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Government

to create a substitute to handle the many administrative functions handled by

the serf-owning nobleman, although the zemstvo legislation drew heavily on

past experience of corporate institutions, including the peasant commune as

much as urban and noble organs and the boards of social welfare.

Zemstvos

at both levels had an assembly, to which nobles, townspeople and peasants’

representatives were elected, and a board, with executive power, which was

elected from the assemblies. But from the start the ‘estate’ nature of the elec-

tions to the assemblies were ambiguous, and the assumption that ‘estates’

were equal in any way was completely absent. In 1864 the three categories,

or curia, were deﬁned by their ownership of property – private landed, urban

and collective land – rather than strictly by social estate (although merchants

with ‘certiﬁcates’ were also eligible), which meant that peasants could partic-

ipate in the ﬁrst curia alongside nobles if they purchased sufﬁcient land. The

land qualiﬁcation ensured that noble deputies would be in majority. In 1890,

this principle of land-ownership as a franchise qualiﬁcation was changed and

became ‘estate’ based, with the peasants eligible to vote only in the third curia,

a change inspired in part by the increase in land purchased by peasants at the

expense of the rural nobility.

At the same time the rural property qualiﬁ-

cations for nobles were lowered and certiﬁed merchants lost their automatic

right to vote which served to increase the noble franchise at the expense of

other social groups (including Jews and clergy). It also increased their repre-

sentation on both district and provincial level assemblies, but most particularly

at the district level (where it increased from 42.4 per cent in the period 1883–6

to 55.2 per cent in 1890)

and became even more prominent at the board level,

which they had always dominated. In the last years of the imperial regime

peasants regained some seats in the zemstvos, particularly at district level, as

landowners but remained under-represented on zemstvo boards.

In addition, the zemstvo led to the employmentof large numbers of zemstvo

employees – teachers, agronomists, doctors, surveyors – of various social

origins, which cut across the ‘estate’ character of the zemstvos. These white-

collar workers were termed the ‘Third Element’ and became more politically

minded and more radicalised than most zemstvo leaders. By the turn of the

century the size and potential power of this group was a source of concern to

the government; there were some 70,000 zemstvo employees in the thirty-four

24 S. F. Starr, ‘Local Initiative in Russia before the Zemstvo’, in Emmons and Vucinich, The

Zemstvo in Russia,pp.5–30.

25 A process most clearly described in K. E. McKenzie, ‘Zemstvo Organization and Role

within the Administrative Structure’, in Emmons and Vucinich, The Zemstvo in Russia,

pp. 31–78.

26 McKenzie, ‘Zemstvo Organization’, p. 44.

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Provincial and local government

provinces where zemstvos had so far been set up, that is, some ﬁfty members

of the ‘Third Element’ to each elected member of the zemstvo board.

The establishment of the zemstvos did not displace the existing corporate

institutions. Urban institutions of self-government and noble assemblies con-

tinued to exist. Urban participation in the zemstvos was limited and did not

diminish the signiﬁcance of urban institutions of self-government. Peasants –

both serf and state – had more direct experience, however, of self-government

through the peasant communes than ordinary townspeople or the nobles col-

lectively. Peasants continued to govern many of their own affairs outside the

competence of the zemstvo, or any other institution, through the commune

and the peasant, volost’, courts, although the introduction of land captains

(zemskie nachal’niki)in1889, with the intention of imposing greater supervi-

sion over peasant institutions, created another link between the peasant village

and provincialadministration. Peasant experience of commune administration

was reﬂected in their attitudes towards the zemstvo, which, along with the

dominance of the nobles and the weakness of urban participation, inhibited

the growth of any sense of the zemsvtos representing ‘all-estate’ interests.

Peasants’ resentment against the zemstvo paralleled their resentment of other

state institutions and ofﬁcials which oppressed them in return for few bene-

ﬁts. In particular peasants resented what they regarded as ‘unnecessary’ taxes

imposed by the zemstvos, particularlytax on land which fell disproportionately

on peasant allotment land, but they also shunned the, largely urban, welfare

institutions – schools, hospitals, etc. – established by the zemstvos.

