Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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397
assessing the threat
joint and separate activities.
64
Concrete examples of this cooperation can
be found. For instance, terrorist groups have shown they are well suited to
creating the climate of instability that enables drug cultivation and produc-
tion to proceed without interruption. Groups such as FARC in Colombia,
the united Wa State Army in Burma and the Taliban in Afghanistan have
all demonstrated they can create and then control zones where they can
exercise power on their terms. ey can then sell the narcotic product to
criminal gangs that have the assets and experience to transport and distrib-
ute it. Central American gangs are working to destabilise parts of the region
to facilitate the transit of drugs and migrants. possible insurgent-criminal
cooperation has also been observed in Brazil. Some members of the Brazil-
ian military and national police believe that the FARC has provided mili-
tary training to some of the gangs in Rio and São paulo.
65
e LTTE’s Sea
Tigers worked with Arakanese smugglers in Burma and northeast India
and almost certainly facilitated the movement of drugs between Asia and
Europe and migrants to Europe, North America and Australia. unspeci-
fied criminal groups have acted as “cut-outs” between major international
arms dealers and terrorists,
66
while unspecified terrorist groups have in the
past couple of decades made increasing use of the human smuggling routes
across the Mediterranean to bring operatives into Europe, and bought arms
and documents from smugglers and forgers.
67
In the philippines the MILF
and the ASG have connections with the “pentagon” gang of kidnappers.
however, the issues of flexibility and partnership, and hoffman’s point
that Al Qaeda and other groups encourage “out-of-box” creative thinking,
suggest that an analytical approach that focuses on group motivations at
the expense of the those of individual actors might be out of touch. picarelli
has suggested that the emergence of a new criminal sub-culture prepared to
supply anyone with specific, illicit goods and services, such as documents
or smuggling across specific sections of border, has meant that criminals
64 Mark A. R. Kleiman, Illicit Drugs and the Terrorist reat: Causal Links and
Implications for Domestic Drug Control Policy, Congressional Research Service,
RL32334; updated 20 April 2004, pp. 2-7.
65 Day, ‘Crime Groups Turn to Terrorism in Rio de Janeiro’.
66 ‘‘Floating market’ in illicit weapons arms terrorists’.
67 Italian authorities suspect that one Islamist gang was responsible for landing
over 30 groups of migrants on an island off Sicily and that the trade brought
them into contact with several organised groups including the Neapolitan
‘Camorra’ as early as 1998: Kaplan, ‘paying for terror’; also ‘Islamic terrorists
linked to the Camorra’, p. 4.
398
small boats, weak states, dirty money
and terrorists have found it easier to deal with each other.
68
e increasing
pace of change, and the need to respond quickly to both opportunities
and reverses, has placed a higher premium on individual skills and meant
that criminals and terrorists have, like businesses but unlike governments,
become more adaptive. he points to the business example of Wal-Mart,
which was able to resume its operations hours after hurricane Katrina had
swept through the uS Gulf states in 2005 while the state and federal gov-
ernments were still struggling to respond; the criminal example of smug-
glers who, when the Albanian authorities closed the port of Vlore to disrupt
their activities, switched their operations to a Greek port in a matter of
days; and terrorist groups in Iraq which have demonstrated a fearsome abil-
ity to adapt IED technology and tactics to changing circumstances. In his
view this adaptability has profound implications for the future of criminal-
terrorist interaction.
69
is flexibility and adaptability extend also to loyalty. Louise Shelley
drew a distinction between “traditional” and “new” criminal organisa-
tions, which picarelli builds upon to separate “sovereign-bound” from
“sovereign-free” criminal and terrorist groups.
70
“Sovereign-bound” groups
respect sovereign power and when they seek to control certain localities,
regions or even countries are seeking to supplant specific states; “sovereign-
bound” terrorist groups tend to be ethno-nationalist while their criminal
counterparts can make some form of “investment” in their societies, such as
the cooperative links between the yakuza and the police in Japan.
71
Neither
“sovereign-free” terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda and its affiliates and
Aum Shinrikyo, which generally have religious or millenarian goals, nor
“sovereign-free” criminals, who have short-term goals driven by market
68 See in this regard the report that Islamist terrorists paid a Mexican drug cartel
to smuggle Afghan and Iraqi operatives through Laredo, TX and their weapons,
which reportedly included Milan anti-tank missiles, RpGs and other firearms
through tunnels under the border, in order to attack the intelligence training
facility at Fort huachuca, AZ: Sara A. Carter, ‘Islamists target Arizona base’,
Washington Times, 26 Nov. 2007.
