Suny R.G. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 3: The Twentieth Century

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Ending the Cold War

If the results of economic reform during the perestroika period were, to say

the least, disappointing, the outcome of the new direction of Soviet foreign

policy was a dramatic improvement in Soviet relations with the outside world.

Gorbachev came to power intent on making a qualitative change in this respect.

He was determined to end the war in Afghanistan and to improve relations

with the United States, Western Europe and China. He wished to move away

also from Soviet tutelage of Eastern Europe. At a meeting with the East

European Communist leaders as early as Chernenko’s funeral Gorbachev told

this disbelieving group that the Soviet Union would respect their sovereignty

and independence and they, in turn, would have to take full responsibility

for developments in their countries. In other words – and Gorbachev was

to make this more explicit in November 1986 – the ruling parties of Eastern

Europe had better earn the trust of their own people, for there would be no

more Soviet military interventions if they ran into trouble.

Granting more

independence to Communist leaders in Eastern Europe and respecting the

full autonomy of those states were not, of course, the same thing. It was

in 1988–9 that Gorbachev went beyond the former position to embrace the

latter.

The issue of how decisive in ending the Cold War was the role played by

political leaders – in particular, Gorbachev – is still a subject for debate, as are

explanationsintermsofmaterialresources, ideasand Soviet domestic politics.

Some see these as alternative explanations. For others they are complementary,

each having some bearing on the eventual outcome but to greatly varying

extent. One argument which would accord primacy to American pressure –

stressing, at the same time, the disparity between the material resources of

the Soviet Union and the United States – holds that by stepping up military

expenditure in a way the USSR would ﬁnd difﬁcult to match, the Reagan

administration was inviting its Soviet adversary either to ‘spend itself to death’

or to capitulate. Expressed more moderately, this is stated as: ‘The end of

32 Gorbachev,Zhizn’ ireformy,p.311;and Alex Pravda, ‘Soviet Policy towards Eastern Europe

in Transition: The Means Justify the Ends’, in Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe: An

End to Confrontation (London: Pinter, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs,

1994), pp. 123–50,atp.134. Within the Soviet Politburo Gorbachev sometimes used more

traditional language. See Mark Kramer, ‘The Collapse of East European Communism

and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union (Part 1)’, Journal of Cold War Studies 5, 4

(Fall 2003): 178–256,atp.183.

33 See esp. Richard K. Herrmann and Richard Ned Lebow (eds.), Ending the Cold War:

Interpretations, Causation, and the Study of International Relations (New York: Palgrave

Macmillan, 2004).

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the Cold War was caused by the relative decline of Soviet power and the

reassurance this gave the West.’

However, the relative strength of the United States in relation to the Soviet

Union was greater in the early post-war years when Stalin’s takeover of Eastern

Europe began the Cold War. Moreover, the Soviet Union, if less militarily strong

thanthe United States in the mid-1980s, had enough nuclear weaponstodestroy

life on earth. It did not need to match the US, weapon for weapon, in order

to maintain the division of Europe. At home, living standards, while low in

comparison with Western Europe, were much higher than Soviet citizens had

put up with over many decades. Even if there had been more widespread

domestic dissatisfaction with Soviet foreign policy and with the domestic

political order than, in fact, there was in 1985, the regime had sophisticated

means of maintaining control and an apparatus of repression that had very

successfully eliminated dissent. It could have continued to do so, using the

mass media to present a propagandistic interpretation of Western aggressive

intentions and the need for the Soviet Union to strengthen still further its

defences, had the leadership opted for continuity rather than change in foreign

policy.

Gorbachev was in a minority of one in the Politburo at the time he took over

as General Secretary in believing that the Soviet Union as well as the United

States had to react to the realities of the nuclear age in a new way. He was

concerned that President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) increased

the chance of Cold War turning into hot war by increasing reliance on fallible

technology and technocratic rather than political decisions. He wished also to

divert excessive military expenditure to civilian purposes, but he was initially

alone also within the top leadership in being willing to tackle the power

of the Soviet military-industrial complex. And even as leader, aware that he

could be replaced as General Secretary at short notice by a CPSU Central

Committee plenum, Gorbachev had to proceed cautiously in challenging the

most powerful institutional interests within the Soviet system.

