Stern R. Hegelian Metaphysics

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230 Hegel and Pragmatism

‘presuppositionlessness’ does he have instead that leads him to insist on such

thinking in the Logic, and is this also compatible with pragmatism?. In fact, I will

now argue, not only is Hegel’s concern with presuppositionlessness compatible

with pragmatism; these concerns are ones shared by the pragmatists themselves,

so that far from presenting an obstacle to a pragmatist reading of Hegel (as

we initially feared), his claims about the need for presuppositionlessness in fact

provide support for it. Hegel’s commitment to presuppositionlessness arises, I

will show, because of the way he views the nature of his Logic;and,Iwillclaim,

his reasons for viewing the Logic in this way are ones that are based on just the

sort of real, non-Cartesian, doubt that the pragmatists also endorse.

Hegel’s Logic is the ﬁrst part of his system (to which the Phenomenology is its

‘introduction’ or ‘ladder’),⁵⁸ and has as its aim ‘[t]o exhibit the realm of thought

philosophically, that is, in its own immanent activity or what is the same, in

its necessary development’.⁵⁹ In so far as it is a philosophical investigation of

thought in this manner, Hegel argues that it must be presuppositionless, for a

variety of related reasons:

(a) Unlike other sciences, it cannot assume anything about the methods of

thinking, because these are part of what an investigation of thought should

inquire into.⁶⁰

(b) Again unlike other sciences, it cannot start with some experience or represent-

ation of the object it is investigating, because thought cannot be experienced

or represented.⁶¹ Other inquiries, Hegel suggests, must therefore presuppose

theirobjects(suchasspace,ornumbers,orGod),buttheLogic cannot and

need not do so, because it is an investigation of thought, and so produces its

objects simply through the process of inquiry itself, which involves thought:

With regard to the beginning that philosophy has to make, it seems, like the other sciences,

to start in general with a subjective presupposition, i.e., to have to make a particular

⁵⁸ The relationship between the Phenomenology and the rest of Hegel’s system is of course

a contentious matter: for further discussion of my own view, see Robert Stern, Hegel and the

‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ (London: Routledge, 2002), ch. 1.

⁵⁹ Hegel, SL,31[Werke,V:19].

⁶⁰ See Hegel, SL,43[Werke,V:35]:‘Logic...cannot presuppose any of these forms of reﬂection

and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of its own content and have ﬁrst to be established

within the science’. Cf. also EL, §1, 24 [Werke, VIII: 41].

⁶¹ Cf. Hegel, SL,74(Werke,V:74),andEL, §1, 24 [Werke VIII: 41]. Cf. also EL, §§28–31,

where Hegel argues that while traditional metaphysics had a properly high estimation of the value

of thought, it too often took its conception of the objects of its inquiries (such as the soul, God,

and the world) as given representations, instead of allowing thought to determine its conception of

these for itself:

The representations of the soul, of the world, of God, seem at ﬁrst to provide thinking with a ﬁrm

hold. But apart from the fact that the character of a particular subjectivity is mingled with them, and

that therefore they can have a most diverse signiﬁcance, what they need all the more is to receive

their ﬁrm determination only through thinking....This metaphysics was not a free and objective

thinking, for it did not allow the ob-ject to determine itself freely from within, but presupposed it

as ready-made (EL, §31 and §31Z, 68–9) [Werke, VIII: 97–8].

Hegel and Pragmatism 231

ob-ject, in this case thinking, into the ob-ject of thinking, just like space, number, etc., in

the other sciences. But what we have here is the free act of thinking putting itself at the

standpoint where it is for its own self, and where hereby it produces and gives to itself its

ob-ject.⁶²

involve claims that are contingent, a science of thought such as the Logic

is not something that can be conducted in this way; rather, it must reveal

thought to have a necessary structure, which it cannot do if the claims it

makes about thought rest on groundless assumptions, for ‘[i]f the beginnings

are immediate, found, or presupposed ...the form of necessity fails to get

its due’.⁶³

(d) The Logic is concerned with the categories belonging to thought, which

Hegel distinguishes from the representations [Vorstellungen]whichbelong

to other faculties, which are distinct from but related to the faculty of

thought. As a result, the Logic cannot use these representations as a basis for

determining the nature of the categories of thought, when in fact the two

behave in very different ways:

Since the determinacies of f eeling, of intuition, of desire, of willing, etc., are generally

called representations,inasmuchaswehaveknowledge of them, it can be said in general

that philosophy puts thoughts and categories, but more precisely concepts, in the place

of representations. Representations in general can be regarded as metaphors of thoughts

and concepts. But that we have these representations does not mean that we are aware

of their signiﬁcance for thinking, i.e., that we have the thoughts and concepts of them.

