Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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307
maritime terrorists
GAM’s maritime arm was developed as a matter of necessity rather than
choice given Aceh’s location. Developing it, however, presented no dif-
ficulty as the group could draw on the strong Acehese maritime tradition
and the cultural and trading links that extended across the Malacca Straits
to Malaysia and ailand.
144
When it was operational it had, unlike the Sea
Tigers, only a narrow and specialised capability. Its primary focus was gun
running.
145
It appears that GAM, unlike the LTTE or the MILF, preferred
to use criminal suppliers rather than establish its own arms purchasing net-
work.
146
According to Mark Valencia most of the suppliers were Chinese
syndicates based in Malaysia and ailand who brought the arms into Ma-
laysia and then transferred them to Aceh in small boats.
147
e direct route
through ailand appeared to focus on Adang about 50 miles (75 km) off
the ai-Malaysian coast and other small islands off the ai provinces of
Satun and Trang from which fishing boats would transfer the arms across
the Malacca Strait.
148
e Indonesian military made several seizures, and
tried to prevent the trade by banning fishing off Aceh’s southeast coast.
149
Its second focus appeared to be raising money by capturing and ran-
soming ship’s crews. Although these are not the actions of a group seeking
international recognition and respectability, and the organisation conse-
quently disclaimed responsibility repeatedly, kidnap-and-ransom did be-
come a feature of maritime predation in the Straits from 2001 through
to the conclusion of the peace accord.
150
e suspicion to which this gives
rise is reinforced by the knowledge that GAM (or people claiming to be
144 Jeffrey Chen, ‘e emerging nexus between piracy and maritime Terrorism in
Southeast Asia Waters: A Case Study of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)’ in
Lehr, Violence at Sea, 2007, p. 145.
145 ‘GAM relies on…gun-runners operating along the rugged coastline to fuel
their rebellion’: paul Dillon, ‘piracy disappears in tsunami’s wake’, AlJazeera.
net, 31 Jan. 2005.
146 Anthony Davis, ‘police interdict arms traffic to Aceh’, Jane’s IR, 1 April 2004.
147 According to Zachary Abuza GAM buys most of its arms in bazaars in Cambo-
dia, ailand and the philippines: Abuza
, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, p.
176.
148 Davis, ‘police interdict arms traffic to Aceh’.
149 Mark J. Valencia,’Security issues in the malacca strait: Whose security and why
it matters’, paper presented at the MIMA Conference on the Straits of Ma-
lacca held at the prince hotel, Kuala Lumper, 11-12 Oct. 2004, pp. 3-4; also
Schulze, ‘e Free Aceh movement’, p. 33.
150 Catherine Zara Raymond
, ‘e Malacca Straits and the threat of maritime ter-
rorism’, PINR, 24 Aug. 2005.
308
small boats, weak states, dirty money
GAM) kidnapped people on land for ransom. In fact, kidnappings became
so frequent in 2001 and 2002 that concerns were raised that GAM was
undergoing a process of criminalisation similar to that of the ASG.
151
It
was, moreover, no stranger to criminality; it was unquestionably involved
in drug cultivation and dealing to pay for arms. An unknown but reput-
edly substantial portion of the world’s supply of marijuana was believed to
come from Aceh and a number of players in addition to GAM, such as the
TNI, the police and local criminal syndicates, were not only involved in
this trade but to a degree cooperated with each other.
152
Despite this the GAM leadership, exiled in Sweden, rejected the accusa-
tion that such acts were sanctioned centrally. Schulze suggests it is likely
that they were the product of “warlordism and the result of local decision
making” driven perhaps by what he calls the “economically driven recruits”
who joined GAM in 1999.
153
Schulze believes this explains the sudden
surge of piracy in Malacca Strait, an activity that he maintains does not fit
GAM’s way of working.