A combination of new Soviet leadership and new ideas was more important

than the difference in material resources between the USSR and the USA in

bringing about change. Domestic Soviet politics were also more important

than the international environment between 1985 and 1988. This changed in

1989 when the citizens of East European countries demanded and secured their

independence. The speed at which this happened left Gorbachev responding to

34 William C. Wohlforth, ‘Realism and the End of the Cold War’, International Security 19,

3 (Winter 1994/5): 91–129,atp.96.

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events, rather than setting the international agenda, as he had done, to a great

extent, in his earliest years in ofﬁce. One of the features that distinguished

Gorbachev from his predecessors as Soviet leader was a strong aversion to

violence. This is, on the whole, recognised both by those who think well of

Gorbachev and by his severe critics in post-Communist Russia. In the words

of Vladislav Zubok: ‘The principle of non-violence was not only Gorbachev’s

sincere belief, and the foundation of his domestic and foreign policies, but it

also matched his personal “codes” . . . The critics claim that Gorbachev “had

no guts for blood”, even when it was dictated by raison d’

etat.’

There was,

moreover, as Anatolii Cherniaev has afﬁrmed, ‘a total lack in Gorbachev of

undue respect for the military or any kind of special fascination with military

parades and demonstrations of military power’.

By bringing in a new foreign-policy team early on, consisting of Eduard

Shevardnadze as foreign minister, Cherniaev as main foreign policy adviser,

Anatolii Dobrynin as head of the International Department of the Central

Committee, and Vadim Medvedev in charge of the Socialist Countries Depart-

ment of that body, Gorbachevopened the way for both new thinking on foreign

policy and new behaviour. From the outset Aleksandr Yakovlev was also an

inﬂuential adviser and from 1988 he was the overseer of international affairs

within the Central Committee. While Gorbachev pursued what George Bres-

lauer has characterised as a ‘concessionary foreign policy’, the Soviet Union

was not forced into this.

It was, rather, a price that a minority of the Soviet

elite – including, however, the principal power-holder – was prepared to pay for

what they (perhaps, in retrospect, naively) believed would be a more peaceful

and self-consciously interdependent world. The policy was intimately bound

up with the changes that the same people wished to make at home. Liberalisa-

tion, followed by democratisation, within the country was linked to abandon-

ing imperial pretensions abroad. Ronald Reagan, contrary to the belief of most

of the Soviet experts on American politics, turned out to be a valuable partner

for Gorbachev in international negotiations. His anti-Communist credentials

were sufﬁciently strong to offer him protection at home, and although there

were important inter-agency tensions within the American administration,

35 Vladislav M. Zubok, ‘Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War: Perspectives on History

and Personality’, Cold War History 2, 2 (Jan. (2002): 61–100,atp.82.

36 Anatolii Cherniaev, ‘Forging a New Relationship’, in William C. Wohlforth (ed.), Cold

War Endgame: Oral History, Analysis, Debates (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State

University Press, 2003), p. 21.

37 On Gorbachev’s way of justifying his change of Soviet foreign policy, see George W. Bres-

lauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2002), esp. pp. 70–8.

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Reagan believed that change within the Soviet Union (and of Soviet interna-

tional conduct) was possible, and, in the words of his ambassador to Moscow,

‘always came down ultimately in support of dialogue’.

The coming to power of Gorbachev led to the toppling of ideological ortho-

doxy in Soviet thinking on international affairs even more quickly than on the

economy and the political system. The concept of ‘reasonable sufﬁciency’ in

military expenditure (rather than fully matching the potential adversary), the

idea that ‘all-human values’ had supremacy over class values and that there

were universal interests which took precedence over those of any one country

led to an emphasis on interdependence that marked a qualitative step forward

from the old Soviet doctrine of ‘peaceful coexistence’. International relations

were no longer seen as a zero-sum game, a deadly struggle between socialism

and capitalism, but rather an arena where, through co-operation, all countries

could beneﬁt.