While

other distinctive features of peasant obligation and non-privilege gradually

came to an end – the poll tax, mutual responsibility for taxes, corporal punish-

ment, etc. – peasant distinctiveness in local administration was retained. The

increase in tax burdens by the zemstvo after 1890 as peasant representation

declined only reinforced their negative perception of the ‘all-estate’ zemstvo as

yet another burden imposed by the state and as an institution which served the

interests of only one class, the nobility. The success of the provincial nobility in

blocking Stolypin’s attempts after 1907 to reform the zemstvos by increasing

non-noble members only conﬁrmed these views.

The zemstvos suffered from the same ambiguities in legislation as Petrine

or Catherinian corporate institutions, which inhibited their opportunities to

function effectively in the provinces. Some of this was due to ambiguous word-

ing (such as ‘participation’ or ‘co-operation’ in certain activities) in some parts

27 Galai, The Liberation Movement,p.32.

28 The relationship is described most fully in D. Atkinson, ‘The Zemstvo and the Peasantry’,

in Emmons and Vucinich, The Zemstvo in Russia,pp.79–132.

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of 1864 statute.

More seriously, the areas of competence of the zemstvos

potentially brought them into conﬂict with the governor, local ofﬁcials, police

and/or the central bureaucracy. Zemstvos (in the statutes of 1864 and 1890) had

to address local needs (economic, administrative, educational, humanitarian)

whilst implementing the demands of the local civil and military administra-

tion. It has already been noted that the main conﬂict of interest arose over the

extent of the zemstvo rights to raise taxes for local needs as well as fulﬁlling

state ﬁscal obligations – taxes, of course, which were largely paid by peas-

ants and townspeople rather than by the nobles who dominated the zemstvo

boards. Nevertheless, the zemstvos did make some advances in the provision

of healthcare and primary education, which has been described as ‘the area of

greatest zemstvo achievement’

(by the turn of the century the zemstvo was

supporting almost 20,000 elementary schools,

a number which had risen to

over 40,000 by 1914),

and played some role in stimulating agricultural mod-

ernisation.

Zemstvos took over welfare functions which had previously been

performed by the state through the boards of public welfare and, in the case

of education, by the Church.

After 1890 the governor’s powers to block zemstvo enactments and to super-

vise its operations were clariﬁed and increased, but the zemstvos continued to

provide and extend local services. But the conservative gentry reaction after

the 1905 Revolution made the zemstvos far less receptive to reform; in their last

decade zemstvos hindered the implementation of the Stolypin land reforms

and blocked attempts to reform local administration, including the establish-

ment of a zemstvo at the lowest, volost’ level which was intended to make

the peasants truly ‘full members of Russian society’.

At the same time, the

increase in state funding for primary schools at the expense of the zemstvos

29 McKenzie, ‘Zemstvo Organization’, p. 45.

30 J. Brooks, ‘The Zemstvo and the Education of the People’, in Emmons and Vucinich, The

Zemstvo in Russia,p.243.

31 N. B. Weissman, Reform in Tsarist Russia. The State Bureacracy and Local Government, 1900–

1914 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981), p. 32.

32 Brooks, ‘The Zemstvo and the Education of the People’, p. 249.

33 Recent research on one province has supported this view: G. Weldhen, ‘The Zemstvo,

Agricultural Societies and Agricultural Innovation in Viatka Guberniia in the 1890sand

1900s’, in V. E. Musikhin (ed.), Viatskomu Zemstvu 130 let. Materialy nauchnoi konferentsii

(Kirov, 1997), pp. 25–31.

34 This process is described by R. Manning in ‘Zemstvo and Revolution: The Onset of

Gentry Reaction, 1905–07’ and R. D. MacNaughton and R. T. Manning, ‘The Crisis of the

Third of June System and Political Trends in the Zemstvos, 1907–14’, in L. H. Haimson,

The Politics of Rural Russia 1905–1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979), pp.

30–66, 184–218. On the fate of Stolypin’s proposed reforms after 1906 see P. Waldron,

Between Two Revolutions: Stolypin and the Politics of Renewal in Russia (London: University

College Press, 1998), pp. 77–99.

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also meant an increase in state control over the operation of those schools

even as their numbers rose. On the eve of war, the zemstvos had retreated

from their ‘all-estate’ character and had become forums to reﬂect the views

of the conservative provincial nobility.

A local bureaucracy?

