RAND Corporation. Social Science for Counterterrorism
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Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers 375
in both Jackson’s and Noricks’s chapters, but other issues exacerbate
the tension. Fundamentally, subject-matter experts and social scientists
have long struggled with the definitions of terrorism versus insurgency.
In this study, we did not want to impose artificial definitions on the
researchers, so we defined terrorism more broadly as the use or threat-
ened use of violence to achieve terror. is allowed researchers to draw
on a wider variety of literatures, including those about insurgencies that
employed terrorism. Nonetheless, the organization versus network ten-
sion seems to have affected the degree to which authors relied on infor-
mation about subnational or nonstate terrorist groups specifically or
political violence in general. erefore, this tension represents another
caution to those in the analytical community. Subject-matter experts
with different backgrounds, such as terrorism versus insurgency work,
will have different perspectives and assumptions.
As with our discussion of supply versus demand, the tension
between network and organizational views can be useful in broaden-
ing our perspectives and seeing different facets of the problem.
More generally, we believe that it is best to view the terrorism
phenomenon in “system” terms. RAND and the Institute for Defense
Analyses were early champions of this perspective in 2002, noting that
it was wrong-headed to see al-Qaeda as a monolith. It was better to rec-
ognize that the al-Qaeda system has many critical components, each
with its own vulnerabilities (Davis and Jenkins, 2002). e components
include, for example, leaders, lieutenants, foot soldiers, financiers, logis-
ticians, sources of moral support, state supporters, and the supporting
elements of the relevant population. David Kilcullen took influential
next steps in his work on global insurgency in 2004 and subsequently.
10
In fact, a system approach often requires numerous perspectives on the
system, leading to different insights and tacks. More work of this char-
acter is needed (see also National Academy of Sciences, 2002).
Possible Implications of the Systems Approach. In the world of
al-Qaeda, terrorist organizations clearly have an influence in day-to-day
operations as well as in strategic guidance. Al-Qaeda senior leaders, for
example, even in the expert community’s most austere interpretation of
their relevance, still issue statements on strategic direction. Moreover,
al-Qaeda collaborators, such as al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, claim to be
376 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
conducting attacks in the name of senior leaders, even if their day-to-
day operational decisions are independent. Both of these components
of the system are separate entities but organizations nonetheless. Addi-
tionally, networks of individuals also clearly exist within this system,
such as for bringing foreign fighters into Iraq and Afghanistan. ey
function separately from al-Qaeda senior leaders, but they contribute
to the whole. Finally, within this system, disparate cells might also
operate either with direction from al-Qaeda leaders or on their own.
One implication of a systems approach is that policy should be
designed to specifically target components of the system as appropri-
ate. For example, rather than focusing on efforts to counter al-Qaeda
in Iraq specifically, in isolation from efforts to counter al-Qaeda in
the Maghreb, policies might focus on thematic threats, such as finan-
cial and recruitment networks, without geographic constraints.
11
us,
policymakers might identify financial networks, for example, as the
most important priority. en, law-enforcement instruments available
to Interpol would be used against the fraud and other petty crimes that
fund disparate cells in Europe. At the same time, diplomatic efforts
could be used with countries in the Gulf to tighten restrictions on
monetary flows. Alternatively, policymakers might choose to priori-
tize the movement of people across borders to areas of conflict out-
side their immediate country of residence. If this path were chosen,
then the Department of Homeland Security might identify countries
across which these individuals flow and work with host nations to
improve their border security. At the same time, Special Operations
Forces would work through “train and equip” programs to improve the
counterinsurgency capabilities of security forces in remote and hard-
to-monitor border areas. Of course, these organizations, networks, and
cells likely interact to a certain extent within the system. us, second-
and third-order effects would need to be accounted for and adjusted to
within the system. is system approach also allows policymakers to
identify one component of the system—for example, recruitment or
financial networks—and understand more fully its relationship to the
whole.
Significance of Religion. e final point of tension that emerged
from our analysis is the significance of religion as a factor of influ-
Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers 377
ence on individual motivations, terrorist behaviors, or even permissive
environments. Of course, questions on the significance of ideology in
general are not new to the study of al-Qaeda in the counterterrorism
world. Subject-matter experts on Latin American militancy have long
pondered the extent to which the Shining Path in Peru, for example, or
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were motivated
by communism.
12
But the issue of radical, or revivalist, Islam has received
particular emphasis in studies of violence since September 2001.
