Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World

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387

assessing the threat

ﬁlled.

It is possible, but remains unlikely.

Four reasons are usually ad-

vanced to explain how criminals are distinct from terrorists: motivation, le-

gitimacy, publicity, and the use of violence. Nonetheless, there are examples

that indicate they have helped each other on land and that the inhibitions felt

generally by both might, under certain circumstances, be set aside.

First, motivation: criminals are interested in money. Terrorists are inter-

ested in righting what they see as social wrongs and achieving political

power; they are driven supposedly by ideals, however warped they might

be.

Criminals want to exploit the world; terrorists want to change it.

Some criminals do, however, appear to want to eﬀect political change. In

India Dawood Ibrahim, the leader of the gang known as the “D Company”

become so involved in political conﬂicts that he, along with another Mus-

lim gangster, Ibrahim Menon, is generally believed to have been behind the

bombs that destroyed ﬁnancial centres in Mumbai (Bombay) in 1993.

is also believed to have links with the group that attacked the Indian parlia-

ment building in 2001, with Lashkar-e-Taiba, a group that India suspects

was behind a series of bombings in New Delhi in October 2005, and with

Al Qaeda with which it is alleged he has made a deal to share smuggling

routes.

Furthermore, it is suspected that he has enjoyed the protection of

20 Richard halloran, ‘What if Asia’s pirates and terrorists joined hands?’ South

China Morning Post, 17 May 2003; ‘Maritime piracy and terrorism are con-

verging’, CSIS Transnational reats Update, vol. 1, no. 9, June 2003, p. 1 and

Koknar, ‘piracy and terrorism are joining forces’.

21 p. Mukundan, interview with author.

22 As James h. Anderson writes: ‘is distinction remains a useful starting point

for analysis, even though it is sometimes diﬃcult to ascertain the dominant

motivation in practice’: James h. Anderson, International Terrorism and Crime:

Trends and Linkages, Conclusions, ND.

23 See Gilbert King, e Most Dangerous Man in the World: Dawood Ibrahim, New

York: Chamberlain Bros, 2004, pp. 25-31. Also B. Raman. ‘Dawood Ibrahim:

e Global Terrorist’, South Asia Analysis Group paper no. 818, 19 Oct. 2003

and David E. Kaplan, ‘paying for terror’, US News & World Report, 5 Dec.

2005. On Menon see Edward A. Gargan, ‘India bombings: Gangs involved,

but who else?’ New York Times, 16 May 1993. Moreover Ibrahim was appar-

ently not the only Muslim gangster so motivated. police in Calcutta blamed

the 1993 bombings there on Rashid Khan. See Subir Bhaumik, ‘Calcutta maﬁa

boss convicted over blast’, BBC News, 30 Aug. 2001.

24 David E. Kaplan, ‘A Godfather’s lethal mix of business and politics’,US News &

World Report, 5 Dec. 2005. For more on the links between ‘D Company’ and

Al Qaeda see King, e Most Dangerous Man in the World, pp. 73-88 and Gu-

naratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, pp. 206-7. On the Oct. 2005 bombings see ‘Bomb

blasts in New Delhi, scores killed’, e Jawa Report, 29 Oct. 2005. On the at-

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small boats, weak states, dirty money

pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency which guaranteed him the use

of pakistan’s coastal smuggling routes in exchange for his cooperation.

In Brazil many favela dwellers believe the pCC and other drug traﬃckers

ﬁght for them against a government that they regard as their oppressor and

which have, in Williams words, “developed alternative forms of governance

based on rudimentary but eﬀective forms of paternalism, the provision of

welfare services, a degree of protection against violence, and career oppor-

tunities for young men who would otherwise be unemployed”.