The ﬁrst fruits of the new co-operation were to be seen in arms reduction

agreements. There were summit meetings between Gorbachev and Reagan

at Geneva (1985), Reykjavik (1986), Washington (1987) and Moscow (1988).

The Reykjavik meeting came close to outlawing a wide range of nuclear

weapons, but ultimately foundered on disagreement over whether work on

SDI should or should not be conﬁned to the laboratory. Although both leaders

left that meeting greatly disappointed, it did not sour the Gorbachev–Reagan

relationship. The Washington summit in December 1987 ended by eliminating

a whole category of nuclear weapons, both Soviet SS-20s and the American

cruise and Pershing missiles. This ‘zero option’ had been Reagan’s policy

since 1981, and so he could take some pride in the outcome. However, hard-

line Washington critics, as well as hard-line Moscow ones, were upset, for

the former had believed that no Soviet leader would dare admit that installing

the SS-20s had been a mistake, and they had counted on the continued presence

of American medium-range missiles in Europe.

The improvement in East–West relations was further enhanced by the

Soviet Union’s decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Gorbachev

had been looking for an exit strategy from the beginning of his General

38 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random

House, 2004), p. 64. See also Archie Brown, ‘Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War’,

pp. 31–57, esp. 50–2, and George W. Breslauer and Richard Ned Lebow, ‘Leadership and

the End of the Cold War: A Counterfactual Thought Experiment’, in Herrmann and

Lebow, Ending the Cold War,pp.161–88, esp. 180–4.

39 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End of

the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 193–228; and Brown,

The Gorbachev Factor, esp. pp. 220–5.

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Secretaryship but he had to take account of the reluctance of the Soviet mili-

tary to depart in a manner which looked like a defeat. He wished, therefore,

to encourage reconciliation among the warring parties in Afghanistan and

sought American help in doing so. In April 1987 Gorbachev told American

Secretary of State George Shultz that the Soviet Union wanted to get out of

Afghanistan but the United States was not doing anything to make it easier.

In July of the same year Gorbachev stated in a newspaper interview that ‘in

principle, Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan has been decided upon’.

Eduard Shevardnadze repeated the request for American help in September

1987, in order that ‘a reactionary fundamentalist Islamic regime’ would not

take power in Afghanistan. He made it clear, however, that the Soviet Union

was committed to withdrawal, in any event.

It was April 1988 before an

agreement on the Soviet army’s withdrawal was actually signed. Soviet troops

began leaving in substantial numbers the following month and the process

was completed by the agreed date of 15 February 1989. By that time President

Reagan had already made his celebrated visit to Moscow. Asked by a reporter

inside the grounds of the Kremlin what had happened to the ‘evil empire’, the

term Reagan had applied to the Soviet Union in 1983, the American president

responded: ‘I was talking about another time, another era.’

Appropriately, since the Cold War had begun with the Soviet takeover of

Eastern Europe, it ended with the Central and East European countries achiev-

ing independent statehood. The key shift of Soviet policy which facilitated this

occurred, along with so much else of immense future signiﬁcance, in the sum-

mer of 1988. In his major speech to the Nineteenth Conference of the CPSU on

28 June, Gorbachev followed a passage in which he had been speaking about

the Communist countries of Eastern Europe with these words:

The concept of freedom of choice holds a key place in the new thinking. We

are convinced of the universality of this principle in international relations at a

time when the most important general problem has become the very survival

of civilisation . . . That is why the policy of force [politika sily] in all its forms

and manifestations has become historically obsolete.

Gorbachev could scarcely have been more explicit in opposing military inter-

vention as a policy, even though up until then Western governments had taken

40 George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: MyYearsasSecretaryofState (NewYork: Macmillan,

1993), p. 895.