13
e tension that religion exhibits within social science is perhaps
both the least and most obvious in our chapters. It probably reflects
some discomfort within the scholarly community. is tension may
not at first be apparent in the earlier chapters. After all, every chapter
addresses the topic to some degree. But how they do so differs and pro-
vides insight into tensions within the academic community. e reader
should recall that the authors were asked to approach their subjects in
a way that remained relatively true to the particular literatures they
addressed, even when the authors were aware of the various tensions as
a result of project-level discussions and general knowledge.
Perhaps the first observation is that, despite covering numer-
ous literatures thought to be relevant, none of the chapters explicitly
addresses recent studies on revivalist Islam from the field of religious
studies. Todd Helmus, in his chapter, does cite Quintan Wiktorowicz
and both Darcy Noricks and Chris Paul refer to Mark Juergensmeyer
in their chapters. However, others, such as Charles Kurzman and Ibra-
him Abu Rabi, experts in Islamic studies, have not been included.
14
In
retrospect, this reflects the fact that the issue of religion does not cur-
rently integrate comfortably into the wider disciplines and, as a result,
was not addressed as well as it might have been. Also, there remains a
marked difference in how ideology and religion are treated from chap-
ter to chapter.
For example, in his chapter, Chris Paul treats ideology as a tool of
validation for political organizations as they attempt to harness popu-
lar support. Paul argues that “normative acceptability of violence” con-
tributes to popular support for terrorism, but his chapter—reflecting
the literature he consulted—does not treat revivalist Islam or even ide-
ology more generally as contributing to that acceptability. is absence
378 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
is interesting, because the effect is often asserted by subject-matter
experts and policymakers. Claude Berrebi similarly argues in his chap-
ter that neither religion nor ideology provides an explanation for the
emergence of terrorism. In this sense, Berrebi and Paul both minimize
the importance of religion, with Paul emphasizing that it is accompa-
nied by or simply reinforces feelings of humiliation or a broader sense
of being under attack by outsiders. If these arguments were taken to
the extreme, it might suggest that efforts to counter ideological extrem-
ism are unlikely to have an effect on popular support for terrorism or,
indeed, affect the success or failure of any particular terrorist group.
15
Darcy Noricks conveys a different story in her chapter. It empha-
sizes disagreement in the social sciences on the importance of religion,
but she gives this factor more weight than either Paul or Berrebi, noting
also that religion appears to be more important when external threats
take on sacred meaning to members of a community. Noricks draws
heavily on work by Mark Juergensmeyer and Jessica Stern in her chap-
ter. Most interestingly, she places “ideology” in her model directly under
“facilitative norms on the use of violence.” Todd Helmus, in his chap-
ter, breaks “religion” into separate pieces when addressing how it relates
to individual motivations for violence. For example, religion is treated
as a factor contributing to bottom-up peer group radicalization. But
religion also affects perceived rewards and “desire for change.” us,
he places even greater emphasis on the role of religion when it comes to
individual radicalization than does Noricks, especially when it comes
to providing a permissive environment for the emergence of terror-
ism. Taken to their extremes, Helmus’s and Noricks’s findings would
suggest that efforts to counter radical ideology could act as preventa-
tive measures to halt the emergence of terrorism at either a societal or
individual level and, thus, should be given priority in counterterrorism
policy.
Of the three points of tension discussed in this chapter, the role of
religion is perhaps the most troubling. Significant resources have been
placed toward building moderate Muslim networks and countering pro-
paganda. Subject-matter experts, such as Peter Bergen, have lauded the
recent criticisms heaped on al-Qaeda by well-respected ideologues such
as Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl) and Sheikh Salman al-Oudah.
16
Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers 379
However, the chapters in this monograph suggest that the effect of
such activities is somewhat debatable. Given the state of the literature,
it is difficult to provide policymakers with strong conclusions about the
benefits of or approaches to countering ideology, including religion.
However, our study does suggest some different analytical
approaches to the question of religion. One would be to distinguish
between leaders and followers in studies of individual motivations,
especially ideological motivations. Logic suggests that patterns of
recruitment may differ between leaders and followers within the al-
Qaeda organization. at is, level of analysis matters here. Making
these distinctions in research would probably bring more insight into
the role of religion, as would distinguishing between, for example, fun-
damentalist and more tolerant strands of the various religions, and, as
a separate factor, distinguishing between strands that have or do not
have patterns of violence in enforcing their perspectives on others. Sim-
ilarly, research efforts to distinguish between the importance of reli-
gion in communities with minority Muslim populations and majority
Muslim populations would be worthwhile. Because religion may con-
tribute to a broader sense of being under attack or threat from outsid-
ers, distinguishing between minority and majority populations in this
regard could also be enlightening, especially in thorough qualitative
comparative analyses.
