Suny R.G. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 3: The Twentieth Century
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
12
The Gorbachev era
archie brown
No period in peacetime in twentieth-century Russia saw such dramatic change
as the years between 1985 and 1991. During this time Russia achieved a greater
political freedom than it had ever enjoyed before. The Soviet system moved
from being highly authoritarian to essentially pluralist. This process ended
with the disintegration of the Soviet state, although even after the fifteen
union republics went their separate ways, Russia remained the largest country
in the world. The break-up itself was remarkably peaceful, in sharp contrast
to the extensive violence that accompanied the separation of the constituent
parts of Yugoslavia. Within what was sometimes called ‘the outer empire’, the
Soviet leadership broke with the past by ruling out military intervention when,
one after another, the countries of Eastern Europe became non-Communist
and independent. The Cold War, which had begun with the Soviet takeover of
East-Central Europe, ended definitively in 1989 when the Central and Eastern
European states regained their sovereignty.
Before these remarkable changes are examined in greater detail, the imme-
diate prelude to the Gorbachev era deserves attention, albeit briefly. When
Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982 he was succeeded by Iurii Andropov
who had earlier in the same year become the second secretary of the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union, following Mikhail Suslov. Andropov had
spent the previous fifteen years as chairman of the KGB and that organisation
had left its mark on him. Immediately prior to running the security police,
he had been an anti-Stalinist secretary of the Central Committee. Appointed
by Nikita Khrushchev, Andropov gathered around him in the first half of the
1960s a team of highly capable consultants, who were to acquire a justified rep-
utation as ‘progressives’ in the Brezhnev years and some of whom (especially
Georgii Shakhnazarov) were to be among the most influential contributors to
the ‘New Political Thinking’ of the Gorbachev era.
Andropov, once he had become General Secretary, continued the policy of
cracking down on any sign of overt dissidence which he had pursued as KGB
316
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The Gorbachev era
chief, but somewhat widened the bounds of permissible discussion by speak-
ing more about economic and social problems than the complacent Brezhnev
had done. At the same time he demanded greater discipline in the workplace
and made examples of some of the more notoriously corrupt officials who had
prospered under his predecessor.
1
Although prepared to contemplate reform
within strict limits, Andropov showed no sign during his fifteen months at the
helm of being willing to engage in fundamental transformation of the Soviet
system. Nevertheless, he made an unwitting contribution to that more ambi-
tious task. Andropov was an admirer of the abilities and energy of Mikhail
Gorbachev and he accorded him greater responsibility within the Secretariat
of the Central Committee. Gorbachev was already a full member of the Polit-
buro as well as a Central Committee secretary when Andropov reached the
top post in 1982. At that time, however, his duties were confined to agricul-
ture. Andropov gave him responsibility for the economy as a whole and also
brought into the Secretariat two people who were to work with Gorbachev
and who, in turn, were to become significant political actors in the perestroika
(reconstruction) era, Egor Ligachev and Nikolai Ryzhkov.
Andropov had hoped that Gorbachev would be his direct successor and,
as illness prevented him from working normally during the second half of
his tenure of the top post, he relied increasingly on the younger man. In
December 1983 he sent an addendum to a speech at a plenary session of the
Central Committee, which he was too ill to attend in person, proposing that
Gorbachev be designated to chair the Politburo and lead the Secretariat during
his absence. That was a clear attempt to move Gorbachev from the third to the
second position in the party hierarchy and to make him, rather than the more
senior Konstantin Chernenko, Andropov’s successor as party leader. Such a
move was anathema to the old guard within the Politburo who, while they
were as yet unaware of just how radical a reformer Gorbachev would be, were
conscious that he was likely to wield a new broom that could sweep them
aside. Chernenko, in consultation with two members of the top leadership
team even older than himself, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai
Tikhonov and Defence Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, took the decision to suppress
the extra six paragraphs Andropov had added to his earlier text.
2
When Andropov died in February 1984 he was succeeded by Chernenko,
already aged seventy-two and in poor health. Several Politburo members who
1 Luc Duhamel, ‘The Last Campaign against Corruption in Soviet Moscow’, Europe–Asia
Studies 56, 2 (Mar. 2004): 187–212.
