Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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maritime terrorists
the LTTE have been linked to a “drug lord”, Ali Khan, and in India to a
New Delhi-based gangster, Ashwin Naik, who was also reportedly involved
in LTTE extortion rackets before he was arrested in 2000.
398
In France, the
LTTE have reportedly “sub-contracted” their extortion operations to two
Tamil gangs, presumably to insert a degree of “deniability”.
399
e LTTE’s role in human trafficking from Sri Lanka and India to West-
ern countries, Australia, Canada and Great Britain in particular, is more
widely recognised. It earns the group a substantial income from charges
that are estimated to range from $18,000 to $32,000 per migrant.
400
In
2000 the Sri Lankan authorities broke up an LTTE operation that was
moving up to 700 people per month into Europe using forged visas.
401
It is
suspected, but unproven, that the LTTE have been involved in the move-
ment of migrants from pakistan across the Indian Ocean to north, east and
even southern Africa where they are handed over to other gangs for onward
movement to Europe.
402
ailand served as an important centre for these
operations.
403
Gunaratna mentions the Rud Pink Fow, which sailed from
phuket in ailand in 1992 bound for Mossel Bay in South Africa.
404
In
July 2003 a North Korean-flagged ship operated by a Sri Lankan company
was seized with 254 migrants on board. In November 2005 a ship named
the Kosmo was seized in ai waters. Evidence found on the ship and in
pattaya revealed the LTTE’s pivotal role in an operation to smuggle mi-
grants to Australia.
405
It is at the point where needs and capabilities can be matched for mutual
benefit without compromising each group’s core mission that arm’s-length
relationships between politically motivated gangs and their criminally moti-
398 Berry, et al., ‘Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism’, p. 107. Also
‘Swiss papers accuse Tamil Tigers of using drug money for fund raising activi-
ties’, e Sunday Times (Sri Lanka), 20 Aug. 2000.
399 Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger’.
400 Rabasa, Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, p. 103.
401 ‘LTTE human smuggling operation in Sri Lanka said foiled’, Kyodo World News
Service, 17 May 2000; and ‘LTTE human smuggling operation busted’, 18 May
2000.
402 private information, Dec. 2005. R. Ramasubramanian, ‘human Smuggling
in Sri Lanka’, Institute of peace and Conflict Studies Article no. 1383, 6 May
2004. More broadly see Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from maritime ter-
rorism’, p. 29.
403 Rabasa, Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, pp. 103-4.
404 Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism’, p. 29.
405 ‘Australia target in human smuggling scam’, e Age, 19 Nov. 2005.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
vated look-alikes become possible. Each is looking for money. Neither cares
greatly how they make it. Business is business: in the LTTE’s case that can
extend to moving supplies for other groups—the ASG, MILF and the unit-
ed Liberation Front of Assam (uLFA) have all been mentioned in this con-
text.
406
e LTTE, the uLFA and several other insurgent groups operating in
India’s northeatern states are believed to share a common interest in the nar-
cotics trade.
407
ere can also be collaboration with known criminal groups
such as the Arakanese smugglers who move drugs as well as arms, and insur-
gent groups in northeast India and Burma.
408
In 2007 the Sri Lankan Foreign
Minister, Rohitha Bogollagama, claimed that “LTTE ships have been used
to provide alternate supply channels to other groups and crime syndicates for
their arms, human smuggling and drug trafficking activities”.
409
What makes some groups successful?
Insurgent groups use terrorism as a tactic and some employ that tactic more
often than others. Several such groups have pursued targets of opportunity
at sea. Others, such as the pIRA, have attempted to launch coherent cam-
paigns. however, the groups that have exploited the sea most successfully
are, in the main, those that have had no option. Groups that have lacked
this imperative have generally abandoned it. Terrorist groups that have
gone to sea out of necessity and waged successful campaigns have landed
forces on exposed flanks, moved supplies and protected their supply lines,
they have, moreover, acted like pirates by stealing money and grabbing
hostages. Occasionally they have attacked maritime targets.
