Slavoj Zizek. First as tragedy, Then as farce
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136 FIRST AS TRAGEDY. THEN AS FARCE
its reduction of politics to the negotiation of private interests. This
gap becomes visible in those rare cases of an honest "democratic"
politician who, while fighting empirical corruption, nonetheless
sustains the formal space of corruption. (There is, of course, also
the
opposite case of the empirically corrupt politician who acts on
behalf of the dictatorship of virtue.) In terms of the Benj aminian
disti
nction between constituted and constituent violence, one could
say that we are dealing th a dierence between "constituted" corruption
(empirical cases of law breang) and the "constituent" corruption of the
democratic form of government itself:
For if democracy means representation, it is first of all the
representation of the general system that bears its fo rms. In other
words: electoral democracy is only representative in so far as
it
is fi rst of all the consensual representation of capitalism, or of
what today has been renamed the "market economy." This is its
un
derlying corruption ... 41
One should take these lines in the strictest transcendental sense: at the
empirical level, of course, multi-party liberal democracy "represents"
mirror
s, registers, measures-the quantitative dispersal of dierent
opinions, what people think about the proposed programs of the
parties
and about their candidates, and so on; however, prior to this
empirical level, and in a much more radical "transcendental" sense,
multi-party liberal democracy "represents"- instantiates-a certain
vision of societ politics, and the role of the individuals within it. Liberal
democracy "represents" a very precise vision of social life in which
politics is organized by parties which compete through elections to
exert control over the state legislative and executive apparatus, and so
on and so forth. One should always be aware that this "transcendental
frame" is never neutral-it privileges certain values and practises. is
41 Badiou, e Meanin
g
of Sarkoz
y
, p. 91.
THE COMMUNIST HYPOTHESIS 137
non-neutrality becomes palpable in moments of crisis or indierence,
when we experience the inability of the democratic system to register
what people really want or think-an inability signaled by anomalous
phenomena such as the UK elections of 2005 when, in spite of the
growing unpopulari of Tony Blair (who was regularly voted the most
unpopular person in the UK), there was no way for this discontent to
nd a politically eective expression. Something was obviously very
wrong here-it was not that people "did not ow what they wanted;'
but rather that cynical resignation prevented them from acting upon
it, so that the result was a weird gap between what people thought and
how they acted (voted).
Plato, in his critique of democracy, was fully aware of this second
fo rm of corruption, and his critique is also clearly discernible in the
Jacobin privileging of Virtue: in democracy, in the sense of the repre
sentation of and negotiation between a plurality of private interests,
there is no place for Virtue. is is why, in a proletarian revolution,
democracy has to be replaced by the dictatorship of the proletariat.
ere is no reason to despise democratic elections; the point is o
y
to insist that they are not per se indication of Truth-on the contr,
as a rule, they tend to reect the predomint doxa determined the
hegemonic ideology. Let us take an example which is surely not prob
lematic: France in 1940. Even Jacques Duclos, second in charge of the
French Communist Par, admitted in a private conversation that if
at that point free elections had been held in France, Marshal Petain
would have won with 90 percent of the votes. en de Gaulle, in his
historic act, refused capitulation to Germany and claimed that only
he, not the Vichy regime, spoke on behalf of the true France (not only
on behalf of the "majority of the Frenc !), what he was saying was
deeply true even if "democratically" speaking it was not only without
legitimization, but was clearly opposed to the opinion of the majori
of French people. ere can be democratic elections which enact a
n
event of Truth-elections in which, against sceptical-cynical inertia,
the majority momentarily "awakens" and votes against the hegemony
138 FIRST AS TRAGEDY, THEN AS FARCE
of ideological opinion. However, the very exceptional nature of such an
occurrence proves that elections as such are not a medium of Truth.
It is this, the authentic potential of democracy, which is now losing
ground to the rise of authoritarian capitalism, whose tentacles are
inching closer and closer to the West. In each country, of course, in
accordance with its own "values": Putin's capitalism with "Russian
values" (the brutal display of power), Berlusconi's capitalism with
"Italian values" (comical posturing). Both Putin and Berlusconi rule
in democracies which are increasingly being reduced to emp ritual
ized shells, and in spite of the rapidly worsening economic situation
they both enjoy a high level of popular support (over 60 percent in
the polls). No wonder they are personal fr iends: both have a tendency
towards occasional "spontaneous" scandalous outbursts (which, at
least in the case of Putin, are well-prepared in advance so that they
t the Russian "national character"). From time to time, Putin likes to
use a common dirty word or make an obscene threat-when, a couple
of years ago, a Western journalist asked him an unpleasant question
about Chechnya, Putin snapped back that if the journalist had not yet
been circumcised he was cordially invited to Moscow, where they have
excellent surgeons who would do the work with gusto ...
