he could see no professional alternative are all likely factors in his decision to
commit himself to what at that point was hardly a promising cause. In
addition we see a character trait emerging that was to manifest itself
repeatedly in Himmler’s political life: failure led him neither to give up
nor to turn back, but rather to redouble his efforts in pursuing the goal he
had set himself, even if he was to learn to do this in a very flexible manner
that corresponded to the power relations at the time. It was precisely these
features of his personality that made him persevere with the NSDAP in the
coming lean years and made him appear suitable for a ‘soldierly’ role within
the party’s paramilitary activities. After a few years as a rural agitator and
then as a low-ranking official in the Munich Party Office, and still under the
wing of his mentor Gregor Strasser, in 1927 he became deputy Reichsfu
¨
hrer
of the protection squads, who acted as bodyguards to party members. From
the perspective of the party leadership it made sense to place the organiza-
tion of speaking engagements by prominent party members (for which
Himmler, as deputy Reich propaganda chief, was responsible) and their
protection in the same hands. Although up to this point he had frequently
failed to make a good impression, it was in this position that he finally
showed what he could do, and at the beginning of 1929 the leadership of the
still fairly insignificant SS fell into his lap.
Himmler now set about building up the SS, which at the point when he
took it over comprised only a few hundred members, into the National
Socialist movement’s second paramilitary organization. He was helped in
this by the long-standing conflict between the party leadership and the SA,
which erupted twice, in the summer of 1930 and the spring of 1931, into
revolts, above all on the part of the Berlin SA. On both occasions Himmler
placed the SS at the party’s disposal as a reliable means of protection.
Though the SS remained subordinate to the SA leadership under Ro
¨
hm,
his old mentor, Himmler was nevertheless successful in making the SS stand
out as clearly distinct from the SA. His SS was more disciplined, did not
provoke the party, and, by contrast with the ruffians in the SA, saw itself as
an elite, a feature that manifested itself not least in what purported to be
racial criteria for acceptance and permission to marry. Himmler regarded
the SS as the racial vanguard for future ‘Blood and Soil’ policies, a claim
he strengthened through his alliance with Richard Walther Darre
´
, the
party’s agrarian expert and settlement ideologue. In contrast to the ideal of
rough, unfettered masculinity propagated by the SA, Himmler advanced the
deliberately ‘soldierly’ image of the SS man, who should, if possible, be head
740 conclusion