41 Ibid., p. 910. 42 Ibid., p. 987.

43 Don Oberdorfer, The Turn: How the Cold War Came to an End – the United States and the

Soviet Union, 1983–1 990 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), p. 299.

44 Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi i stat’i, vol. vi,pp.347–8.

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it for granted that, in the last resort, the Soviet Union would use force of arms

to maintain Communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev expressed

similar sentiments to those in his party conference speech in his address to

the United Nations in December 1988, although they were given less publicity

than the ‘hard news’ of substantial Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern

Europe.

In 1989 the Central and East Europeans took Gorbachev at his word. One

after another the countries of the region rejected their ruling parties and the

Moscow connection and became independent and non-Communist. Except

in Romania, where the deposed president, Nicolae Ceaus¸escu was executed

by ﬁring squad, the ‘revolutions’, if they can be called that, were peaceful.

Soviet troops remained in their barracks and not a shot was ﬁred in Eastern

Europe by a Russian. The contrast with Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia

1968 could not have been more stark.

The ﬁnal piece of the jigsaw fell into

place with the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. A summit

meeting between Gorbachev and the new American President George Bush

in December 1989 in Malta was the ﬁrst time a Soviet and American top

leader gave a joint press conference at the end of it and treated each other

as partners. The Soviet Foreign Ministry’s adroit press spokesman, Gennadii

Gerasimov, was able to announce: ‘We buried the Cold War at the bottom of

the Mediterranean Sea.’

The Cold War was pronounced dead many times, but it is safe to say that

the ideological reasons for its continued existence had ceased to exist before

the end of 1988 and that it ended in political reality in 1989. The reuniﬁcation

of Germany in 1990 was a natural consequence of Soviet acquiescence in the

destruction of the Berlin Wall.

The suddenness of the process, nevertheless,

took both the Soviet leadership and its Western counterparts by surprise.

45 Pavel Palazchenko (citing George Shultz), My Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The

Memoir of a Soviet Interpreter (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania University Press, 1997),

p. 370.

46 For an excellent study of the events of that year, see Jacques L

evesque, The Enigma of

1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe (Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1997).

47 Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End

of the Cold War (London: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 165.

48 On the political process of German uniﬁcation, see Timothy Garton Ash, In Europe’s

Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993); Philip Zelikow

and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Uniﬁed and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft

(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995); Mikhail Gorbachev, Kak eto bylo

(Moscow: Vagrius, 1999);and Viacheslav Dashichev,‘On the Road toGerman Uniﬁcation:

The View from Moscow’, in Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1991 :A

Retrospective (London: Cass, 1994), pp. 170–9.

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Gorbachev had become the ﬁrstSoviet leader since the end of the Second World

War to recognise in 1987 that Germany might not remain divided for ever, but

neither he nor, at that time, Chancellor Helmut Kohl imagined for a moment

that within three years uniﬁcation would have occurred. Given, however,

Gorbachev’s aversion to the use of force to preserve unpopular Communist

regimes in East-Central Europe, the logic of events led to his telling Chancellor

Kohl in February 1990 that it was up to the Germans to decide in what kind

of state they wished to live and the speed with which they would attain it.

Both within the International Department of the Central Committee and in

Soviet military circles, there was criticism of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze for

not striking a tougher bargain over Germany. Against that, the countries of

what had been the ‘Soviet bloc’ were returned to the citizens of East-Central

Europe in a remarkably peaceful process. While events had passed beyond the

control of Moscow, the Soviet Union could have greatly complicated them.

Had not Soviet troops been kept in their barracks throughout the region, the

short-term outcome might have been different and would certainly have been

bloodier. In the speciﬁc case of German uniﬁcation, Gorbachev’s conduct of

negotiations (that were delicate and dangerous for him in the context of Soviet

domestic politics) left a legacy of German goodwill both for him personally

and for Russia.

