Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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maritime terrorists
freighter, the Stillus Limassol, which because it was never seen again sug-
gests it was probably one from the LTTE’s own fleet.
197
e LTTE’s cease-fire with the Sri Lankan government, negotiated
in 2002, crumbled in 2006.
198
e ferocity of the group’s attacks on Sri
Lankan naval units and facilities in 2006 demonstrated the continuing im-
portance it attached to maintaining its ability to operate freely at sea and
preventing the Sri Lankan forces from doing the same.
199
however, the
SLN had greater success in disrupting or neutralising Sea Tiger operations.
Furthermore the fact that some of these operations were disrupted before
they were launched raised questions about the LTTE’s operational security
and, possibly, their continuing tactical competence.
200
In May 2006 the
Sea Tigers used 15 boats to attack a single Sri Lankan troop ship, the Pearl
Cruise II, carrying over 700 Sri Lankan soldiers to the crucial Jaffna sector.
Seventeen Sri Lankan sailors and an estimated 50 Tamil Tigers were killed
in what e Times described as one of the “bloodiest naval engagements in
modern times”. Although a Sea Tiger suicide craft apparently hit the troop
ship it did not sink and after a two and a half hour battle the Sea Tigers
were forced to withdraw. e SLN reportedly lost one Dvora patrol boat in
the encounter.
201
In June the Sea Tigers used 20 boats to attack SLN patrol
craft in a lagoon 100 miles (160km) north of Colombo. ey approached
197 Sakhuja, ‘Sea piracy in South Asia’.
198
‘Sri Lanka’s Tigers on the loose’, e Economist Global Agenda, 28 Dec. 2005;
peter Foster, ‘Revenge attacks on Tigers as army chief is hurt in blast’, Daily
Telegraph, 26 April 2006; Rahul Bedi, ‘Refugees facing bleak future as Tigers hit
back’, Sunday Telegraph, 1 May 2006; Rahul Bedi, ‘Sri Lanka falls into spiral of
death’, Daily Telegraph, 3 Aug. 2006; Rüdiger Falksohn and padma Rao, ‘Old
animosities, new pain: Civil war returns to Sri Lanka’, Spiegel Online, 23 Aug.
2006.
199 e attack on a ‘Jetliner’ ferry carrying over 800 Sri Lankan soldiers in Aug.
2006 is an example of the Sea Tigers’ attempt to prevent the Sri Lankan forces
moving freely. See ‘Sri Lankan Navy repulses LTTE attempt to destroy troop
carrier, heavy fighting continues in East’, Colombo Page, 1 Aug. 2006.
200 R. hariharan, ‘Sri Lanka 2006: LTTE’s unbalanced score card’, Asian Tribune,
12 Jan. 2007; B Raman. LTTE: Diminishing Options and Assets – Interna-
tional Terrorism Monitor – paper No. 354’. South Asia Analysis Group Paper
No. 2557, 18 January 2008.
201 Richard Beeston, ‘Tamil Tigers sink peace hopes with suicide raid at sea’, e
Times, 13 May 2006; peter Foster, ‘Tamil Tiger naval raid brings war closer to
Sri Lanka’, Daily Telegraph, 12 May 2006; ‘Air strikes on Sri Lanka rebels after
sea battle leaves 45 dead’, Channel NewsAsia.com, 11 May 2006. For a Tamil
report of the attack see D.B.S. Jeyaraj, ‘e marine battle over ‘MV pearl Cruise
II’: An overview’, Tamil week, 14 May 2006.
318
small boats, weak states, dirty money
their targets by hiding amongst fishing boats.
202
In September the SLN
claimed to have sunk twelve of the 20 Sea Tiger vessels that attacked its
base at Kasnkasanthurai on the Jaffna peninsula.
203
In October the Sea Ti-
gers attacked again, this time targeting the naval base at Dakshina close to
the southern port of Galle. Once again the attack craft hid among fishing
boats in order to get closer to their targets.
204
Fearing attacks on the coun-
try’s main port the Sri Lankan Navy banned all small boats from around
Colombo, allowing trawlers to enter and leave the zone only during the
hours of daylight.
205
A few days later the Sri Lankan Navy intercepted a
15-boat Sea Tiger convoy off the Jaffna peninsula and claimed to have
destroyed two of them in a prolonged engagement.