Second, legitimacy: previously the relationships most terrorist groups had

with criminals were restricted because they hoped to be in government

some day. ey therefore wanted neither to compromise their future au-

thority nor to alienate their supporters. Extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda

and FARC, have changed this assumption.

ird, publicity: for the most part terrorists want as many people as pos-

sible to know what they have done and why they have done it. publicity

is their friend. Criminals, including pirates, prefer discretion. publicity is

their enemy, largely because the level of publicity often determines the level

of the state’s response. Even though some maﬁa leaders, such as John Gotti

in the uS and the Kray twins in the uK, revelled in their notoriety they

were generally much more reticent about the details of their crimes. In a

break with that tradition, Central American gangs actively court publicity

as a way of demonstrating their power to the police and recruiting new

members.

While the Mexican cartels do not seek publicity in the same

way, the sheer scale of the attacks on the police, which prompted the col-

umnist Jesus Silva-herzog to compare the level of violence to that of the

tack on the Indian parliament see ‘parliament suicide attack stuns India’, BBC

News, 13 Dec. 2001.

25 Kaplan, ‘A Godfather’s lethal mix of business and politics’.

26 Logan, ‘Brazil’s p.C.C.: e True power Behind the Violence’. phil Williams.

From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: e Decline of the State and US

Strategy. Carlisle, pA: uS Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2008,

pp. 23-4.

27 Barry R. McCaﬀrey and John A. Basso, ‘Narcotics, Terrorism, and Interna-

tional Crime: e Convergence phenomenon’ in Russell D. howard and Reid

L. Sawyer, eds, Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security

Environment, Guildford, CT: McGraw-hill/Dushkin, 2003, p. 210.

28 Gilmore, ‘Gang Warfare’, p. 49.

389

assessing the threat

Iraq war, had, according to polls published in June 2008, seriously eroded

conﬁdence in the Calderón government.

Fourth, the use and purpose of violence: most criminals have traditionally

avoided violence where they can. Although a minority have used it exces-

sively and some have combined it with gratuitous cruelty, most criminals

who employ violence use it in a controlled way.

Both criminals and ter-

rorists use violence in self-defence. ey both use it oﬀensively to attack

rival groups or government forces. e crucial diﬀerence is that while both

use violence to communicate they do so to diﬀerent audiences and on a dif-

ferent scale. Organised criminal gangs have traditionally assassinated rival

individuals or killed members of opposing gangs. Terrorists generally, un-

like most criminals, use what is called “triangular” violence: they threaten

to kill one person or group in order to inﬂuence another.

historically

criminals have seen few advantages in killing large numbers of people. per-

haps the best known exception was the mid-ﬂight bombing of a passenger

aircraft over Colombia in 1989 by the “Extraditables”, a group of cocaine

smugglers led by pablo Escobar who wanted to avoid extradition to the

uS.

Now, however, criminal groups in Central America, such as MS-13

and M-18, and others in Mexico—such as Los Zetas (which drew many

of its original personnel from the uS-trained Special Air Mobile Force

Groups), linked closely to the Gulf cartel, and the Arellano Felix Organisa-

tion (AFO) that employed well-trained, almost paramilitary forces—and in

Brazil, such as the “Comando Vermelho” (CV) and the pCC, and even in

Europe, have become demonstrably more willing to use what amounts to

terrorism to inﬂuence government policy, mainly to deter the authorities

29 Laurence Iliﬀ and Alfredo Corchado. ‘Mexico drug wars’. Dallas Morning News,

7 June 2008.

30 Godson and Olson, ‘International Organized Crime’, p. 21.

31 uN Commission on Crime prevention and Criminal Justice, ‘Diﬀerences and

Similarities between Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorist Crimes’,

Fifth Session, Vienna, 21-31 May 1996.

32 MIpT Terrorism Knowledge Base, Group proﬁle: ‘e Extraditables’; Stan

Yarbro, ‘Colombian jet crashes, killing 107’, Washington Post, 28 Nov. 1989;

Xavier Raufer, ‘Gray Areas: A New Security reat’, Institute for International

Studies Political Warfare: Intelligence, Active Measures and Terrorism Report, no.

20, Spring 1992, p. 6, who also reports that the group were responsible for the

assassination of three Colombian presidential candidates, a minister of justice,

a public prosecutor, the editor of a major newspaper and the leader of M-19, a

rival narco-terrorist group.