Necessity is the primary motivation, the maritime terrorists’ equivalent
of the pirates’ opportunity. As with opportunity it is not unalloyed and is
406 Raman, ‘Maritime terrorism: An Indian perspective’; Animesh Roul, ‘Is there
any linkage between uLFA and LTTE?’ e Counterterrorism Blog, 3 Dec.
2006. peiris suggests that in 1994, the LTTE transferred ‘at least’ two shiploads
of weapons to the MILF on behalf of the harkut-ul-Mujahideen (huM), a
terrorist organisation supported by pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)
agency: peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: transnational im-
pulses’, pp. 110-11 and Raman, ‘Action Against LTTE’s Maritime Terrorism’.
407 peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: transnational impulses’, pp.
101-2.
408 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 6;
Anthony Davis, ‘Tamil Tiger arms intercepted’, Jane’s IR, vol. 16, no. 2, Feb.
2004, p. 6.
409 ‘Sri Lanka’s perspective on maritime security in the region and its relevance to
the world–Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Rohitha B’.
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maritime terrorists
insufficient to ensure success. Experience has shown there are eight major
factors that influence how effectively a terrorist group operates at sea:
Legal and jurisdictional opportunities.1.
Geographical necessity.2.
Inadequate security.3.
Secure base areas.4.
Maritime tradition.5.
Charismatic and effective leadership.6.
State support.7.
promise of reward.8.
ere is considerable overlap with the factors that influence piracy. Like
them, these factors interact with each other and, while circumstances de-
termine which predominates, it is usual to find most are present in some
degree whenever groups that use terrorism are active at sea.
Legal and jurisdiction opportunities. International law is a political con-
struct. States abide by it for a number of reasons. Although respect for
the rule of law is certainly a motive for some states, reasons of state and
the calculus of advantage ultimately drive actual observance. It is not the
purpose of this book to explore why some states support insurgents. It is
enough to recognise that some do. Insurgents need cover. States can give
them sanctuary; obviously they can be given base areas on land but they
can also find shelter in the territorial waters of states that lack the means,
will or desire to pursue them. ere is little cover on the ocean but ships are
islands of territoriality that can be used to mask nefarious activity. States,
especially the uSA, are aware of this and initiatives such as the proliferation
Security Initiative (pSI), the amendments to the SuA Convention and the
somewhat ill-starred Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) have
been designed to limit this freedom. e problem is that this freedom can
only be limited to a degree before it compromises the essential freedom of
the sea, which is fundamental to trade and the unhindered movement of
naval forces. Flag state sovereignty therefore has to be maintained and as an
unavoidable consequence international law will continue to provide terror-
ists with a place where they can hide whether they choose the protection of
a strong state or the shelter of a weak one.
Geographical necessity. In most cases, but not always, geography determines
whether terrorists need to go to sea or not. e Nicaraguan “contras” did
not have to use the sea, nor did Al Qaeda. In most cases geography shapes
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
the why and the how of what terrorists do on the water. Two campaigns
illustrate this.
Sri Lanka and Ireland are divided islands. Sri Lanka is divided between
the rebel north and east and the remainder, which is government held. Ire-
land is divided between the united Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland.
For much of their history the Tamil Tigers have had access to safe areas
overseas, first in Tamil Nadu and then later in small islands off Burma and
ailand. eir principal bases, however, have always been “in theatre”, di-
vided by sea from their rear areas. e provisional IRA (pIRA) was able to
maintain secure base areas across the porous land border with the Irish Re-
public, immune from British attack. It was the British base areas that were
across water on the mainland; even there they were not immune from pIRA
assaults. Both the LTTE and the pIRA needed to bring in supplies by sea.
Because the Tamil Tigers have to bring their supplies directly into the areas
they control, the Sri Lankan Navy could limit or extinguish the rebellion by
imposing a blockade.
