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Endnotes
1
One challenge with this line of reasoning, however, is the argument that terror-
ism is actually driven by demand from the terrorist organizations themselves, which
is in turn aided by the need to operationalize only a small number of recruits. e
arguments in this paper attempt to address this line of reasoning.
2
If well-educated and experienced recruits were readily available, terror organiza-
tions would systematically rely on them for more of their operations.
3
is paper makes frequent use of the terms “radical” and “radicalization.” In this
context, they mean “terrorist” and “the process of becoming a terrorist.” In another
context, the same words would mean something more benign, such as “strong pro-
ponent of a view” and “the process of coming to accept that strong proponency.”
4
e process does not have a single outcome, that of being a terrorist. Individuals
can begin the cycle but escape its grasp at any point in time.
5
What is referred to as “radicalization” in this paper can be regarded as psycho-
logically very similar to the process by which otherwise unremarkable teenagers are
indoctrinated into military service. Factors such as socialization, recruitment, and
110 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
duty to defend the collective are likely all influential in this regard. Needless to say,
this does not suggest a moral equivalency.
6
Interviews with incarcerated Middle East terrorists reveal a similar pattern where
convicted terrorists cited peer influence as a major reason for joining the group and
“Membership was described as being associated with a fusion of the young adult's
individual identity with the group's collective identity and goals” (Post, Sprinzak,
and Denny, 2003).
7
According to a government white paper report, the Singapore paper published
by Jemaah Islamiyyah invited prospective recruits to attend otherwise innocuous
religious classes. e desire for religious instruction and Muslim fellowship ini-
tially motivated many to attend. Teachers would then insert references to Jihad and
Muslim suffering. Students who expressed additional interest in the Muslim plight
were identified and submitted to further screening and indoctrination and were
invited to join the organization. A series of tactics were then implemented to solidify
in-group bonding. ese included the use of secrecy, the idea that group outsiders
were infidels, and escalation of commitment to include pledging public allegiance to
the organization and psychological contracting. See “e Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests
and the reat of Terrorism” (2003).
8
Twenty-year-old British Muslim Younis Tsouli took up the Web name Irhabi007
and became a highly influential voice in al-Qaeda chat rooms. He soon became a
public relations mouthpiece for Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda in Iraq and
proved prolific in efforts to post Jihadi videos, to disseminate terror training materi-
als, and to raise funds (Sageman, 2008).
9
A Fatah member was quoted as saying, “I belong to the generation of occupation.
My family are refugees from the 1967 war. e war and my refugee status were the
seminal events that formed my political consciousness, and provided the incentive
for doing all I could to help regain our legitimate rights in our occupied country”
(Post, 2005, p. 622).
10
is aspect of jihadi-Salafi ideology was in part inspired by Egyptian author and
Islamist Sayyid Qutb, who was the leading intellectual of the Muslim Brotherhood
in the 1950s and 1960s. He argued that militant jihad was necessary to overthrow
non-Islamic governments and institute a “pure” Islamic society (Silber and Blatt,
2007).
11
Abu Maysara, who is believed to be a commander of al-Qaeda in Iraq, listed the
following as one of al-Qaeda’s key organizational goals: “To re-establish the Rightly-
Guided Caliphate in accordance with the Prophet's example, because [according to
the tradition] ‘whoever dies without having sworn allegiance to a Muslim ruler dies
as an unbeliever’” (as transcribed by the Middle East Media Research Institute,
2008).
12
In addition, survey data suggest strong although not necessarily violent support
for a caliphate among a majority of Muslims. Authors of the survey report argue
Why and How Some People Become Terrorists 111
that “For some Muslims, the imagery of an Islam reflective of the golden era of
Muhammad is a religious value worthy of pursuit in terms of life goals, finances,
and personal sacrifice ‘in the cause of Allah’” (National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2008).
13
e group partly justifies its militant stance using the following Biblical texts:
“Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of
God made he man” (Genesis 9:6) and “So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye
are: for blood it defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that
is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it” (Numbers 35:33).
14
In one experimental study, despite submitting identical resumes, Arab-named
applicants for French jobs received five times fewer callbacks than applicants with
western names (Greif, 2007).