Conversely, it is one thing to have thoughts and concepts, and another to know what the

representations, intuitions, and feelings are that correspond to them.⁶⁴

⁶² Hegel, EL, §17. 41 [Werke, VIII: 62–3]; trans. modiﬁed.

⁶³ Hegel, EL, §9, 33 [Werke, VIII: 52]. Cf. Hegel, SL,40[Werke, V: 30]: ‘No subject matter

is so absolutely capable of being expounded with a strictly immanent plasticity as is thought in

its necessary development; no other brings with it this demand in such a degree; in this respect

the Science of Logic must surpass even mathematics, for no subject matter has in its own self this

freedom and independence’; and ibid., 58–9 [Werke,V:55],trans.modiﬁed:

The system of logic is the realm of shadows, the world of simple essentialities freed from all

sensuous concreteness. The study of this science, to dwell and labour in this shadowy realm, is the

absolute education [Bildung] and discipline of consciousness. In logic, consciousness is busy with

something remote from sensuous intuitions and aims, from feelings, from the merely imagined

world of representations. Considered from its negative aspect, this business consists in holding off

the contingency of ordinary thinking and the arbitrary selection of particular grounds—or their

opposites—as valid.

⁶⁴ Hegel, EL, §3, 26–7 [Werke, VIII: 44], trans. modiﬁed. Cf. also ibid, §20, 49–50 [Werke,

VIII: 72–4], and SL,33[Werke,V:22],trans.modiﬁed:

In the ﬁrst place, we must regard it as an inﬁnite step forward that the forms of thought have been

freed from the material in which they are submerged in self-conscious intuition, representational

ideas, and in our desiring and willing, or rather in our representational desiring and willing—and

there is no desiring or willing without representational ideas—and that these universalities have

been brought into prominence for their own sake and made objects of contemplation as was done

232 Hegel and Pragmatism

This fundamental contrast between thought and the other faculties means that

thought can and must be investigated on its own, without any need to base

that investigation into its categories on representations taken from elsewhere;

indeed, if the attempt was made to do so, the result would be a distortion of

those categories, so that presupposing representations in this way would prove

disastrous for the Logic.

We can see, therefore, why it is that for Hegel, philosophy can only conduct an

investigation into thought in a presuppositionless manner, and thus why the Logic,

as the ‘science of thought’ must proceed without presuppositions. It seems, then,

that this has nothing to do with Cartesian doubts or Kantian aspirations to ‘free

thought’: it just follows from the fact that the Logic has thought as its object, and

this object (Hegel believes) can only be investigated presuppositionlessly, or not

at all. It can be argued, then, that Hegel’s commitment to presuppositionlessness

is thus driven by his conception of the sui generis nature of thought as the

subject-matter of this ‘science’, rather than the sorts of issues highlighted by

Houlgate.

But, it might be asked, why does Hegel think we need to go in for this ‘science’

at all? Why should we make thought into the object of our investigations? Until

we know the answer to this question, the suspicion might remain that Hegel

is still Cartesian in his approach after all: for, perhaps he wants to investigate

thought in order to avoid the possibility of error, or to show that thought can be

rendered free by being rendered presuppositionless.

However, I think this suspicion can easily be allayed, and that in fact when we

examine the motivation that Hegel himself provides for the Logic, it is t horoughly

compatible with pragmatism as we have envisaged it. For, Hegel makes plain

that the reasons why we must conduct his ‘science of thought’ is that we have

found that much of our ordinary thinking is prone to error, confusion, and

incoherence, which is just the kind of real doubt that he contrasts with the

Cartesian one. He completely accepts, therefore, that until we have been shown

that this is the case, we have no reason to go in for his ‘science of thought’, where

it is the role of the Phenomenology to show that without it, we will face the sort

of genuine intellectual and practical difﬁculties that he documents so richly in

that text.

