Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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347
maritime terrorists
which he describes as “the hub of all power and movement, on which eve-
rything depends”. his advice is that this is “the point against which all…
energies should be directed”.
348
As Gray points out, this concept “retains
its utility even if one rejects Clausewitz’s preference for applying strength
against strength” and therefore, as uS Assistant Secretary of Defence for
Special Operations Michael Vickers argued, “if we can deter the support
network…then we can start achieving a deterrent effect on the whole ter-
rorist network” and constrain their ability to operate.
349
e 9/11 attacks caused such consternation that many previous assump-
tions about terrorist motivations, tactics and capabilities were challenged.
One of the areas that came under the microscope was ship ownership. is
is a tangled subject. Many owners are concerned to hide their beneficial
interest in a ship in order to avoid their regulatory or tax obligations. e
use of bearer shares, nominee shareholders and various business interme-
diaries such as agents or lawyers is the method most commonly used to
disguise who ownes what.
350
During the period when these concerns were
being raised and investigated, reports began to appear in the press of an “Al
Qaeda navy”.
351
e Al Qaeda “navy”. From the end of 2001 through to 2004 there were
several press reports, all of them apparently well informed, about the exist-
ence of what came to be called an “Al Qaeda navy”.
352
Although the con-
cern grew in the post-9/11 climate it appeared to be based on earlier reports
that bin Laden operated a very small number of ships when he was based in
the Sudan, which were disposed of some time before 2001—that is, before
348 Carl von Clausewitz. (ed. and tr. Michael howard and peter paret). On War.
princeton: princeton up, 1976, pp. 595-6.
349 Colin S. Gray. Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford up, 1999, p. 96. For Michael
Vickers comment see Eric Schmitt and om Shanker, ‘uS adapts Cold-War
idea to fight terrorists’, New York Times, 18 March 2008.
350 For a useful description of these evasive practices see herbert-Burns, ‘Terror-
ism in the early 21st century maritime domain’, pp. 158-61; also Felstead and
Odell, ‘Agencies fear extent of al-Qaeda’s sea network’.
351 For example, Felstead and Odell, ‘Agencies fear extent of al-Qaeda’s sea network’;
Martin Bright, et al., ‘hunt for 20 terror ships’, e Observer, 23 Dec. 2001, and
Mintz, ‘15 freighters believed to be linked to Al Qaeda’; ‘Al-Qaeda’s ‘Navy’–how
Much of a reat?’ Centre for Defence Information, 20 Aug. 2003.
352 John Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, Adelphi paper 352, Oxford:
Oup for the IISS, 2002, p. 88; David Osler, ‘Nato unmasks al-Qa’eda fleet’,
Lloyd’s List, 29 Nov. 2001.
348
small boats, weak states, dirty money
the later speculation arose.
353
Opinion in the intelligence community ap-
pears to be divided over whether bin Laden controlled any ships directly.
354
Officials talked of up to 15 ships, although some estimates talked of 30
and even 50 ships, engaged mostly in legitimate trade. ey were reputed
to have acted as transports but the principal fear was that they could be
used to attack ports or shipping.
355
A Syrian businessman named Marmoun
Daranzali reportedly bought the first ship, the Jennifer, on Al Qaeda’s be-
half in 1993 or 1994.
356
e continuing reports and rumours appeared to
be given some substance in 2002 when Tonga announced it would close
its international ship register at the request of the uS authorities who had
noticed a significant correlation between Tongan-flagged vessels and those
involved in people and arms smuggling. In particular, they were interested
in the operations of a company called Nova, registered in Delaware, which
appeared to have links with Al Qaeda.
357
In February 2002 eight paki-
stanis jumped off the Twillinger, one of the company’s ships in Trieste;
they claimed to be crew members but their papers were false.
