengthen the tendency towards more organized cooperation. One possible

hypothesis could be that further development of free trade agreements between

Comparison of European and Southeast Asian Integration

221

countries and regions creates needs for rules and controlling institutions in order

to be effective. It has been predicted that if AFTA becomes a success, a more

institutionalized organization will develop (Westerlund, 1997). ASEAN has already

attempted to develop new institutional structures along these lines, for example,

by adding a protocol for the settling of trade disputes based on a majority voting

procedure.

The expansion of ASEAN, with the problems surrounding the membership of

Myanmar and the temporary suspension of Cambodian admission in the end of the

1990s, strengthened also the organizational cooperation. Several new meetings,

working groups and procedures were institutionalized in this period. There are also

interesting elements in the ASEAN decision-making procedures which resemble

those of the EU, such as the use of majority voting and ﬂexible consensus.

The comparative study of the EU and ASEAN highlights the existence of

signiﬁcant differences between the two groupings, on the basis of which a quite

unique Asian model is likely to develop. As Paul Evans (1994) has argued,

institution-building in the Asia–Paciﬁc region, rather than following the pattern

established in Europe and North America, is instead ‘emerging from unique

historical circumstances and will likely evolve in its own particular way’. Although

the picture today remains somewhat complex, the period of transition that these

countries now are going through may prove to be a key step towards greater and

deeper both economic and political integration in the future.

Notes

1 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at a conference on ‘Non-state Actors

and Authority in the Global System’, University of Warwick, 31 October–1 November

1997. The authors would like to thank Solgunn Hoff and Anne Caroline Tveøy who

have participated in preparing part of this manuscript, and in addition Pinar Tank and

Alice Chamrernnusit for their help in the ﬁnal editing of the chapter, all employed at

the Centre for European and Asian Studies at the Norwegian School of Management

in Oslo. We would also like to thank Nick Sitter for valuable comments on the revised

version of the chapter.

2 The term ‘new regionalism’ has been used by several writers, including Telò, Hetne

(2000–04) and other authors of this volume.

3 The formal track of the Southeast Asian pattern of integration includes cooperation

through regional institutions like APEC, PECC and EAEC (East Asia Economic

Caucus), and sub-regional free trade areas like NAFTA, AFTA and the Australia–New

Zealand and recently several more free trade areas.

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PART III

European Union as a New

Civilian Power in the Making?

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Chapter 11

The European Union and the

Challenges of the Near Abroad

Mario Telò

A distinctive feature of this book is the consideration of possible tensions between

the EU’s increasing global actorhood and its relations to the near abroad. The

two dimensions, regional and global, are not always easy to reconcile. Global

responsibilities demand further integration and cohesion, by representing the EU

world wide and also more centralized and efﬁcient decision making. The regional

dimension, however, entails both issues, deepening and widening; enhanced ability

to act at continental and Mediterranean level, but also a tremendous pressure for

wider membership, up to now without any strategically deﬁned borders. Since

the size matters and the very nature of a regional organization interacts with the

internal balance between deepening and enlarging, we will commence by analyzing

the evolving relationship of the EC–EU with the ‘near abroad’, namely with the

eastern/continental dimension and with its southern neighbours.

The evolution of European regionalism is confronted with very complex challenges

coming from the so-called arch of the crisis, from the east to south of the EU. R.

Seidelmann and G. Joffé both contribute to this volume, respectively considering

eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. A common problem concerns the complex

interrelationship between the economic and political dimension of partnership, and

the changing balance between the security challenges (including energy security,

hard security, terrorism, and so on) and the other issues. In both cases, even if during

the last two decades we witnessed a shift towards dramatic military and civilian

crises, new threats are emerging, that is, ethnic fundamentalism, and refugee ﬂows.

Secondly, in both cases, even if for different reasons, the original kind of western

European regionalism is being challenged because of the implications of multiple

applications and decisions of full membership: the eastward enlargement process

(2004 and 2007) and the southern one (2004 and the negotiations with Turkey).

1 European Union and the challenge of a continental Europe

Ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall we are witnessing a new situation as far

as continental Europe is concerned.

On the one hand, we see an emerging western-

centred east–west cooperation. In spite of domestic instability, Russia’s step by

step integration into western international organizations, growing interdependence,

and a change in Russian priorities are making a military conﬂict between east and

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226

west unthinkable. ‘In comparison with the past, the new East–West relations in

Europe are basically demilitarized, based on economic and political cooperation

and on a western-dominated power formula’ (Seidelmann). On the other hand,

as conﬁrmed by the Kosovo war, nationalism, ethnocentric movements and

economic backwardness, in one word, ‘Yugoslavization’, make the design of a

new European peace order not yet established, by highlighting some political limits

of the EU. Moreover, one must not underestimate the collapse of Eastern European

subregional cooperation:

‘Visegrad’, ‘Black Sea community’ and ‘Community

of Independent States’ have not been supported enough by EU, while bilateral

conditionality often played a disintegrating role. Last but not least, the new pan-

European institutional architecture, shaped after 1989 (the institutionalization of the

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1990 ‘Charta of Paris’ and

revival of the Council of Europe), is largely disappointing as far as the governance

of the continent is concerned. Certainly, the EU and NATO are the major actors at

continental level and they dominate political and economic developments in Eastern

countries. However, since their strategies and interests present both similarities and

differences, the ﬁrst question is to what extent and how is the EU strengthening

its role as a regional engine, and to what extent is its role still partially submitted

to the leadership of others. However, it is a matter of fact that such huge regional

problems already changed from an inter-bloc issue to a major challenge for the EU,

and constitute a global issue, concerning also the main world power.