410
e Tigers need to prevent this and have therefore
invested in a naval capability that is strong enough to neutralise the SLN
close to the Sri Lankan coast, although never strong enough to defeat it. e
pIRA did not have to bring its supplies into Northern Ireland directly. It
could land them in the Republic. e Royal Navy could not blockade the
Republic; instead the British depended on intelligence, which they could
then feed to Irish or other allied countries in the hope that they would agree
to make an interception. Even then the pIRA, unlike the LTTE, was never
dependent on sea shipments alone. It could also bring in weapons by air
or hidden in regular cargo moved through the international transport sys-
tem.
411
Consequently, while both groups have extensive international arms
buying networks, the Tamil Tigers needed to invest in a maritime capability
to prevent their supplies being intercepted during the final stage of their
journey, while the pIRA had to become adept at using various methods of
transport, hiding arms amongst consignments of other goods and disguising
the true nature of the shipments from British intelligence.
410 Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, pp. 237 & 238-9.
411 is was the method used by the Loyalist paramilitary units who, for obvious
reasons, had to ship their arms into ulster directly. Although the Royal Navy
operated the ‘Granada patrol’ in the North Channel that separates ulster from
Scotland, to deter the use of trawlers and other small vessels for arms smug-
gling, guns and explosives were almost certainly shipped into Northern Ireland
hidden in normal container cargo, although no consignments were ever discov-
ered. Discussion with Steven haines, Feb. 2008.
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maritime terrorists
Similarly, Israel’s tightly controlled land borders meant that insurgents
such as the pLO had to develop maritime capabilities and exploit the prox-
imity of Lebanese bases if they were to be able to exploit Israel’s sea flank.
All three philippine groups, which in addition extorted money from coastal
settlements by using methods indistinguishable from those of organised
criminals, also needed to bring supplies in by sea. GAM was similarly de-
pendent on overseas supply sources and probably preyed piratically on local
seafarers. Once they had been driven out of Cuba the anti-Castro groups
had little option but to engage in coastal raiding and attacks on shipping if
they were to continue their fight.
Inadequate security. Inadequate security is a given for any insurgency to suc-
ceed. In the maritime domain the clearest contrast has been between what
the two most determined and resourceful maritime insurgencies have been
able to achieve. e Sea Tigers have fought the Sri Lankan Navy to a virtual
stalemate for long periods. Neither has been able to overcome the other.
Both can achieve local sea superiority to carry out specific operations; this
is of greater benefit to the Tamil Tigers because they depend on maritime
re-supply. In contrast, although the palestinian groups achieved success
initially, particularly in their ability to land raiding parties, the IDF/Navy
achieved almost complete control over the sea areas it regarded as vital to
its interests, reduced coastal raiding to negligible levels and imposed severe
(although by no means total) restrictions on palestinian maritime logisti-
cal activity. In Southeast Asia GAM, ASG, MNLF and groups such as JI,
which needed to move personnel and supplies by sea, benefited from under-
investment in maritime security by Indonesia and the philippines and poor
international security cooperation between all the states in the region.
Secure base areas. All insurgent groups need secure base areas for planning,
rest, logistical support and training, but the fact that people cannot live per-
manently at sea and depend upon reliable boats makes those who operate at
sea arguably more dependent on bases than their land-orientated counter-
parts. piracy has usually been eliminated only once pirate base areas have
been overrun rather than through maritime interdiction. e same appears
to be case for maritime terrorism. Two clear examples are the palestinian
groups and GAM. e palestinian groups operated a string of small work-
shops and bases along the Lebanese coast with a particular concentration
around Tripoli in the north. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 and
dispersed the pLO, Libya became the nearest maritime base area and others
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
were as far away as Tunisia and Algeria. is move seriously restricted the
palestinians’ maritime options and operational tempo.
however, an organisation’s determination affects how it copes with
the destruction of its bases. Although GAM’s maritime operations were
conducted mainly in the Malacca Straits and not off Aceh’s Indian Ocean
coast, they were nonetheless affected badly by the 2004 tsunami. It appears
that the scale of the losses GAM suffered (along with the criminal pirates
in the same area) was sufficient to close down their maritime operations.
