components and parts themselves because in many
instances outsourcing may prove to be more cost-
effective. Outsourcing is the practice of buying
parts or whole products from other manufacturers
while allowing a buyer to maintain its own brand
name. For example, Ford Festiva is made by Kia
Motors, Mitsubishi Precis by Hyundai, Pontiac
Lemans by Daewoo, and GM Sprint by Suzuki.
A modification of outsourcing involves producing
various components or having them produced under
contract in different countries.That way,a firm takes
advantage of the most abundant factor of production
in each country before assembling components into
final products for worldwide distribution.
Solectron and Flextronics are examples of con-
tract manufacturers that do manufacturing for many
well-known brands. Solectron, a contract electron-
ics maker, makes components and finished products
for electronics companies,and its customers include
Cisco Systems, HP, and Ericsson. A recent deal
involves Solectron making optical networking
equipment worth as much as $2 billion for Lucent
Technologies for three years. Xerox has a five-year
contract that transfers about half of Xerox’s manu-
facturing operations to Flextronics and represents
more than $1 billion in annual manufacturing costs.
Flextronics, based in Singapore, is a $12 billion
global electronics manufacturing services company,
manufacturing Xerox office equipment and compo-
nents at a modest premium over book value.These
copiers and printers are used worldwide.
6
Once in the maturity stage, the innovator’s com-
parative advantage is gone, and the firm should
switch from producing simple versions to produc-
ing sophisticated models or new technologies in
order to remove itself from cut-throat competition.
Japanese VCR makers used to make 99 percent of
the machines sold in the USA and 75 percent of all
machines sold worldwide, but they still cannot
compete with low-wage Korean newcomers strictly
on price, because labor content in VCRs is substan-
tial. To retain their market share, the Japanese rely
on new technology, such as 8-mm camcorders.
For a relatively high-tech product, an innovator
may find it advantageous to get its product system
to become the industry’s standard, even if it means
lending a helping hand to competitors through the
licensing of product knowledge. Otherwise, there is
always a danger that competitors will persevere in
inventing an incompatible and superior system. A
discussion of product adoption above should make
it clear that several competing and incompatible
systems serve only to confuse potential adopters
who must acquire more information and who are
uncertain as to which system will survive over the
long term.
The worst scenario for an innovating firm is
when another system supplants the innovators’
product altogether to become the industry’s stan-
dard. Sony’s strategic blunder in guarding its
Betamax video system is a good case to study.
Matsushita and Victor Co. took the world leadership
position away from Sony by being more liberal in
licensing its VHS (Video Home System) to their
competitors. Philips and Grundig did not introduce
their Video 2000 system until VHS was just about to
become the industry’s standard in Europe and the
world. By that time, despite price cutting, it was too
late for Video 2000 to attract other manufacturers
and consumers. The problem was so bad that
Philips’ own North American subsidiary refused to
buy its parent’s system. Ironically, Sony itself had
to start making VHS-format machines in 1988. In
2002, Sony ended its bitter experience by discon-
tinuing the Betamax machines.
A more recent case of competing technologies
and strategic alliances involves the digital videodisc
(DVD) which can also store audio and computer
data and software.Toshiba’s system competed with
the Multimedia Compact Disc system offered by
Sony and Philips. In addition, Toshiba aggressively
courted movie makers (e.g., Warner Bros., MCA,
and MGM/UA) while offering “open” licensing to
other electronics companies.As a result, such man-
ufacturing giants as Matsushita, Thomson, and
Pioneer chose to ally with Toshiba. In the end, Sony
and Philips had to come to a compromise by adopt-
ing a single format that was closer to Toshiba’s
system than theirs.
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