154
Whether some of the acts of piracy and kidnap-
ping that took place around the Aceh coast were those of the group cen-
trally, or of a splinter group or groups, or common criminals or members
of TNI posing as GAM, has never been clear. In August 2003, for example,
two vessels described as “disguised” oil service craft or tugs attacked a large,
Taiwanese-registered fishing vessel, the Dong Yih. e ‘disguised’ craft
chased the fishing vessel for two hours, hitting it with over 200 rounds one
of which wounded the vessel’s captain.
155
e IMB suggested this was an-
other GAM attack but ONI took the view that the craft were Indonesian,
possibly even naval patrol boats enforcing Indonesia’s recently declared ban
on vessels approaching Acehese waters “without proper permits”.
156
In an-
other example the Indonesian authorities reported in 2007, that Rusli bin
Abdulgani, the “long sought and feared pirate of tankers, merchant vessels
as well as fishing boats in the Malacca Strait”, had been captured. Reput-
edly he used his network, which was alleged to cover Medan and Aceh, to
extort protection money from ship owners. he claimed that he did this
151 Schulze, ‘e Free Aceh movement’, pp. 17 & 28.
152 Ibid., pp. 27-8.
153 Ibid., p. 28.
154 Ibid., p. 29.
155 Bradsher, ‘problems with pirates continue in sea lanes of South Asia’.
156 NGA ASAM. 2003-275, 9 Aug. 2003; herbert-Burns and Zucker, ‘Drawing
the line between piracy and maritime terrorism’, p. 33.
309
maritime terrorists
on behalf of GAM, but “judging from his fancy way of living” he retained
much if not all of the proceeds of his activities himself.
157
On the other hand, in September 2001, a GAM spokesman, while de-
nying that the group was involved in piracy, went on to issue a warning to
ships using the Malacca Straits that they would need to “seek permission”
if they were to pass without hindrance—a demand very similar to the one
made by the LTTE in the case of the MV Princess Kash for example —and
pointed to the attack on a 348 DWT coal carrier, the Ocean Silver, that had
been captured and which was freed only after the payment of a $34,000
ransom, as an indication of what would happen.
158
e spokesman’s denial
that GAM was involved in any act of piracy rang even hollower when the
hostages reported that they had been held in a GAM camp in Aceh where
their kidnappers admitted they were GAM members. Again, although the
group denied it, the suspicion persists that GAM or GAM members also
undertook the attacks on the Trimanggada—assaulted by 50 men in three
boats—in April 2003, the Penrider in August 2003, possibly the Cherry
201 in January 2004, and the Tri Samurda in March 2005. e attack on
the Tri Samurda raised particular alarm because it was a methane gas car-
rier and the raiders were armed with RpGs.
159
e Penrider was boarded
close to the entrance to port Klang in Malaysia by men equipped with
grenade launchers and automatic weapons, and sailed across the Strait to
Indonesia where the ship was released but the officers were retained and a
ransom of $100,000 was demanded (although only $52,000 was actually
paid, according to the Royal Malaysian Maritime police).
160
e crew of
the Cherry 201 were less fortunate: when the owners tried to bargain, the
kidnappers shot four of the crew, although eight managed to escape when
the firing began.
161
ere are also grounds for believing GAM was involved
157 ‘pirate ring leader caught in Cirebon’, Antara News, 30 Sept. 2007; ‘Former
GAM members ‘high sea robbers’, Jakarta Post, 2 Oct. 2007.
158 ‘Aceh rebels warn ships to seek permission to use Malacca Straits’, uS Depart-
ment of Transportation, Transportation and Security Review, vol. 2, no. 14, 5
Sept. 2001; NGA ASAM 2001-266, 25 Aug. 2001. Also herbert-Burns and
Zucker, ‘Drawing the line between piracy and maritime terrorism’, p. 32.
159 ONI WWTTS Report, 6 April 2005, paragraph K.2; ‘pirates storm Indonesian
tanker’, BBC News report, 14 March 2005.
160 IMO, Reports on Acts of piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’, MSC.4/
Circ.40, 4 Sept. 2003, Annex One; Keith Bradsher, ‘problems with pirates con-
tinue in sea lanes of South Asia’, New York Times, 15 Aug. 2003. Also herbert-
Burns, ‘Terrorism in the early 21st century maritime domain’, pp. 167-8.