206
Engagements between the Sea Tigers and the SLN continued in 2007,
and although reports were characterised by the usual claim and counter-
claim from either side as to the losses suffered, it appeared that the Sea Ti-
gers (and the Tigers generally) suffered some serious reverses.
207
Nonethe-
202 peter Foster, ‘17 killed in sea battle as Tamils attack navy’, Daily Telegraph, 29
June 2006.
203 Michael hirst, ‘‘100 Tigers killed’ in sea battle with Sri Lankan navy’, Daily
Telegraph, 3 Sept. 2006.
204 peter Foster, ‘Sri Lankan rebels attack southern port popular with tourists’,
Daily Telegraph, 18 Oct. 2006; Shimali Senanayake, ‘Bombs rock Sri Lankan
port town’, International Herald Tribune, 18 Oct. 2006; ‘Suspected Tamil Tiger
suicide bombers attack Sri Lankan port’, Channel NewsAsia, 18 Oct. 2006;
‘Security stepped up after bombing of Sri Lankan port’, Channel NewsAsia, 19
Oct. 2006; Ranil Wijayapala and Rajmi Manatunga,’Navy foils LTTE suicide
bid on Dakshina base’, Daily News (Colombo), 19 Oct. 2006; Leigh Murray,
‘Sri Lankan Navy destroys 2 rebel boats’, ABC News International, 21 Oct.
2006.
205 ‘Sri Lanka bans small boats totally in Colombo harbour area’, Colombo Page, 24
Oct. 2006.
206 ‘S Lankan navy ‘sinks rebel boats’’, BBC News, 20 Oct. 2006.
207 Simon Gardner, ‘Sri Lankan navy battles rebels at sea, troops ambushed’, Reu-
ters, 18 Nov. 2006; ‘Tamil Tigers sea hQ ‘destroyed’’, BBC News, 4 April 2007;
Tony Birtley, ‘Sri Lanka battles Tigers at sea’, Aljazeera.net, 11 June 2007; Sunil
Jayasiri, ‘LTTE boats destroyed, Sea Tigers killed’, Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka),
21 June 2007. In July 2007 ONI reported that the Sea Tigers’ leader, Colonel
Soosai, was critically injured when a suicide craft in which he was travelling
exploded on 19 June: ONI, WWTTS report, 18 July 2007, paragraph h. 10.
At the end of the month the Sri Lankan air force claimed to have destroyed
the Sea Tigers’ principal training base at Alampil near Mullaittivu: paul Tighe,
‘Sri Lanka says military destroyed Tamil rebel training base’, Bloomberg.com, 30
July 2007; paul Tighe, ‘Sri Lanka destroys rebel flotilla, raids financial center’,
Bloomberg.com, 14 Sept. 2007; paul Tighe, ‘Sri Lanka says leader of Tamil rebel
319
maritime terrorists
less, the Sea Tigers remained capable of offensive activity.
208
In May 2007
a commando raid was launched against the SLN facility on the strategically
important Delft Island at the northern end of the Jaffna peninsula, while
in June the Sri Lankan authorities uncovered a plan to mount seaborne
attacks against Colombo.
209
When the SLN captured a “locally-modified
’giant’ boat” off point pedro in June 2007 it was discovered to be armed
with a Chinese-manufactured 14.5mm twin barrelled cannon and Japa-
nese-manufactured radar and outboard motors that were not usually sold
“without proper permission from a government”.
210
In March 2008, 14
SLN sailors were killed when their Super Dvora craft was hit by what was
described initially as a sea mine but which the Sea Tigers later claimed was
a suicide attack.
211
In May 2008 the SLN supply ship ‘Invincible’ was sunk
sea unit killed’, Bloomberg.com, 3 Oct. 2007; ‘Sri Lanka says 40 rebels killed in
sea battle’, Agence France-Presse, 26 Dec. 2007. By early 2008 it was suggested
that the Sea Tigers might have been affected by the SLN’s interdiction of its
supply vessels as a result of which the Tigers’ naval arm might have been suffer-
ing from a shortage of fuel: ‘Tigers suffer setbacks’, Jane’s TSM, Jan. 2008, pp.
12-13. For background on the policy of the government of president Mahinda
Rajapakse to increase the level of violence see ‘Sri Lanka: Bloody mindsets’,
ISN Security Watch, 24 July 2007. On the ‘information war’ see Roland Buerk,
‘Who is winning Sri Lanka’s War?’, BBC News, 25 May 2007 and ‘Sri Lanka
lashes out at war reporting’. Agence France-Presse, 5 June 2008.