From pseudo-federation to disintegration

From the outset of perestroika, its proponents had stressed how crucially inter-

related were both domestic and foreign policy. Whereas in the ﬁrst three and

a half years of perestroika, this meant that domestic change in the Soviet Union

was having a dramatic impact on international relations, from early 1989 the

boot was on the other foot. Developments in Eastern Europe began to feed

back into Soviet domestic politics in a way which threatened and ultimately

destroyed the unity of the Soviet state.

The break-up of the Soviet Union had several proximate causes in addition

to the legacy of the past. That legacy, however, was especially important in

two respects. First, the suppression of national aspirations and the severe per-

secution of even peaceful manifestations of nationalism meant that there was

an underlying resentment of the Soviet political order that existed to some

degree in all the union republics, but was more widespread in some than oth-

ers. It amounted to outright disaffection in the three Baltic states which had

49 Dashichev, ‘On the Road to German Uniﬁcation’, p. 176.

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been forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union against the will of the great

majority of their populations in 1940. The second legacy was an institutional

one. The fact that the union republics had their own ‘national’ branches of

the Communist Party (with the exception of Russia – until 1989), their own

Councils of Ministers, Supreme Soviets and Academies of Sciences meant that

under conditions of liberalisation and democratisation they had available to

them institutions through which they could articulate distinctive national sen-

timents and demands. The signiﬁcance of this element of institutional path

determinism is indicated by the fact that the only Communist states which

disintegrated in the course of transition from Communist rule were the three

that had federal forms (the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) and

by the equally signiﬁcant datum that it was the ﬁfteen union republics of

the USSR, which were the best endowed with institutional resources – and

not other national territories, such as the so-called ‘autonomous republics’ or

‘autonomous regions’ – that achieved independent statehood. Thus, though

the power structure of the unreformed Soviet Union could fairly be charac-

terised as ‘pseudo-federal’, the federal forms which up until 1985 played an

extremely circumscribed role in the political life of the country were of great

latent importance.

Yet another legacy of the pre-perestroika Soviet period that played its part in

fomenting national discontent was, paradoxically, one of the success stories –

the achievement of near-universal literacy in the USSR and the existence of a

substantial stratum of the population in all of the republics who had received

a higher education. It is, as a rule, intellectuals rather than peasants who are

the bearers of nationalist ideology. In the Central Asian republics, in partic-

ular, a native intelligentsia and national consciousness were equally the cre-

ations of the Soviet period. New ways of looking at the world were both a

result of higher education and broadening intellectual horizons, on the one

hand, and the federal forms, on the other, even though it was well into the

Gorbachev era before the latter acquired federal substance. Contrary to the

predictions of some scholars, however, it was not from the Asian and Islamic

parts of the Soviet Union but from its most westerly European republics

that the strongest pressure for sovereignty emanated.

The majority of cit-

izens of Soviet Central Asia, like a majority of inhabitants of Belarus, had

50 See Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the

New Europe (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), esp. chs. 1

and 2; and Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism

and the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

51 Cf. H

ene Carr

ere d’Encausse, L’Empire

Eclat

e (Paris: Flammarion, 1978).

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archie brown

independent statehood thrust upon them in 1991. Only a minority had been

striving for it.

Perestroika produced its own impetus for centrifugal pressures. Glasnost’

brought to the surface injustices and discontent that it would have been dan-

gerous to air earlier. These revelations, in turn, had a radicalising effect on

opinion within several of the republics. Moreover, the reduction and subse-

quent removal of the ‘leading role’ of the Communist Party took away a key

institutional pillar not only of the Soviet system but of the Union. The federal

forms had been tolerated by Soviet leaderships prior to perestroika because

they were outweighed by the ‘leading role’ of the party. The party remained

strictly hierarchical and even republican party ﬁrst secretaries had to be highly

responsive to instructions coming down the line from the Central Committee

in Moscow. This meant that the party, at the level of the union republic Cen-

tral Committee, could, and did, place limits on the extent to which republican

ministries or republican institutes of the Academy of Sciences might ignore

Moscow’s wishes.