161 NGA ASAM 2004-37, 5 Feb. 2004 on the Cherry 201 and 2003-274, 10 Aug.
310
small boats, weak states, dirty money
in kidnapping fishing boats and their crews. A headman from the village
of hutan Merlintang in Malaysia told Liss that victims who had returned
said they had been taken by men who claimed to be GAM and who in the
earliest years had held them hostage in GAM territory.
162
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). e LTTE’s aim has been to
gain independence for the Tamil-populated northern and eastern areas
of Sri Lanka. e conflict traces its origins back to the 1950s, when the
Sinhalese-dominated government attempted to reverse what the Sinhalese
majority on the island saw as the undue influence of the Tamil minority.
It was given added impetus by the anti-Tamil riots of 1983, which led to
many Tamils fleeing Colombo and the southern parts of the island and re-
settling in the Tamil north or even in the Tamil areas of India.
163
Founded
in 1972, the LTTE had by 1987 emerged as the dominant Tamil militant
group with effective control over the Jaffna peninsula and much of the east
coast.
164
e group married terrorism, including suicide terrorism, to the
operational techniques of classic guerrilla warfare. From the very beginning
it recognised that a maritime arm was essential. e group’s founder, Velu-
pillai prabhakaran, made this clear when he said that,“(g)eographically the
security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas. It is only when
we are strong on the seas and break the dominance the enemy now has that
we will be able to retain the land areas we liberated and drive our enemies
from our homeland.”
165
When the insurgency started the group’s rear base area was across the
palk Strait in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
166
Its existence was vital early
on, although by the mid-1980s it had become a divisive issue.
167
Contact
2003 on the Penrider.
162 Liss, ‘e roots of piracy in Southeast Asia’.
163 For useful background on the conflict see Jeremy Barnicle, et al., ‘Securing the
peace: An action strategy for Sri Lanka’, Woodrow Wilson School for public
and International Affairs, princeton university and Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Draft, Jan. 2004.
164 Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, p. 239. For background
on the rise of Tamil militant groups see Gamini Samaranayake, ‘patterns of
political violence and responses of the government in Sri Lanka, 1971-1996’,
Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 110-22.
165 Quoted in R. hariharan, ‘Sri Lanka: how strong are the Tigers?’ South East
Asia Analysis Group Note no. 297, 28 Feb. 2006.
166 For details on these base areas see Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commer-
cial maritime infrastructure’, pp. 1-2.
167 On the reasons why the rear base became a divisive issue see Dharmeratnam
311
maritime terrorists
between the base area and the front was first maintained by use of a mixture
of fast dinghies for personnel transport and slower fishing vessels for logisti-
cal movements, both equipped only with small arms and grenades. e Sri
Lankan Navy (SLN) recognised that it needed to sever this link. Once it
had been re-equipped with faster and more heavily armed patrol craft, par-
ticularly the Israeli-built Dvora and Super Dvora, it inflicted heavy losses
on both types of Tamil craft.
168
To counter this threat the Tigers reor-
ganised their naval resources and formed the Sea Tigers, the Kadal puli,
in 1984. As it developed from an essentially defensive force to one that
conducted sea control, supply and amphibious support operations in an
area from the Strait around the north of Sri Lanka and down the coast as
far as Trincomalee, it became the most capable and tactically astute of all
the seaborne insurgency groups.
169
It played a vital role in the Sri Lankan
forces’ surrender of the Elephant pass base complex in 2000 by fighting its
way through an SLN covering force to land nearly 1,500 Tiger troops and
their supplies at Kudarappu-Maamunai. e capture of the base was key
to control of the Jaffna peninsula. e subsequent withdrawal of the Sri
Lankan forces altered the strategic situation in the north of the country and
led to the subsequent cease-fire.
170
e pivotal role of the Sea Tigers in the LTTE’s overall order of battle,
and the importance the group attached to the sea, has never diminished.