69 picarelli, ‘e Turbulent Nexus of TOC and Terrorism’, pp. 7-9. Also Galeotti,
‘e New World of Organised Crime’, p. 47 and Godson and Olson, ‘Inter-
national Organized Crime’, p. 23 where they note the ‘inherent flexibility’ of
narcotic traffickers..
70 picarelli, ‘e Turbulent Nexus of TOC and Terrorism’, pp. 14-15.
71 Louise I. Shelley, ‘e unholy Trinity: Transnational Crime, Corruption, and
Terrorism’, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. XI, Issue 2, Winter/Spring 2005,
p. 108.
399
assessing the threat
forces and whose allegiance is solely to the money they make, are concerned
about the damage they inflict on states. For such criminals working with
terrorists presents no sort of problem. e Indian gangster Aftab Ansari, for
example, who had close connections to Al Qaeda, “was trying to use the
militants’ network for underworld operations” while at the same time the
“leaders of different militant outfits in pakistan were trying to use his”.
72
“Traditional” and “new” criminal groups also differ in the way they use
corruption: “traditional” groups tend to use it as a tool to gain long-term
influence; the “new” groups depend on “high levels of systemic and insti-
tutionalised corruption” to secure deals and “buy-off” interference.
73
While
“traditional” criminal groups such as Colombian drug cartels are willing to
undermine weak states—as appears to be happening in West Africa includ-
ing, for example, Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau
74
— “new” groups thrive
in the absence of government.
75
Terrorists can also thrive in such situa-
tions. Where such groups converge in weak states they can form “black
holes” (defined as areas where politically interested criminals or criminally
inspired terrorists can “effectively challenge the legitimacy of a state, and
ultimately replace the state in many, if not all, of its functions”
76
) that serve
as safe havens for their continued operations, as has occurred in pakistan’s
Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and the “tri-border” region
centred on Cuidad del Este in paraguay, where terrorist groups such as
hizbollah and hamas freely do business with criminals including Brazil-
ian gangsters and Japanese yakuza.
77
ey need not be remote; they can be
72 Stern, ‘e protean Enemy’, pp. 35-6.
73 Shelley, ‘e unholy Trinity’, p. 106. Also phil Williams, ‘Transnational Crimi-
nal Networks’ in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars,
Santa Monica: RAND, 2001, pp. 78-80.
74 Nico Colombant, ‘West Africa’s drug circulation increases, worrying officials’,
NewsVOA.com, 18 June 2007; Stephanie hanson, ‘In West Africa, reat of
Narco-States’, Council of Foreign Relations Daily Analysis, 10 July 2007; Mario
de Queiroz, ‘Guinea-Bissau: African paradise for South American traffickers’,
Inter Press Services News Agency, 10 Aug. 2007; ‘Drug cartels begin cracking
West Africa’, Jane’s FR, 23 Aug. 2007; ‘uN: Cocaine influx could destabilise
Guinea-Bissau’, AP, 1 Nov. 2007; Kevin Sullivan. ‘Route of evil’. Washington
Post, 25 May 2008; Mbachu, ‘e West Africa-South America Drug Route’.
75 Shelley, ‘e unholy Trinity’, p. 106.
76 Tamara Makarenko, ‘e Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay be-
tween TOC and Terrorism’, Global Crime, vol. 6, no. 1, Feb. 2004, pp. 139-40;
Shelley, ‘e unholy Trinity’, p. 107; Godson and Olson, ‘International Or-
ganized Crime’, p. 26..
77 Sullivan, ‘Terrorism, Crime and private Armies’, p. 73. On the FATA see Griff
400
small boats, weak states, dirty money
found in the midst of cities.
78
e ultimate in “black holes” are failed states,
which because they can become in Max Manwaring’s words, “breeding
grounds for instability and terrorism”, represent the most “dangerous long-
term security challenge facing the global community today”.
79
A vital fact
is that these are not “ungoverned” or “lawless” spaces; they are governed by
insurgents, criminals or warlords for their own ends.