2 For further detail on this episode, see Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), pp. 67–9.
317
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
archie brown
were worried about granting Gorbachev the role of Chernenko’s heir apparent
tried to prevent him acceding to the vacant slot of second secretary. As a
compromise it was agreed that Gorbachev would carry out the duties of the
second-in-command without formally being recognised as such. This meant
that he led the Secretariat and, when Chernenko was indisposed, chaired the
Politburo as well. Later Gorbachev was recognised within the party apparatus
as the second secretary, and responsibility for ideology and foreign affairs was
added to his overlordship of the economy. However, there were many attempts
to undermine him and to prevent him becoming the sole serious candidate to
succeed Chernenko, whose health was in visible decline. It was, for example,
only at the last minute that Gorbachev would be informed that Chernenko
was too unwell to chair Politburo meetings.
3
A Central Committee plenum on
scientific and technological progress that Gorbachev had been preparing was
postponed, and Chernenko himself telephoned Gorbachev on the very eve of a
December 1984 conference devoted to ideology to propose the postponement
also of that event.
4
Chernenko’s own immediate circle, strongly supported by
the editor of the party’s theoretical journal, Kommunist (Richard Kosolapov),
was anxious to put a stop to the rise of Gorbachev. It seized upon the text
of Gorbachev’s speech prepared for the conference which, on the instigation
of Chernenko’s aides, had been circulated to members of the Politburo and
Secretariat.
5
In it Gorbachev had used some of the new vocabulary of politics
which would become commonplace during the period of perestroika and he
attacked as irrelevant to the problems of real life a number of the tired formulae
of Soviet doctrine, complaining about the attempt ‘to squeeze newphenomena
into the Procrustean bed of moribund conceptions’.
6
In a gesture of defiance
that was very unusual in the strictly hierarchical Soviet Communist Party,
Gorbachev firmly refused to go along with Chernenko’s wishes that he change
the formulations in his speech to which the General Secretary objected and
that he postpone the conference.
7
The conference had some reverberations in the highest echelons of the
CPSU, but Gorbachev was still not clearly perceived to be a reformer. For his
elderly colleagues in the Politburo, he was primarily a young man in a hurry.
3 Yegor Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin, trans. Catherine A. Fitzpatrick et al. (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp. 53–4.
4 Ibid., pp. 46–8; Vadim Medvedev, V kommande Gorbacheva (Moscow: Bylina, 1994), p. 22;
and Aleksandr Iakovlev, Sumerki (Moscow: Materik, 2003), pp. 369–70. For the text of the
speech, see M. S. Gorbachev, Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984).
5 Iakovlev, Sumerki,p.369.
6 Gorbachev, Zhivoe tvorchestvo naroda,p.41.
7 Iakovlev, Sumerki,pp.368–70; Vadim Medvedev, V komande Gorbacheva,p.22.
318
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The Gorbachev era
When Chernenko died on 10 March 1985, this was just a week after Gorbachev’s
fifty-fourth birthday. He was still the youngest person in the top leadership
team. Making full use of the possibilities offered by his position as second
secretary, he lost no time in convening a meeting of the Politburo. It was held
on the same evening that Chernenko died and it was agreed that the election of
a new General Secretary would take place the next day. Less than twenty-four
hours after Chernenko’s death Gorbachev had not only been nominated as
General Secretary by the Politburo but had also been elected to that office by
the Central Committee. Both votes were unanimous, for when it came to the
point Gorbachev’s enemies within the leadership knew that they could not
find a viable alternative leader, although both the Moscow party first secretary,
Viktor Grishin, and the former Leningrad first secretary, Grigorii Romanov
(whom Andropov had brought to Moscow to join the Secretariat of the Central
Committee), had aspired to the top post.