Summary. In sum, this chapter has identified three thematic ten-
sions in our monograph. We did not attempt to resolve these tensions,
as many of them are the result of the different perspectives across disci-
plines that are worth recognizing: limited data, definitional struggles,
and even methodological constraints within social science. Nonethe-
less, our probes into these tensions suggested some alternative policy
approaches (and also research approaches):
To address the flow of new members into al-Qaeda or other affili-•
ated terrorist groups, focus resources on the process of recruiting,
training, and organization, rather than more narrowly on original
motivations of those being recruited.
Recognize that • disruption of al-Qaeda and its affiliates is probably
valuable in this regard and use associated metrics.
380 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
Disregard debates about whether al-Qaeda is an organization or a •
network in preference to a systems approach in which both facets
appear naturally.
To better explore ideology and prioritize countering ideological •
support for terrorism, distinguish between leaders and followers
in terrorism studies.
To better explore ideology, distinguish between minority and •
majority Muslim populations.
Having explored points of tension, the next section addresses
points of agreement or consensus across our chapters.
Points of Agreement
Although our review of the literature exposed disagreement across the
social-science community, it also identified important points of con-
sensus. e following sections explore four of these in greater detail.
In identifying factors that contribute to terrorism, context matters •
and no specific “one size fits all” recipe exists.
In exploring terrorism life cycles, factors that contribute to its •
emergence do not always contribute to its sustenance.
Popular support is often very important to terrorist organiza-•
tions, and loss or popular support can be very important in their
decline. However, there is no silver bullet here: Terrorist groups
weigh popular support against many other factors when making
decisions and taking actions.
Descent does not necessarily mirror ascent.•
ere are many other points of consensus, of course, as discussed
in the other chapters. However, we have highlighted these four points
of agreement because they have important policy implications.
Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers 381
Context Matters
In identifying the myriad of factors that contribute to the emergence or
persistence of terrorism, it appears clear from these papers that “histori-
cally specific circumstances” matter. Although this may seem banal, it
is not: At any given time, there tend to be strong inclinations to over-
generalize and apply solutions broadly. is is often counterproductive,
as noted consistently by people coming back from theaters of operation
such as Iraq and Afghanistan.
Citing Frances Fox Piven (1979), Darcy Noricks first raises the
importance of context in her chapter on how and why terrorism rises
as a caution against globally systemic explanations. at is, it is too
simplistic to understand the rise of al-Qaeda as part of a global wave
of religious violence. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has little to do with Hamas and
Hizballah. And so on.
Chris Paul, in his chapter on how terrorists generate and maintain
support, reaches a similar conclusion. He argues that there is no “one
size fits all” formula to popular support for terrorism: Specific circum-
stances matter. For example, it is simplistic to explain the nature and
extent of support for al-Qaeda in the Muslim world as a response to
U.S. foreign policy—a typical explanation with posited policies rang-
ing from the Gulf War in the early 1990s to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. Paul regards context so important as to list it as a recommen-
dation: e first order of business should be to understand a particular
context rather than attempting to apply a generic template.
Finally, and perhaps most important, Gaga Gvineria notes in his
chapter on how terrorism ends that the success or failure of state coun-
terterrorism measures often depends on context as much or more as the
policy itself.
A related dynamic is playing itself out in the global war on
terrorism. For example, Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines
(OEF-P) is cited frequently as a success story. But U.S. security officials
in Pacific Command and the Philippines caution against using OEF-P
as a model for other regions, because its success is very much context-
specific. Before OEF-P, the U.S. government had a good relationship
with Manila. e Abu Sayyaf Group already had marginalized most
of the residents of the southern Philippines by turning to crime. And,
382 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
perhaps most important, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
already had entered into peace negotiations with Manila, creating a
relatively permissive environment for U.S. intervention and activities
related to the global war on terrorism. erefore, it is difficult to ascer-
tain how much the success of OEF-P had to do with U.S. counterter-
rorism policy instruments used and how much to a historical conver-
gence of events.