390

small boats, weak states, dirty money

from interfering in their activities.

In 2002 a pCC gang was intercepted

with a 65 lb (30 kg) bomb it intended to use to blow up the São paulo stock

exchange.

In December 2004, members of MS-13 killed all 28 passengers

on a bus in honduras to deter the government from continuing with its

“mano dura” (“strong hand”) crackdown.

e ﬁghting in Mexico between

the Sinaloa and Gulf drug cartels and the government has been described

as having moved from “the domain of law enforcement into that of low

level conﬂict”.

In 2006 ﬁve severed heads were thrown onto a nightclub

dance ﬂoor in uruapan, and in 2007 the tactic was repeated when a severed

head was thrown into a military camp shortly after the Mexican army was

drafted in to reinforce the government’s anti-drug clampdown.

33 Jerrold post refers to this activity as ‘‘criminal terrorism’: post, e Mind of the

Terrorist, p. 5. On the Central American gangs see Ana Arana, ‘how the Street

Gangs Took Central America’, Foreign Aﬀairs, vol. 84, no. 3, May/June 2005,

pp. 98 & 103. On the Mexican cartels see Gordon James Knowles, ‘reat

Analysis: Organized Crime and Narco-Terrorism in Northern Mexico’, Military

Review, Jan.-Feb. 2008, p. 79; Grayson, ‘Mexico and the Drug Cartels’; Alfredo

Corchado, ‘Cartel’s enforcers outpower their boss’, Dallas Morning News, 11

June 2007; ‘Drug Cartels: Arellano-Felix Organization’, DEA Background In-

formation, Feb. 1997; Graham h. Turbiville, Jr., ‘Mexico’s Evolving Security

posture’, Military Review, May-June 2001, p. 45; héctor Tobar, ‘New phase

seen in Mexico’s drug war’, LA Times, 18 May 2008; and for background on

the origins of the Zetas see Brendan M. Case, et al, ‘Oﬃcials develop clearer

picture of Zetas’, El Universal, 21 March 2005 and héctor Tobar, ‘A Mexican

cartel army’s war within’, LA Times, 20 May 2007. On the Brazilian gangs see

Logan, ‘Brazil’s p.C.C.: e True power Behind the Violence’; Michael Day,

‘Crime Groups Turn to Terrorism in Rio de Janeiro’, Jane’s IR, 1 Aug. 2003;

Andrew Downie, ‘Brazil gang takes on state’, Christian Science Monitor, 16 May

2006; Monte Reel, ‘Brazilian city wakes to prison gang’s power’, Washington

Post, 21 May 2006 and Jonathan Wheatley, ‘Gang leaders take Brazil hostage

from inside jail’, Financial Times, 17 May 2006. On the incidents in Europe see

Gorka, ‘e ‘New’ reat of Organised Crime and Terrorism’.

34 Anthony Faiola, ‘Brazilian gangs take turf wars out of slums’, Washington Post,

15 Dec. 2002

35 Gilmore, ‘Gang Warfare’, p. 50.

36 ‘Mexico’s three reasons to be fearful’, Jane’s FR, no. 2936, 12 July 2007, p. 2.

Also Oscar Becerra, ‘Fighting Back: Mexico Declares War on Drug Cartels’,

Jane’s IR, April 2007, pp. 6-11; Laurence Iliﬀ, ‘Cartels go on oﬀensive against

Mexican army’, Dallas Morning News, 12 May 2007; Ioan Grillo, ‘Drug cartels

target military in Mexico’, AP, 14 May 2007 and ‘Can the army out-gun the

drug lords?’ e Economist, 15 May 2008.

37 ‘Severed head greets new troops in Mexico drug war’, Reuters, 12 May 2007; on

the nightclub incident see Grayson, ‘Mexico and the Drug Cartels’; on both of

these incidents and others see James C. McKinley, Jr., ‘With beheadings and at-

tacks, drug gangs terrorize Mexico’, New York Times, 26 Oct. 2006 and Becerra,

391

assessing the threat

ese developments should not be exaggerated. Diﬀerences still out-

weigh similarities.