358
A similar
incident happened in Casablanca in August 2002, this time involving 15
353 Michael Scheuer suggests that during the period when bin Laden was based in
the Sudan (1991-96) he established what Scheuer describes as a ‘naval bridge’
between Sudan and Yemen to supply hasan al-Turabi’s Islamist regime in Khar-
toum with guns and fighters in one direction and to infiltrate Al Qaeda fighters
into Saudi Arabia via Yemen in the other: Michael Scheuer, ‘Yemen’s role in
al-Qaeda’s strategy’, e Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Focus, vol. V, Issue 5,
5 Feb. 2008.
354 Confidential information, Sept. and Oct. 2006; ‘Dispute over al-Qaida’s ‘ter-
rorist navy’’, WorldNetDaily, 19 Feb. 2004.
355 probably the most influential article was Mintz.
‘15 freighters believed to be
linked to Al Qaeda’. Also see paul harris and Martin Bright. ‘how the armada
of terror menaces Britain’, e Observer, 23 Dec. 2001. On the higher estimate
see Newman, ‘Terrorists feared to be planning sub-surface naval attacks’; ‘Al-
Qaeda’s ‘Navy’–how much of a threat?’ and Daly, ‘Al Qaeda and maritime
terrorism (part I)’.
356 ‘Bin Laden bought ship ‘for terror’’, e Times, 17 Oct. 2004; Osler, ‘Nato
unmasks al-Qa’eda fleet’; Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, p. 15.
Another suggestion was that the fleet had been bought from ‘a Greek shipping
agent suspected of having a direct relationship with Osama bin Laden’: ‘What
al-Qaida could do with ‘terror navy’’, WorldNetDaily, 20 Oct. 2003.
357 Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Who steers Al Qaeda’s fleet?’ Institute of peace and Conflict
Studies, Article no. 975, 28 Feb. 2003.
358 ‘Al-Qaeda’s ‘navy’–how much of a threat?’; Mintz,
‘15 freighters believed to be
linked to Al Qaeda’.
349
maritime terrorists
pakistanis and a ship named the Sara.
359
e Tongan flag had also proved
useful to other terrorists and their associates. e Karine A, which was in-
tercepted off the Sinai coast in January 2002 carrying Iranian arms destined
for palestinian terrorists, was also registered in Tonga.
360
Later, in Novem-
ber 2002, uS intelligence sources told reporters that, following his capture,
al-Nashiri had revealed the identities of 15 small- to medium-sized cargo
vessels that had been operating under various flags of convenience, and that
more might be identified in the future.
361
Despite all this detail the story is
now largely discounted; maritime expert Charles Dragonette is convinced
the reports had “little foundation in reality”.
362
In all probability it was a
misconception based on concerns over the ownership of ships by “front”
companies.
363
Nonetheless, there is no disputing that Al Qaeda and its affil-
iates have ready access to shipping through associates, sympathisers and the
charter market (as does any adequately funded terrorist organisation).
364
LTTE maritime support operations. e LTTE, on the other hand, unques-
tionably do have their own fleet known, informally and rather quaintly,
as the “Sea pigeons”, which while often crewed by Sea Tigers is managed
and controlled separately.
365
As mentioned the group had, from its incep-
tion, a need to move men and supplies across the strait dividing Sri Lanka
359 Mintz, ‘15 freighters believed to be linked to Al Qaeda’.
360 See Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade, pp. 95-6; ‘e ships that died
of shame’, Sydney Morning Herald, 14 Jan. 2003 and ‘New al-Qaeda threat:
15-ship mystery navy’, WorldNetDaily, 29 Sept. 2003. Also ‘What al-Qaeda
could do with ‘terror navy’’ for a discussion on the possible links between the
organiser of the Karine A operation and Al Qaeda. Sakhuja claims the Karine-A
and the Twillinger were sister ships: Sakhuja, ‘Who steers Al Qaeda’s fleet?’ On
the continuing interest this fleet provokes, and the links between terrorism and
drug smuggling, see philip Sherwell, ‘e Royal Navy closes one of al-Qaeda’s
last escape routes’, Sunday Telegraph, 21 March 2004.
361 ‘e ships that died of shame’; Julian Borger and Brian Whitaker, ‘uS watching
al-Qaida’s fleet’, e Guardian, 1 Jan. 2003.
362 Dragonette, ‘Lost at Sea’, p. 175 and Catherine Meldrum, ‘Murky waters–Fi-
nancing maritime terrorism and crime’, Jane’s IR, 1 June 2007.
