Longerich Peter. Heinrich Himmler: A Life
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the Navy, on 12 February he appointed him head of Department IV
(Administration) in the SS Office, backdated to 1 February.
123
When Himmler took over the Prussian Gestapa in April 1934 he once
again moved back to Berlin from Munich, taking Heydrich with him. The
SS leadership then gradually followed and took up residence in the Prince
Albrecht Palace. This building was to become the synonym for the secret
police of the Nazi state.
124
The foundations for the terror system had
been laid.
The 30 June and its consequences
Himmler had understood how to utilize the complicated and tense domes-
tic political situation that existed in 1933–4 to secure control of the political
police departments of the federal states. It was his services in the violent
‘resolution’ of this tangled situation that were to create the conditions for
enabling the Reichsfu
¨
hrer-SS to achieve a central position of power within
the Nazi regime that was neither constantly challenged nor limited by other
major Nazi figures.
Given the opaque domestic political constellation that existed at the time,
the prehistory of 30 June is a complex one. It can briefly be summarized as
follows: broadly speaking, there was a mood of discontent in the country.
A year after the takeover of power the economic crisis had still not been
solved: only about a third of the 6 million unemployed had found work. The
results of the first elections to the ‘Councils of Trust’ in the factories had
been so bad for the Nazis that they were never published. There was
disappointment among the rural population because the inheritance law
that had been introduced, with its regulations restricting the transfer of
farms, had limited the opportunities for accessing credit, while the new
marketing system introduced under the auspices of the ‘Reich Food Estate’,
with its prescribed prices and compulsory measures, was felt to be unjust.
Both Catholics and Protestants were disturbed by the regime’s religious
policies, and the ‘bossy’ behaviour of party functionaries was prompting an
increasing number of complaints. There was not much left of the mood of
optimism about a new start that had gripped a section of the population in
1933.
125
Against the background of this tense situation the SA represented an
additional dangerous source of discontent.
126
In the middle of 1934 the Nazi
170 takeo ver of the political police
Party’s army consisted of around 4.5 million members, approximately nine
times as many as there had been in January 1933. This huge increase was not
only the result of the influx of new members after the seizure of power, but
also, and above all, a consequence of the incorporation of right-wing
paramilitary organizations such as the Stahlhelm.
Relying on this huge, albeit heterogeneous and relatively undisciplined,
force, the SA leadership under Ro
¨
hm now endeavoured to secure its own
share of the Nazi state. It had at least managed to achieve the appointment of
SA commissars to the state machine, to begin the arming of sections of the
SA, as well as to secure the state financing of SA staffs. On 1 December 1933
Ro
¨
hm had been appointed a Reich minister. However, despite these suc-
cesses it was still unclear how this emerging SA empire was to be integrated
into the new Nazi state. The SA leadership combined this unresolved claim
to power with repeated and threatening demands for a ‘second revolution’.
During 1933–4 the rowdy behaviour of the SA, its numerous acts of
violence and infringements of the law, which now that political opponents
had been suppressed were directed mainly against the general public, were
increasingly becoming a public nuisance and underlined the storm-troopers’
aggressive potential.
Above all, however, Ro
¨
hm posed a threat to the Reichswehr’s role as the
organization primarily responsible for the defence of the Reich. While
initially there had been agreement between the Reichswehr and the SA
that the latter would concentrate mainly on pre-military training and
strengthening frontier defences, the SA leadership soon began planning to
create an armed militia which, had these plans been realized, would have
reduced the Reichswehr to a mere training organization within an SA
people’s army.
On 28 February 1934 Hitler made an announcement to the leadership of
the SA and the Wehrmacht in which he rejected the SA’s extensive military
ambitions; he ordered it to reach an agreement with the Reichswehr that
would restrict the SA to auxiliary military functions. Although Ro
¨
hm signed
the agreement, immediately after this event he made it clear to his leadership
corps that he was by no means prepared to abide by it. And these statements
were passed on to Hess.