As already noted, both democratic centralism and the monopoly of power

of the Communist Party had ceased to exist by 1989 when competitive elections

for a new legislature, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR, took

place and were followed a year later by contested elections for legislatures

in the republics. While the institutional changes were especially important in

permitting national movements to gain a strong foothold within a system in

ﬂux, the withering away of Marxism-Leninism also played a part. Although

many ofﬁcials, not to speak of ordinary citizens, had paid only lip-service to the

ideology, its thorough debunking by the end of the 1980s left space open for

other ideologies, of which nationalism turned out to be especially important

for the future (or, more precisely, non-future) of the Union. As Ronald Suny

has aptly put it:

[National] pasts were constructed and reconstructed; traditions were selected,

invented,andenshrined; and even those with the greatest antiquity of pedigree

became something quite different from past incarnations. While alternative

discourses of afﬁliation, like class and gender, were silenced, the dominance of

the national discourse deﬁned its constituents almost exclusively as subjects

of the nation, effacing the multiplicity of possible identities.

A series of ﬂashpoints in particular republics exempliﬁed and exacerbated

nationality-related problems. The appointment of a Russian, Gennadii Kolbin,

52 Ronald G. Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the

Soviet Union (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 160.

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The Gorbachev era

as ﬁrst secretary of the CPSU in Kazakhstan (on the recommendation of the

outgoing ﬁrst secretary, Dinmukhamed Kunaev) in December 1986 provoked

riots in Alma Ata (Almaty). In July 1987 Moscow’s Red Square was the scene

of a sit-down demonstration by Crimean Tatars demanding to be allowed

to return to the homeland from which they had been exiled by Stalin. From

February 1988 the temperatureof the dispute betweenArmeniaand Azerbaijan

over the land of Nagorno-Karabakh was seldom below boiling point. The

federal authorities found this an especially intractable problem, since both

Armenians and Azeris were utterly convinced of their historic claim to the

territory. The fact that this predominantly Armenian enclave was within the

Soviet republic of Azerbaijan had long been a sore point for Armenians. It

was – for Gorbachev and the federal authorities – just one of the unintended

consequences of liberalisation that Armenians in their tens of thousands felt

able to raise the issue sharply less than three years into perestroika. The dispute

led to inter-ethnic violence in 1988 with at least thirty-two people, mainly

Armenians, killed in the city of Sumgait in Azerbaijan where many more

Armenian homes were wrecked. In turn there were fatal attacks on Azeris

in Nagorno-Karabakh and in Armenia itself. A further escalation of violence

occurred in 1990 when a pogrom of Armenians in Baku killed at least sixty

people. This led Gorbachev’s special envoy, Evgenii Primakov, to urge strong

action against the PopularFront in Azerbaijan. The indiscriminate nature of the

onslaught subsequently ordered by Soviet senior ofﬁcers on the spot produced

an ofﬁcial death toll of eighty-three, though according to Azeri nationalist

sources several hundred people may have died. The cycle of violence merely

further inﬂamed national passions and did nothing to resolve the problems.

This was never more evident than in the case of the violent suppression of a

peaceful demonstration by young people in Tbilisi in April 1989. Soviet troops,

with the support of the ﬁrst secretary of the CPSU in Georgia (and against the

explicit wishes of Gorbachev who had asked Shevardnadze to ﬂy to Georgia

to negotiate a peaceful end to the stand-off), brutally attacked the protestors.

Nineteen of the demonstrators (mainly young women) were killed and several

hundred were injured. From that time on, Georgian nationalism was more

than ever a force to be reckoned with. Similarly, violence against protesters

in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, and the Latvian capital, Riga, in early 1991

merely added fuel to the ﬁres of national discontent. Gorbachev, in the winter

of 1990–1, had made a tactical shift in the direction of more conservative

forces and at times his rhetoric was a throwback to an earlier period. He

desperately wished to preserve the Union, but was not willing to pay the price

of bloodily suppressing nationalist movements. Each use of excessive force by

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