363 Osler, ‘Nato unmasks al-Qa’eda fleet’; ‘Terrorism probe extends to shipping’,
American Maritime Officer, Oct. 2001.
364 private interviews, April and Sept. 2005. Its use of the sea continues: in Dec.
2003, for example, the uS Navy intercepted three Al Qaeda-linked boats in
the persian Gulf with two tons of hashish on board; other seizures followed: A.
Brownfeld, ‘Al-Qaeda’s drug-running network’, Jane’s TSM, 1 Feb. 2004.
365 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements, p. 119; Sa-
khuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’, p. 3 on
the separate command and control arrangements.
350
small boats, weak states, dirty money
from its base areas in India.
366
It was India’s foreign intelligence service,
the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), that enabled the LTTE to build
its maritime capability by training LTTE operatives at Vishakapatnam in
Andhra pradesh and facilitating the construction of the group’s first deep-
water boats.
367
In 1987 the Indian government withdrew its support for
the insurgency. e southern part of the subcontinent was being forced to
absorb increasing numbers of refugees and the crisis was fuelling separatist
tendencies there as well.
368
Without Indian support the group had to look
for alternative sources of finance and supplies. Angered by what it saw as
Indian betrayal, it assassinated Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, a blunder that only
made its position worse. Its base areas in Tamil Nadu were closed, forcing it
to move all its facilities to Sri Lanka.
369
Nonetheless, the area which houses
approximately 65,000 Tamil refugees spread across 113 camps continued to
be an important area for LTTE support and procurement operations.
370
e
366 Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, pp. 71-2. For further details on the
LTTE fleet including how it was started in the mid-1980s, ship numbers and
how they are employed see Rohan Gunaratna, ‘International and regional im-
plications of the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgency’, Tamilnation.org, 2 Dec. 1998;
Davis, ‘Tiger International’; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial
maritime infrastructure’’, and Chalk, ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s inter-
national organisation and operations–A preliminary analysis’, pp. 2 & 7-9.
367 Gunaratna, ‘e threat to the maritime domain: how real is the terrorist
threat?’, p. 83; Edward Cody, ‘Roots of Gandhi slaying lie in India’s role in Sri
Lanka’, e Washington Post, 30 May 1991.
368 Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements, p. 118; Rohan
Gunaratna, ‘International and regional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil
insurgency’, Tamilnation.org, 2 Dec. 1998.
369 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 2;
Rohan Gunaratna, ‘e transformation of terror?’ Asia Times Online, 25 Sept.
2002. ere are indications that the links were not severed entirely or have been
revived subsequently: ‘LTTE may get arms from S Indian hideouts–Report’,
Rediff.com, 24 Sept. 2007; ‘LTTE has arms stores in India: Report’, Zee News,
12 Oct. 2007. Also Robert Karniol, ‘Tamil Tigers’ hangout: S-E Asia’, e Straits
Times, 22 Oct. 2007. In 2008, in an attempt to restrict supply movements and
to prevent LTTE cadres from fleeing to Tamil Nadu, the SLN laid sea mines
along the sea border with India, provoking protests from Indian fishermen who
have traditionally fished in Sri Lankan waters: ‘Sri Lankan Navy plants mines
along maritime border with India’, e Times of India, 23 Jan. 2008; K. praveen
Kumar, ‘Lanka mines sea borders to block Tamil Tigers’, Newindpress, 23 Jan.
2008; Jaya Menon, ‘Fishermen up in arms against Lankan Navy’s move to lay
sea mines’, Indian Express, 25 Jan. 2008.
370 Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger’.
351
maritime terrorists
group also appeared to have moved some of its support and boat building
operations to India’s Kerala coast in an attempt to avoid surveillance.
371
e group’s most pressing requirement was for arms. Although it quick-
ly established an indigenous armaments industry that was capable of manu-
facturing weapons of remarkable sophistication, it still needed to buy many
of the weapons and explosives it needed, plus other supplies. Without In-
dian support these needed to be paid for. e group began to raise money
from two sources: donations from the large Tamil diaspora community,
and crime.