Local administration suffered from the inability of the state to recruit men of

quality. Local administration was never as prestigious, or as well rewarded, as

service in St Petersburg or Moscow, and the civil service was never as highly

regarded as military service. Young, provincial noble boys often entered the

civil service only if they lacked the social connections or the physical ability

to join a regiment. In the eighteenth century senior ofﬁcials were frequently

accused of corruption or ignorance. This was partly due to the lack of effective

control exercised by the centre over distant provinces. It was also due to

the paucity of institutions of higher education, and in particular to the slow

development of legal training in Russia (the ﬁrst Russian professor of law

was S. A. Desnitskii, appointed in 1773 to Moscow University, who trained at

Glasgow University),

to the poor salaries and to the unattractiveness of life

in unsophisticated provincial backwaters. A high proportion of senior elective

noble posts in the institutions set up in 1775 were occupied by nobles who

had served in the army and had no civil training (in 1788 some 85 per cent

of the presidents of the highest provincial courts were appointed directly from

the army).

At the lower level, the clerical staff, who were mostly themselves

the sons of clerks or sons of the clergy (‘culled’ or lured by the state from

clerical seminaries), shifted vast amounts of paperwork around but were badly

paid, badly educated and badly treated by their superiors. Police ofﬁcers were

underpaid, poorly trained and not respected. Bribery was endemic in Russian

courts, and scarcely regarded as corrupt, at least at the lower levels.

Although the corruption, greed and ignorance of local ofﬁcials remained a

theme in Russian literature in the nineteenth century, there is some evidence to

35 See A. H. Brown, ‘S. E. Desnitsky, Adam Smith and the Nakaz of Catherine II’, Oxford

Slavonic Papers, ns, 7 (1974): 42–59.

36 R. D. Givens, ‘Eighteenth-Century Nobiliary Career Patterns and Provincial Govern-

ment’, in W. M. Pintner and D. K. Rowney (eds.), Russian Ofﬁcialdom: The Bureaucratiza-

tion of Russian Society from the Seventeenth to the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan,

1980), p. 122.

37 J. M. Hartley, ‘Bribery and Justice in the Provinces in the Reign of Catherine II’, in S.

Lovell, A. Ledeneva and A. Rogachevskii (eds.), Bribery and Blat in Russia. Negotiating

Reciprocity from the Middle Ages to the 1990s (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp. 48–64.

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suggest that a gradual professionalisation of the local bureaucracy was taking

place during the century. Even in the late eighteenth century there were a small

number of enlightened governors and senior provincial administrators who

took their duties seriously and who developed a sense of what we might call ‘a

legal consciousness’.

Educational standards of senior ofﬁcials rose after the

introduction of formal examinations in 1809, and the reform of clerical schools

and increase in numbers of state schools (at least in towns) led to a gradual

increase of standards amongst junior staff (although salaries remained pitifully

low). The number of directtransfers from the military to senior posts in the civil

service declined in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century. The proportion of

nobles in the bureaucracy – local and central – fell as the century progressed.

After the municipal statute of 1870 the levels of education amongst mayors

and senior urban representatives rose. Land captains, despite the criticisms

levelled at them at the time by peasants and St Petersburg ofﬁcials alike, had

respectable levels of education (some 30 per cent had higher education).

The

most important change affected governors, who by the early twentieth century

frequentlyhad considerable experience of local government, either as marshals

of the nobility or as vice-governors. They had become, as the historian Robbins

states, ‘experts’ and ‘specialists’ who had a profound knowledge of local affairs

(some 80 per cent of governors in 1913 had served in another capacity in the

provinces).

The consequence of this, however, was that governors became

less willing to implement government policy unquestioningly; after 1905 many

governors blocked further attempts at local reform in order to preserve what

they regarded as local interests.

Epilogue

In times of crisis,local government institutions had performed valuableservice.

In 1812 noble assemblies and town dumas had collected considerable sums and

foodstuffs which they contributed to the war effort.

The zemstvos (which by

38 See J. Keep, ‘Light and Shade in the History of the Russian Administration’, Canadian

Slavic Studies 6, 1 (1972): 2–3 and Hartley, ‘Bribery and Justice in the Provinces’, pp. 55–62.

39 D. A. J. Macey, ‘The Land Captains: A Note on the Social Composition 1889–1913’, RH 16

(1989): 351.

40 R. G. Robbins, Jr, The Tsar’s Viceroys: Russian Provincial Governors in the Last Years of Empire

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 37.

