Lieven D. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 2: Imperial Russia, 1689-1917

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Foreign policy and the armed forces

costly) adaptation to the realities of warfare in eastern, central and southern

Europe.

A reliable source of military manpower was a central feature of that system.

In 1705 Peter introduced a new approach to conscription that, with modiﬁca-

tions, was to endure until 1874. The country was divided into blocks of twenty

peasant households, and in every year each was required to supply a man

who was drafted for life into the army’s ranks. Serf owners, and in some cases

village communities themselves, were to make the selection. Of course, Peter

soon ignored the limits that the law of 1705 placed on military reinforcement,

and on numerous occasions both arbitrarily raised the numbers of draftees

called up and decreed additional special levies in response to the progress of

the war.

The recruiting procedures laid down in 1705 (as well as the frantic

deviations from them) resulted in the induction of over 300,000 men over

the next twenty years.

Despite its unfair and capricious implementation, this

method of recruitment stabilised under Peter’s successors. In 1775 Catherine

the Great changed the basic unit of conscription to the block of 500 peasant

males from which one recruit per year was exacted in peace, but as many as

ﬁve in wartime. In 1793 she also capped a private soldier’s military service at

twenty-ﬁve years, a measure that produced only a tiny class of retired veterans,

as the majority of recruits died or were disabled long before then. The basic

concept of the Petrine draft – compelling predetermined units of peasants to

replenish the army’s ranks on a crudely regular schedule – remained in place.

The system worked well enough to furnish the Russian army with more than

2 million soldiers between 1725 and 1801.

Because of the dramatic increase

in the population of the empire over the century, even larger intakes were

possible in times of crisis.

The recruitment system not only made it feasible for Russia to raise a

large army but also gave that army some qualities that differentiated it from

armies in the West. The ﬁrst of these was the simple fact that it was wholly

conscripted, not partially hired. Until the French Revolution, most of the

great European powers maintained armies that included large proportions of

highly trained professional mercenaries. And mercenaries, however skilled,

manifested an alarming propensity to desert. The military manuals of the day

strongly advised against marching forces by night, or moving in the immediate

3 Lindsey Hughes, Russia in the Age of Peter the Great (New Haven and London: Yale Uni-

versity Press, 1998), pp. 68–9.

4 William C. Fuller Jr, Strategy and Power in Russia 1600–1914 (New York: Free Press, 1992),

pp. 45–6.

5 John L. H. Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar: Army and Society in Russia 1462–1874(Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1985), pp. 145, 165.

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vicinity of swamps and dense forests, in order to diminish the risk of mass

ﬂight. By contrast, Russia’s post-Petrine commanders routinely engaged in

all of these manoeuvres, since the rates of desertion from the Russian army

were considerably lower than those that obtained in the French, Prussian or

Austrian ones.

This ought not to be taken to suggest that military service was popular

in rural Russia. Although a serf became legally ‘free’ when he entered the

army, conscription was a species of death. The recruit was torn away from

his native village, severed from the company of his family and his friends, and

was well aware that the chances were that he would never return to them.

Indeed, it became the custom for village women to lament the departure of

the recruits with the singing of funeral dirges.

Once a soldier had completed

his preliminary training and joined his regiment, he entered a milieu in which

irregular pay, shortage of supplies, epidemic disease and brutal discipline were

all too common.

Yet to enter military service was also in a sense to be reborn, for in the

soldier’s artel the Russian army possessed a powerful instrument for socialising

recruits and building group cohesion. Every unit in the army was subdivided

into artels, communal associations of eight to ten men who trained, messed,

worked and fought together. The artel functioned both as a military and

economic organisation, for it held the money its members acquired from

plunder, extra pay and hiring themselves out as labourers. In a sense, the artel

became a soldier’s new family, and it is signiﬁcant that in the event of his death

it was his comrades in the artel, rather than his kinfolk, who inherited his share

of the property. Artels, which also functioned at the company and regimental

level, were reminiscent of the peasant associations back home with which

the recruit was already familiar, and consequently assisted his adjustment to

the rigours of his new environment and helped persuade him that the state’s

military system was legitimate.

