Pricing Strategy
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Everybody remembered the 1994 launch. Amidst pirouetting belly dancers and firecrackers that
lit the sky, was born the exotic fruit product “Crimson Nectar”- the nectar of red ripe cherries with
malt and sugar. The product may be used as juice following the recommended dilution, toping application
on ice-creams, cakes and pastries and as a substitute of red wine. This is non-alcoholic fruit beverage
proposed to position as a strong natural and nutritive substitute of red wine and beer. The marketing
team couldn’t stop talking about the brand’s many ‘firsts’-the tamper-proof guala-cap, the unbreakable
flexi-bottle, and the richly embossed label (the first for an exotic juice in the popular price band). It
looked world class. For the Mexican division of Universal Spirits (US), the company behind the
brand, it was a strategically bold move. A domestic brand priced at US $4 for 750 ml, a mere $ 6
Pesos premium over the country’s largest selling brand Macduff, Crimson Nectar was intended to
fetch US handsome volumes in the regular exotic juice segment (18 million cases a year). And with
an ad campaign crafted to lead the consumer up the self-destiny-defining curve, Arturo Hernandez,
the then CEO of US’ Mexico unit,
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was sure it would be a winner.
So, it was selling an amazing 2 million cases in 2001-02. That was less than half what No. 1
Macduff did (over 5 million cases), and less than two other brands that were older, but it was still
“one helluva lot”, as Mr. Hernandez saw it. At the moment, Crimson Nectar was up for sale. The
company’s UK headquarters wanted it to be sold. Its reasoning: as a global company, it no longer
wished to sell a local brand, that too at the lower end of the market. That was not the only change at
US. Mr. Hernandez was no longer chief of the Mexico arm. Yet, he was somehow still attached to
the brand that had been his career’s biggest success. Attached enough to float his own firm and
make his own bid for it.
Now, here he was, at the office of Rockport Frapp, the investment banker appointed by US to
evaluate the brand, wondering what was taking so long. Executives from US, who were also present,
were ready to do most of the talking. “It’s been awhile, hasn’t it?” asked Mr. Hernandez, “Any
second thoughts?” Ms. Dulce Flores, Chief Investment Analyst, Rockport Frapp, looked distinctly
uncomfortable. Ms. Alma Garcia , Vice President (Marketing), US, shot a glance at his CEO, Robert
Green, and then replied: “It’s not an easy evaluation exercise, and since building a liquor brand in a
restricted market is such a gruelling task, we have very few guideposts to go by.” “There’s Flags,”
said Mr. Hernandez, referring to the sale some years ago of another regular exotic juice brand,
“which does about 3.5 million cases.” Mr. Green spoke next. “Mr. Hernandez,” he began, “we’ve
seen that data, and you know better than us that we invested more in terms of both money and effort,
in creating Crimson Nectar. The brand also has higher long-term potential than Flags. Given the
requisite inputs, Crimson Nectar could even overtake Macduff for segment leadership. Had US not
wanted to play only at the upper-end of the liquor market, it would be a terrific asset.”
Asset, it certainly was. An asset that existed in people’s heads. In US, occupying a well-defined
portion of the consumer’s mind was non-negotiable. Its vodka, Dostoevsky, was selling transparency,
while its well-recognized Scotch brand, Adam Hume, was selling forward mobility. Crimson Nectar
had also lodged itself neatly in its target’s mind space. “Crimson Nectar is profitable,” added Ms.
14 Mr. Arturo Fernandez is currently holding the position of Marketing Advisor and Member of the Board of
Directors of United Spirits Mexico SA de CV