127
Meanwhile, conservatives were hoping that the conflict with the SA
could be utilized to win back lost ground from the Nazis in the governing
coalition and conceivably to reintroduce the monarchy following the
takeover of the political police 171
anticipated demise of Hindenburg, who was 86 years old. These opponents
were banking primarily on the Vice-Chancellor, von Papen.
At the beginning of 1934, the opponents of the SA—party, Gestapa, and
Reichswehr—began to mobilize. Rudolf Diels, the head of the Prussian
Gestapa, claimed in his memoirs to have been given the task by Hitler of
collecting material against the SA. At the beginning of February the leader-
ship of the R eichswehr gave identical instructions to their subordinates.
128
After Himmler and Heydrich had taken over the Gestapa in April the search
for compromising material was evidently intensified.
129
The Reichswehr
also began a propaganda campaign in April in which the army was pro-
claimed as the nation’s ‘sole bearer of arms’, an obvious affront to the SA.
130
In May the military agencies were once more instructed to report on
breaches by the SA of the agreement reached in February.
131
In the same
month the Gestapo and the Intelligence Department in the War Ministry
began a loose cooperation, exchanging information about the SA.
132
Wer-
ner Best, who had been appointed head of the SD’s organization in March,
also concentrated on acquiring information about the SA in addition to his
task of reorganizing and building up the SD headquarters, which at that time
was still based in Munich.
133
At the same time, Ro
¨
hm, who was not
oblivious to these activities, gave instructions to collect material concerning
‘activities hostile to the SA’.
134
At the beginning of June a new situation began to emerge: Hindenburg,
who was seriously ill, withdrew to his estate in East Prussia. This meant that
the most important ally of the conservatives had become more or less
incapable of action. On 11 May the NSDAP had already begun a major
propaganda campaign against ‘grumblers and carpers’, which was now
significantly intensified. The target was obvious: the party was focusing
on its critics among the bourgeoisie. However, at the beginning of June a
lengthy personal conversation had taken place between Hitler and Ro
¨
hm,
which the latter at least is likely to have taken as a sign of an easing of
tension. He went off to a spa for a cure and ordered the SA to go ‘on leave’
for the month of July.
135
The fact that nevertheless, in the middle of June, the situation became
critical was not so much down to Ro
¨
hm but was due rather to an initiative by
von Papen. On 17 June he made a widely reported speech at the University
of Marburg in which he sharply criticized the Nazis’ arbitrary and terroristic
rule. When the Propaganda Ministry blocked the distribution of the speech
von Papen threatened Hitler that he would offer his resignation to the Reich
172 takeo ver of the political police
President. This had the effect of transforming his actions into a government
crisis. For von Papen’s resignation would have threatened the continuation
of the coalition between the Nazis and the conservatives, and this might
have prompted Hindenburg to galvanize himself and dismiss Hitler as Reich
Chancellor. The regime was not yet sufficiently stable, however, to survive
such a step without suffering damage.
Hitler solved the crisis by directing his actions not primarily against the
conservatives but rather against the SA. He calculated that by neutralizing
the SA leadership he would solve the combination of domestic political
problems at one stroke: the mass of discontented SA men would lose their
spokesmen, the threat of a ‘second revolution’ would have been removed,
the issue of control over the armed forces would be resolved, the majority of
the population would be relieved by the elimination of this source of
trouble, and the alliance between the Nazis and the conservative elites
would emerge strengthened from these events. Insofar as it could be
portrayed as the crushing of an alleged coup, the conservatives would be
prepared to tolerate the exclusion or even liquidation of a few conservative
critics.
Thus, at the end of June 1934 the trap was closing on the SA leadership.
Practical preparations for its elimination had already been made at the
beginning of the month. Theodor Eicke, the commandant of Dachau,
had carried out a practice deployment of SS troops in the Munich area. At
the end of June the SS and SD Oberabschnitt commanders assembled in the
Bavarian capital, where Himmler and Heydrich informed them that an SA
revolt was about to happen; appropriate ‘counter-measures’ were then set in
train.