Fm
t Rent
Whence this resurgence of direct, non-democratic authori? Above
and beyond any cultural fa ctors involved, there is an inner necessi for
this resurgence in the very logic of contemporary capitalism. at is to
say, the central problem we are facing today is how the predominance
(or even hegemonic role) of "intellectual labor" within late capitalism
aects Marx's basic scheme of the separation oflabor from its objective
conditions, and of the revolution as the subjective re-appropriation of
those conditions. In spheres like the Wo rld Wide Web, production,
exchange and consumption are inextricably intertwined, potentially
even identied: my product is immediately communicated to and
THE COMMUNIST HYPOTHESIS 139
consumed by another. Marx's classic notion of commodi fetishism
in which "relations between people" assume the fo rm of "relations
between things" has thus to be radically re-thought: in "immaterial
labor;' "relations between people" are "not so much hidden beneath
the veneer of objectivity, but are themselves the very material of our
everyday exploitation;'41 so we cannot any longer talk about "reica
tion" in the classic Lukcsian sense. Far from being invisible, social
relationality in its very uidity is directly the object of marketing and
exchange: in "cultural capitalism;' one no longer sells (and buys) obj ects
which "bring" cultural or emotional experiences, one directly sells (and
buys) such experiences.
While one has to admit that Negri does here have a grip on the
key question, his answer seems inadequate. His starting point is Marx's
thesis in the Grundrisse on the radical transformation of the status of
the "ed capital":
e development of ed capital indicates to what degree general social
owledge has become a direct fo rce of production, and to what degree,
hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under
the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance
with it. To what degree the powers of social production have been
produced, not only in the
f
orm of knowledge, but also as immediate
organs of social practice, of the real life process.43
Wi the development of general social owledge,
e "produive power
oflabour" is thus "itself e greatest productive power. Fm the standpoint
of the direct production process it can
be regarded as the production
of ed capital, this ed capital being man himsel' And, again,
since capital organizes its exploitation by appearing as "ed capital"
42 Nina Power, "Dissing:' Radical Philosoph 154, p. 55.
43 Karl Marx, Grundrisse, translated with a fo reword by Martin Nicolaus,
Harmondsworth: Penguin 1973, p. 706.
44 Ibid.
140 FIRST AS TGEDY, THEN AS FARCE
against living labor, the moment the key component of ed capital
is "man himsel' "general social owledge;' the very social founda
tion of capitalist exploitation is undermined, and the role of capital
becomes purely parasitic. According to the Negrian perspective, with
today's global interactive media, creative inventiveness is no longer
dividual, it is iediately collectivized, pa of the "commons;' so that
any attempt to privatize it through copy-righting becomes problem
atic-more and more literally, "proper is the" here. So what about
a company like Microso which does precisely this-organizing and
exploiting the collective synergy of creative cognitive Singularities?
e only remaining task seems to be to imagine how cognitive workers
will "eliminate bosses, because industrial control over cognitive work
is completely depasse:'45 What new social movements Signal is that
"the wage epoch is over, and that we have passed from the confronta
tion between work and capital concerning wages to the confrontation
between the multitude and the State concerning the instauration of
the citizen's income:'46 erein resides the basic feature of "today's
social revolutionary transition": "One has to bring capital to recognize
the weight and importance of the common good, and if capital is not
ready to do it, one has to compel if'47 Note Negri's precise fo rmulation:
not "abolish" c
apital, but "compel it" to recognize the common good,
in other words, one remains within capitalism-if there ever was a
utopian idea, this is surely one. Here is how Negri describes the prox
imity of contemporary biopolitical capitalism to the direct assertion of
the productivity of the multitude:
e picture is one of a circulation of commodities, webs of information,
continuous movements, and radical nomadism of labour, and the
ferocious exploitation of these dynamics ... but also of constant and
ineaustible excess, of the biopolitical power of the multitude and of
45 Toni Negri, Goodb
y
e Mr. Socialism, Rome: Feltrinelli 2006, p. 234
46 Ibid., p. 204.
47 Ibid., p. 235·
THE COMMUNIST HYPOTHESIS 141
its excess with regard to the structural controlling ability of dominant
institutions. All of the available energies are put to work, society is put
to work ... Within this explOited totality and injunction to work lies
an intransitive freedom that is irreducible to the control that tries to
subdue it. Even though freedom can run against itself, ... lines of ight
still open up in this ambivalence: suering is oen productive but never
revolutionary; what is revolutionary is excess, overflow, and power.48
at we d here is the standard post-Hegelian matr of the productive
wch is always excess red to e s totality which
tries to subdue and control it . . . But what if, in a parallax shi, we
perceive the capitalist network itse as the true excess over the ow of
the productive multitude? at if, while the contemporary produc
tion of the multitude directly produces life, it continues to produce an
excess (which is even functionally superuous), the excess of Capital?
Why do immediately produced relations still need the mediating
role of capitalist relations? What if the true enigma is why continuous
nomadic "molecular" movement needs a parasitic "molar" structure
which (deceptively) appears as an obstacle to its unleashed produc
tivity? Why, the moment we abolish this obstacle/excess, do we lose
the productive constrained by the parasitic excess? And this
also means that we should invert the topic of fetishism, of "relations
between people appearing as relations between things": what if the
direct "production of life" celebrated by Hardt and Negri is falsely
transparent? at if, in it, the invisible "relations between [immaterial]
things [of Capital] appear as direct relations between people"?
Here, more than ever, it is crucial to remember the lesson of the
Marxist dialectic of fe tishization: the "reication" of relations between
people (the fact that they assume the form of phantasmagorical
"relations between things") is always redoubled by the apparently
opposite process, by the false "personalization" ("psychologizatio )
48 Toni Negri, "On Rem Kooaas:' Radical Philosoph
y
154, p. 49.
142 FIRST AS TGEDY, THEN AS FARCE
of what are eectively objective social processes. Already in the 1930S,
the rst generation of Franurt School theoreticians drew attention
to how-at the very moment when global market relations began to
exert their full domination, making the individual producer's success
or failure dependent on market cycles totally beyond his control
the notion of a charismatic "business genius" reasserted itself in the
"spontaneous capitalist ideology:' attributing the success or failure of a
businessman to some mysterious je ne sais quai he possessed. And does
not the same hold true even more so today, as the abstraction of the
market relations that govern our lives is pushed to an extreme pOint?
e bookshops are overowing with psychological manuals advising
us on how to succeed, how to outdo our partner or competitor-in
short, treating success as being dependent on the proper "attitude:' So,
in a way, one is tempted to turn Marx's fo rmula on its head: under
contemporary capitalism, the objective market "relations between
things" tend to asse the phantasmagorical fo rm of pseudo-personed
"relations between people:' And Hardt and Negri seem to fall into this
trap: what they celebrate as the direct "production oflife" is a structural
illusion of this e.
However, before we succumb to bemoaning the "alienating" eect
of the fact that "relations between persons" are replaced by "relations
between things" we should nonetheless keep in mind the opposite,
liberating, eect: the displacement of the fe tishism onto "relations
between things" de-fe tishizes "relations between persons:' allowing
them to acquire "formal" freedom and autonomy. While, in a market
economy, I remain de fa cto dependent, this dependency is nonetheless
"civilized:' enacted in the form of a "free" market exchange between me
and other persons instead of in the form of direct servitude or physical
coercion. It is easy to ridicule Ayn Rand, but there is a grain of truth in
the fa mous "hymn to money" from her Atlas Shrued:
Until and unless you discover that money is the root of all good, you ask
fo r your own destruction. When money ceases to become the means by
THE COMMUNIST HYPOTHESIS 143
which men deal with one another, then men become the tools of other
men. Blood, whips and guns or dollars. Take your choice-there is no
other.49
Does not Ma's fo rmula regardg how, a commodity economy,
"relations between people assume the ise of relations among g
say something similar? In e market economy, relations between people
can appear as relations of mutually recognized freedom and equali:
domination is no longer directly enacted or visible as such. at is
problematic is Rand's underlying premise: that the only choice is beeen
direct and indirect relations of domination and loitation.