8
Launching political reform
While there had been an accumulation of problems over several decades,
including a secular decline in the rate of economic growth and rising rates of
infant mortality and alcoholism, and though the gulf between Soviet rhetoric
and reality had led to an increase in popular cynicism, there was no strong
pressure from below for change in 1985. The dissident movement had been
crushed and the atmosphere was primarily one of political apathy and fatal-
ism. In Brezhnev’s time there had been a lot of talk about the ‘scientific and
technological revolution’, but technologically the Soviet Union was lagging
far behind the advanced Western countries and not faring well in compar-
ison with the newly industrialising countries of Asia. Moreover, the war in
Afghanistan was proving costly and becoming increasingly unpopular. Yet all
the mechanisms of political control were firmly in place and it is highly likely
that the system – and, accordingly, the Soviet state – could have survived into
the twenty-first century had not radical reform, or ‘revolution from above’,
shaken its foundations. Although Gorbachev, with some justification, spoke
8 Gorbachev’s allies, among them two people who were later to find themselves on oppo-
site sides of the political struggle, Egor Ligachev and Aleksandr Yakovlev, who in 1984
was still the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations
(IMEMO), had also not been idle in preparing for Gorbachev’s succession to Chernenko.
See Iakovlev, Sumerki,pp.459–63; Anatolii Gromyko, Andrei Gromyko.V labirintakh kremlia:
vospominaniia syna (Moscow: Avtor, 1997), pp. 92–5; Mikhail Gobachev, Zhizn’ i reformy
(Moscow: Novosti, 1995), vol. i,pp.266–7; and Ligachev, Inside Gorbachev’s Kremlin,
pp. 72–9.
319
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
archie brown
of the presence of ‘pre-crisis phenomena’ in the Soviet Union he inherited, it
was not so much a case of crisis forcing radical reform as of radical reform
generating crisis.
9
The General Secretary in the post-Stalin era did not have a completely free
hand in making appointments to the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central
Committee. Generally, Soviet leaders required time to build up their power
base, gradually bringing in known supporters who had worked with them in
the past. Gorbachev was unusual in that no one whom he promoted to either of
thetwohighest organs of the CPSU wasfrom his native Stavropol’ where he had
spent the whole of his career in the Komsomol and party between graduating
from the Law Faculty of Moscow University in 1955 and being brought to
Moscow as a secretary of the Central Committee in 1978.
10
Nevertheless, he
used to the full his authority as General Secretary to make radical personnel
changes in his first year. Among those who were ousted from the Politburo
were Grishin, Romanov and Tikhonov. Ligachev was given full membership
of the Politburo in April 1985 and became the second secretary within the
party. Nikolai Ryzhkov was also promoted to the Politburo in April and was
appointed chairman of the Council of Ministers in succession to Tikhonov in
September 1985. An appointment that turned out to be even more important in
retrospect than it appeared at the time was that of Boris Yeltsin as first secretary
of the Moscow party organisation, in succession to Grishin, in December 1985.
Much of the focus of the new leadership team was on getting the country
moving again and one of the early catchwords of the Gorbachev era was
uskorenie (acceleration). Gorbachev himself was from the outset, however,
interested also in what he called ‘democratisation’, which included a greater
tolerance of, and even encouragement for, a variety of views, although it
did not yet signify for him or anyone in a position of authority fully-fledged
pluralist democracy. Yet, it was symbolic of the way in which political reform
edged ahead of economic change in Gorbachev’s priorities that when in 1987
two important Central Committee plenary sessions put radical reform on the
political agenda, it was the first of these, the January plenum, that was devoted
to political reform and only the second, the June plenum, that focused on
9 For interesting elaboration of that point, see Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The
Soviet Collapse 1970–2000 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
10 The nearest thing to an exception was Vsevolod Murakhovskii, who had been Gor-
bachev’s subordinate and later his successor as first secretary of the Stavropol’ regional
party organisation. Murakhovskii was brought to Moscow as head of a newly created
State Committee for the Agro-Industrial Complex. It was not, however, a particularly
powerful post, and Gosagroprom, as it was known, was abolished in early 1989, having
failed to live up to Gorbachev’s expectations.
320
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The Gorbachev era
the economy. At the January plenary session, Gorbachev introduced some
measures of intra-party democratisation and announced that there would be
a special all-Union conference in the summer of 1988 ‘to discuss matters of
further democratising the life of the party and society as a whole’.