Nonetheless, terrorists and criminals in general, if not

usually pirates in particular, have on occasion found reason to work to-

gether, although pirates and terrorists have separately made money at sea

by attacking ships and kidnapping seafarers. however, as criminals and

terrorists quite naturally have many more interests on land, most maritime

operations are undertaken to support those interests by facilitating the ter-

rorist and criminal equivalent of “trade”—that is, the movement of sup-

plies between diﬀerent parts of a single criminal or terrorist enterprise or

the exchange of goods such as arms, drugs or migrants between enterprises.

As Rohan Gunaratna has noted, for terrorists “the maritime domain is pri-

marily a medium to support operations not to mount attacks”.

Terrorists and insurgents have always needed money to support their

cause and have rarely had qualms about using criminal methods to get it.

In the past, however, terrorists rarely sought out direct or regular contact

with criminals; in fact, increasing criminality was often regarded as a sign

of senescence. is has changed. Terrorists and insurgents, faced with re-

duced state sponsorship following the end of the Cold War and the incep-

tion of the “global war on terror”, both of which made it far more diﬃcult

for them to raise funds and transfer money by legal or quasi-legal means,

turned to crime, and criminal accomplices, more readily and at an earlier

stage in the normal evolutionary cycle in order to survive.

Although individual attacks can be mounted relatively cheaply, main-

taining a terrorist network is an expensive undertaking. Ronald Noble, the

Secretary-General of Interpol, estimated that only ten per cent of Al Qae-

da’s estimated 2001 expenditure of $30-$50 million went on attacks; the

rest was used to run the organisation.

State sponsorship of terrorist groups

‘Fighting Back: Mexico Declares War on Drug Cartels’, p. 9, who suggests they

might have been the work of ‘Maras’ gangs, hired by the Mexican cartels, who

are known to use dismemberment to intimidate their rivals and the authorities.

Also Chris Dishman, ‘Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Terror-

ism Funding’, 10 Jan. 2007.

38 R.T. Naylor, Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance and the Underworld

Economy, Cornell up, 2002, pp. 44-87; Godson and Olson, ‘International Or-

ganized Crime’, p. 19; also hoﬀman, Inside Terrorism, p. 42.

39 Gunaratna, ‘e threat to the maritime domain: how real is the terrorist

threat?’ p. 82, note 3.

40 Mark huband, ‘Extremists in Europe ﬁnd fraud pays’, Financial Times, 15 June

2004. Interestingly the report goes on to quote unnamed uS oﬃcials who esti-

mated that in 2004 Al Qaeda’s annual expenditure was closer to $10 million.

392

small boats, weak states, dirty money

declined, partly because of the demise of the Soviet union, which acted as

quartermaster and guardian to many of the states that sponsored terrorism

directly, and partly because those states began to see that terrorism was a

less easily deniable form of covert warfare. Terrorist groups that wanted to

survive had to ﬁnance their activities by turning to private benefactors, by

siphoning oﬀ funds from legitimate businesses, by illicit funding through

charity organisations, or by resorting to such criminal activities as credit

card fraud, counterfeiting of goods, drug and human traﬃcking, kidnap-

ping, extortion and bank robbery.

e groups that survived the shakeout

were the ones that learned how to launder money.

is remains vitally

important but has come under enormous pressure from law enforcements

agencies around the world. One of the successes of the “war on terrorism”

has been the tracing, disruption and in some cases freezing of terrorist funds.

Al Qaeda was believed to have lost $130 million as a result. As the transfer

of money from legitimate businesses, charities and benefactors through the

formal banking system became increasingly diﬃcult, ever larger quantities

had to be moved via the informal hawala system or by courier.

ese pres-

sures have forced terrorist groups more and more into crime. Local groups,

for example, have had to become self-supporting.