208 Iqbal Athas, ‘Battles highlight Sea Tigers’ capabilities’, Jane’s DW, 4 Oct. 2006;
‘Six Lankan naval personnel killed by LTTE’, e Times of India, 6 Feb. 2008.
More generally see peter Foster, ‘Tamil Tiger suicide squad in audacious strike’,
Daily Telegraph, 24 Oct. 2007.
209 On the significance of the attack see R. hariharan, ‘Sri Lanka: Implications of
the LTTE’s Delft Attack’, India Defence, 14 June 2007. On the attack itself see
‘Tamil rebels launch naval attack’, BBC News, 24 May 2007 and Chen Zhanjie,
‘Sri Lanka’s security situation worsens further’, Xinhua News Agency, 24 May
2007; ‘Sri Lanka navy sinks three LTTE boats, top Tiger commander killed’,
Colombo Page, 28 Sept. 2007. On the planned attack on Colombo see ‘Sri
Lankan rebels planning attack on Colombo port: report’, Agence France-Presse,
14 June 2007.
210 Jayasiri, ‘LTTE boats destroyed, Sea Tigers killed’, and Sunil Jayasiri, ‘LTTE
gets equipment from Japan’, Daily Mirror (Sri Lanka), 26 June 2007. It also
appears to have moved the focus of its maritime operations from the east to the
west coast of India to avoid the close surveillance off Tamil Nadu: ‘LTTE shift-
ing operations to Kerala coast: Top Navy official’, Zee News, 26 Nov. 2007.
211 ‘Tigers sink Sri Lanka Craft, heavy land battles erupt’, Agence France-Presse, 22
March 2008; ‘LTTE attack destroys navy craft: ten missing’, e Sunday Times
(Colombo), 23 March 2008; Ranga Sirilal, ‘Sri Lanka navy, air force strike at
Tiger rebels’, Reuters AlertNet, 25 March 2008. See also the analysis in R.S.
Vasan. ‘Incident Analysis: Sinking of SLN Dvora Craft on 22
nd
March 2008’.
South Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 2652, 28 March 2008.
320
small boats, weak states, dirty money
in Trincomalee harbour probably as the result of an attack by a suicide
diver.
212
In parallel with its assaults at sea the Tigers have repeatedly killed Sri
Lankan navy sailors on land. e series of land mine attacks on buses carry-
ing SLN personnel in December 2005 and January, April and May 2006,
each one of which left around ten dead, culminated when a convoy of buses
carrying sailors on leave was attacked in October by a suicide bomber, leav-
ing 98 dead and another 100 injured.
213
Although some Indian commentators voiced concerns about the Sea Ti-
gers’ ability to affect Indian national security as early as 2004, the interna-
tional impact of the LTTE’s maritime campaign has been muted. For much
of the insurgency India been reluctant to take sides in the struggle, conscious
of its own substantial Tamil minority concentrated in Tamil Nadu state.
214
Sea Tiger activity in 2007, however, appeared to trigger a re-think in Indian
defence circles spurred perhaps by the discovery of an LTTE boat laden with
explosives off the southern Indian coast in February,
215
and the domestic
political reaction to the capture and killing of Indian fishermen by Sea Tiger
cadres in March, even though similar incidents had occurred in the past.
216
212 R S Vasan. ‘Sri Lanka: Sinking of A 520/MV Invincible in Trincomalee’. South
Asia Analysis Group Paper No. 2700, 13 May 2008.
213 ‘Blasts kill 13 Lanka sailors’, BBC News, 23 Dec. 2005; ‘Sailors killed in Sri
Lanka blast’, BBC News, 12 Jan. 2006; ‘Sailors killed in Sri Lanka blast’, BBC
News, 11 April 2006; Frances harrison, ‘Sailors killed in Sri Lanka blast’, BBC
News, 23 May 2006; ‘Sri Lanka attack causes carnage’, BBC News, 16 Oct.
2006; Ranil Wijayapala, ‘Global community condemns LTTE suicide attack
on unarmed sailors’, Daily News, 18 Oct. 2006.
214 Suryanarayan, ‘Sea Tigers–threat to Indian security’ and ‘India must neutralise
‘Sea Tigers’’; ‘India worried by LTTE air, sea power: Narayanan’, Newkerala.
com, 29 May 2007.