11
That event,
the Nineteenth Party Conference (discussed later in this chapter), was to be the
point at which Gorbachev and his allies moved beyond reform and embarked
on a path of systemic transformation. Already in January 1987 Gorbachev
launched a strong attack on the stagnation in Soviet political thinking which,
he claimed, had not advanced much beyond the level of the 1930s and 1940s.
The June plenum on economic reform, accompanied by a document outlining
the principles of economic reform, inaugurated an attempt to decentralise
economic decision-making in the Soviet Union. While the assumption at this
stage was that the economy would remain a centrally planned one, the aim was
to try to keep the focus of central planners on issues of national importance,
‘leaving all operational decisions to lower levels’.
12
The reform also extended
the rights of workers to participate in factory decision-making.
While in the summer of 1987 a majority of the members of the Politburo and
Secretariat were far from being committed to fundamental reform, four of the
five most important politicians in the country by that time had been brought
into those positions since Gorbachev succeeded Chernenko. The three most
powerful politicians after Gorbachev, following the June 1987 plenum, were
Ligachev, Ryzhkov and Aleksandr Yakovlev, followedby Eduard Shevardnadze.
Of the top five, three – Gorbachev, Yakovlev and Shevardnadze – were firmly
in the radically reformist camp, although Gorbachev often played the role of
a ‘centrist’ in order to carry more conservative colleagues along with him.
Ryzhkov had a more limited and technocratic view of reform, while Ligachev
was increasingly identifying with those who felt that freedom to criticise the
Soviet past and present was getting out of hand.
Yakovlev’s promotion had been extraordinarily speedy. He was not one
of the 470 people elected to full or candidate membership of the Central
Committee in March 1981 at the end of the Twenty-SixthParty Congress. Thus,
Yakovlev could not be promoted to the Secretariat until that deficiency had
been rectified at a party congress. He was not only duly elected to the Central
Committee at the Twenty-Seventh Congress in February–March 1986 but also
simultaneously promoted by Gorbachev to a secretaryship of that body. At
11 M. S. Gorbachev, ‘O perestroike i kadrovoi politike partii’, in Gorbachev, Izbrannye rechi
istat’i, vol. iv (Moscow: Politizdat, 1987), p. 354.
12 Ed A. Hewett, Reforming the Soviet Economy: Equality versus Efficiency (Washington: Brook-
ings Institution Press, 1988), p. 349.
321
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
archie brown
the January 1987 plenum he became a candidate member of the Politburo
and at the June plenum a full member. The diversity of view which had long
existed within the Soviet Communist Party (although carefully concealed
from most outside observers) was now increasingly clearly represented in
the highest echelons of the CPSU. Yakovlev and Ligachev vied with each
other for predominant influence within the Secretariat. Their disagreement
and rivalry not only exemplified but also facilitated a growing intra-party as
well as societal pluralism. According to their disposition, editors and party
functionaries could take their cue from the radically reformist Yakovlev or the
conservative Ligachev.
The new freedoms
One of the most important developments in the Soviet Union following Gor-
bachev’s selection as General Secretary was a change of political language.
New concepts were introduced into Soviet political discourse and old ones
shed the meanings they had been accorded hitherto by Soviet ideology. A case
in point was the idea of freedom. Instead of freedom meaning the recogni-
tion of (Marxist-Leninist) necessity, it acquired in the Soviet political lexicon
its everyday meaning of freedom from constraints or, simply, ‘ordinary free-
dom, as established and practiced in the liberal democratic countries of the
world’.
13
The term ‘pluralism’ had hitherto been used in Soviet publications
and speeches only pejoratively in the context of attacks on East European
‘revisionism’ and on ‘bourgeois democracy’. It was Gorbachev who broke
that taboo by speaking positively about a ‘socialist pluralism’ and a ‘pluralism
of opinion’ in 1987.
14
This gave a green light to social scientists and journalists
to advocate pluralism and frequently to leave out the adjective ‘socialist’.