171
Because the land areas held by the LTTE have never been contiguous, the
Sivaram, ‘e importance of ‘Rearbase’: Taraki, 1989’, TamilNet.com, 17 Feb.
2006.
168 ‘SL Naval history from 1984’; Rafik Jalaldeen, ‘Navy’s pivotal role in battle
against terrorism’, Daily News (Colombo), 10 Dec. 2007.
169 In peter Chalk’s estimation, LTTE ‘set the benchmark’ for maritime terrorism.
Interview with author, 2004. For a brief review of some of the earliest Sea Tiger
attacks see Menefee, TMV, pp. 49-50. For a list of its bases and installations see
‘LTTE bides time to win Eelam’, Sunday Observer (Colombo), 30 Oct. 2005.
170 Suryanarayan, ‘Sea Tigers–threat to Indian security’; R. hariharan. ‘Sri Lan-
ka: taking stock of LTTE’, PINR, 29 July 2005; N. Manoharan, ‘Tigers with
fins: Naval wing of the LTTE’, Institute of peace and Conflict Studies Article
no. 1757, 31 May 2005. e other side of the coin, of course, is that ‘the Sri
Lankan army which has a major force advantage over the LTTE in the penin-
sula, is handicapped by the inadequacy of air support and the inability of the
navy to control the seas’: N. Ram cited in Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri
Lankan conflict’, p. 238.
171 e Sea Tigers are reportedly the most expensive arm of the LTTE organisation:
Bharadwaj, ‘Maritime aspects of Sri Lankan conflict’, p. 245.
312
small boats, weak states, dirty money
group’s ability to move its cadres freely by sea has been vital.
172
During the
LTTE’s negotiations with the Sri Lankan government in 2003 the LTTE
demanded de facto naval status for the Sea Tigers, equal to that of the SLN,
and control of over contiguous marine resources.
173
If this demand had
been conceded—and the Norwegian-led mediation team did propose an
exclusive sea area for the Sea Tigers—it would have given the LTTE con-
trol over some two-thirds of the Sri Lankan coastline.
174
It would also have
established a “third navy” in the region, which would have had implica-
tions for Indian as well as Sri Lankan security and set a disturbing interna-
tional precedent.
175
Naturally enough, the proposal was not acceptable to
either country’s government.
In the time since the group was formed in 1984 it has destroyed between
a third and a half of the Sri Lankan navy’s coastal fleet.
176
Its equipment has
included patrol boasts captured from the SLN and others that it adapted,
such as armed trawlers. It has built its own boats and its own suicide boats.
It has acquired its own fleet of ocean-going freighters to carry weapons
and equipment in addition to legitimate cargo. As mentioned earlier it has
built its own mines, most of which were improvised, and attempted to buy
submersibles and build its own.
172 Sudha Ramachandran, ‘e Sea Tigers of Tamil Eelam’, AsiaTimes Online, 31
Aug. 2006.
173 V. Suryanarayan, ‘prabhakaran: Back to the old game’, e Hindu, 1 Dec. 2003
and V. Suryanarayan, ‘Sea Tigers and Indian security’, Journal of Indian Ocean
Studies, vol. 12, no. 3, Dec. 2004, p. 409; on the LTTE’s demand that the
ceasefire monitors grant the Sea Tigers equal status with the Sri Lankan Navy
see p.K. Balachandran, ‘LTTE wants monitors to protect Sea Tiger vessels also’,
HindustanTimes.com, 13 May 2006 and ‘Soosai reiterates sovereign right to seas
bordering Tamil homeland’, TamilNet, 13 May 2006. e LTTE also strongly
deny the assertion by the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), responsible
for monitoring the ceasefire agreement, that non-state actors have no rights
over contiguous sea space. See S. Muthucumaran, ‘e sea rights of states in
formation’, SiberNews, 15 May 2006. For a Sri Lankan perspective see Rohan
Joshap, ‘Sri Lankan Navy…LTTE Sea Tigers and the right to territorial seas’,
Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence: e Media Centre for National Security, 21
July 2006.