Unfortunately, this finding—“context matters”—is not particu-
larly useful for policymakers. Key questions then become “To what
extent?” and “In what circumstances?” Although more research of this
nature could be done, our review and ongoing RAND research on
other projects suggest a number of instances in which context is likely
to be especially important.
e utility of democratic reforms may be more useful for majority •
Muslim populations than for minority populations.
e utility of economic measures may be more useful to counter •
terrorism than to counter radicalization.
e tolerance for terrorism may be higher in societies with a his-•
tory of violence than for those without.
Deradicalization efforts using religious arguments may be more •
effective in rural areas, whereas arguments to encourage disen-
gagement may be more persuasive in urban areas.
Of course, context likely matters across a wide variety of factors
and issues, but these four conditions emerged repeatedly in our chap-
ters and thus are worthy of special attention. Additionally, it seems
clear that the actual manifestation of terrorism is also correlated to the
specific motivational cause for which it is undertaken. Put differently,
the evolving dynamic of a terrorist campaign will depend not only on
the environmental context in which it takes place but also on the politi-
cal agenda against which it is justified. is needs to be recognized and
taken into account when framing a counterterrorism plan of action.
Finally, the fact that no single root cause exists for terrorism
strongly suggests that there is similarly no single “silver bullet” for
eliminating outbreaks of such violence. In addition, this finding would
Cross-Cutting Observations and Some Implications for Policymakers 383
seem to lend support to the notion that trying to eradicate the existence
of terrorism is an untenable goal. Rather than trying to “defeat” ter-
rorism, the goal should be to reduce outbreaks of extremist violence to
manageable levels.
Root Causes Do Not Always Sustain Terrorism
It also appears fairly certain, looking across the chapters, that signifi-
cant factors in the emergence of terrorism are not necessarily important
to how terrorist groups sustain themselves.
For example, Table 10.1 lists factors from Darcy Noricks’s chap-
ter on the root causes of terrorism and compares them with those of
Christopher Paul’s chapter on how terrorist groups generate and main-
tain support. ose chapters list a great many more factors than those
below. We have chosen to replicate only those factors for which sub-
stantive agreement exists in the social sciences that they are, indeed,
relevant to the emergence and continuation of terrorism.
Table 10.1
Contrasting Lists of Factors
Root Cause Maintain Support
Perceived illegitimacy of state Perceived illegitimacy of state
State repression State repression
Lack of opportunity Lack of opportunity
Curtailed civil liberties Humiliation and alienation
Elite disenfranchisement Resistance as a public good
Ethnic fractionalization Defense of self or community
Identification with group
Kinship ties with group members
Intimidation by group
Group provision of services
Perceived legitimacy of group
384 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
In theory, one might expect that factors allowing terrorism to
arise in the first place would also be significant in sustaining popu-
lar support for terrorism over time, because both in essence relate to
how people feel about the application of violence against civilians
in opposition to the state. And, indeed, some commonality exists
between the lists in the table: perceived illegitimacy of the state, state
repression, and lack of opportunity for political freedom. It is interest-
ing to note that all three common factors could be interpreted as a dis-
juncture between the nation-state and its citizens. at is, these factors
have less to do with the circumstances in which people find themselves
and more to do with their relationship with the nation-state itself.
ese preliminary finding suggest that, no matter the cause of a
particular campaign of terrorism, state countermeasures need to con-
form to and uphold accepted constitutional parameters of the rule of
law if the situation is not to be unduly exacerbated. Excessive repres-
sion, it would seem, encourages more extreme reactions on the part
of the militants and, even if it does not directly encourage terrorist
recruitment, it at least serves to delegitimize the state in the eyes of the
wider populace. It is essential therefore that all government responses be
directed only against the terrorists themselves (rather than extended to
elements that are merely supportive or sympathetic to militant designs)
and are appropriately calibrated to be proportionate to the situation at
hand.
At first glance, it is difficult to see how U.S. policy interventions
can affect these factors. Would it not be better for the host nation of
terrorist groups to address its own perceived illegitimacy? Stop repres-
sive measures? Provide greater political freedom to its citizens? Never-
theless, the U.S. global war on terrorism has included some measures to
affect these three factors. For example, foreign internal defense (FID)
programs not only teach basic military tactics but also attempt to steer
recipient militaries and nations away from collective punishment and
other harsh repressive measures. Even in Iraq, efforts are made by mili-
tary commanders to “put the Iraqis out front” in an effort to bolster the
legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the mind of the population. Of
course, it is unclear how much effect these programs can have on the
long-term behavior of recipient nations and their military command-