So what about the standard critique of "formal freedo: namely
that it is in a way even worse than direct servitude, since the former
is a mask that deludes one into thinking that one is free? e reply
to this critical point is provided by Herbert Marcuss old moo that
"freedom is the condition of liberatio : in order to demand "actual
freedom;' I have to have already experienced myself as basically and
essentia
i
ly fr ee-only as such can I experience my actual servitude
as a corruption of my human condition. In order to experience this
antagonism between my fr eedom and the actuality of my servitude,
however, I have to be recognized as fo rmally free: the demand for my
actual freedom can only aris
e
out of my "formal" freedom. In other
words, in exactly the same way as, in the development of capitalism,
the fo rmal subsumption of the production process under Capital
precedes its material subsumption, formal fr eedom precedes actual
fr eedom, creating the latter's conditions. e very fo rce of abstraction
which dissolves organic life-worlds is simultaneously the resource of
emancipatory politics. e philosophical consequences of this real
status of abstraction are crucial: they compel us to reject the historicist
relativization and contextualization of dierent modes of subjectivity,
and to assert the "abstract" Cartesian subject (co
g
ito) as something
49 A Rand, Atlas Shrued, London: Penin Books 2007, p. 8.
144 FIRST AS TRAGEDY. THEN AS FARCE
which today corrodes from within all dierent fo rms of cultural
self-experience-no matter how far we perceive ourselves as being
embedded in a particular culture, the moment we participate in global
capitalism, this culture is always already de-naturalized, eectively
functioning as one specic and contingent "way of life" of abstract
Cartesian subjectivi.
How did we reach this new phase of the reign of abstraction? e
1968 protests focused their struggles against (what was perceived as)
the three pillars of capitalism: the factory, the school, the family.
As a result, each domain was subsequently submitted to postin
dustrial transformation: factory work is increasingly outsourced
or, in the developed world at least, reorganized on a post-Fordist
non-hier
archical interactive team-work basis; permanent and ex
ible privatized education is increasingly replacing universal public
education; multiple fo rms of variegated sexual arrangements are
replacing the traditional family.50 e Le lost in the very moment
of victory: the immediate enemy was defeated, but was replaced by
a new fo rm of even more direct capitalist domination. In "post
modern" capitalism, the market has invaded new spheres which
were hitherto considered the privileged domain of the state, from
education to prisons and law and order. When "immaterial work"
(education, therapy, etc.) is celebrated as the kind of work which
directly produces social relations, one should not forget what this
means within a commodity economy: namely, that new domains,
hitherto excluded from the market, are now commodied. When
in trouble, we no longer talk to a friend but pay a psychiatrist or
counselor to take care of the problem; children are increasingly
cared fo r not by parents but by paid nurseries or child-minders, and
so on. We are thus in the midst of a new process of the privatization
of the social, of establishing new enclosures.
50 See Daniel Cohen. Trois lecons sur la societe post industrielle. Paris: Editions
du Seuil 2006.
THE COMMUNIST HYPOTHESIS 145
To grasp these new forms of privatization, we need to critically
transform Marx's conceptual apparatus. Because he neglected the
social dimension of the "general intellect;' Marx fa iled to envisage the
possibility of the privatization of the eneral intellect" itse-d this is
what lies at the core of the struggle over "inteectual property:' Negri is
right on this point: within this framework, exploitation in the classica
Marxist sense is no longer possible, which is why it has to be enforced
more and more by direct legal measures, that is, by non-economic
means. is is why, today, exploitation increasingly takes the form of
rent: as Carlo Ve rcellone puts it, postindustrial capitalism is charac
terized by the "becoming-rent of the prot:'51 And this is why direct
authori is needed: in order to impose the (arbitrary) legal conditions
fo r extracting rent, conditions which are no longer "spontaneously"
generated by the market. Perhaps therein resides the fundamental
"contradiction" of today's "postmodern" capitalism: while its logic
is de-regulatory, "anti-statal;' nomadic, deterritorializing, and so on,
its key tendency to the "becoming-rent-of-prot" signals a strength
ening of the role of the state whose regulatory function is ever more
omnipresent. Dynamic deterritorialization co-exists with, and relies
on, increasingly authoritarian interventions of the state and its legal
and other apparatuses. What one can discern at the horizon of our
historical becoming is thus a society in which personal libertarianism
and hedonism co-exist with (and are sustained by) a complex web of
regulatory state mechanisms. Far from disappearing, the state is today
gathering strength.
To put it another way: when, due to the crucial role of the "general
intellect" (owledge and social cooperation) in the creation of wealth,
forms of wealth are increasingly "out of all proportion to the direct
labour time spent on their production;' the result is not, as Marx
seems to have expected, the self-dissolution of capitalism, but rather
the gradual relative transformation of the prot generated by the
51 See Capitalismo cognitivo, edited by Carlo Vercellone, Rome: Manifestolibri 2006.