By contrast the LTTE’s Sea Tigers, despite losing some 2,000 personnel
plus unspecified numbers of boats and other equipment, including four
coastal radars in the vicinity of Mullaittivu,
412
replaced its loses quickly
and resumed operations.
413
As far as Al Qaeda is concerned, Gunaratna
suggests that a significant reason why it was unable to build on the success
of the Cole and Limburg attacks and develop a sustainable maritime attack
capability was that its resources were scattered and it was unable to secure
a safe base area from which to operate.
414
Maritime tradition. e sea is an alien environment. To operate anywhere
outside a port or harbour a terrorist group needs to be trained or be in a
position to draw on the support and skills of a maritime community. Two
groups exemplify this: the ASG and the Sea Tigers.
e ASG are primarily a Tausug group. e Tausugs are the predomi-
nant ethnic group of the Sulu islands (with minorities on Mindanao in
Zamboanga and Tawi-Tawi provinces and on the island of Basilan, and a
substantial presence in Sabah).
415
ey are Muslims and the ASG draws its
members from “Muslim families with strong, centuries-old seafaring tradi-
tions. eir deep knowledge of the maritime domain gives them ample
capability to conduct maritime terrorism.”
416
e Sulu archipelago was,
as mentioned earlier, the home of the Sulu pirates who were notorious for
raiding coastal towns and villages in search of slaves. It may or may not be
a coincidence that the ASG has a similar reputation for coastal raiding and
hostage taking.
412 Davis, ‘Tamil Tigers seek to rebuild naval force’.
413 R.S. Vasan, ‘Sea control and the LTTE’, Observer Research Foundation Strate-
gic Trends, vol. IV. Issue 27, 7 Aug. 2006.
414 Gunaratna,’e asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism’, p. 87.
415 Tausug people, Wikipedia; for a description of the various ASG factions based
in these locations see Banlaoi, ‘Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia: e Abu
Sayyaf threat’, p. 69.
416 Ibid., p. 71.
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maritime terrorists
e Sea Tigers’ maritime capability is equally well rooted in local sea-
faring communities, particularly Valvettiturai, which has a long-standing
reputation as a smuggling centre and as the home of the “audacious” Ka-
raiyar fishing caste.
417
V. Suryanarayan describes the existence of “a close
nexus among fishermen, smugglers and Tamil militants” and points out
that the group’s founder, Velupillai prabakaran, and other leaders all hailed
from the town.
418
Sakhuja writes about a “…cohesive community held to-
gether by ties of kinship and caste. ere were links between its smugglers,
fisher folk and ordinary tradesmen”,
419
who have done business all across
south and Southeast Asia for centuries.
420
Similarly palestinian groups have worked with smugglers ever since the
inception of their maritime capability in 1966. More recently they have
sought to hide amongst the Gaza fishing fleet, something that would be
impossible without the fishermen’s connivance.
Charismatic and effective leadership. Visionary leadership exercised with de-
termination can overcome many obstacles. Al Qaeda emerged from the
deserts and mountains of Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. It had no appar-
ent affinity with the sea. It had no pressing need to use the sea to mount
attacks, lacked maritime experience and had no obvious maritime tradition
upon which to draw. Yet it mounted two of the most effective maritime
terrorist attacks in history and planned several more. Reports suggest that
one man, al-Nashiri, drove Al Qaeda’s maritime strategy and operations. A
Saudi of Yemeni extraction, he apparently observed shipping off the Yemen
coast and recognised what could be achieved.