372
e supplies could only be delivered to Sri Lanka by sea.
e group’s development of an ocean-going maritime capability was not
a response born out of panic. On the contrary, the LTTE maritime ship-
ping network was established well before Indian support was withdrawn. It
turned from chartering vessels to owning its own in 1984 after purchasing
its first freighter, the MV Cholan, from a Bombay businessman.
373
At about
the same time it placed its first construction order for a second freighter,
the Kadalpura, and established a connection with the military regime in
Burma.
374
Although its first choice for an operating base was apparently
Singapore, the LTTE’s connection with the Burmese regime meant that
from 1987 it was allowed to use bases on several small islands off the Bur-
mese coast, the most important of which was Twante.
375
ese bases were
eventually closed in 1995 following intense diplomatic pressure by the
Sri Lankan government.
376
e Tigers then switched their operations to
371 ‘LTTE spreading its wings in Kerala?’ e Times of India, 6 March 2008.
372 Rabasa, et al., Beyond al-Qaeda: Part 2, 2006, pp. 108-9.
373 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 2;
Gunaratna, ‘International and regional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil in-
surgency’; Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, p. 245; peiris,
‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: transnational impulses’, p. 98;
‘LTTE linchpin Kp free’.
374 ‘Kadalpura’ translates as ‘sea pigeons’. It was captured by the SLN in 1987.
Gunaratna, ‘International and regional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil
insurgency’; Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, p. 245; Sa-
khuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 2.
375 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 2;
Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements, pp.
121-2, note 14; Davis, ‘Tiger International’; Gunaratna, ‘International and re-
gional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgency’; Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime
aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, p. 245. On Singapore see V. Jayanth. ‘LTTE’s
flourishing shipping network’. e Hindu, 29 March 2000; Davis, ‘Tamil tiger
international’..
376 According to peiris, LTTE ships continued to use Burmese ports even after
352
small boats, weak states, dirty money
phuket in ailand, and a number of offshore islands, whence they oper-
ated for much of the 1990s.
377
e LTTE has bought arms around the world and transported them to
Sri Lanka, in most cases in its own ships, as the Swene and Stillus Limassol
cases mentioned earlier demonstrate. Weapons became widely available in
Southeast Asia in the 1980s and into the 1990s as a consequence of the war
between Vietnam and the Khmers Rouges. While the war was being fought
ai Army sources estimate that between 20 and 30 per cent of all Chinese
arms intended for the conflict were taken and sold by corrupt members
of the ai military. As the fighting wound down even larger volumes of
weapons became available. Many were sold initially to Burmese groups
but by the early 1990s several new purchasers had emerged, of which the
largest and best organised was the LTTE. ey recruited members of the
Tamil diaspora and opened front companies in phuket and Trang province
on the Andaman Sea and in Bangkok. By 1995 its network had spread to
phnom penh and then to Saigon, Sihanoukville and Cheng Mai. As well as
buying arms the network moved people and traded documents. Movement
by sea has been crucial to the arms trade; according to the ai military,
by the end of the 1990s 80 per cent of the arms leaving Cambodia left by
ship. Arms destined for the LTTE appear to have been moved from Siha-
noukville across the Gulf of ailand to the long established smuggling
centre of Rayong on ailand’s eastern coast and then to Ranong on the
Andaman Sea.
378
Some arms flowed north to feed the northeast Indian in-
surgent groups via the Bangladeshi ports of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazaar.
Some of the consignments were moved by the Arakanese smugglers who
developed out of the insurgent Arakan Liberation party (ALp), but others
have been moved by the LTTE for themselves and for others.
379
Twente and its other bases were closed: peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in
Sri Lanka: transnational impulses’, p. 107.
377 Davis, ‘Tracking Tigers in phuket’; Gunaratna, ‘e transformation of terror?’;
Jayanth. ‘LTTE’s flourishing shipping network’; peiris, ‘Secessionist war and
terrorism in Sri Lanka: transnational impulses’, p. 107; Bertil Lintner, ‘Arms
Trade: e phuket Connection’, e Week, 30 April 2000.