The homogeneity of the army also facilitated a soldier’s identiﬁcation with

military life. The overwhelming majority of private soldiers in the army were

Great Russian by ethnicity and Orthodox by confession. This was so because

the bulk of the empire’s non-Russian subjects were either excused from service

6 Walter M. Pintner, ‘The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725–1915’, RR 43 (1984):

252.

7 Fuller, Strategy and Power,pp.167–73. Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian

Soldier (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 110–11.

8 Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier,pp.78, 148; Dietrich Beyrau, Milit

ar und

Gesellschaft im Vorrevolution

aren Russland (Cologne and Vienna: B

ohlau Verlag, 1984),

pp. 347–8.

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in exchange for tribute, or organised in special formations of their own. This

was another respect in which the Russian army contrasted strikingly with the

armies of the West. At various points in the eighteenth century more than

half the troops in the service of the kings of Prussia and France were foreign

mercenaries. Since ethnic and religious homogeneity promoted cohesion, and

cohesion could translate into superior combat performance, contemporary

observers understandably viewed the homogeneity of the Russian army as

one of its greatest assets. A government commission of 1764 hailed the sense

of unity created in the army by a ‘common language, faith, set of customs and

birth’.

Certainly on many occasions Russia’s eighteenth-century troops did

perform outstandingly in battle, not merely against the forces of the Crimean

Khan and Ottoman Sultan, but even when matched against such ﬁrst-class

Western opponents as Prussia. At Zorndorf (August 1758) during the Seven

Years War, the Russians killed or wounded over a third of the troops Frederick

the Great committed to the ﬁeld and earned the awed plaudits of an eye-witness

for their ‘extraordinary steadiness and intrepidity’.

Of course an army must not only be recruited but also led. Peter I ini-

tially sought to engage capable military specialists abroad, but soon ordered

all males of the gentry estate into permanent service in the army, navy or

bureaucracy in his effort to ensure an adequate domestic supply of ofﬁcers

and civil administrators. Moreover, in a series of decrees culminating in the

promulgation of the Table of Ranks in 1722, he established the principle that

acquisition of an ofﬁcer’s rank conferred nobiliary status even on common-

ers. Yet the bulk of the ofﬁcers continued to be drawn from the nobility, and

the ofﬁcer corps became even more ‘noble’ as the century proceeded, despite

the fact that Peter III freed the nobility from the legal obligation to serve in

1762.Over90 per cent of all ofﬁcers who fought at Borodino in 1812 were of

noble birth.

As for the nobles themselves, while the calling of the ofﬁcer had

acquired the cachet of prestige among the wealthy strata of the elite, it was

also the case that there were large numbers of impecunious noblemen who

had no choice but to rely on government salaries for their livings.

Incompetence, mediocrity, peculation and even sadism were to be met

with within Russia’s eighteenth-century ofﬁcer corps. An analysis of military-

judicial cases has revealed that the most typical grievances the soldiers voiced

9 Fuller, Strategy and Power,p.171.

10 Christopher Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military

Power 1700–1800 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), pp. 89–90.

11 Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar,p.125; D. G. Tselorungo, Oﬁtsery russkoi armii-uchastniki borodin-

skogo srazheniia. Istoriko-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Kalita, 2002), p. 73.

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about their commanders had to do with cruelty in the imposition of corporal

punishment on the one hand, and such economic abuses as withholding pay or

purloining artel funds on the other.

There were, however, also ofﬁcers who

distinguished themselves by their honesty, fairness and paternalistic concern

for the wellbeing of their men. In any event, educational standards were low.

Certainly, there were the handful of military-technical academies that Peter I

had established, as well as some exclusive institutions of later foundation, such

as the Noble Land Cadet Corps. But there were not enough places in such

schools to accommodate more than a few hundred aspiring ofﬁcers.