Hegel thus allows that while the Logic is driven by ‘the resolve ...that we

propose to consider thought as such’, any such resolution ‘can only be regarded

as arbitrary’ unless we are shown why we must commit ourselves to it.⁶⁵ Hegel

clearly holds that the only way to get us to ‘consider thought as such’ and to

by Plato and after him especially by Aristotle; this constitutes the beginning of the intelligent

apprehension of them.

For more on Hegel’s distinction between these various faculties, see Hegel, EM, §§445–468,

188–228 [Werke, X: 240–88].

⁶⁵ Hegel, SL,70[Werke,V:68].

Hegel and Pragmatism 233

make ‘thoughts themselves, unmixed with anything else, into ob-jects’,⁶⁶ as we

do in the Logic, is by showing how problematic our view of the world will be

if we do not, because we will fail to employ the categories of thought properly,

and so get into difﬁculties. Hegel therefore accepts that ‘[i]n its relation to

ordinary consciousness, philosophy would ﬁrst have to show the need for its

peculiar mode of cognition, or even to awaken this need’,⁶⁷ by showing ordinary

consciousness that it will face real problems otherwise, where it is these problems

for ordinary consciousness that are documented in the Phenomenology,after

which consciousness is ready to take seriously the Logic as a ‘science of thought’.

It can therefore be said that the only grounds for the sort of investigation

carried out by the Logic into thought (which must therefore be carried out

presuppositionlessly, in so far as thought is its object) is exactly the kind of

‘real doubt’ championed by the pragmatists at the expense of the ‘artiﬁcial

doubt’ associated with Cartesianism. Hegel emphasizes that it is only when

consciousness has been brought to a state of genuine despair that it will be ready

for the Logic, where this is something the ‘shilly-shallying’ doubt of Descartes

can never achieve, thereby providing no proper motivation for the kind of

investigation into thought that Hegel believes must in the end be carried out.⁶⁸

The rationale for Hegel’s presuppositionless inquiry is thus one with which the

pragmatist can safely sympathize, rather than having an objectionable Cartesian

(or Cartesian-cum-Kantian) basis.

Turning, ﬁnally, to the passage from the Encyclopaedia Logic that perhaps led

Houlgate to his Cartesian reading of Hegel, we may now put it in a different

light; but the passage requires more extensive quotation if this is to be seen:

All ...presuppositions or assumptions must equally be given up when we enter into

the Science, whether they are taken from representations o r from thinking; for it is this

Science, in which all determinations of this sort must ﬁrst be investigated, and in which

their meaning and validity like that of their antitheses must be [re]cognised.

I would read this as Hegel saying that the Logic, as the science of thought,

cannot begin by presupposing anything about how various concepts relate to

one another or should be understood, because any investigation into thought is

precisely an investigation into such concepts.

Being a negative science that has gone through all forms of cognition, scepticism might

offer itself as an introduction in which the nullity of such presuppositions would be

exposed. But it would not only be a sad way, but also a redundant one, because, as

we shall soon see,⁶⁹ the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the afﬁrmative

Science. Besides, scepticism would have to ﬁnd the ﬁnite forms only empirically and

unscientiﬁcally, and to take them up as given.

⁶⁶ Hegel, EL, §3, 27 [Werke, VIII: 44]. ⁶⁷ Ibid., §4, 27 [Werke, VIII: 45].

⁶⁸ Cf. Hegel, PS, 49–50 [Werke, III: 72].

⁶⁹ Hegel is referring here to the subsequent sections of EL:see§§79–82.

234 Hegel and Pragmatism

Given that the Logic has to be presuppositionless, it might be felt that the way to

proceed here is to adopt a sceptical approach. But this sort of prior scepticism is

not needed, as the categories themselves will show themselves to be inadequate

in various ways through the dialectic, while the sceptical approach cannot ever

be really systematic and exhaustive.

To require a consummate scepticism of this kind, is the same as the demand that Science

should be preceded by universal doubt, i.e., by total presuppositionlessness. Strictly speaking,

this request is fulﬁlled by the freedom that abstracts from everything, and grasps its own

pure abstraction, the simplicity of thinking—in the resolve of the will to think purely.⁷⁰

What the sceptical position represents in its insistence on universal doubt is

the requirement for presuppositionlessness; but the science of logic fulﬁls this

requirement without the need for universal doubt, because it sets out to think in

a pure manner, which can only be done in a presuppositionless way, so that no

sceptical beginning for this project of presuppositionless inquiry is either called

for or required—it is just part of the nature of the inquiry into thought itself.