378 Other ports reported to be used were Krabi, Sattoship, haadyal and Songahla:
‘LTTE bides time to win Eelam’.
379 Bertil Lintner, ‘LTTE purchases: A link with Cambodia’, Jane’s IR, Dec. 1996,
p. 9; Anthony Davis, ‘Tamil Tiger International’, Jane’s IR, vol. 8, no. 10, 1 Oct.
1996; Anthony Davis, ‘ailand cracks down on illicit arms trade’, Jane’s IR, 1
Dec. 2003, p. 34; also Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime
infrastructure’’, p. 6; ‘‘Floating market’ in illicit weapons arms terrorists’, Jane’s
353
maritime terrorists
Various suggestions have been made as to how many ocean-going cargo
ships the group has operated at any one time. e numbers appear to fluc-
tuate between nine and 15, although a figure of 11 is mentioned most fre-
quently.
380
In truth, no one outside the organisation probably knows how
many ships are involved, although in 2007 the SLN claimed that the LTTE
had owned ten ships of which it had destroyed nine.
381
e owned fleet is
probably supplemented by chartered vessels, which operate not merely in
the Indian Ocean but also in the Mediterranean and the pacific.
382
When supplying the LTTE units in Sri Lanka, the ships transfer their
loads to high-speed logistics craft about 120 miles off the northeast coast.
For most of the period of the conflict the SLN was reluctant to attack the
ships directly in international waters for fear of sparking an international
incident if it acted on incorrect information.
383
Despite this the group suf-
fered a number of significant losses amongst the ocean-going fleet; the loss
of one, the MV Yahata, transformed into the MV Ahat by the simple ex-
pedient of painting out the first and last letters in 1993, revealed that the
group wires its ships with explosives to prevent whatever they are carrying
from falling into Sri Lankan hands. In this case the senior LTTE com-
mander, Krishnakumar Sathasivam, better known as “Kittu”, who was on
board ordered the captain and his civilian crew to jump over the side before
blowing up the ship along with himself and the other LTTE personnel on
TSM, 17 May 2006; and Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger’. e author
of the blog ‘LTTE linchpin Kp free’ alleges a close relationship between senior
ai army officers and the LTTE procurement wing. Because the author is
anonymous this information needs to be treated with circumspection,
380 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, pp.
3-4; Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements,
p. 119. For a useful summary of known LTTE ships up until 2002, including
registrations, see Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Asia pacific: Organised crime and inter-
national terrorist networks’ in A.p.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni, e Global reat of
Terror: Ideological, Material and Political Linkages, New Delhi: Bulwark Books
for e Institute of Conflict Management, 2002, p. 260.
381 ‘Sri Lankan Navy completely destroy three LTTE ships and demolish their
arms shipment capabilities’, Sri Lankan Navy Security News, 11 Sept. 2007; B.
Muralidhar Reddy, ‘ree LTTE ships destroyed: Navy’, e Hindu, 12 Sept.
2007.
382 Sakhuja, ‘e Dynamics of LTTE’s Commercial Maritime Infrastructure’, p.
2; p.K. Ghosh, ‘Maritime Security Challenges in South Asia and the Indian
Ocean: Response Strategies’, paper prepared for the CSIS American-pacific
Sealanes Security Institute Conference on Maritime Security in Asia held in
honolulu, hawaii, 18-20 Jan. 2004, p. 6. Also ‘LTTE linchpin Kp free’.
383 Murphy, ‘Maritime reat: Tactics and Technology of the Sea Tigers’, p. 6.
354
small boats, weak states, dirty money
board.
384
Malaysia seized the MV Sun Bird in 1990, India interdicted or
impounded three ships between 1991 and 1999, and in February 1996
the Sri Lankan Air force sank the MV Horizon and the MV Comex Jules.
385
Since 2000 the SLN has shown itself more prepared to intercept LTTE
ships in international waters. In 2003 two oilers, the MV Shoskin and the
MV Koimar, were both engaged over 200 miles (370 km) off Sri Lanka’s
eastern seaboard.