As holden-Rhodes and

41 See uS National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, pp. 7-8; Ian O. Lesser,

‘Countering the New Terrorism: Implications for Strategy’, in Ian O. Lesser

et al., Countering the New Terrorism, Santa Monica: RAND, 1999, pp. 106 &

137; Kimberley L. ackuk, ‘Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can It Be Severed?’

Strategic Forum no. 191, May 2002, pp. 1 & 3; Kaplan, ‘paying for terror’.

42 David Veness, ‘Terrorism and Counterterrorism: An International perspective’,

Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism, vol. 24, 2001, p. 410.

43 One of the hardest knocks Al Qaeda sustained was the failure of BCCI (Bank

of Credit and Commerce International). See Richard Sale, ‘Collapse of BCCI

shorts Bin Laden’, United Press International, 1 March 2001. e bank was also

involved in laundering money for Abu Nidal, the Medellin cartel and Manuel

Noriega. See Chalk, Grey-Area Phenomena in Southeast Asia, p. 50. Ironically it

is alleged that BCCI was the main channel the CIA used to pass funds to the

Afghan Mujahideen.

44 ere is evidence that the Islamic group responsible for the Madrid train bomb-

ings ﬁnanced its activities through drug traﬃcking (and possibly arms deals).

Jamal Ahmidan, who was responsible for the group’s money, had an extensive

criminal record but was not regarded as a terrorist: ‘March 11 attackers trade

drugs for explosives’, CSIS Transnational reats Update, vol. 2, no. 7, April 2004,

p. 5. See also ‘Madrid bombings: 3 Moroccans held’, CNN.com, 24 May 2005.

According to Kaplan, Ahmidan was the brother of one of Morocco’s most suc-

cessful hashish smugglers, and when his home was raided over $2 million in drugs

and cash was recovered. Kaplan also reports that the planned 2002 attacks on

warships transiting the Gibraltar Straits were ﬁnanced using drug money: Kaplan,

393

assessing the threat

Lupsha wrote in 1993: “If you want to make a revolution…you need hard

cash to do it…Bank robberies and kidnappings are still useful, but drug

traﬃcking can generate the cash to pay the bills.”

Ineluctably, therefore,

terrorist groups have come to look and behave even more like criminal

groups than they did in the past, and although it would be unreasonable

and unrealistic to argue that terrorism and criminality have merged, they

clearly share much common ground and generate many of the same ef-

fects. Speaking in 2006 Jean-paul Laborde, the Chief of the Terrorism

prevention Branch of uNODC, said: “e threat posed by transnational

and non-state actors involved in drugs and crime was one of the great-

est challenges to international security and peace…Networks involved in

drugs, crime and terrorism were exploiting globalization, threatening State

sovereignty and endangering security.”

Table 8. Terrorists and criminals: Transformation, convergence and cooperation

‘paying for terror’.

45 J.F. holden-Rhodes and peter A. Lupsha, ‘horsemen of the Apocalypse: Gray

Area phenomena and the New World Disorder’, Low Intensity Conﬂict and Law

Enforcement, Autumn, vol. 2, no. 2, 1993, p. 220.

46 uN General Assembly, Department of public Information, ‘Criminal involve-

ment by transnational, non-state actors poses major threat to international se-

curity, third committee told’, 4 Oct. 2006.

47 Typology based on Chris Dishman, ‘Terrorism, Crime and Transformation’,

Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism, vol. 24, 2001, pp. 43-58; omas M. Sander-

son, ‘Transnational Terror and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines’, SAIS Re-

view, vol. 24, no. 1, Winter-Spring, 2004, pp. 49–61; phil Williams, ‘Terrorism

and Organized Crime: Convergence, Nexus or Transformation?’ in G. Jervas

(ed.), Report on Terrorism, Swedish Defence Research Establishment, 1998, pp.

69-92 where he suggests a similar three-level model from full integration to

arm’s-length association; and Tamara Makarenko, ‘A Model of Terrorist-Crim-

inal Relations’, Jane’s IR, Aug. 2003, pp. 6-11, who puts forward the idea of

alliances into which both criminals and terrorists can enter and a linear model

of convergence where criminals and terrorists can eﬀectively become a single

entity.