At the highest levels of military authority there was much to criticise, for

patronage and court politics were frequently decisive in the bestowal of a

general’s epaulettes, with predictable results. Yet eighteenth-century Russia

also beneﬁted from the masterly leadership of some truly outstanding com-

manders. Confronted by foreign invasion in 1708–9 and 1812 respectively, Peter

I and M. I. Kutuzov ﬁgured out how to turn Russia itself, in all its immen-

sity, emptiness and poverty, into a weapon to grind down the enemy. Other

ﬁgures, including B. C. M

unnich, P. A. Rumiantsev, Z. G. Chernyshev and

A. V. Suvorov, led the army to impressive victories over Tatars, Turks, Poles,

Swedes, Prussians and Frenchmen alike. M

unnich smashed the Ottomans at

Stavuchany (1739) and was the ﬁrst Russian commander ever to breech the

Tatar defences on the Crimean peninsula. Rumiantsev, a brilliant logistician

and tactician, routed the Turks at Kagul (1770) although outnumbered by over

four to one. Chernyshev, a talented military administrator no less than a strate-

gist, was instrumental in the capture of Berlin (1760). And in the course of his

extraordinary military career, the peerless Suvorov overwhelmed the Turks at

Rymnik and Focsani (both 1789), stormed Izmail (1790), forced the surrender

of Warsaw (1794) and defeated France’s armies in northern Italy (1799). His last

great military accomplishment – his ﬁghting retreat through Switzerland –

became the capstone of his legend.

Yet even military commanders of genius cannot win wars unless their armies

are paid, fed, clothed and supplied. All of this requires money, and money had

been a commodity in relatively short supply in seventeenth-century Muscovy.

It was once again Peter the Great who devised expedients to extract more

cash from his oppressed subjects than ever before by saddling them with all

manner of new taxes. Here one of his most important innovations was the

poll (or soul) tax of 1718 that required every male peasant as well as most of

the male residents of Russia’s cities and towns to pay to the state an annual

12 Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier,p.123.

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sum of 74 (later 70) kopecks. Owing to such ﬁscal reforms, as well as to the

growth in the size of the taxable population during his reign, he was able to

push state income up to 8.7 million roubles by the close of his reign. Whereas

military outlays had constituted roughly 60 per cent of state expenditure in old

Muscovy, under Peter they may have consumed between 70 and 80 per cent

of the state budget.

The army and navy continued to account for about half of

the Russian state’s expenses throughout the century until the 1790s, when the

empire’s territorial, economic and demographic growth combined to whittle

this ﬁgure down to roughly 35 per cent. By that point, net state revenues

exceeded 40 million roubles per annum, although it bears noting that there

had been considerable inﬂation over the previous seventy years.

TheRussianarmy of the eighteenth century, then, evolved into a remarkably

effective instrument of state power. It won the overwhelming majority of

Russia’s wars during the period and was the reliable bulwark of the state

against internal disorder, as in 1774 when it was employed to suppress the

massive peasant and Cossack insurrection of Emelian Pugachev.

The joists that supported Russian military success in this era were pre-

cisely the Russian Empire’s political and social backwardness by comparison

to Western Europe. Because Russia was an autocracy, and the country lacked

an independent Church or an ancient feudal nobility there were few imped-

iments to the ruthless exercise of governmental authority, which could be

used to requisition huge quantities of men, money and labour for the military

effort despite the meagreness of the resource base. In 1756 the Russian army,

if irregulars are included, was larger than the army of France, despite the fact

that the revenue of the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna was probably less than

one-ﬁfth that of Louis XV.

It helped enormously that Russia was a society

organised in hereditary orders where institutions like serfdom and peasant

bondage of all kinds persisted long after they had been discarded in the West.

The subjugation of the peasants made it possible to count, tax and draft them,

as well as hold them (or their masters) collectively accountable if they failed to

perform any of their obligations. All of this meant that the Russian state could

more easily reenforce the ranks of the army with new draftees than could its

Western neighbours, particularly as the population of the empire increased.

This was no small matter, because Russian military casualties – as a result of

combat but even more so from disease – tended to be extremely high. If the

13 Keep, Soldiers of the Tsar,p.137.

14 Arcadius Kahan, The Plow, the Hammer and the Knout: An Economic History of Eighteenth-

Century Russia (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 337, 341.