386
In 2007 the SLN intercepted the MV Kyoi 200 nauti-
cal miles off Dondra head in February and the MV Seiyoo at roughly the
same range but further to the east in March. It sank three more vessels over
600 nautical miles (1,100 km) southeast of the island in September and the
3,000 ton MV Matsushima 920 nautical miles (1,700 km) south of Dondra
head on 7 October.
387
It appears that these successes might have been the
result of foreign intelligence support.
388
Reports emanating from Sri Lanka
384 Davis, ‘Tamil Tiger International’; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commer-
cial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 3; Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan
conflict’, p. 243; B. Raman, ‘Action Against LTTE’s Maritime Terrorism - In-
ternational Terrorism Monitor: paper no. 58’, South Asia Analysis Group Paper
no. 1802, 18 May 2006. For further details of LTTE loses see ibid., pp. 3-5.
Also peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: transnational impuls-
es’, p. 112 and Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency
Movements, p. 120, note 7.
385 Davis, ‘Tamil Tiger International’; Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from
maritime terrorism’, p. 29.
386 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 4.
387 For the details see Sri Lanka Navy, ‘Destruction of ‘Matsushima’’, 7 Oct. 2007
and Asif Fuard. ‘Is the tide turning against the LTTE?’ e Sunday Times (Co-
lombo), 14 Oct. 2007. e ships sunk in Sept. were named as the Koshia,
the Seishin and the Manyoshi. See also ‘Sri Lankan Navy completely destroy
three LTTE ships and demolish their arms shipment capabilities’; Reddy, ‘ree
LTTE ships destroyed: Navy’. It certainly appears to be the case that at the
very least the ships destroyed in Sept. and Oct. were located as the result of an
intelligence-driven operation. For a broad-brush account of the background
from an SLN perspective see Jalaldeen, ‘Navy’s pivotal role in battle against ter-
rorism’ and Ravin Edirisinghe, ‘SL navy’s role in eradicating international mari-
time terrorism: Year 2007 and challenges ahead’, Asian Tribune, 10 Jan. 2008.
Whether this intelligence was related to the reported (but unconfirmed) ar-
rest of the LTTE’s principal arms procurement agent, Kumaran pathmanathan
(‘Kp’) is unclear: B. Muralidhar Reddy, ‘Top LTTE man held in Bangkok’, e
Hindu, 12 Sept. 2007. For doubts about the arrest see Karniol, ‘Tamil Tigers’
hangout: S-E Asia’. For background on Kp see ‘Who is Kp?’, Lanka Guardian,
10 Sept. 2007. e blog ‘LTTE linchpin Kp free’ alleges that Kp was arrested
but subsequently freed in late 2007 on the orders of senior ai army officers
after payment of a million dollar bribe.
388 ‘Tigers suffer setbacks’; p.S Suryanarayana. ‘India’s naval surveillance a big help
355
maritime terrorists
suggest that the LTTE supply fleet, or at least that part of it that was at-
tacked successfully by the SLN, used Indonesia as its “home base”. Goods
were brought out from Indonesian ports and transferred to ships that were
described as “floating warehouses” in international waters. ese ships then
loitered just west of Java before moving closer to the Sri Lankan coast when
needed.
389
e general assumption is that the LTTE will recover from this
setback by first resorting to more indigenous supply sources on Sri Lanka
or in the Tamil areas of southern India and, secondly, perhaps by initiating
more effective deception measures and positioning its ships further out to
sea in future, beyond the range of land-based aerial surveillance.
Not all the ocean going vessels carry Tamil Tiger supplies exclusively.
On the contrary they probably transport legitimate cargo at least 95 per
cent of the time, earning the group additional income.
390
When they are
carrying supplies for the Tigers these will be hidden amongst innocent
goods. ey have shown, in other words, how an insurgent group with a
maritime capability can use it, in parallel with insurgent activity, to gener-
ate funds perfectly legally.
ey have also shown, however, that the same ships can also be used to
move criminal cargoes. In the case of the Tigers this usually means smug-
gling arms, illegal migrants and drugs, either on their own account or
for criminal gangs.
391
According to a report prepared for the uS Federal
Research Service in 2003, the LTTE use narcotics to fund their opera-
to Sri Lanka’. e Hindu, 4 June 2008.