394

small boats, weak states, dirty money

Given these developments, criminals and terrorists might now be com-

ing together in any of three ways that can be summarised as transforma-

tion, convergence or cooperation.

Some analysts are unsure about the idea of cooperation. Chris Dishman

points out that there is little evidence that either major transnational crim-

inal organisations (TCOs) or terrorists are interested in co-operating. If

they do it is only for short periods because the risks outweigh the beneﬁts.

picarelli picks up this point, noting that terrorism and organised crime are

high-risk endeavours and that because terrorists and organised criminals are

risk averse, they are reluctant to add to that risk by engaging in long-term

collaboration.

Cooperation need not be intentional, however; criminals

might be unaware of the real identity of the people with whom they are

dealing or, in the case of smugglers, the goods they are transporting.

As far as terrorists are concerned, Dishman saw the major challenge for

the future as the emergence of groups where the aim of “ﬁnancial well-

being co-exists or over-rides traditional political motivations”.

he envis-

aged that criminal groups—although they were traditionally reluctant to

draw attention to themselves unnecessarily—could also undergo a trans-

formation and use terror (almost certainly tactically) “to force government

leniency and negotiation”.

Finally, he pointed out that “both TCOs and

terrorists already maintain organisations that are capable, to some extent,

of engaging in terrorism and organised criminal activities” and that this

“‘in-house’ capability obviates the need for terrorists to appeal to criminal

organisations to foster proﬁt-minded relationships. In essence, a political

or criminal organisation would…mutate (its) own structure and organi-

sation…rather than co-operate with (other) groups”.

All these develop-

ments appear to have come about. FARC and the Turkish pKK have dem-

onstrated that mutation does take place. Both groups have become deeply

48 Dishman, ‘Terrorism, Crime and Transformation’, pp. 45-6 & 56.

49 John T. picarelli, ‘e Turbulent Nexus of TOC and Terrorism: A eory of

Malevolent International Relations’, Global Crime, vol. 7, no. 1, Feb. 2006, p.

50 Inday Espina-Varona, ‘Terror groups to use crime to raise funds’, e Ma-

nila Times, 7 Jan. 2007; Sara A. Carter, ‘Terrorists teaming with drug cartels’,

Washington Times, 8 Aug. 2007. Also Sara A. Carter, ‘Drug cartel-terrorist ties

known in 2001’, Washington Times, 14 Aug. 2007.

51 Dishman, ‘Terrorism, Crime and Transformation’, p. 44.

52 Ibid., p. 47. See also pp. 50-1, where he cites the activities of the Medellin cartel

as an example.

53 Ibid., p. 48.

395

assessing the threat

involved in the drugs business and epitomise the phenomenon known as

“narco-terrorism”. Makarenko essentially agrees, pointing out that the

problems inherent in alliances mean that most terrorist and criminal groups

have developed the capacity to engage in criminal and terrorist acts on their

own.

hizbollah, for example, has developed an extensive international

criminal network that is involved in intellectual property crime, drug and

cigarette smuggling, and the African illegal diamond trade to support its

insurgency.

For Williams, too, the transformation hypothesis is the most

compelling, and he points to the anti-Castro groups as a clear example of

terrorists who abandoned their substantive political agenda, probably in

the early 1980s, to concentrate on traditional mob rackets.

On the other hand, there is also evidence that points towards examples

of convergence or cooperation taking place for speciﬁc reasons at speciﬁc

times.

Antonio Maria Costa, the Executive Director of the uN Oﬃce of

Drugs and Crime (uNODC), is quoted as saying: “e world is seeing the

birth of a new hybrid of organised crime-terrorist organisations”.

Wil-

liams, who is sceptical about cooperation, does acknowledge that cases of

collaboration limited to customer-supplier and occasional service contract

relationships have occurred even though they have not been common.