15 Fuller, Strategy and Power,pp.96, 105.

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Russian army was militarily effective, it was not necessarily militarily efﬁcient.

Russia may have lost as many as 300,000 men during the Great Northern War

and may have taken another quarter of a million casualties during the Seven

Years War of 1756–63, a ﬁgure equal to two-thirds of the troops who saw service

in those years.

The military system also enabled the Russian state, in a pinch,

to make military efforts that were more robust than its Western rivals. In the

later stage of the Seven Years War after 1760, as France, Austria and Prussia

began to totter from acute military exhaustion, the growth in size of Russia’s

ﬁeld armies in Germany did not abate.

And in 1812 a series of extraordinary

levies permitted Russia both to make good its losses and even enlarge the

forces it pitted against Napoleon. It has been calculated that 1.5 million men,

or 4 per cent of the empire’s total population, served in the army during the

reign of Alexander I.

Other than in Prussia, a military participation rate like

this one was inconceivable anywhere else in Europe.

For all of its success, however, the Russian military system had some weak-

nesses, which were already grave by the end of the eighteenth century and

became critically so in the next. To begin with, there was the issue of the

army’s size. Russia’s autocrats believed that they had to maintain a large army,

not only to support their geopolitical ambitions, but also as a matter of simple

security. Russia’s borders were longer than those of any other polity, and Russia

confronted potential enemies in Asia as well as in Europe. Moreover, there

was the question of the internal stability of the empire to consider. It was the

army that protected the autocracy from servile rebellion, and the deployment

of troops had to take into account domestic threats to the empire, no less than

foreign ones. The problem was that the larger the army grew, the harder it

became to foot the bill. As the Russian treasury was in constant ﬁnancial dire

straits, tsarist statesmen were always preoccupied with ﬁnding economies in

the military budget.

One expedient was to make the soldiers themselves responsible for part

of their own upkeep. The state supplied the regiments with such materials

as leather and woollen cloth and then commanded them to manufacture

their own boots, uniforms and other articles of kit. It also authorised the sol-

diers’ artels to engage in ‘free work’ (that is, paid labour) on nearby estates.

Despite the fact that this arrangement diverted the troops away from military

16 A. A. Kersnovskii, Istoriia russkoi armii, vol. I (repr., Moscow: Golos, 1992), p. 63; John

L. H. Keep, ‘The Russian Army in the Seven Years War’, in Eric Lohr and Marshall Poe

(eds.), The Military and Society in Russia 1450–1917 (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 200.

17 Duffy, Russia’s Military Way,p.118.

18 Kersnovskii, Istoriia,p.204.

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exercises and opened egregious opportunities for larceny to dishonest regi-

mental colonels, ‘self maintenance’ (also known as the ‘regimental economy’)

endured within the army in one form or another until 1906.

Another tactic that the state employed to save money concerned housing.

In peacetime, for up to eight months of the year the army dispersed and was

quartered on the rural peasantry. Since the army therefore only ‘stood’ during

the four months it slept under canvas at summer bivouacs, the government was

relieved of the duty to construct (or rent) permanent barracks. This practice

naturally led to degeneration in the combat readiness of the armed forces,

a situation that was only ameliorated gradually as barracks accommodation

became more common in the early nineteenth century.

A ﬁnal cost-cutting device involved settling a signiﬁcant proportion of the

troops on farms where they would grow their own victuals as well as drill and

where their sons could be brought up to join the ranks as soon as they came of

military age. Using ‘land-militias’ to colonise (and thus to secure) dangerous

borderlandshadlong been practised inRussia,as wellas in such other European

countries as Austria. But Alexander I established an extensive network of

internal military colonies, which in 1826 were populated by 160,000 soldiers

and their families.

However, this experiment was an execrable failure: living

and working conditions were intolerable, and soldiers hated the harsh and

intrusive regimentation of every aspect of their lives. The massive uprisings in

the north-western military colonies of 1831 forced the government to institute

reforms that (inter alia) excused the ‘farming soldiers’ from the obligation of

military training.

A penultimate deﬁciency in the Russian military system was its inﬂexibility.