421
he assembled a specialised
group with the requisite skills. he probably drew on the experience of local
seafarers for the boat-handling skills that he needed, which would explain
the concern, expressed when members of this gang escaped from jail in
2006, that Al Qaeda would seek to exploit these skills—or, given that the
417 Suryanarayan, ‘Sea Tigers–threat to Indian security’; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics
of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 7; Manoharan, ‘Tigers with
fins: Naval wing of the LTTE’; Wijesekera, ‘e Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE): e Asian Mafia’, p. 309 and peiris, ‘Secessionist war and ter-
rorism in Sri Lanka: transnational impulses’, pp. 88-9.
418 Suryanarayan, ‘Sea Tigers–threat to Indian security’; Wijesekera, ‘e Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): e Asian Mafia’, p. 310.
419 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 7.
420 Davis, ‘Tiger International’.
421 e 9/11 Commission Report, p. 15
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
breakout had outside help, that it already had a plan in mind.
422
Al Qaeda,
however, unlike the LTTE did not build an infrastructure to capture and
exploit this expertise. e momentum went out of its maritime operations
once al-Nashiri was caught. To say that this loss was attributable solely to
his capture would be going too far: he was captured along with other lead-
ers in the international campaign that drove the group out of its base areas
in Afghanistan and placed serious restrictions on its operational freedom.
423
Nonetheless, it has not so far been able to replace his vision, drive and or-
ganisational ability.
Leaders can also, of course, share a vision. Velupillai prabhakaran
might be a “plump, baby-faced, small time smuggler turned guerrilla”,
424
but there is no doubt that he dominates the LTTE and has successfully
instilled it with the belief that a powerful maritme arm together with in-
novatitive thinking are vital for success. In addition to being the only insur-
gent organisation that effectively has its own navy and air force, it was also
able to hijack the Intelsat-12 satellite between 2005 and 2007 to transmit
its own news programmes. When its access was discovered it was said to
have regarded the loss as merely a temporary setback.
425
Maritime mastery
is a key element in the success of the insurgency as a whole. Raman rates
the LTTE as the “most intelligent and futuristic-thinking terrorist organi-
sation in the world”. For Chalk the LTTE “remains at the cutting edge
of terrorist-insurgent sophistication and innovation”.
426
Bharadwaj writes
that the “LTTE has introduced a different way of conducting the war at
sea”;
427
while according to Sakhuja, the LTTE’s leaders have “tremendous
capacity and vision…” and are “convinced that maritime infrastructure is
crucial and (that they) must…develop a navy…”
428
422 Christine Seib, ‘Lloyd’s flags risks to ships in Sri Lankan and Yemeni waters’,
e Times, 22 May 2006.
423 Chalk, ‘Maritime terrorism in the contemporary era’, p. 35; Matthew penning-
ton and paul haven, ‘Experts: Mohammed arrest slowed al-Qaida’, Washington
Post, 16 March 2007.
424 Cited in Jerrold M. post. e Mind of the Terrorist. New York: palgrave Macmil-
lan, 2007, p. 98.
425 On its air capability see Animesh Roul, ‘Sri Lanka: Rebels with an air force’,
ISN Security Watch, 2 May 2007. On the satellite hijack see Roland Buerk,
‘Tamil Tigers unveil latest tactic’, BBC News, 26 March 2007; John C.K. Daly,
‘LTTE: Technologically innovative rebels’, ISN Security Watch, 5 June 2007.
426 Chalk, ‘Training the Tigers’, p. 28.
427 Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, p. 238.
428 B. Raman, ‘e Omens from Katunayake’, South Asia Analysis Group Paper
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maritime terrorists
State support. State support for insurgencies with a significant maritime
dimension has taken several forms. According to Kamarulnizam Abdullah,
for example, a regional security expert at the National university of Malay-
sia, the “Sabah government under Tun Mustapha harun (who was chief
minister from 1967 to 1975) supported the MNLF. he provided logistical
support. e federal government knew but kept silent.”