215 ‘Deadly weapons, suicide belt seized off Kodiakarai’, e Hindu, 15 Feb. 2007;
Animesh Roul, ‘LTTE infiltration in south India’, e Counterterrorism Blog,
11 March 2007; Raman, ‘Action Against LTTE’s Gun-Running’.
216 ‘Indian fishermen seek safety against SL Navy’, Hindustan Times, 5 March
2007; ‘Tamil Tigers humiliate India by killing Indians; Karunanidhi forced
to act against pro-Tiger Vaiko’, Asia Tribune, 30 April 2007; M.R. Narayan
Swamy, ‘LTTE sympathy to erode over fishermen abductions’, Indo-Asian News
Service (IANS), 20 May 2007. On previous incidents and subsequent calls for
Indian action see, for example, ‘World, South Asia: Tamil fishermen attacked’,
BBC Online Network, 29 Sept. 1998; ‘Jayalalithaa for joint naval exercises to
check LTTE’, e Hindu, 7 Dec. 2003. To put these clashes into perspective,
it is important to note that fishermen from both sides of the palk Strait have
poached in each others’ waters for years, and because the richer fishing grounds
are on the Sri Lankan side this gave the LTTE an opportunity to pose as the
321
maritime terrorists
e result was increased Indian naval activity in the palk Strait and the Bay
of Bengal.
217
e Sea Tigers have shown repeatedly what maritime insurgents can
achieve if they pursue their goals with determination, innovation and, in
their case, suicidal intent. Even as Sri Lanka’s strategic location draws the
renewed attention of external powers, it would be foolish to assume that
the Tigers will not continue to present a potent threat.
218
Furthermore, if one seeks to understand maritime insurgency, then the
LTTE’s Sea Tiger organisation is the group that needs to be studied most
closely. Evidence exists that this is exactly what some other insurgency
groups have done, in some cases directly. For example, one report suggests
that the LTTE were twice part of an Al Qaeda team in the philippines
training the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG), and it is suspected that they may have transferred some of
their technology to the ASG.
219
e Nicaraguan “Contras”. e word “contras” was a collective term for
a number of groups opposed to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua
although there was often no formal connection between them. e united
States, which tried to unify the movement, was their main backer, although
protectors of Sri Lankan fishermen. V. Suryanarayan, ‘Fishing in choppy wa-
ters’, e Hindu, 25 Feb. 2004.
217 Ministry of Defence (Sri Lanka), ‘Tiger air, sea power worries India’, 30 May
2007; ‘Indian navy heightens vigil to check Sri Lanka Tamil Tiger clout’,
Lankaeverything.com, 5 June 2007; e Media Centre for National Security (Sri
Lanka), ‘Indian Navy boosts its presence in the Bay of Bengal to curb LTTE’,
7 June 2007; ‘Indian Navy tightens surveillance along Tamil Nadu-Sri Lankan
coast line’, Indian Defence, 14 June 2007 and ‘India’s support helped weaken
LTTE: Sri Lanka’, Rediff.com, 15 Jan. 2008.
218 ‘Sri Lanka: Exercises with uS send a message to China’, STRATFOR Global
Intelligence Brief, 19 Oct. 2006; Rahul Bedi, ‘uS Marines to train Sri Lankan
navy’, India e News.com, 25 Oct. 2006. is exercise was subsequently deferred.
‘Sri Lanka: 20 rebels killed in sea battle’, Rediff News, 20 Oct. 2006. As the
Associated press commented: ‘Sri Lanka’s resources are limited, as is the inter-
est of the West’. While LTTE operatives will be arrested if they are discovered
breaking the law in Western countries, it is likely that the LTTE will escape
serious investigation because Al Qaeda and its affiliates will remain the focus of
attention for some time: ‘Ap IMpACT: An investigation into fundraising and
weapons smuggling by Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers’.
219 Confidential interview, June 2004. Graham Gerard Ong. ‘Next wave of ter-
ror targets: Will they be at sea?’ e Straits Times, 15 Sept. 2003, suggests the
LTTE might have trained al-Gamaya al-Islamiya and Egyptian Islamic Jihad
(the groups led by al-Zawahiri which merged with Al Qaeda).
322
small boats, weak states, dirty money
not the only one. Starting in 1983 these groups, responding to uS pressure
and acting in many instances under uS guidance, launched a maritime
campaign directed at the Nicaraguan economy. ports on both the Carib-
bean and pacific coasts were attacked; oil supplies and oil infrastructure in
particular were struck in a series of coordinated commando and air raids.
