Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers 387
al-Qaeda leaders have forsaken popular support to accomplish their
immediate operational objectives. e most well-known examples are
the attacks against fellow Muslims by al-Qaeda in Iraq under Abu
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s leadership, including hotels in Amman, Jordan.
So, clearly, it would be useful to explore the relative weight of al-Qaeda’s
priorities further, either through academic social-science research or
within the intelligence community. In the meantime, Jackson’s and
Berrebi’s chapters do provide initial insight.
It appears from these chapters to be generally accepted that iso-
lated leaders within terrorist groups tend to be driven more by internal
dynamics. In contrast, broadly dispersed movements tend to be driven
by strategies or initiatives posted on the Internet by members and
through popular support. Similarly, terrorist groups heavily involved
in criminal activities tend to be less reliant on populations for their
survival. In contrast, terrorist groups who draw on resources from their
supporters are similarly more likely to weight popular support heavily.
ese findings, for the most part, confirm what experts have gener-
ally believed about the role that popular support can or cannot play
in terrorism. Nevertheless, it is worth underscoring that neither Jack-
son’s nor Berrebi’s study diminishes the importance of popular sup-
port. ey rather should be understood as a plea for policymakers to
consider other factors as well.
Descent Does Not Necessarily Mirror Ascent
If root causes do not always sustain terrorism, then it is equally evident
from our research that terrorism does not always end the way it begins.
Table 10.2 lists factors derived from Noricks’s chapter with modes of
decline identified by Gaga Gvineria. For example, it is possible to argue
that attempts by the nation-state to increase legitimacy, reduce repressive
measures, and address the lack of civil liberties could all be construed
as success or preliminary success for the terrorist group, depending on
the strategic objectives of the terrorists. Similarly, the elite disenfran-
chisement often articulated in root causes literature tends to have these
elites taking a leadership position in the terrorist group. us, burnout,
poor succession, and the loss of leaders could relate to elite disenfran-
chisement. Still, even with these parallels, the loss of state support and