15
One factor presumed to contribute to limited political representation is the fact
that immigrant Muslims may lack knowledge on how to participate in the political
process (Greif, 2007)
16
Several psychological studies highlight the powerful role of revenge. Studies show
that individuals engaged in a cooperative task are frequently willing to sacrifice
their own rewards to exact revenge on an opponent caught cheating (Tudge, 2002).
Other studies suggest that young males and religious individuals are particularly
prone to attitudes of vengeance. See Silke (2008, p. 105) for a more detailed review
of the psychology of vengeance and its relationship to terrorism.
17
Data collected by the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa,
as cited in Moghadam (2006).
18
Popular support for violence against civilian targets is 29 percent for Jordan, 28
percent for Egypt, 14 percent for Pakistan and 16% for French and Spanish Mus-
lims (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006).
19
For a review on the hypothesized role of sensation seeking in radicalization, see
Victoroff (2005).
20
Abrahms notes, for example, that commuting the prison sentences of Italian Red
Brigade members in exchange for actionable intelligence against former comrades
has helped breed resentment among movement members. Government programs
that seek to infiltrate radical online chat rooms may also have a similar effect. e
intent, where possible, should be to sow confusion and mistrust among radical social
networks.
113
CHAPTER FOUR
How Do Terrorists Generate and Maintain
Support?
Christopher Paul
Introduction
Objectives
How do terrorists generate support initially, and how do they maintain
it over time? What benefits do terrorists or insurgents draw from such
support, and how critical are these benefits?
A starting point may be to remember Mao Tse-tung’s (1937)
admonition that “the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish
swims in the sea.” e suggestion in our context would be that terrorists
and insurgents desperately need popular support, and that disconnect-
ing them from that support is a potentially highly effective approach to
combating them. Although the proposition is quite plausible intuitively
and is part of a near-consensus view, it is not as straightforward as it
might seem. ere are disagreements on the matter and the empirical
base is fairly thin.
1
Nonetheless, it appears to be an important proposi-
tion and what follows surveys much of the relevant literature. It then
seeks to structure the information in a coherent way and to draw some
conclusions for counterterrorism.
Disciplinary Approaches to Studying Support for Terrorism
Where support for terrorism is addressed in the literature, the focus
is typically limited to state support, financial support, or expressions
of support as captured in public opinion polls. More often, support is
assumed, as authors address other questions. As a result, the survey in
114 Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together
this paper includes insights from studies that touch on support for ter-
rorism only tangentially.
Support for terrorism (or, more generally, for insurgency) is treated
differently and to different depths in the various social-science disci-
plines. For example, the topic is minimally treated in sociology but
with slightly greater frequency in economics, where much of the rel-
evant work is focused on finance (see, for example, Basile, 2004; Levitt,
2007) or public opinion (see Jaeger et al., 2008, for example). e most
useful insights about support come from studies that cross traditional
disciplinary boundaries. Case studies (be it from historians, political
scientists, or interdisciplinary scholars) are the best sources for empiri-
cal work on factors and relationships. However, most such are aimed
primarily at other topics. ey offer little unifying theory.
e theory that exists is not tied to specific cases and typically
stems from the work of policy analysts and military theorists (primar-
ily those associated with counterinsurgency; see, for example, SHARP,
2006; Kilcullen, undated; Metz and Millen, 2004).
On the empirical side, an area of social science that does regularly
and explicitly focus on support is public-opinion research (for exam-
ple, Myers, 2004; Fair and Shepherd, 2006; Khashan, 2003; PCPSR,
2001; Abdallah, 2003; Haddad, 2006; Haddad and Khashan, 2002;
Pew Research Center, 2005; and Hayes and McAllister, 2005). How-
ever, as discussed below, integrating this work is complicated by the
many different denotations of “support.”
A broader set of materials is available when one approaches ques-
tions of support obliquely, drawing on criminological research on orga-
nized crime and street gangs (for example, Makarenko, 2002; Roth
and Sever, 2007; Kleemans and Bunt, 1999; Cottino, 1999; Shulte-
Bocholt, 2006; and Jankowski, 1991) as well as on sociology and politi-
cal science on social movements (such as Tilly, 1979). Even less directly
related (but with relatively concrete findings) are contributions from
behavioral science on community, identity, and baseline cultural and
social processes, such as the development of trust (for example, Kenny,
2007; Welch, Sikkink, and Loveland 2007; Farrell, 2003; and Putnam,
2001).