80
e concern must
be that as so many weak states are coastal states, and as organised criminal
groups or even individuals with special skills associated with such groups
are displaying a greater willingness to work with terrorists, this coopera-
tion or convergence will manifest itself in increased use of the maritime
domain.
81
reats to international shipping networks. half a century of peace, the cargo
integrity that came with containerisation, bigger ships, global communica-
tions and weather forecasting, the decline in piracy during the twentieth
century compared to the eighteenth and nineteenth, all combined to en-
courage people to assess threats in terms of the risk of accidents, not attack,
and left the international shipping network unprepared for deliberate, per-
haps multiple, disruptions. Although, as described earlier, no group has
the resources to seriously threaten the economy of a major state directly,
the huge investment in the system, in both money and confidence, means
there is a temptation to play down threats and brush aside their implica-
tions which could leave terrorists with an opportunity they could exploit.
e target would be confidence in the system. ough the sensitivity of
markets varies—attacks on oil installations, for instance, have not to date
had lasting effects on prices—sensitivity could become vulnerability to the
point where terrorists could achieve disproportionate gains from apparently
random attacks, provided these were persistent and amplified by a deter-
mined information campaign. e cumulative loss of confidence in the abil-
ity of the system or its constituent parts to deliver goods and raw materials
reliably that might result from extensive terrorist disruption would be re-
Witte, ‘pakistan seen losing fight against Taliban and al-Qaeda’, Washington
Post, 3 Oct. 2007.
78 John p. Sullivan, ‘Maras Morphing: Revisiting ird Generation Gangs’, Global
Crime, vol. 7, Nos. 3-4, Aug.-Nov. 2006, pp. 488 & 501.
79 Max Manwaring. ‘e New Global Security Landscape: e Road Ahead’ in
Bunker, Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency, p. 24.
80 Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty, p. 9
81 Mark J. Valencia sees a correlation between ‘weak’ states and piracy, especially if
the issue of the economy is taken into account: interview with author.
401
assessing the threat
flected in rising prices, particularly energy and commodity prices and rates
for insurance and shipping, which would affect productivity. e economic
effects of any serious disturbance could be felt globally and states, particu-
larly weaker states, might be faced with instability if food and fuel supplies
were severely affected or prices rose dramatically.
e terrorism-related risks that most concern marine insurers currently
are pollution, the blockage of a chokepoint forcing shipping to make a
time-consuming diversion, and the closure of a port with significant num-
bers of ships trapped inside. Other, remoter threats might also be realised.
A material like LNG may not be an attractive tool for terrorists on its
own, but a supply chain consisting of ships dispersed across the oceans,
200-300 miles apart, departing and arriving at terminals and transiting
chokepoints on predictable schedules that are set contractually years in ad-
vance, could be severely damaged by an attack on an LNG carrier and the
threat of more. e prospect of achieving a level of disruption that would
send tremors not only throughout the target economy but also through all
economies dependent on similar supply chains, could excite a terrorist’s in-
terest in LNG or another similar resource, despite the practical challenges it
presents. Likewise, while the detonation of explosive devices in ports or on
board ships, or on ships rammed into offshore or coastal terminals where
oil was loaded or discharged—all very difficult to achieve—might not in-
dividually be especially disruptive, cumulatively they could, if successful,
reach a level that would weaken the maritime transport system sufficiently
to shake confidence in the security of the world’s supply chains for energy,
raw materials and finished goods.
Such potential weaknesses in the commercial maritime transport system
demand serious attention, but there will always be limits to what can be
achieved if the system is to remain efficient. Given these limitations, the in-
dustry, its customers and the public at large need to recognise that terrorists
may well succeed and that if they do, strategies, plans and resources needs
to be in place to minimise the damage and disruption. e attractiveness
of “confidence” as a target needs to be reduced. Resilience needs to replace
fragility by managing the shock and controlling the fear upon which ter-
rorists depend. e alternative is that as the volume of trade transported
by sea increases, and the sea’s resources are exploited with greater inten-
sity, the system’s vulnerabilities to disruption, including disruption by ter-
ror attacks, will have correspondingly greater implications for the world’s
economy and security.
402
small boats, weak states, dirty money
Maritime insurgency. prognoses of the future of maritime terrorism have
usually been “more of the same”, but with larger explosions and more
deaths. ese could prove to be accurate but begs the question: what would
induce insurgent or terrorist groups to invest their limited resources in try-
ing to overcome the manifest functional difficulties of operating at sea?