One of the groups, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), announced
in October 1983 that the waters of puerto Sandino had been mined, al-
though it is questionable whether any mines were actually laid. In 1984
the various groups increased pressure on the Nicaraguan government by
mining all of the country’s ports, ostensibly to prevent the arrivals of arms
shipments from Cuba and the Soviet union. is time mines were de-
ployed. A number of ships were hit, including a Soviet and a Liberian
tanker, a Japanese cargo ship and fishing vessels. Mining was supplement-
ed by machine gun attacks mounted from high-speed boats supported by
helicopters. ese attacks forced various ships to divert away from Nicara-
guan ports just at the time when the country’s primary agricultural exports
needed to be shipped overseas. As Menefee comments: “Similar in nature
to Russian activity during the Korean War and to the mining of the Red
Sea…the Contra mining campaign and related harbour attacks show what
is possible for an insurrectionary force to accomplish with assistance from
an involved state.”
220
Philippine “Moro” groups.
221
If it is safe to assume that people have a very gen-
eral understanding of the Israel-palestinian conflict but are almost certainly
unaware of its maritime dimension, then the reverse is probably true about
what people know of the long-running insurgency in the philippines. e
high profile attacks on Superferry 14 and the abductions of foreigners from
220 Menefee, TMV, p. 97. In fact, that assistance amounted to the actual conduct of
operations. According to Todd Greentree, the mining operation was undertak-
en by CIA clandestine operatives and uS Navy SEALS and the first the Contras
knew about it was when their CIA handlers told them to claim responsibility.
Todd Greentree. ‘Irregular Maritime Strategy’. (In My View), NWCR, Vol. 61,
No. 1, Winter 2008, pp. 140-1.
221 In addition to Muslim-based insurgency the philippine government has, since
the late 1960s, also had to counter an insurgent challenge from the Maoist
Communist party of the philippines and its military arm the New people’s
Army (NpA). Despite their political and philosophical differences the NpA and
the MILF have been known to cooperate, particularly in areas where they over-
lap such as central Mindanao. Abuza
, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 41.
For background on the NpA and a brief description of the other Communist
splinter groups see Anthony Davis, ‘NpA rebels complicate Manila’s counterin-
surgency strategy’, Jane’s IR, 1 June 2003.
323
maritime terrorists
seemingly idyllic and luxurious resorts have made people aware that terrorists
in the philippines attack maritime targets, but any understanding of who
those terrorists are and what inspires them is almost certainly vague.
e word “Moro” denotes the Muslim inhabitants of the philippines,
who are concentrated mainly on the southern islands of Mindanao and the
Sulu archipelago; the word is believed to derive from the Spanish Moro
(“Moor”), the name given to the Muslim inhabitants of southern Iberia
between 711 and 1492 and, more generally, the Arab-Berber inhabitants
of North Africa. e Spanish occupation of the philippines began in 1565
within living memory of the reconquista.
222
e history of Moro resistance
has been a long one, against first Spanish domination (although Spain
barely penetrated the southern islands) and then American. e specific
reason why the unrest continued after philippine independence was the
influx of immigrants from the more crowded northern islands, Luzon in
particular, to the less populated southern islands, which started during the
1950s with the central government’s encouragement.
223
e vast majority
of the migrants were Christian and by the late 1960s constituted a majority
in areas previously considered Muslim. e influx, which coincided with a
new self-awareness amongst the Muslim communities of the south—bol-
stered by new international ties—sparked inter-communal violence, which
by 1972 had reached the point that the government under Ferdinand Mar-
cos declared martial law.
224
e first uprisings were isolated but one group, the Moro National Lib-
eration Front, led (but not founded) by Nur Misuari, brought them togeth-
er. It attracted funds from Libya and from Muslim backers in Malaysia.
225
It quickly recruited tens of thousands of members and controlled large
222 International Crisis Group, ‘Southern philippines backgrounder: Terrorism
and the peace process’, Asia Report no. 80, 13 July 2004, p. 3.
223 For two summaries of the origins of the Muslim unrest see Abuza
, Militant Is-
lam in Southeast Asia, pp. 33-38 and Marco Garrido, ‘e evolution of Muslim
insurgency’, Asiaweek, 6 March 2003.
