PFE Chapter 19, Stock valuation page 27
The Economist November 24th 2001
Economics focus Taking the measure
Apart from “animal spirits”, what figures excite stockmarket bulls?
AFTER shares worldwide hit their post-
attack lows on September 21st, the Dow
Jones Industrial Average has risen by close
to 20%—in what some enthusiasts already
call a new bull market. Given dismal
forecasts of American growth, plunging
consumer confidence and slashed estimates
for corporate profits, can any of the tools
that are used to measure the markets
validate the bulls?
• P/e ratios. One common indicator the
bulls seem to have forgotten, at least in
America, is the price/earnings (p/e) ratio:
the share price divided by earnings per
share. Even when the S&P 500 index hit a
three-year low just after the terrorist attacks,
the average p/e ratio, at 28, was already
high by historical standards; now it stands at
31. In Japan, the average p/e is around 62—
which, hard to believe, is modest compared
with the mid-1990s, when analysts
attempted to justify p/es of over 100. In
Europe, p/e ratios are now blushingly
modest; they average around 16, more
comfortably within historic ranges (see left-
hand chart).
Adding to questions about high
valuations in America is uncertainty over
the “e” in the p/e ratio, the earnings that un-
derpin share valuations. Earlier this month,
Standard & Poor’s, a ratings agency,
complained that too many companies
artificially boost their profits. A recent study
by the Levy Institute estimates that
operating profits for the S&P 500 have been
inflated by at least 10% a year over the past
two decades, thanks to a mix of one-time
write-offs and other accounting tricks. Such
sleights of hand mean that American shares
may be even dearer than they look.
• Yield ratios. As soaring p/e ratios have
become harder to justify in recent years, and
questions about earnings have mounted,
other indicators have come into fashion.
One is the “earnings yield ratio”, which
compares returns on government bonds with
an implicit earnings “yield” (in fact, the
inverse of the p/e ratio) to shareholders. The
theory behind this ratio, popularised by
Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman, some
years ago, is that the earnings yield on
shares has moved fairly closely in line with
yields on government bonds, at least
recently. In late September, plenty of
analysts pointed to this rule of thumb as an
argument that American shares were cheap.
As a relative measure, the earnings yield
ratio has the virtue of comparing shares with
a riskless alternative, but it is a long way
from being an iron law. As Chris Johns of
ABN Amro, an investment bank, points out,
the relationship between bond yields and
equity earnings yields is far less stable than
it at first appears. In America, for most of
the years since 1873, and even as recently as
the 1970s, shares traded at far higher
earnings yields—that is, lower p/e ratios—
relative to government bonds than they do
today (see the right-hand chart).
Earnings yield ratios have a problem.
Traditionally, investors have looked to cash
dividends as the ultimate source of share
value: these are pocketable returns, after all.
But as dividends have fallen out of fashion,
investors have had to rely on earnings,
flawed as they are, as a proxy. Shareholders
face two big risks; first, that without a
dividend stream they may never recoup
their investment, and second, that the flaws
in earnings make profits difficult to gauge.
Given these, it seems a stretch to put too
much faith in a fixed relationship with bond
yields, much less the view that shares are
fairly valued when these yields are equal.
• Better ratios. Some point to Tobin’s Q—
the ratio of a firm’s market value to the
replacement cost of its assets—as the best
way to understand market values. This
certainly has appeal, since it reflects the
costs a competitor would face in re-creating
a business. But replacement cost is hard to
measure, and is of little help in explaining
daily price movements. The next best thing,
comparing market prices with the book
value of assets, vastly underestimates the
value of companies with intangibles such as
patents and brands.
An alphabet soup of ratios is available to
escape the flaws of measuring earnings:
price-to-EBITDA (earnings before interest,
tax, depreciation and amortisation) and
price-to-cashflow, for example. These do a
somewhat better job, since they measure
profit in a way that, ideally, is more closely
tied to a company’s underlying
performance. But on these measures,
according to Peter Oppenheimer of HSBC,
stockmarkets in America, Britain and
France are still highly valued, though
German shares are less so.
Of course, no single metric can unlock
the secrets of share values. But the good
measures are those that are useful in bear
and bull markets alike. Discounted cash-
flow valuation, for instance, is another
metric that looks at the value of an entire
firm according to the profits it expects in
future. But it relies on a “risk premium”—
the additional return investors require to
compensate for the risks of holding
shares—which is both the most important,
and the most debated, figure in finance.
Differing views about the risk premium can
support almost any equity values. Recent
weeks have shown that this slippery idea is
central in the struggle between the bulls and
the bears. .
Figure 19.4: Article from the Economist on multiple valuation