Let us turn to the second question. The EU is becoming more and more like a

kind of a magnet from an economic and civilian point of view. Among the twenty-

six applications for membership during the history of European integration, twelve

were from central and eastern Europe and some more will come. This proves the

signiﬁcant regional inﬂuence of the EU and its impact on both domestic policy

and the external relations of eastern applying and neighbouring countries.

History,

security, economy and social links create a high degree of interdependence between

the previous two parts of Europe. Since part of eastern Europe still faces obstacles

and difﬁculties regarding democratization, growth and peace, if the EU proves itself

unable to manage, control and solve the critical consequences of interdependence,

they will consequently have an impact on the EU’s inner legitimacy and political

support, as shown by the referenda of 2005 held in France and Netherlands

regarding the constitutional treaty.

The EU is being challenged to cope with its pan-European responsibilities. On the

one hand, the huge political, ﬁnancial, institutional, social and cultural implications

of the eastern enlargement for the continental stability have no precedent in the

history of European construction. On the other hand, if the EU, as an organization,

fails in managing the enlargement process and partnership with Russia, it will

lose the political support of European public opinion. The current situation shows

dramatic weakness, as far as EU regional action is concerned, regarding enforcing

and settling peace agreements, defending national minority rights, implementing a

so-called ‘Marshall Plan’ for Eastern Europe, setting a common energy policy in

partnership with Russia and Ukraine. Seidelmann’s paper underlines three major

limits of the EU as far as a regional actor is concerned:

The European Union and the Challenges of the Near Abroad

227

In spite of the ‘Stability Pact’ and the new ‘common strategies’, approved

in 1999 by the Cologne European Council (regarding Russia), by the Helsinki

European Council (regarding Ukraine) , the progress achieved by The Western

Balkan policy between 2002 and 2004, and during 2006 regarding steps towards

an European energy policy, the EU still lacks a comprehensive, cost-efﬁcient, and

cohesive political-economic ‘grand’ strategy towards eastern Europe, the Balkans

and Russia in particular.

The Maastricht CSFP project, in spite of the improvements approved in

Amsterdam (new Treaty provisions) and in Helsinki (new military means

for ‘Petersberg tasks’ and defence policy) still lacks a satisfying degree of

institutionalization and policy implementation.

The EU shows clear limits regarding its diplomatic power in relation to

intergovernmental bodies (the several ‘Contact groups’ for instance), to nation

states’ power (for example, as the UN security council is concerned) and to the

American role in Europe.

According to Seidelmann, in terms of power, the EU shows its dramatic

deﬁcits in the case of the remilitarization of local conﬂicts (as shown by the former

Yugoslavia and former USSR experience), particularly in comparison with the

enhanced NATO role in Eastern European security challenges.

Ten years after 1989, instead of a homogeneous trend, we are observing not one,

but instead many ‘eastern Europes’. The ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia looks

as a still insufﬁcient framework for a balanced and dynamic compromise including

energy policy, economic cooperation and political dialogue. There is a ‘winners

group’ (such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Hungary, some of the

Baltic states), where clear achievements in economic and democratic transition are

making of EU 2004 enlargement a recognized success story

. There is a various

‘losers group’ (Belarus, Moldova, but also some of the Balkan countries). Here, the

huge problems of economic and political reform have provoked a vicious circle of

dependence on the west. Economic crisis, domestic turbulence, foreign and domestic

malevolence and the real threat of regional instability and anti-West movements have

aggravated this. Ukraine is representing a distinctive transition, including intensive

dialogue with EU and refusal of NATO membership. Finally, after the Kosovo war, a

new group was born, including Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia,

Montenegro and Kosovo, where ad hoc plans and new priorities have been agreed

with EU, because of political and humanitarian criteria. In conclusion, the general

picture is still very differentiated and ambiguous concerning the feasibility of a new

peace and democratic order at pan-European level.

As far as the foreseeable future is concerned, two developments are possible,

since the Yugoslavian tragedies of the 1990s shattered the rhetorical idealistic

approach of a general benevolence and a ﬁnal victory for democratic values.

Either one can conceive the eastern European problems as marginal for the global

governance of the world economy and security, or one can emphasize the threat

coming from re-emerging nationalisms, pan-Slavonic fundamentalism, both in the

Balkans and in the former Soviet Union. The ﬁrst vision takes into account the

dramatic decline of the former USSR as a superpower, the end of the nuclear threat

and the transformation of eastern Europe as part of a growing and encompassing