To this extent, therefore, Hegel can agree with all the pragmatist objections to

scepticism, while basing his project on a different set of considerations in favour

of proceeding presuppositionlessly, considerations which (I have argued) should

not in themselves trouble the pragmatist.

We have seen, therefore, that when it comes to the motivations underlying Hegel’s

commitment to presuppositionlessness in the Logic, there is no problematic

Cartesianism, either relating to some sort of Cartesian doubt, or to the broader

Cartesian/Kantian conception of ‘free thought’. Is this enough, however, to show

that Hegel and pragmatism can be unproblematically aligned with one another

when it comes to the issue of presuppositions? For, even if I am right in saying

that Hegel’s reasons for thinking we should proceed presuppositionlessly in the

Logic are not Cartesian or Kantian, and thus that his position need not raise any

qualms with the pragmatist on this score, I am still nonetheless allowing that

Hegel does think we are able to suspend our presuppositions when it comes to

this ‘science of thought’; and isn’t this enough to render Hegel a ‘Cartesian’ in a

broad sense? And isn’t this also something the pragmatist would deny, holding

instead that we must always make some assumptions in any inquiry, as Peirce

seems to claim when he writes: ‘We must begin with all the prejudices which we

actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy’, as if the having of

such ‘prejudices’ is just a necessary feature of what it is to be a thinking subject

at all?

⁷⁰ Hegel, EL, §78, 124 [Werke, VIII: 167–8], trans. modiﬁed.

Hegel and Pragmatism 235

Now, as Houlgate rightly notes, there are some critics of Hegel’s approach in the

Logic who do take this line, and so who claim not merely that presuppositionless

inquiry is unwarranted in normative terms (by the ‘emptiness’ of the Cartesian

doubt that drives it, or whatever), but also that it is just an unrealizable project,

andso‘animpossibledemandtofulﬁl’,⁷¹ or ‘preposterous’;⁷² and Houlgate

works hard to show that in fact, it may not be as unrealizable as critics of this

sort suppose.⁷³ The question for us here, therefore, is whether the pragmatist

needs to be put among critics of this sort, and thus whether there remains a

signiﬁcant point of difference between Hegel and the pragmatist tradition over

the feasibility of presuppositionlessness inquiry, regardless of whether trying to

conduct such an inquiry could ever be justiﬁed or warranted. Even if the Hegelian

could convince the pragmatist that his Hegelian grounds for trying to inquire

presuppositonlessly in the Logic are not in themselves objectionable, might not

the pragmatist still commit himself to insisting, along with other critics of Hegel

(such as Heideggerians and hermeneuticists), that it just cannot be done?

Now, one way to raise this kind of criticism of Hegel is to say that the

Logic project is unrealizable, because we are just unable to think or reason

presuppositionlessly, given how thinking works for us; and Peirce may seem to be

saying precisely this in insisting that our ‘prejudices’ are something with which

we ‘must begin’. However, although this question is too large to be satisfactorily

settled with here, I would argue that Peirce’s comment should not be taken as an

attack on presuppositionlessness of this sort, but rather that his position centres

squarely on the normative issue, of whether such an inquiry can be justiﬁed.

That is, on my reading, Peirce is saying that ‘when we enter upon the study of

philosophy’ and thus begin an inquiry in this domain, the sense in which we

‘must’ begin with the beliefs we ﬁnd ourselves with at that point is that there is

nothing the Cartesian can do to legitimately dislodge those beliefs by appealing

to his ‘Cartesian maxim’ that we should begin with universal doubt, because

at the start of this inquiry, no ‘real doubt’ has been raised over them (though

it might be so raised later). In my view, the ‘must’ here has a normative basis,

grounded on the inadequacy of Cartesian doubt to put these beliefs legitimately

into question, not a basis in any supposed fact about how the mind must work

andwhatisrequiredtomakethinkingpossible.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Houlgate, Hegel’s ‘Logic’, 28.