From 1987 onwards there was also advocacy of checks and balances, separa-
tion of powers, a state based upon the rule of law and a market economy. Some
writers qualified these concepts by placing ‘socialist’ in front of them. Others
did not. Since there was also, however, increasingly vigorous argument as to
what constituted socialism (with the writer Chingiz Aitmatov using his speech
to the First Congress of People’s Deputies in 1989 to name, among other coun-
tries, Switzerland as a fine example of socialism!),
15
the use of ‘socialist’ was
13 Andrzej Walicki, Marxism and the Leap to the Kingdom of Freedom: The Rise and Fall of the
Communist Utopia (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 554–5. See also
Archie Brown, ‘Ideology and Political Culture’, in Seweryn Bialer (ed.), Politics, Society,
and Nationality inside Gorbachev’s Russia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 31.
14 Pravda, 15 July 1987,p.2;andPravda, 30 Sept. 1987,p.1.
15 Izvestiia, 4 June 1989,p.2.
322
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The Gorbachev era
not the constraint upon debate it would have been in the Soviet past. From
very early in the Gorbachev era one of the key concepts given emphasis was
glasnost’, meaning openness or transparency, although glasnost, like perestroika,
was about to enter the English and other languages, such was the international
impact of the changes in the Soviet Union. In each year that followed 1985 glas-
nost’ became increasingly indistinguishable from freedom of speech. There
were, nevertheless, occasions when glasnost’ was conspicuous by its absence.
The most notable was the disaster at the Chernobyl’ nuclear power station in
Ukraine on 26 April 1986. The news of what turned out to be the world’s worst
nuclear accident thus far came to Soviet citizens from the West by foreign
radio (in a reversion to what was common in the unreformed Soviet system).
It was not until 28 April that the accident was noted by Soviet television and
much later before any detailed account was provided. Those within the Soviet
Union who wished change to progress faster used Chernobyl’, however, as
an illustration of what was wrong with the system – from shoddy work at
the nuclear plant, to the local attempt to cover up the scale of the disaster,
to the reluctance of the Soviet leadership and mass media to provide prompt
and accurate information about the catastrophe. The more reform-oriented
parts of the mass media were soon carrying articles very critical of the absence
of glasnost’ on this occasion, a development that in itself would have been
impossible prior to 1985 when even air crashes and some natural disasters in
the Soviet Union went unreported in order to convey the impression that all
was well on the home front. When, following Chernobyl’, every catastrophe,
whether natural (such as the Armenian earthquake in 1988) or man-made, was
extensively reported and commented on, it appeared to some Soviet citizens
that the incidence of misfortune had increased.
The growing freedom of speech was a mixed blessing for the General Sec-
retary who had allowed it to happen. On the one hand, it served Gorbachev’s
interests that radical reformists were now free to criticise party and state
bureaucrats who were opposed to change. On the other hand, almost every
social and national group had an accumulation of grievances which had been
impossible to air publicly in the unreformed Soviet system. These problems
now spilled out into the open and overloaded the political agenda with highly
contentious issues. Nowhere was that more true than in the sphere of relations
among different nationalities, a topic on which more will be said later in the
chapter.
Some of the new freedoms, which were soon to be taken for granted, repre-
sented a huge advance for Soviet citizens. Among the most important was the
ending of the persecution of religion. A new religious tolerance prevailed and
323
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
archie brown
many places of worship were reopened. The year of the major turning point
for this, as for much else, was 1988. In June the celebration of the millennium of
Russian and Ukrainian Christianity took place with state support. New legisla-
tion gave the Church the right to publish literature and to engage in religious
education. Other traditional religions of the Soviet Union also benefited from
the change of policy. The jamming of Russian-language foreign broadcasts
to the Soviet Union was ended and foreign travel for Soviet citizens became
easier. By the last years of the Soviet Union financial constraints had become
more important than bureaucratic obstacles to freedom of travel.