David Kilcullen is one writer who has talked about complex irregular
warfare and the way in which its practitioners can exploit the sort of clut-
tered physical, human and informational environment found in the litto-
rals that can degrade Western target acquisition systems.
82
he wrote with
the growing size and number of undifferentiated cityscapes in mind. Other
environments have the same effect. Coastal waters and the contiguous lit-
torals offer good cover: a combination of the wild terrain associated tradi-
tionally with guerrilla operations and crowded environments more akin to
the habitat of urban terrorists.
83
As Commodore Simon Williams of the
Royal Navy put it, maritime patrol operations are “…really no different
than civil-military contacts in Baghdad or Ramadi…At sea, the houses are
fishing grounds. e streets are traditional sea lanes…”
84
Rough coasts and
rough water can hide movement as well as rough country, particularly as
both can frustrate and distort radar, sonar and communications signals.
Beaches crowded with people, and offshore waters crowded with pleasure
craft and fishing boats, can offer insurgents cover similar to city streets. In
the past irregular fighters put distance between themselves and their en-
emies by mounting raids from bases in mountains and jungles. Now they
prefer to hide in densely populated cities close to their targets. Density, not
distance, is now the key to irregular war fighting.
85
If—and only if—circumstances changed on land, terrorists might wish
or need to operate more at sea. Two scenarios—an increased use of “sea
bases” by uS and possibly other forces, and a major political shift taking
place in a coastal region that fortifies terrorist, particularly jihadist, pres-
82 ‘Complex Irregular Warfare: e Face of Contemporary Conflict, e Military
Balance, 2005-2006. London: Routledge for the IISS, 2005, p. 414; Frank.G.
hoffman, ‘Complex Irregular Warfare: e Next Revolution in Military Af-
fairs’, Orbis, vol. 50, no. 3, Summer 2006, pp. 395-411.
83 Martin N. Murphy, ‘Suppression of piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Suitable
Role for a Navy?’ NWCR, vol. 60, no. 3, 2007, pp. 35.
84 Quoted in Jim Garamone
, ‘Maritime ops in Middle East have deterrent effect’,
American Forces Information Service News Articles, 27 April 2006.
85 Frank G. hoffman, ‘Small Wars Revisited: e united States and Nontradi-
tional Wars’, e Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 6, Dec. 2005, pp. 923
& 931.
403
assessing the threat
sures—exemplify the kinds of development that might lead to an increase
in the incidence of maritime insurgency.
86
All military forces need rear areas where they can rest, repair and re-
cuperate. In expeditionary war such areas can be difficult to secure. ey
present the defender with large, static and valuable targets either for air
and missile strikes or for Special Forces and insurgent raids. e solution
which has been proposed and is being developed enthusiastically by mari-
time powers is the concept of the “sea base”.
87
In essence the “rear area” will
operate at sea out of sight of land. It will consist of a collection of vessels
that are capable of sustaining the land operation. Carriers, surface vessels
and submarines will provide air and fire support. Supplies and reinforce-
ments will be ferried into the theatre using landing craft and vertical lift
aircraft which on the return run will bring back casualties for treatment and
troops on rotation. e “sea base” will in turn be the focus of the supply
lines from secure homeland or out of theatre base areas. e sea base will be
mobile. It will move close to shore when needed and retire deeper into the
ocean if threatened. If will be protected by the full panoply of naval force:
carrier-borne air power, surface AAW and ASW, and submarines. e size
of the base will be tailored to the demands of the mission.
88
Some sense of
how it will operate was provided by the collection of naval vessels includ-
ing a Carrier Strike Group, an Expeditionary Strike Group, maritime pre-
positioning ships and a hospital ship that assembled off Aceh in 2005 to
provide post-tsunami relief.
89
e origins of the concept might have lain in concerns over the vulner-
ability of “in theatre” base areas to nuclear bombardment, but its develop-
ment has also been coloured by the experience of hizbollah’s attack on
the uS Marine base in Beirut in 1983, when two truck bombs killed 241
American and 58 French servicemen, prompting the peacekeeping force to
86 is section has been shaped by a valuable discussion with David Kilcullen,
Sept. 2006.
87 Jason Sherman, ‘pentagon group details Sea Base concept’, Defense News, 13
Aug. 2001.