The imperial state often found it hard to concentrate its military strength in

the most crucial theatre when it went to war. Although the 1830/1 insurrection

in Poland assumed the character of a full-blown war, Russia was able to deploy

no more than 430,000 of its 850,000 troops there, in view of the magnitude

of the other foreign and domestic threats it felt it had to deter.

The optimal

solution to this problem would have been the introduction of military reserve

programme. This would have entailed a deep cut in the recruit’s term of

military service and a simultaneous increase in the percentage of draft-eligible

men taken into the army every year. In that event Russia might have been able

to diminish the number of troops it kept on active duty while building up a

19 V. G. Verzhbitskii, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v russkoi armii 1826–1859(Moscow: Izd. Sovet-

skaia Rossiia, 1964), pp. 118–19.

20 Frederick W. Kagan, The Military Reforms of Nicholas I: The Origins of the Modern Russian

Army (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999), pp. 224–5.

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The imperial army

large reservoir of trained reservists on which it could draw in an emergency.

Yet the peculiarities of the Russian military system made a proper reserve

programme inconceivable. The Russian army had originally been designed

as a closed corporation, set apart from Russian society, that swallowed up

the peasants inducted into its ranks for good. There was no way in which a

civil society deﬁned by hereditary estates and serfdom could have absorbed

or even survived an inﬂux of a 100,000 or more juridically free demobilised

soldiers every year. Measures to assemble a class of reservists gradually (such

as the introduction of ‘unlimited furloughs’ in 1834) were only palliatives. If

serfdom and autocracy were the ﬂoor beneath Russian military power, they

also constituted its ceiling.

Finally, there is the question of military technology. The logic of the Russian

military system presupposed a low rate of military-technical innovation, and

the system consequently functioned best in an era when that held true. Over

time governmental decrees and entrepreneurial energy had made eighteenth-

century Russia mostly self-sufﬁcient in the production of armaments. Russia’s

rich deposits of minerals were an advantage here, and for several decades in

the eighteenth century Russia led Europe in the output of iron. Although

improvements were made in the quality and performance of weapons, partic-

ularly artillery, during this period, overall the technology of combat remained

remarkably stable. The smooth bore musket was the standard infantry arm

under Alexander I just as it had been under Peter the Great. The relatively long

useful life of muskets – forty years was deemed the norm – obviously made

it easier for Russia to bear the cost of equipping its ground forces with them.

In fact, in 1800 the Russian state had issued at least some of its regiments with

muskets that had been in its arsenals since Peter’s time.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, the Industrial Revolution

was making a major impact on the technology of war. Countries that neglected

to invest in the latest weaponry courted military disaster, as Russia herself

was to discover during the Crimean War. Unfortunately, Russia was a poor

country that could ill afford expensive rearmament drives. Her industrial sector

was insufﬁciently developed to manufacture the new ordnance, riﬂes and

munitions on a large scale. And the social, economic and political institutions

generated by autocracy were not particularly hospitable to modern industrial

capitalism either.

21 Pintner, ‘Burden of Defense’, 232.

22 Thomas C. Owen, Russian Corporate Capitalism from Peter the Great to Perestroika (New

York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 8–9.

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Foreign policy and the armed forces

Accounting for Russian military failure, 1854–1917

If it was military success that built up the Russian Empire, it was military defeat

that helped to bring the empire down. Russia’s great victory over Napoleon

seemingly validated the military system as it was and had closed the eyes of

many to its defects. Nicholas I (r. 1825–55) was personally devoted to the army,

desired to impose military order and discipline on his country as a whole,

and frequently turned to military ofﬁcers to ﬁll the most important posts in

the civil administration. Yet the army suffered from his neurotic obsession

with petty details and his penchant for staging massive parades and reviews,

which, though impressive, did little to enhance combat readiness. Nicholas

did manage to beat the Persians in 1828, the Ottomans in 1829 and the Poles

in 1831. Then, too, his Caucasian Corps fought credibly if unimaginatively

and indecisively in its interminable campaigns against the Muslim guerrillas

in Chechnia and Daghestan.