TheSoviet pressacquiredaspectacular diversityin the Gorbachevera. There
were weeklies such as Ogonek (Little light) and Moskovskie novosti (Moscow
news) (with new editors and transformed content from the summer of 1986)
that were in the vanguard of reform and glasnost’ and publications such as
the newspaper Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia) or the Komsomol journal
Molodaiia gvardiia (Young Guard), which combined political conservatism with
Russian nationalism. One periodical which published information that would
have been unthinkable in the past, and was at times in a battle of words even
with the more tolerant authorities of the perestroika era, Argumenty i fakty
(Arguments and facts), sold, at the peak of its circulation, as many as 33 million
copies a week. In general, the circulation of newspapers and journals reached
far greater heights during the perestroika period than either before or since in
Russia. An entirely new and independent newspaper, which incorporated the
word ‘independent’ in its title, Nezavisimaia gazeta, began publication in 1990.
Films which had failed to pass the censor in the unreformed Soviet system
were now screened and made a great impact – none more so than the anti-
Stalinist Georgian film, Pokoianie (Repentance), which went on general release
in November 1986. The backlog of forbidden literature was even longer. The
solid monthly literary journals were able to fill their pages with high-quality
creative writing and revealing memoir material that had failed to pass the cen-
sor in times past. Many of the works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn appeared in
official Soviet publications for the first time, including his devastating indict-
ment of the Soviet system, The Gulag Archipelago, which was serialised in the
large-circulation literary monthly, Novyi mir (New world), in 1989. Other works
deemed in the past to be especially dangerous, the very possession of which
was a criminal offence – among them George Orwell’s Animal Farm and Nine-
teen Eighty-Four, Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at Noon, Vasilii Grossman’s Life and
Fate, Doctor Zhivago (Boris Pasternak’s Nobel prize-winning novel) and Anna
Akhmatova’s poem, Requiem, about the victims of Stalin – were published in
large editions.
324
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The Gorbachev era
From early in the Gorbachev era criticism of Stalin and Stalinism – which
had been banned in the Brezhnev years – resumed and the critiques became
much more fundamental than Khrushchev’s attack which had condemned
some of Stalin’s purges but did not question the system that had allowed him
to get away with mass murder. It was in 1988 that the much bolder step, in
the Soviet context, of criticising in print Marx and Lenin was taken. The first
author to achieve this breakthrough was Aleksandr Tsipko in the pages of
the popular science monthly, Nauka i zhizn’ (Science and life). Tsipko, who
had been brought into the Central Committee apparatus in 1986, was still
working in the CPSU headquarters when he published a series of articles,
beginning in November 1988, that were critical of the Bolsheviks and the
consequences of their revolution. In his own words, he set the precedent of
‘legal anti-Communism’ and did so under the protection of Central Committee
Secretaries Yakovlev and Vadim Medvedev.
16
It is one of the paradoxes of
the dismantling of the Communist system that the most decisive steps in
that process were taken by high-ranking members of the Communist Party,
including, crucially, the highest. These new freedoms, it is important to note,
occurred at a time before Yeltsin was playing any part in national decision-
making. Aleksandr Bovin rightly sees as one of Yeltsin’s principal merits that
he preserved the inheritance of freedom that Gorbachev introduced.
17
To see
freedom of speech and publication as a product of post-Soviet Russia would
be a serious distortion. The many new liberties were, on the contrary, among
the most notable achievements of perestroika, although they contributed also
to its ultimate undoing.
From political reform to systemic transformation
New concepts and a greatly enhanced freedom were accompanied by insti-
tutional change. The point at which the policy pursued by Gorbachev and
his supporters moved beyond an attempt to reform the existing system was
in the run-up to the Nineteenth Party Conference in the summer of 1988.
Encouraged by the removal of Boris Yeltsin in November 1987 from his post as
Moscow party chief after he had criticised the party leadership and, in partic-
ular, Ligachev at a Central Committee meeting the previous month, conser-
vatives within the CPSU Central Committee began to fight back against the
16 Alexander Tsipko, ‘The Collapse of Marxism-Leninism’, in Michael Ellman and Vladimir
Kontorovich (eds.), The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insiders’ History
(Armonk, N. Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 169–86, esp. pp. 184–5.
17 Aleksandr Bovin, XX vek kak zhizn’: vospominaniia (Moscow: Zakharov, 2003), pp. 682–3.
325