⁷² Ibid., 40. For example, Houlgate quotes Gadamer as saying that Hegel’s Logic ‘must always

presuppose and use the categories of reﬂection when it claims to deduce dialectically’ (Hans-Georg

Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1976), 93, my emphasis; cited by Houlgate, Hegel’s ‘Logic’, 73).

⁷³ See Houlgate, Hegel’s ‘Logic’,esp.ch.3and4.

⁷⁴ Cf. Wittgenstein’s remark in On Certainty, with which Peirce’s position is often compared:

‘But what about such a proposition as ‘‘I know I have a brain’’? Can I doubt it? Grounds for

doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it’ (Ludwig Wittgenstein, On

Certainty, trans. Denis Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), §4, 2. Wittgenstein

is clearly saying here that I cannot doubt ‘I have a brain’ not because there are some things that

236 Hegel and Pragmatism

However, a further question may perhaps remain, namely: even if Hegel were

able to convince the pragmatist that he can give us good grounds on which

to suspend our beliefs when it comes to the project being envisaged in the

Logic, would the pragmatist not argue that from that sort of presuppositionless

position, no further inquiry is possible, not because we must always operate with

some assumptions that cannot be set aside, but because no inquiry can make

progress when all such assumptions are put in abeyance, so that Hegel is bound

to ﬁnd that his ‘path of inquiry’ in the Logic is blocked.⁷⁵

Now, again, this is a large issue, but also harder to gauge, both in terms of where

the differences between the pragmatist and Hegel might lie, and how important

these differences ultimately are. To concentrate once more on Peirce, it is certainly

correct that he believed that such a ‘blockage’ would be the consequence of the

Cartesian way of questioning our assumptions, and that this therefore would

hinder our investigations when it comes to our everyday inquiries, natural science,

and so on. But the Logic is rather different from these sorts of investigations,

with a different kind of focus, so that there are perhaps reasons to think that

the Hegelian could convince Peirce that presuppositionless inquiry could work

when it comes to the sort of investigation Hegel envisages here,⁷⁶ particularly

when (as Houlgate makes clear) the kind of presuppositionlessness Hegel is after

and what he means by it is qualiﬁed in some respects.⁷⁷ Arguably, moreover,

what Peirce takes to be stultifying about Cartesianism is not so much that it

asks us to suspend all our beliefs, but that the abstractness of its doubts makes

it impossible for us to resolve them, so that the inquiry cannot continue or get

anywhere; but here, as we have seen, Hegel is in agreement with the Peircean, but

takes his inquiry not to be based on abstract doubt, and so to have a determinate

must be presupposed in thinking and this is one of them, but because the Cartesian does not give us

sufﬁcient grounds for questioning this belief, even though it could turn out to be false (‘Nevertheless

it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on’).

⁷⁵ Cf. Peirce CP 5.416, EP II,335–6,wherePeirceseemstosuggestthatifyoudid manage to

‘divest yourself’ of the ‘immense mass of cognition already formed’, you might well have thereby

‘made all knowledge impossible to yourself ’.

⁷⁶ For example, Cheryl Misak suggests that one reason Peirce holds that we should not suspend

or doubt all our beliefs is that ‘if we did, we would not possess a body of stable belief by which

to judge new evidence and hypotheses’ (Cheryl Misak, ‘Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)’, in

Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Peirce (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

2004), 1–26, at 13). But it is not clear how this sort of worry would apply to an investigation

such as Hegel’s Logic, where inquiry into its object (thought) is not a matter of proceeding in this

way. Moreover, as Chris Hookway has pointed out to me, a good case can be made that Peirce

himself aimed to proceed in a presuppositionless manner in certain parts of his own philosophical

system that are themselves most analogous to Hegel’s Logic, such as his semeiotic: for discussion

of this, see Christopher Hookway, ‘Normative Science vs Natural History of Thought: Peirce on

Dewey on Logic’, forthcoming. Of course, these are precisely the parts of Peirce’s enterprise that

other pragmatists viewed with suspicion, partly perhaps because they had wider concerns regarding

presuppositionlessness than Peirce; but then, if it makes sense to see this as an issue on which the

pragmatists themselves disagreed, then at least it shows that Hegel’s position does not put him at

odds with the pragmatist tradition as a whole.

⁷⁷ See Houlgate, Hegel’s ‘Logic’,esp.ch.3.