Nonetheless, Al Qaeda, the LTTE and many TCOs operate like modern

business organisations;

ONI/uSCG have commented that “organised

crime…will continue to develop business strategies similar to those used

54 Makarenko, ‘A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations’, p. 7.

55 Michael p. Arena, ‘hizbollah’s Global Criminal Operations’, Global Crime, vol.

7, Nos. 3-4, Aug.-Nov. 2006, pp. 454-70.

56 Williams, ‘Terrorism and Organized Crime: Convergence, Nexus or Transfor-

mation?’ p. 89.

57 See several CSIS Transnational reats Update reports, for example, ‘Islamic

terrorists linked to Camorra’, vol. 2, no. 7, April 2004, p. 4; ‘Italian mobsters

linked to Islamic terrorists’, vol. 2, no. 9, June 2004, p. 4; ‘Could organised

crime in Russia’s eastern regions aid terrorists?’, vol. 1, no. 11, Aug. 2003, pp.

1-2.

58 ‘uN Warns About Nexus Between Drugs, Crime and Terrorism’, uN press

Release SOC/Cp/311, 1 Oct. 2004. Also Kaplan, ‘paying for terror’.

59 Williams, ‘Terrorism and Organized Crime: Convergence, Nexus or Transfor-

mation?’ p. 89.

60 One Tamil militant reported that ‘the LTTE functions like a multinational cor-

poration…(LTTE leader) prabhakaran’s acumen is as much that of a CEO as of

a military commander’: Davis, ‘Tiger International’.

396

small boats, weak states, dirty money

by legitimate corporations”.

Modern business theory stresses the impor-

tance of ﬂexibility and ﬁnding partners when a capability is lacking, rather

than forcing the organisation to do something it is not capable of doing

well or which would place excessive demands on scarce resources. Modern

terrorist groups and modern criminals also appear to be following this para-

digm as they are apparently willing to seek out partners as and when they

need them. As Bruce hoﬀman points out, Al Qaeda encourages “creative

approaches and out-of-box thinking” and “actively encourages subsidiary

groups ﬁghting under the corporate banner to mix and match approaches”.

Terrorist organisations have a history of imitating each other and therefore

this cooperative model is likely to spread.

In the ﬁrst instance terrorists are likely to turn to other terrorists for help.

Terrorists are not fools; they recognise that cooperating with criminals ex-

poses them to security risks. Compared with terrorist groups, most crimi-

nal gangs are easier to track and penetrate, while their individual members

are more likely to become informers in exchange for money or immunity.

Nonetheless, there will be situations where other terrorist groups lack es-

sential skills or resources.

In these cases turning to criminals may be the next best option. In his re-

port for the Congressional Research Service on the links between terrorism

and drugs, Mark Kleiman lists four reasons why criminals and terrorists

might cooperate: ﬁrst and foremost, for money; secondly, for creation of

chaos and instability in the source and transit countries; thirdly, to encour-

age a climate where corruption is acceptable and intimidation is unop-

posed; and fourthly, to provide cover and a common infrastructure for their

61 ONI/uSCG, reats and Challenges to Maritime Security 2020, 1999, p. 15.

62 McCaﬀrey and Busso, ‘Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Crime: e

Convergence phenomenon’, p. 211; Bergen, Holy War, Inc, pp. 33-4; Bruce

hoﬀman, ‘Redeﬁning Counterterrorism: e Terrorist Leader as CEO’, RAND

Review, Spring 2004, p. 14. Brad McAllister, on the other hand, argues that Al

Qaeda’s network structure, which it had been forced to adopt because it was

without a safe haven, lacks the ﬂexibility of business networks and severely

inhibits its oﬀensive capability: Brad McAllister, ‘Al Qaeda and the Innovative

Firm: Demythologizing the Network’, Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism, vol. 27,

2004, pp. 297-319.

63 According to uS investigators ‘some of the most useful intelligence they are

now receiving on terrorists linked to al-Qaeda has been given by informers or

inﬁltrators of criminal gangs’: Mark huband, ‘Al-Qaeda forms drug links as

anti-terror war bites’, Financial Times, 15 June 2004. Also Kaplan, ‘paying for

terror’.

Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy &amp; Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World

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Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World