429
Similarly the LTTE benefited from Indian support. Although the group
had established some training camps in Tamil Nadu in 1982, official In-
dian support did not begin until 1983 and was terminated in 1987. e
rationale for the Indian support was that Sri Lanka had moved away from
non-aligned status and become too close to the West, and also to pakistan
and China with which India had fought border wars since independence.
is support, which was channelled through the Research and Analysis
Wing (RAW), enabled the LTTE to build an extensive network of base
camps and to establish a supply route across the palk Strait. According
to Gunaratna some 20,000 LTTE operatives passed through these camps
up to mid-1987 when the Indo-Lanka accord signed in July brought this
central government support to a close and the group into conflict with the
Indian peace Keeping Force (IpKF). Wijesekera reports that there were 35
bases where training was carried out by retired Indian army officers. None-
theless, until the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, the central govern-
ment’s position was ignored by the Tamil Nadu’s state government under
its Chief Ministers M.G. Ramachandran and then Muthuvel Karunanidhi
(who was dismissed in 1991), which allowed the LTTE to continue much
of its activity.
430
As mentioned earlier, Burma allowed the Tamil Tigers to
use islands off its coast between 1987 and 1995, possibly in exchange for
payment or because of a common interest in drug smuggling.
431
Yugoslavia
apparently trained ETA and palestinian swimmers.
no. 285, 26 July 2001; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime
infrastructure’’, p. 12.
429 Suh and Lopez, ‘Getting tough’.
430 Gunaratna, ‘International and regional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil
insurgency’; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infra-
structure’’, pp. 1-2; Wijesekera, ‘e Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE):
e Asian Mafia’, pp. 312 & 315; peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri
Lanka: transnational impulses’, p. 106.
431 Gunaratna, ‘International and regional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil
insurgency’; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infra-
structure’’, p. 2; Davis, ‘Tiger International’.
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
State support can, however, do more than compensate for weakness or
gaps in capability; it can provide operatives with the skill and experience
needed to identify unrecognised opportunities and the resources to enable
groups to undertake larger operations than they would be able to do on
their own. e resistance mounted by the Nicaraguan “contras” might or
might not have been successful overall without uS assistance but it is ques-
tionable, if this support had not been available, whether any of the con-
stituent groups would have been able to mount maritime operations. ey
certainly depended on that support to mine Nicaragua’s most important
ports. While the mines were actually laid by Central American commandos
(possibly from El Salvador), Americans employed by the CIA supervised
the operation from a ship located outside Nicaragua’s territorial waters.
432
e creation of the palestinian “navy” was announced at a pan-Arab
summit in 1967. From then on it received substantial support from a range
of sources including the Soviet union, countries in Eastern Europe and
Arab states. Although the palestinians had talented maritime commanders
of whom Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) was possibly the most prominent, to
what extent their maritime operations would have been successful without
that extensive and continuing support is unclear. As it was, palestinian
naval operations pushed Israel hard until it invaded Lebanon in 1982 and
closed down the palestinians’ bases south of Beirut. Such support contin-
ues. In the case of hizbollah it entails today, as is now known, the provi-
sion of sophisticated anti-ship missiles and, quite possibly, the technicians
needed to maintain and fire them.
e promise of reward. Terrorists, like pirates, would not put to sea without
the promise of reward. As Louise Richardson points out, terrorist move-
ments have two types of goal: long term goals that can only be realised
through political change and short term goals such as wreaking revenge,
causing disorder, forcing concessions or reinforcing internal cohesion.
433
e maritime contribution to achieving long term goals will always be one
of supporting the campaign on land or linking various campaigns in differ-
ent theatres; revolutions, like wars, are not won at sea.
434
e focus, there-
432 Menefee, TMV, p. 97. According to Greentree, ‘Irregular maritime strategy’,
uS Navy SEALS were also involved directly.
433 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, pp. 75-80.
434 e relationship between maritime strategy and terrorist ‘strategy’ is tenuous at
best. Nonetheless, Julian Corbett’s famous observation, that however profound
the influence of the maritime dimension might be all conflicts (‘except in the
rarest cases’) have been decided on land, loses none of its force even when one