224 ‘Moro National Liberation Front’, ICG, ‘Southern philippines backgrounder’,
pp. 3-4. Interestingly this is almost a mirror image of the migration that took
place in Indonesia, whereby under the Suharto regime between 1965 and 1985
when Muslims were forcefully relocated from the overcrowded central islands
of Java and Madura to the outer islands, which were predominantly Christian
and hindu. is movement sparked inter-communal violence and separatist
demands: Abuza, ‘Shifting focus: Jamaah Islamiyah’s long-term agenda towards
Islamism’, p. 23.
225 ‘Moro National Liberation Front’; Abuza
, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp.
38-39.
324
small boats, weak states, dirty money
areas of the southern island of Mindanao in support of its aim to create
an independent Muslim state on Mindanao and in the neighbouring Sulu
archipelago. e government responded militarily. e fighting reached
its height in 1973-74 but by 1976 the government was able to subdue the
rebellion by deploying the bulk of the philippine Army in the southern
islands and using non-military tactics designed to encourage internal divi-
sion. In that year the Tripoli Agreement, brokered by the Organisation
of the Islamic Conference (OIC), was signed. e Marcos government,
however, proceeded to implement it according to its own interpretation,
principally by dividing the proposed autonomous region into two. e
talks consequently broke down and the MNLF declared a resumption of
hostilities in 1977.
226
e Agreement nonetheless achieved what the government wanted. e
MNLF was demoralised and never regained its former vigour, much of
which drained away in factionalism and traditional tribal rivalry. e first
defection was by the group that became the MNLF/Reformist Movement
led by Dimad undato.
227
however, the most serious was that of the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) under the leadership of Salamat hashim.
e leadership of the MNLF was predominantly Tauseg from the Sulu is-
lands; the largest Moro population was concentrated in western and central
Mindanao; the MILF drew much of its support from the Maguindanao
people of Mindanao. Although the final break only occurred in 1984 it
developed from 1977 when hashim, who was at that point Misuari’s dep-
uty, organised the “New Leadership” faction in dissatisfaction with the
MNLF’s attempt at a negotiated settlement and the highly unfavourable
outcome.
228
e MILF advocated a more pronounced Islamic agenda and
rejected negotiation in favour of renewed insurgent war, a determination
perhaps driven by the greater influx of Christian immigrants on Mindanao
than in the Sulu islands.
229
226 omas M. McKenna, ‘Muslim separatism in the philippines: Meaningful au-
tonomy or endless war? e Tripoli Agreement–A charter for philippine Mus-
lim autonomy.’ Asian Social Issues Program, 2000.
227 ‘Moro National Liberation Front’.
228 ICG, ‘Southern philippines backgrounder’, p. 4; Ressa. Seeds of Terror, pp. 125-
6; Abuza
, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 39-41.
229 Angel M. Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Ter-
rorists, Adelphi paper 358, Oxford up for IISS, 2003, p. 51; David Wright-
Neville, ‘Dangerous dynamics: Activists, militants and terrorists in Southeast
Asia’,e Pacific Review, vol. 17, no. 1, March 2004, p. 36. e Christian pro-
portion of the Mindanao population had possibly reached 80 per cent by 1983.
325
maritime terrorists
After Marcos was overthrown in 1986, the philippine government,
led by president Corazon Aquino, signed ceasefire agreements with the
MILF and the MNLF/Reformist Movement, and later in the year reached
agreement (the “Sulu Agreement”) with Nur Misuari of the rump MNLF
to open formal discussions on a political solution.
230
In 1987 the MNLF
signed the “Jeddah Agreement” in which it agreed to relinquish its goal
of full independence in return for a new government offer of full autono-
my.
231
Talks continued sporadically during 1987 but led nowhere and in
1988 the MNLF returned once again to armed conflict, although few in-
cidents took place.
232
e bulk of the membership, however, rejected the
proposed agreement and defected to the MILF, which became the largest
Moro resistance grouping with an armed wing, named the Bangsamoro
Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF), of 10-15,000 men.
233
It is the only group
that retains the capacity to maintain a sustained insurgency against the
philippine government.
234
however, although a clash between the AFp and
MILF in July 2007 demonstrated that the latter remained a deadly op-
ponent, its military capability has declined considerably since its peak in
1999-2001. Only a fraction of its total force are full time combatants and
peter Chalk, ‘Militant Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia’ in paul J. Smith
(ed.), Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States
and Regional Stability, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, Note 12, p. 33.