But when Russia had to battle Britain, France,

Sardinia and the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War of 1853–6 the

upshot was a military and political debacle. In its struggle with this powerful

coalition, the imperial government fell back on the methods of 1812 and by

means of extraordinary levies inundated the 980,000-man regular army with

over a million newly mobilised Cossacks, militia and raw recruits. But Russia

found it hard to bring more than a fraction of this strength to bear against the

enemy since hundreds of thousands of troops were pinned down in Poland,

campaigning in the Caucasus, guarding the Baltic frontier or garrisoning the

vast expanses of the empire. For much of the time, allied forces on the Crimea

peninsula were actually numerically superior to Russia’s. Russia’s principal

Black Sea Fortress, Sebastopol, fell in large measure due to the unremitting

pressure of the allies’ technologically superior siege artillery. During the con-

ﬂict, which was the empire’s most sanguinary war of the nineteenth century,

that of 1812 excepted, 450,000 Russian soldiers and sailors lost their lives.

The

terms of the Peace of Paris of 1856, with their ban on Russian warships in the

Black Sea, were a humiliating infringement of Russia’s sovereignty, and left her

southern ports and trade perpetual hostages to the French and British ﬂeets.

The Crimean War exploded one of the principle justiﬁcations for autocracy –

its ability to beget military power and security. The Crimean defeat not only

discredited the Russian military system but also destroyed conﬁdence in the

empire’s entire panoply of political, social and economic structures.

23 See Moshe Gammer, Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia

and Dagestan (London: Frank Cass, 1994).

24 John Shelton Curtiss, Russia’s Crimean War (Durham: Duke University Press, 1979),

pp. 455, 471.

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The imperial army

Under the new emperor Alexander II (r. 1855–81) fundamental domestic

reform wascomplemented bya policy of recueillement in foreign affairs. Russia’s

military leadership took advantage of the respite from major war to attempt

an overhaul of the entire military system. However, the army still did have

to cope with ‘small wars’ on the empire’s periphery. Although the capture

of imam Shamil in 1859 facilitated the eventual paciﬁcation of the Caucasus,

in 1863 the Poles rose in a serious rebellion that could only be suppressed

by brute force. There were also several campaigns in central Asia during the

1860s, 1870s and early 1880s. These solidiﬁed the military reputations of such

prominent generals as M. G. Cherniaev and M. D. Skobelev and effected

the submission to St Petersburg of Kokand, Bukhara, Khiva, Transcaspia and

Merv. The motivations behind this central Asian imperialism were complex

and confused, and ranged from a desire for more defensible frontiers, to a

concern for enlarging Russian trade, to a perceived need to concoct a paper

threat against Britain in India.

But a great deal of the impetus behind the

advance came from Russia’s ambitious military commanders there, who often

sparked off armed clashes with the Muslims in contravention of their orders.

When Russia’s next large-scale war erupted in 1877 against the Ottomans,

her military reforms had not yet come to fruition. Yet the protracted eastern

crisis that preceded its outbreak did permit the Russian military leadership

to develop its mobilisation, concentration and campaign plans with greater

than usual care.

Although Russia won the war, its military performance was

mixed. In the hands of excellent commanders, Russian forces were capable

of such magniﬁcent actions as the seizure and defence of Shipka Pass and

the astounding Balkan winter offensive that brought the Russian army within

ﬁfteen kilometres of Constantinople by January 1879.

But these triumphs

were to some extent counterbalanced by the failure of the three bloody

attempts to storm Plevna, the epidemic of typhus and cholera on the Caucasus

front, the total breakdown in army logistics and the appalling dimensions of

the butcher’s bill. Still worse, the other European powers, led by Germany,

colluded to prevent Russia from realising her entire set of war aims.

Germany was already the power that Russia feared the most. Since the

establishment of Bismarck’s Reich at the close of the Franco-Prussian War,

25 Seymour Becker, Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia. Bukhara and Khiva,1865–1924(Cam-

bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 23; Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian

Empire and its Rivals (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 211.

26 David Alan Rich, The Tsar’s Colonels: Professionalism,Strategy and Subversion in Late Imperial

Russia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 157–8.

27 Bruce W. Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 77–8.

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