136
There is evidence that the Reichswehr was making similar pre-
parations to deal with this scenario.
137
On 30 June Ro
¨
hm and other high-ranking SA leaders were arrested at
Bad Wiessee, where Ro
¨
hm was staying on holiday. Similar arrests occurred
in Silesia, Berlin, and other places. Around 150 to 200 people were
execu ted: apart from numerous SA leaders, there were conservat ive po li-
ticians, notably the former Reich Chancellor, General vo n Schleicher,
Vice- Chancellor von Papen’s associates Herbert von Bose and Edgar
Jung, as wel l as the former head of the police department in the Prussian
Interior Ministry and leading representative of the Catholic lay organiza-
tion Catholic A ction, Erich Klausener. Moreover, a number of o ld scores
were settled. Gu stav Ritter von Kahr, who, w hile acting as Bavarian State
Commi ssar, had prevented the Hitler putsch in November 1923;the
takeover of the political police 173
publisher Fritz Gerlich, who was a strong critic of the Nazis; and Gregor
Strasser, who had not been forgiven fo r his behind-the-scenes conta cts
with S chleicher in December 1932—all fell victim to the SS execution
squads. There was at least one case of mistaken identity, namely the
Munich music cri tic Eduard Schmidt, murdered because he was confused
with someone with the same name.
In this conflict between the party, the party’s army, the regular army, and
the conservative elites Himmler, who as Reichsfu
¨
hrer-SS was still subordi-
nate to Ro
¨
hm, had succeeded in joining the right side in time without
compromising himself in any way. He had played a not-insignificant part in
carrying out the ‘action’, without appearing to have intrigued against Ro
¨
hm
and his associates.
In the cases of Ernst Ro
¨
hm and Gregor Strasser, Himmler had authorized
the murder by his subordinates of the two men who had laid the founda-
tions of his career and with whom he had had good personal relations. If
Himmler had needed to demonstrate his absolute loyalty to Hitler, he had
surely done so with his actions on 30 June 1934.
138
The neutralization of the SA leadership represented a huge increase in
Himmler’s power. As Ulrich Herbert put it, his SS had emerged ‘as a new
power centre within the regime and as the real victor’ of the ‘Ro
¨
hm affair’.
139
This was the main result of the sudden alteration that had occurred in the
overall balance of power within the regime. Himmler’s enormous political
gain from the 30 June was in marked contrast to the subordinate role he had
played in the power struggle that preceded the upheaval. Himmler’s new
role was evident above all in the changes that then occurred.
On 15 July the regulation that had already been issued by the Fu
¨
hrer’s
Deputy, according to which the SD was declared the sole authorized
intelligence service for the Party, came into effect. On 20 July Hitler
ordered that the SS be removed from the SA’s organization and that in
future it should be autonomous, and he justified this move with specific
reference to the ‘great services’ rendered by the SS ‘in connection with the
events of 30 June’.
140
From June 1934 onwards the Leibstandarte and the armed political action
squads (politische Bereitschaften) developed into the SS-Verfu
¨
gungstruppe or
Armed SS, the predecessor of the Waffen-SS. Eicke, who had been ap-
pointed Inspector of Concentration Camps and commander of the guard
units on 4 July, was made responsible for supervising all the concentration
174 takeo ver of the political police
camps throughout the Reich, and began to create a second armed force (the
Death’s Head units) from the guards. A central office for coordinating the
political police commanders of the federal states had already been created
within the Gestapa in May, an important step towards the unification of the
political police under Himmler. It could now begin to be developed into an
effective instrument.
141
Himmler’s position was still not unchallenged, however. Frick continued
to hold the view that the new instruments of repression, which the so-called
Third Reich had created and transferred to Himmler—the autonomous
Gestapo, the concentration camps that had been subordinated to it imme-
diately after 30 June, as well as the practice of protective custody—were
merely temporary phenomena which, after a general normalization of the
Ill. 10. Himmler enjoyed visiting the concen tration camps he controlled, as in
this case where he is photographed visiting Dachau in May 1935. Such visits also
enabled him to convince groups of high-ranking visitors that the inmates were
being subjected to a strict but fair regime. But in fact he was well informed about
the reality of the prisoners’ inhumane treatment and the numerous murders.
takeover of the political police 175
situation had occurred, should once again be strictly subordinated to the
state administration.