88 For a history of the concept see Robert O. Work,’On Sea Basing’ in Carnes Lord
(ed),, Reposturing the Force: US Overseas Presence in the Twenty-first Century, Naval
War College Newport Papers 26, Feb. 2006, pp. 95-101; Geoffrey Till, Naval
Transformation, Ground Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse: e Sea-Basing De-
bate, e Letort papers. Carlisle, pA: uS Army War College, Dec. 2006.
89 ‘uS 7
th
Fleet to provide naval support for Aceh province’, Navy Newsstand, 1
Jan. 2005.
404
small boats, weak states, dirty money
withdraw. e belief is that if such headquarters and supply facilities are
positioned at sea this vulnerability will be avoided.
As conceived originally, sea bases were not intended for long term de-
ployments; however, it is possible that the uS might have no option but to
use them in this way. If the “long war” against global jihad is to be waged
then the main theatres are likely to be in Central Asia, the Caucasus, the
Middle East, parts of South and Southeast Asia, Northeast Africa including
the horn, the North African littoral and the Gulf of Guinea. Given not
only the vulnerability of land bases but also the political hostility to which
they can give rise, positioning bases offshore to support the various sub-
conflicts would be an attractive option.
It has been suggested, for example, that uS forces could continue to
support indigenous Iraqi security forces following a Coalition withdrawal
by operating from a sea base. Such a base would need to be positioned
either in the northern persian Gulf or in the eastern Mediterranean. Both,
however, are narrow seas already well frequented by insurgent maritime
activity. It is possible that such a transfer of key American assets from the
land to the sea would give insurgents and terrorists in these regions the
incentive to develop a greater maritime attack capability in order to be
able to harass or disrupt the operation of the sea base, possibly with state
support. Nevertheless, the difficulties of operating at sea that are typically
experienced by non-state actors would remain, and the target would have
very sophisticated defences. A sea base is less vulnerable than a base on land
and it is likely that terrorists would take a long time to amass the maritime
expertise necessary to effectively confront one directly, if they were able to
do so; but as experience with land bases has shown, the expense and the fa-
tigue induced by uninterruptedly high alert levels reduce military efficiency
and discourage reenlistment. e sea base’s natural response, which would
be to retire to deeper water, would increase transit times and costs and pos-
sibly impair its effectiveness.
While the maritime terror threat is at present minor, there are indi-
cations that insurgent activity is increasing in some coastal regions: the
Indian Navy, for example, is concerned about the threat of “seaborne ter-
rorist strikes against its vast coastline, including [against] strategic offshore
and onshore installations”. According to Chief Admiral Sureesh Mehta,
the security situation across the entire Indian Ocean has become “complex,
fluid and significantly challenging”, with a “dramatic increase in asymmet-
405
assessing the threat
ric threats”.
90
is is a view with which the uS concurs.
91
When maritime
terrorism is seen through a wider lens, the most significant challenge may
well come in the future from jihadist groups. One of the distinguishing
features of jihadist terrorism is its global outlook. Jihadist organisations
such as Al Qaeda are skilled at opening new fronts in their war where they
detect opportunity, observe weakness or are able to build local alliances.
92
Sheik Abu-Bakar Naji, reputedly Al-Qaeda’s chief theoretician, has writ-
ten about the need to extend the jihadist conflict to anywhere in the world
with a significant Muslim presence and to create parallel societies alongside
existing ones, a formulation that echoes Williams’ discussion of “formal”
and “informal” states co-existing within a single border.
93
New instability
in a given state, or other kinds of political change as in Somalia or in the
Malaysian-philippine-Indonesian maritime “tri-border” region, might al-
low jihadists to operate with greater freedom than they do at present.
94
If
such changes took place in regions where the sea offered significant strate-
gic opportunities, such groups might be inclined to invest in developing a
maritime capability to supplement and support their strengthened presence
on land, perhaps looking to the LTTE’s Sea Tigers as a model.
95
‘Chatter’
90 ‘Navy gears up for sea-borne terrorist attack’, Rediff.com, 29 May 2007; also
Neelesh Misra and Rahul Singh, ‘Terror alarm along India’s coastline’, Hin-
dustan Times, 12 March 2007; ‘Terror threat from the seas real: Antony’, Zee
News, 11 March 2008 and ‘Maritime terrorism gains roots in Indian Ocean’.
e Times of India, 9 August 2008.