389 ‘Sri Lankan Tamil Tiger ships used Indonesia as ‘home base’–sources’, e Island
(Colombo), 21 Oct. 2007. Also Bharatha Mallawarachi, ‘Sri Lankan military
investigates Indonesian ship on suspected involvement with Tamil rebels’, AP,
26 Dec. 2007. For the report on ‘floating warehouses’ see ‘Countering LTTE:
India admits helping Lanka’, NDTV.com, 16 Jan. 2008 and ‘Global concern
over maritime security cripples LTTE’, News Post India, 21 Jan. 2008.
390 Daniel Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements, p. 120;
Gunaratna, ‘International and regional implications of the Sri Lankan Tamil in-
surgency’; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastruc-
ture’’, p. 3; peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: transnational
impulses’, p. 98; ‘Ap IMpACT: An investigation into fundraising and weapons
smuggling by Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers’; Solomon and Tan report that ‘much
hearsay exists about the LTTE’s telecommunications and shipping ventures in
Southeast Asia, but there is no definite proof’: Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the
Tiger’.
391 Chalk, ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam’s international organisation and op-
erations–A preliminary analysis’, pp. 5-6; Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri
Lankan conflict’, p. 239. Also Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from mari-
time terrorism’, p. 29.
356
small boats, weak states, dirty money
tions.
392
e president of Canada’s Mackenzie Institute, John ompson,
has argued that following their formation in the 1970s the LTTE financed
themselves through extortion rackets but that this changed following the
1979 Iranian Revolution and the subsequent Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, which disrupted the established opium and heroin smuggling routes
through south-central Asia. e LTTE’s familiarity with smuggling, a
product of their origins in long-established Tamil smuggling communities,
meant that they were in a position to offer an alternative.
393
Sri Lanka’s
strategic location meant that it could serve as a transhipment point between
the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent and Europe,
394
a position
which in turn might have stimulated the LTTE to form a relationship
with the Burmese regime.
395
On at least two occasions, in 1999 and 2000,
vessels sailing between Sri Lanka and India and vice versa were seized with
drugs on board.
396
Tamil networks in Europe and Canada have been in-
volved directly in drug distribution and human trafficking.
397
In pakistan
392 LaVerle Berry, et al., ‘Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism’,
report prepared for the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Wash-
ington, DC, Oct. 2003, p. 105. See also Frank Cilluffo, ‘e threat posed from
convergence of organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism’, testimony be-
fore the uS house Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, CSIS
on the Hill, 13 Dec. 2000, and Daja Wijesekera, ‘e Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE): e Asian mafia’, Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement,
vol. 2, no. 2, Autumn 1993, pp. 312 & 316-17. Wijesekera also suggests (p.
311) that the LTTE worked with the Medellin cartel in the 1980s, but in the
absence of further evidence this seems far-fetched.
393 John ompson, ‘Terrorism and transnational crime: e case of the LTTE’,
paper for the Centre for Conflict Studies, Fall Seminar, 3-4 Oct. 2003.
394 Berry, et al., ‘Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism’, p. 105;
Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger’.
395 Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’’, p. 3,
5, 6 & 11; Davis, ‘Tiger International’; peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism
in Sri Lanka: transnational impulses’, p. 98-9.
396 Berry, et al., ‘Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism’, pp. 106-7;
‘e heroin trail through India’, Indian Express, 3 Nov. 1999.
397 Berry, et al., ‘Nations hospitable to organized crime and terrorism’, p. 105;
John ompson, ‘Terrorism and transnational crime: e Case of the LTTE’;
peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka: transnational impulses’, pp.
90-3; Lakshman hulugalle, ‘LTTE and drug smuggling’, LankaLibrary Forum,
8 Nov. 2006; hulugalle is head of the Sri Lankan military’s Media Centre for
National Security and therefore his account should be treated with appropriate
care. peter Chalk makes the point that definitive proof is lacking in Canada
despite two intensive police investigations: Rabasa, et al., Beyond al-Qaeda: Part
2, p. 105. Also Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger’.