174 Ramachandran, ‘e Sea Tigers of Tamil Eelam’.
175 V.S. Sambandan, ‘SLMM head, Sea Tigers meet’, e Hindu, 17 July 2003;
V. Suryanarayan, ‘Sri Lanka and India’s security’, e Hindu, 25 April 2003;
B. Raman, ‘Maritime terrorism: An Indian perspective’, South Asia Analysis
Group Paper no. 1154, 29 Oct. 2004, p. 8.
176 Barnicle, et al., ‘Securing the peace: An action strategy for Sri Lanka’, pp. 5-6;
Suryanarayan. ‘Sea Tigers–threat to Indian security’; Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of
LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastructure’, p. 7.
313
maritime terrorists
e two most important categories of boats operated by the Sea Tigers
are attack and logistics craft. e logistics craft are fast but lightly armed.
eir role is to collect the weapons and equipment from the Sea Tigers’
freighters in international waters and run them to beach pick-up points.
Naturally the SLN has attempted to intercept this activity. Consequently,
the logistics craft are shielded by the attack craft that are heavily armed
with a combination of 23mm cannon, machine guns and RpGs. ey tend
to operate in packs of three. eir aim is to draw the SLN away from the
logistics craft. ese operations generally take place at night to nullify Sri
Lankan air superiority. e Sea Tigers break off any engagement at first
light. ey land their craft on beaches where they are pulled out of the
water and hidden under jungle cover during the day.
For suicide missions a mixture of modified craft including fishing trawl-
ers and racing style boats has been used supplemented by specialised, indig-
enously manufactured vessels. e specialised vessels are difficult to detect
because most attacks take place under cover of darkness and the boats lie low
in the water. As with the attack boats the suicide craft generally operate in
groups of two or three with two, and latterly three, suicide bombers on each
boat to ensure that if one is killed during the attack run the mission will still
be completed.
177
Suicide attacks are a vital part of LTTE operations on land
and at sea. ey have been designed, in peter Chalk’s words, to “engender
chronic operational paralysis in the enemy”, and he reports that one retired
member of the SLN has admitted that the “fear of being caught in a martyr
strike has been one of the main factors contributing to decreases in recruit-
ment to the (Sri Lankan) navy over the past several years.”
178
Sea Tiger numbers grew throughout the period of the ceasefire; in 2001
the force reportedly consisted of between 3,000 and 4,000 men. When the
tsunami struck the Sri Lankan coast in late 2004 reports, which the group
itself denied, suggested that the force had lost a substantial number of men
and boats as a result.
179
Despite these denials, estimates made in 2006 sug-
gested Sea Tiger numbers had dropped to 1,500-2,000 and an unknown
177 Murphy, ‘Maritime threat: tactics and technologies of the Sea Tigers’, pp. 8-9.
For an earlier report on the indigenously manufactured suicide craft see Roger
Davies, ‘Sea tigers, stealth technology and the North Korean connection’, Jane’s
IR, vol. 13, no. 3, March 2001, pp. 2-3.
178 Chalk, ‘Maritime terrorism in the contemporary era’, pp. 38-9.
179 p.K. Balachandran, ‘Tsunami did not wreck our navy: LTTE’, HindustanTimes
1 Jan. 2005.
314
small boats, weak states, dirty money
number of boats had been lost.
180
ere is possibility that a surprisingly
large proportion of the Tigers’ fleet may have survived because, as men-
tioned, their standard procedure was to store the key attack and logistics
craft away from the sea in jungle hideouts when not in use.
181
It is believed, nonetheless, that the need to replace naval assets lost in
the tsunami became one of the principal motives behind fund-raising ac-
tivity amongst the Tamil diaspora around the world.
182
Fund-raising was
pursued with vigour from 2005 onwards and raised substantial funds for
the organisation. In 2006 human Rights Watch issued a report detailing
the methods the LTTE used amongst diapora communities.