91 ‘India’s fears of terrorists using sea routes well-grounded: uS’, e Times of In-
dia, 24 Aug. 2007.
92 Bruce hoffman, ‘Remember Al Qaeda? ey’re baaack’, LA Times, 20 Feb.
2007; Josh Meyer, ‘Al Qaeda ‘co-opts’ new affiliates’, LA Times, 16 Sept. 2007;
Coughlin, ‘Al Qaeda ‘as strong today as it was on 9/11’’.
93 Amir Taheri. ‘Al Qaeda’s plan B’. New York Post, 1 July 2008; Williams. From
the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age, p. 13.
94 See the comment on this area as a safe haven in uS Department of State,
Country Reports on Terrorism, 2006 available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/
crt/2006/82728.htm. Also the relevant chapters by Rabasa and Chalk in Raba-
sa, et al. Ungoverned Territories. For more specific comments on the ‘tri-border’
region see Kim Cragin, et al. Sharing the Dragon’s Teeth: Terrorist Groups and the
Exchange of New Technologies. Santa Monica: RAND, 2007, pp. 23-46; ‘South-
east Asia’s tri-border black spot’ and Storey, ‘e Triborder Sea Area: Maritime
Southeast Asia’s ungovered Space’.
95 See, for example, the remarks of the head of the Canadian navy, Vice Admiral
Drew Robertson: ‘Navy will have to learn to fight terrorists and pirates: admi-
ral’, e Canadian Press, 16 Sept. 2007.
406
small boats, weak states, dirty money
on jihadist websites indicates they are not blind to these possibilities.
96
Naji
writes about attacking seaports while the al-Qaeda strategist Al-Suri writes
about attacking chokepoints such as the Straits of hormuz and the Bar el
Mandeib specifically, about targeting ships and of blocking passages using
“mines and sinking ships in them, or by threatening the movement there by
piracy, martyrdom operations and by the power of weapons”.
97
To begin with, the focus would be on developing greater capacity to
move cadres, equipment and funds. ough the possibility of jihadist in-
surgents developing anything more substantial than an enhanced logistical
ability at sea might seem remote, time and again terrorist and insurgent
organisations have been able to depend on the scepticism of military and
other analysts about their capabilities and determination to spring success-
ful surprises. e attacks of 9/11 should have undermined this tendency to
underestimate terrorist capabilities; so too should the IDF’s experience at
the hands of hizbullah in 2006, when it encountered a sophisticated and
elaborate layered defensive system that it had never known existed.
98
With this experience in mind, we might expect terrorists and insurgents
in maritime theatres, emboldened by major successes on land, to build
on existing maritime expertise to become able eventually to harass com-
mercial and naval traffic to a degree that hindered its free movement and
made certain coastal regions high-risk areas for all kinds of vessel.
99
Such
an elaboration of insurgent capability at sea could take place in the eastern
Mediterranean, off the horn of Africa (including Yemen),
100
or in South-
96 ‘Jihadist website commentary argues ‘maritime terrorism’ strategic necessity’,
Biyokulule Online, 29 April 2008. is website is a known venue for supporters
rather than operatives but similar rhetoric has been noted on extremist sites
that are associated more closely with Al Qaeda. A summary of the contents of
this posting can also be found at ‘Al-Qaeda Affiliated E-Journal: ‘e Sea is e
Next Strategic Step Towards Controlling e World And Restoring e Islamic
Caliphate’’, MEMRI, 1 May 2008.
97 Lia. Architect of Global Jihad, p. 401.
98 Andrew Exum, ‘hizballah at War: A Military Assessment’, e Washington In-
stitute for Near East Policy, policy Focus, no. 63, 12 Dec. 2006; ‘hizbullah’s
Islamic Resistance’, Jane’s TSM, 13 Sept. 2006.
99 In Rohan Gunaratna’s view ‘most threat groups with access to water move (over
time) from conducting support operations to guiding surface and underwater
attack capabilities’: Gunaratna, ‘e asymmetric threat from maritime terror-
ism’, p. 88. is book argues that this progression is possible under certain
political circumstances but is neither as automatic nor as straightforward as this
statement implies.
100 Yemen appears to be particularly vulnerable. See Michael Knights, ‘Jihadist par-