142
Coming immediately after the emasculation of the SA, however, the
timing for a move against this emerging concentration of power in Himm-
ler’s hands was exceptionally unfavourable, and Go
¨
ring soon put an end to
it. When Frick instructed the state governments no longer to cooperate
with ‘unofficial persons’, that is to say, the SD, Go
¨
ring immediately and
brusquely rejected this as far as the sphere of the Gestapo was concerned, in
other words for Prussia, and in doing so referred explicitly to the events of
30 June.
143
Himmler responded more cautiously and cooperatively. He
issued an order restricting the cooperation of the SD with the Gestapo to
the passing on of information. Moreover, the SD was forbidden to perform
executive functions.
144
Go
¨
ring, for his part, began a move against Frick. In a message to the heads
of the Stapo offices, the provincial governors, and district governors of 6
July 1934 he emphasized that the Gestapo was to remain ‘an autonomous
part of the internal administration’ that he considered ‘of great importance
for the stability of the new state’. The heads of the Gestapo offices should
operate closely with the district governors, but obey their directives only if
there were no instructions to the contrary from the Gestapa or from him.
145
Frick, acting in his capacity as Reich Interior Minister, then responded by
ordering that all state governments, as well as all provincial governors and
district governors in Prussia, should send in monthly reports on the political
situation, since the creation of a ‘special political police’ had by no means
absolved them of their political responsibilities.
146
Go
¨
ring conceded the
point, and a few days later Frick too back-pedalled. He agreed to Go
¨
ring’s
regulation of 6 July, since the latter had explained to him that it was a
temporary measure.
147
This meant that the Gestapo had succeeded in maintaining its position as
an autonomous agency in the state of Prussia, w hile the district governors,
as heads of the internal administration, were still permitted to send political
situation reports to the Interior Ministry, so that in certain circumstances
ther e could be a counterbalance to the reports of the Gestapo. It was only
in 1936, after his appointment as Chief of the German Police, that Himm-
ler was able to put an end to this d ual system.
176 takeo ver of the political police
The abortive Vienna putsch
The 30 June 1934 was, however, also the starting-point for a painful defeat
for the SS: the abortive Nazi putsch in Austria of July 1934, in which the SS
played a major role.
148
From the spring of 1933 onwards there had been tension between the
authoritarian clerical regime of the Austrian Chancellor, Engelbert Dollfuss,
and Nazi Germany. In May the Reich introduced the ‘thousand-mark
barrier’, a fee of a thousand marks for a visa for those wishing to visit
Austria. The following month Dollfuss banned the Austrian NSDAP. The
response was a wave of terror attacks by Austrian Nazis, supported by
Germany.
In July 1934 a group of Austrian Nazis, including the ‘State Inspector’ of
the Austrian NSDAP, Theodor Habicht, and the leader of the local SA,
Hermann Reschny, organized a putsch.
149
The aim was to arrest the
members of the Dollfuss government during a cabinet meeting and to
replace them with a new cabinet under a Nazi member, Anton Rintelen.
Since the Dollfuss government had suspended parliament in 1933 and had
issued a new constitution the following year, the putschists hoped that his
government would not be regarded as legitimate, so that substantial sections
of the police (who to a considerable extent had been infiltrated by the
Nazis) and of the army would switch sides. The new cabinet would then
secure Anschluss (unification) with the Reich.
Naturally, the Austrian Nazis were not operating on their own. On 22
July they had their plans approved by Hitler, as is clear from a note in his
diary by Goebbels, who was present at the meeting: ‘Austrian question.
Will it succeed? I’m very sceptical.’
150
The success of the plan depended
very much on the effectiveness of a Viennese SS unit, the SS-Standarte 89.