Hegel and Pragmatism 237

way forward as a result. Thus, just as the pragmatist can perhaps be brought to

accept the motivations for Hegel’s project in the Logic, so too he can be brought

to accept that no obstacles stand in the way of Hegel’s actually achieving it and

bringing that project to completion.

VII

In this paper, we have considered how much common ground can be found

between Hegel and pragmatism, where I have argued that there is more than

may initially have appeared. As we have seen, when it comes to the normative

commitments underlying Hegel’s justiﬁcation for the Logic, there is nothing

that need force him apart from the pragmatist, once it is seen in the right

context. Whether, however, Hegel could convince the pragmatist that his goal

of presuppositionless inquiry in the Logic is achievable is perhaps harder to

establish, as much will depend on how that project is conceived in more detail

on the one hand, and on the other hand what role in inquiry the pragmatist

gives to the having of assumptions, and whether that role would in fact apply to

the Logic—where it is very likely that the pragmatists would disagree amongst

themselves on precisely what their ‘Neurathian’ outlook really amounts to and

how far it should go. Nonetheless, even if in the end this question has to remain

open, I hope to have cleared the way for seeing how deeply Hegel’s position can

be aligned with that of the pragmatist on certain fundamental issues, once that

position is understood along the lines that I recommend here.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Earlier versions of this paper were presented at conferences at Warwick and Edinburgh, and

I am grateful for those who offered helpful comments on those occasions. I am also particularly

grateful for comments from Chris Hookway and Stephen Houlgate, which have led me to a better

understanding of these issues.

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Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?

My aim in this paper is to consider one of Peirce’s criticisms of Hegel, namely,

that Hegel was a nominalist.¹ Of the various criticisms of Hegel that Peirce

offers, this has been little discussed, perhaps because it is puzzling to ﬁnd Peirce

making it at all. For, Peirce also criticizes Hegel for his overzealous enthusiasm for

Thirdness, where it is then hard to see how Hegel can have both faults: how can

anyone who acknowledges the signiﬁcance of Thirdness in Peirce’s sense also fail

to be a realist? I will begin by setting out this difﬁculty and showing how it can

be resolved, and will then consider the justice of Peirce’s criticism once we have a

clear i dea of what it amounts to. I will suggest that this criticism is unwarranted,

and that in some respects it is curious to ﬁnd Peirce making it, when he could

just as easily have treated Hegel as an ally in the struggle with nominalism. The

issue therefore takes us to the heart of Peircean and Hegelian metaphysics, and

in a way that relates to questions that are central to contemporary philosophical

debates concerning the nature of realism, idealism, and anti-realism.

Whereas in the case of Peirce’s other criticisms of Hegel,² there is no internal

difﬁculty in seeing how Peirce might have thought (rightly or wrongly) that Hegel

¹ For reasons of space, it is not possible in this paper to consider Peirce’s criticisms of Hegel in

full. I consider Peirce’s related criticisms of Hegel in connection with the other two categories in

‘Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Firstness’, International Yearbook of German Idealism, 5 (2007),

276–308 (repr. below as Ch. 10), and ‘Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness’, Inquiry 50

(2007), 123–55 (repr. below as Chapter 9); because these criticisms are related, a full discussion of

Peirce’s treatment of Hegel must take them into account.

² Peirce’s response to Hegel was not of course only critical, but also contained positive elements:

see e.g. ‘My philosophy resuscitates Hegel, though in a strange costume’ (CP 1.42 [c.1892]), and

‘In the more metaphysical part of logic the philosophy of Hegel, though it cannot be accepted

on the whole, was the work of a great man’ (Selected Writings, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York:

Dover, 1966), 271 [1901]). For further general discussion of Peirce’s relation to Hegel, see Joseph

Anthony Petrick, ‘Peirce on Hegel’, unpublished PhD dissertation, Pennsylvania State University,

1972, and Max H. Fisch, ‘Hegel and Peirce’, in J. T. O’Malley, K. W. Algozin and F. G. Weiss

(eds.), Hegel and the History of Philosophy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 172–93; repr. in

his Peirce, Semeiotic and Pragmatism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 261–82. In

the Appendix to his dissertation, Petrick provides an almost complete list of Peirce’s references to

Hegel, classiﬁed into ‘positive’ and ‘negative’: see, 181–2.