230 Bernardo M. Villegas, ‘e philippines in 1986: Democratic reconstruction in
the post-Marcos era’, Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 2, Feb. 1987, p. 197; also Fidel
V. Ramos, ‘Break not the OIC-brokered peace’, Manila Times, 5 Sept. 2006.
231 For a summary of the main agreements between the GRp and the various
‘Moro’ movements see ICG, ‘Southern philippines backgrounder’, Appendix
C, pp. 29-32.
232 ‘Moro National Liberation Front’.
233 Vaughn et al., ‘Terrorism in Southeast Asia’, p. 21 estimate 10,000; Abuza,
in Balik Terrorism, p. 37 estimates 12,000 and in Militant Islam in Southeast
Asia, p. 46 suggests between 12 and 15,000 men. A former MILF central
committee member told the ICG that the armed force was between 10 and
15,000 strong and that between 1987 and 1990 122,000 MILF members had
undergone basic training and could be used to back up the regular force if
necessary: ICG, ‘Southern philippines backgrounder’, pp. 4-5. Anthony Davis
quotes AFp sources suggesting the MILF had around 12,600 fighters in 2000,
whereas Western intelligence sources usually suggest the figure should be closer
to 15,000: Anthony Davis, ‘Attention shifts to Moro Islamic Liberation Front’,
Jane’s IR, 1 April 2002, p. 21.
234 McKenna, ‘Muslim separatism in the philippines’, e 1996 peace agreement.’
Asian Social Issues Program, 2000.
326
small boats, weak states, dirty money
the prolonged peace process has led to declines in combat readiness, train-
ing and weapons acquisition.
235
In 1996 a new philippine president, Fidel Ramos, who had been armed
forces Chief of Staff at the time of Marcos’ overthrow, reached a new agree-
ment with the MNLF alone. e government ignored the MILF and the
more violent ASG, which had been formed in 1992. It did this possibly
for two reasons: firstly the MNLF retained OIC recognition as the repre-
sentative of the Moro people and Misuari retained strong personal links
with international leaders, while secondly, the MILF powerbase was on the
now predominantly Christian Mindanao and the government came under
strong local pressure not to negotiate with what was regarded as a Muslim
terrorist group.
236
e MILF initially drew strength from Misuri’s compro-
mise but in 1997 it also agreed a cessation of hostiles.
237
Negotiations pro-
ceeded slowly, however, and it resumed hostilities in 1999. In February
2000 bombs exploded on the ferry Our Lady Mediatrix off Ozamis City; in
July the group withdrew from the talks altogether in the face of president
Joseph Estrada’s reluctance to agree to its demands.
238
In 2001, following
Estrada’s overthrow, the group signed another ceasefire agreement with an-
other philippine president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, but sporadic violence
continued and became worse in 2003, first in February when the philippine
military accused the group of harbouring other terrorist groups, and then in
March when a bomb exploded at Davao City airport killing over 20 people
and injuring 150.
239
is was followed by another bomb in April, on a ferry
as it drew away from Sasa Wharf near Davao City, which killed 16 and
wounded 30 more.
240
e MILF denied both attacks but the results none-
235 Zachary Abuza, ‘e philippine peace process: Too soon to claim a settlement
with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front?’ e Jebsen Center for Counter-ter-
rorism Studies Research Briefing Series. vol. 3, no. 3, Feb. 2008, p. 7.
236 ICG, ‘Southern philippines backgrounder’, p. 4; omas M. McKenna, ‘Mus-
lim separatism in the philippines: meaningful autonomy or endless war? Im-
pediments to peace and the current crisis.’ Asian Social Issues Program, 2000.
237 Davis, ‘Attention shifts to Moro Islamic Liberation Front’, p. 20.
238 ICG, ‘Southern philippines backgrounder’, p. 6; McKenna, ‘Muslim separa-
tism in the philippines: e 1996 peace agreement.’
239 human Rights Watch, ‘Lives destroyed: Attacks against civilians in the philip-
pines’, pp. 6-7.
240 ‘Guide to the philippines conflict’, BBC News, 10 Feb. 2005; ICG, ‘Southern
philippines backgrounder: Terrorism and the peace process’, p. 22. e Davao
bombings appear to have been in retaliation for the AFp’s assault on the MILF’s
Buliok camp complex, one of the group’s last remaining safe havens: Anthony