183
To indicate
the scale of the LTTE’s income from their rackets and “taxes”, they were
estimated to have squeezed $120 million from the 70,000-strong expatri-
ate Tamil community in France alone. On top of the general levy extracted
from individual expatriates each week they were reported to have demand-
ed a €2,000 “loan” from each family specifically to replace lost naval equip-
ment. Reluctance to pay was met by intimidation and threats often accom-
panied by further threats to kill family members still living in Sri Lanka.
184
180 hariharan, ‘Sri Lanka: how strong are the Tigers?’
181 Davis, ‘Tamil Tigers seek to rebuild naval force’; Confidential interview, Aug.
2005.
182 Murphy, ‘Maritime threat: Tactics and technology of the Sea Tigers’, p. 6; pri-
vate information, Dec. 2005.
183 human Rights Watch, ‘Funding the ‘final war’: LTTE intimidation and extor-
tion in the Tamil diaspora’, vol. 18, no. 1(c), March 2007.
184 Murphy, ‘Maritime threat: Tactics and technology of the Sea Tigers’, p. 6; pri-
vate information, Dec. 2005. Also Christophe Cornevin, ‘Tigers demanding
money in Mafia style…’, Le Figaro, 2 Dec. 2005
and V.S. Sambandan, ‘LTTE
raising funds for ‘final war’’, e Hindu, 16 March 2006; Roht William Wad-
hwaney, ‘Lankan expats ‘forced to fund LTTE’’, Gulf Times, 11 May 2006.
For a broader view of LTTE fund raising and other external operations see By-
man, et al., Trends in Outside Support for Insurgency Movements, Santa Monica:
RAND, 2001, pp. 42-59; peiris, ‘Secessionist war and terrorism in Sri Lanka:
Transnational impulses’, pp. 86-8; peter Chalk, ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam’s International Organisation and Operations–A preliminary Analysis’,
Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Commentary no. 77, Winter 1999; and
John Solomon and B.C. Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger: how Sri Lankan insurgents
fund their war’, Jane’s IR, Aug. 2007. More recently the LTTE have come under
sustained air attack and this appears to have resulted in a greater push for mon-
ey from Tamils living in North America to pay for anti-aircraft weapons: Shaun
Waterman, ‘Tamil moves in N America cause concern’, ISN Security Watch,
29 Aug. 2006; also Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger’. Finally see ‘LTTE
linchpin Kp free’, Peace Lanka, 18 Dec. 2007 which provides further details on
LTTE fund raising operations. e author of this blog does not reveal his or her
315
maritime terrorists
e Sri Lankan Ministry of Defence has suggested that the Tamil Tigers’
total annual income from its worldwide fund-raising operations (including
their criminal income) amounted to $300 million annually in the decade
between 1997 and 2007, up from around $40 million annually in the mid-
1980s.
185
In 2006 an Indian-based research group, the Strategic Foresight
Group (SFG), estimated the LTTE’s total annual income to be between
$175 million and $385 million.
186
In 2007 Solomon and Tan and the As-
sociated press both put the figure at between $200 and $300 million.
187
e LTTE have also been accused of piracy.
188
e first alleged incident
took place off Vettilaikerni in October 1994 when the MV Ocean Trader
was attacked. Attacks continued at the rate of about two a year until 2001,
after which they became less frequent. Of the known cases several, like the
first, occurred in the 50 mile (93 km) wide strip of coastal water that the
LTTE asserts as its own. however questionable this assertion may be it
nonetheless blurs the distinction between piracy and insurgent attack.
189
e MV Princes Wave, attacked in 1996, and the MV Cordiality, attacked
in 1997 (NGA ASAM 1997-76), were loading cargoes of valuable ilmenite
(titanium ore) in what the LTTE claimed was a government attempt to
identity, which must mean the information should be treated circumspectly,
although internal evidence suggests they may be connected to the Indian police
or security services.
185 ‘LTTE terrorists have annual profit margin of uS $300million’, e Media Cen-
tre for National Security, Ministry of Defence, public Security, Law and Order
(Sri Lanka), 27 July 2007.