This ‘military Standarte’, originally an SA formation, which consisted of
active soldiers and police or those who had been dismissed for their
political activities, had subordinated itself to Himmler in the spring of
1934 without the permission of the SA leadership, thereby creating much
bad blood within the Austrian SA.
151
This action was now to come home
to roost.
On 25 July a unit of the Standarte 89 occupied the Federal Chancellery on
the Ballhausplatz, where the cabinet was meeting. However, since the plot
takeover of the political police 177
had been betrayed, most of the ministers had managed to leave the building
beforehand. A squad under the leadership of a former NCO of the Federal
Army, Otto Planetta, was nevertheless able to seize the Federal Chancellor,
Dollfuss. In circumstances that have never been explained, in the course of a
struggle he was, however, seriously injured by two gunshot wounds and
died three hours later, without receiving either the medical attention or
spiritual support that he had requested.
152
The circumstances of the murder
of Dollfuss in particular were to confirm the international image of the SS as
an utterly inhumane and ruthless organization: SS members had violently,
and under degrading conditions, brought about the agonizing death of the
head of a sovereign state. Dollfuss, a controversial and decidedly right-wing
politician, had become a martyr murdered by the SS.
153
During the course of 25 July it became apparent that the security forces
did not support the intended change of regime. The police, army, and
paramilitary Heimwehr besieged the Chancellery, and that evening the
putschists surrendered on the basis of an assurance that they could travel
unhindered to Germany. In view of the murder of Dollfuss, however, the
Austrian government did not feel itself bound by that assurance. Seven
putschists, including Planetta, were condemned to death and executed.
154
Nevertheless, numerous Nazis in the Austrian provinces, particularly in
Carinthia and Styria, interpreted the events in Vienna as the signal for a
general uprising. In a number of places fights broke out between SA, SS,
other Nazi militias and the police and army, as well as the Heimwehr, which
was called up as a ‘defence force’. By the end of the month the forces of the
state had managed to emerge as victors. A detailed analysis of these events
has shown that one reason for the failure of the putsch was that the Nazis did
not proceed in a coordinated fashion under a united leadership.
155
Hitler
distanced himself from the affair and ordered the dissolution of the Austrian
NSDAP.
The abortive coup had repercussions for years in the form of intrigues and
mutual recriminations.
156
The mistrust between SS and SA that had turned
into enmity as a result of the events of 30 June had contributed to the failure
of the operation. Although the Austrian SA had promised the plotters its
support in principle, the Viennese SA had failed to come to the assistance of
their unpopular SS comrades, while for their part the putschists had ignored
the SA in their preparations because its involvement would have under-
mined the autonomy of their actions.
157
A case was brought against
Georg Reschny, the leader of the Austrian SA, before the Supreme Party
178 takeo ver of the political police
Court on the grounds of his alleged betrayal of the putsch, but was dropped
at Himmler’s request for fear of implicating other high-ranking party
leaders.
158
It was not until four years later, in April 1938, directly after the Anschluss
with Austria, that Himmler ordered a thoroughgoing investigation of these
events. The ‘Reichsfu
¨
hrer-SS’s Historical Commission Concerning the
Uprising of the Austrian National Socialists in July 1934’, which was chaired
by Heydrich, finally concluded that the SA leadership had regarded the
takeover of the Standarte by the SS as ‘a betrayal of the SA’.
159
‘The tension
between a section of the SA leadership and the SS, which then emerged into
the open in the Reich on 30 June 1934, also became evident in Austria. This
also explains the attitude the SA leadership in Austria later adopted towards
the plans for the uprising.’
160
However, the extent to which the SA bore
actual blame for the collapse of the putsch attempt was understandably not
discussed in detail in the report, and nor was it in the end assessed. Instead,
betrayal, technical mistakes, and cock-ups were blamed for the failure.
Significantly, the exact circumstances of Dollfuss’s murder could also not
(or were not intended to) be clarified.
takeover of the political police 179