186 Of that $100 million to $250 million was believed to come from drug traf-
ficking although, as the study acknowledged, there was no direct evidence of
LTTE involvement. Local taxation and extortion were estimated to contribute
about $30 million; human smuggling and funds siphoned off from NGOs were
believed to generate a further $3 to 5 million; the contribution from the Tamil
expatriate community was believed to bring in $40 to $50 million, while the
group’s business ventures were thought to yield profits of between $35 and
$50 million: p.K. Balachandran, ‘Lanka most militarised in South Asia: study’,
Hindustan Times, 21 Sept. 2006.
187 Solomon and Tan, ‘Feeding the Tiger’; ‘Ap IMpACT: An investigation into
fundraising and weapons smuggling by Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers’, AP, 5 Nov.
2007.
188 For example, Gunaratna,’e asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism’, p.
28 and ‘Sri Lanka’s perspective on maritime security in the region and its rel-
evance to the world–Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Rohitha B’, Asian Tribune, 4
June 2007. In respect of individual incidents, reference has been made when-
ever possible to NGA ASAMs.
189 On the 50-mile claim see Nirupama Subramanian, ‘Disguised message by Sea
Tigers might have led to ship’s highjack’, Indian Express, 21 Aug. 1998.
316
small boats, weak states, dirty money
strip assets from Tamil areas.
190
e group claimed that MV Princess Kash,
hijacked in 1998 (NGA ASAM 1998-50), was brought in for inspection
because it had entered the LTTE-claimed area without permission, and the
same is possibly true of the Yu Jia (NGA ASAM 1999-103).
191
All the ferries
that the group has attacked have been empty of civilian passengers except
the Irish Mona (NGA ASAM 1999-103), which in 1995 was used to lure
two SLN patrol boats into a kill zone using distress messages. Several ships,
such as the MV Mercs Uhana in 2000, have been attacked or hijacked off
point pedro and might have been delivering supplies to the SLA garrisons
on the Jaffna peninsula. e reports about the grounding of the MV Farah
III in December 2006 (NGA ASAM 2007-7) are (as usual) contradictory,
although on balance an armed attack by the Sea Tigers would appear to be
the most likely explanation, given that the rebels removed the ship’s cargo
of 14,000 tons of rice.
192
Details on the attack on the MV City of Liverpool
(NGA ASAM 2007-23) suggest that the SLN knew it was an LTTE ship
and attacked it to draw the Sea Tigers into an engagement.
193
ere was also a strong suspicion that the group pirated vessels and
transformed them into “phantom ships”.
194
Although no firm evidence of
this alleged activity has come to light,
195
Sakhuja suggests that the MV Sik
Yang, a small cargo ship that went missing en route from Tuticorin in India
to Malacca in 1999, might be an example.
196
e group’s most audacious
act of piracy, one that was certainly reminiscent of a “phantom ship” cargo
fraud, was the hijacking of 32,000 mortar shells intended for the SLA.
e manufacturer arranged for the consignment to be loaded on board a
190 ‘Sri Lanka’s perspective on maritime security in the region and its relevance to
the world–Sri Lanka Foreign Minister Rohitha B’; ‘LTTE allays shipping fears’,
TamilNet, 12 Sept. 1997.
191 Subramanian, ‘Disguised message by Sea Tigers might have led to ship’s high-
jack’; ‘Tiger tricks’, Shiptalk, 29 May 2007.
192 ‘Cargo boat ‘looted off Sri Lanka’’, BBC News, 1 May 2007.
193 e ship was reportedly part of the LTTE fleet that operated in the Indian
Ocean: Sakhuja, ‘e dynamics of LTTE’s commercial maritime infrastruc-
ture’, p. 5.
194 Chalk, ‘Training the Tigers’, p. 26.
195 Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from maritime terrorism’, p. 29.
196 Vijay Sakhuja, ‘Sea piracy in South Asia’, South Asia analysis group Paper no.
1259, 18 Feb. 2005. e NGA ASAM 1999-54, 25 May 1999 also suggests
this might have been an LTTE ‘phantom ship’ hijack.