41 R. G. Robbins, ‘Choosing the Russian Governors: The Professionalisation of the Guber-

natorial Corps’, SEER 58, 4 (1980): 600.

42 See J. M. Hartley, ‘Russia and Napoleon: State, Society and the Nation’, in M. Rowe (ed.),

Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe: State Formation in an Age of Upheaval, c.

1800–1815 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 186–202.

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this time reﬂected predominantly noble interests) carried out important relief

work during the Russo-Japanese War and the First World War. The All-Russian

Union of Towns performed the same service in the First World War.

These

were exceptional circumstances, but nevertheless, this activity demonstrated

that there was some potential for local society to act collectively to address

not only local but also national interests. By the early twentieth century there

is some evidence that a corporate, or ‘estate’, identity had developed amongst

the provincial nobility and at least in the merchant-dominated towns like

Moscow. This was the type of identity which Peter I and Catherine II had tried

to stimulate in the eighteenth century with very limited success. The tragedy

was that by the time it had been achieved it was already anachronistic in the

light of the very rapid social and economic changes which had taken place since

the late nineteenth century. The exclusion of the most dissatisﬁed groups in

society – peasants and workers – from all but the most limited participation in

these institutions was symptomatic of a more general failure to recognise that

society had changed and that local institutions should modernise to reﬂect the

new economic and society reality. The fault lay not only with the government

which established, and then modiﬁed, these institutions but also by the early

twentieth century with the local institutions which blocked further reforms

in defence of ‘corporate’ interests which no longer served the interests of the

country.

43 Porter, The Zemstvo and the Emergence of Civil Society,p.239.

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State ﬁnances

peter waldron

In 1898, Sergei Witte, the Russian minister of ﬁnance, wrote to Emperor

Nicholas II:

The French state budget is 1,260 million rubles for a population of 38 million;

the Austrian budget is 1,100 million rubles for a population of 43 million. If our

taxpayers were as prosperous as the French, our budget would be 4,200 million

rubles instead of its current 1,400 million, and if we matched the Austrians,

our budget would be 3,300 million rubles. Why can we not achieve this? The

main reason is the poor condition of our peasantry.

While the minister of ﬁnance bemoaned the poverty of the Russian population

and the consequent low level of taxation that it produced, the Russian state’s

overall ﬁnancial performance had proved to be relatively successful. Although

it had faced ﬁnancial difﬁculties, Russia had avoided the type of ﬁnancial crisis

that had made a major contribution to the collapse of the French monarchy

at the end of the eighteenth century, and had given the Habsburg state such

difﬁculties during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Witte’s analysis

identiﬁed low per capita yields from taxation as the fundamental weakness of

the Russian state’s ﬁnancial system and he laid the blame for Russia’s inability

to generate a sufﬁciently large state budget ﬁrmly at the door of the peasantry.

But Witte, Imperial Russia’s most successful and inﬂuential ﬁnance minister,

failed to recognise that the tsarist regime had proved adept at both avoiding

fatal ﬁnancial crises and at overcoming lesser problems. It had proved able

to ﬁght a multitude of wars and to expand the boundaries of its empire, as

well as to make major internal reforms that had ﬁnancial implications. This

I am very grateful for the ﬁnancial support of the British Academy in carrying out the

research for this chapter.

1 S. Iu. Vitte, Vospominaniia. Memuary (Moscow: AST, 2000), vol. I, p. 724.

2 See P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria Theresa 1740–1780 (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1987), vol II, chapters 1 & 2 for an account of Habsburg ﬁnancial

difﬁculties.

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discussion of Russian state ﬁnances will examine the Russian government’s

chief elements of expenditure and revenue and analyse changes that took

place during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It will also analyse the

impact of the government’s taxation policies on the empire’s population and

the wider social consequences of ﬁscal policy.

The Russian state budget hardly warranted such an appellation until well

into the nineteenth century. Troitskii describes the ‘inadequate centralisation

of ﬁnancial administration, the lack of a central treasury, the secrecy of the

budget, the unsatisfactory recording of business, the lack of accountability in

agencies and the almost complete absence of state ﬁscal control of expenditure’

that characterised Russian state ﬁnances during the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth

century.

Catherine the Great acknowledged the disarray of Russia’s ﬁnancial

position at her accession to the throne in 1762: soldiers’ wages were in arrears,

customs duties had been farmed out for a tiny return to the state and the cur-

rency itself was of dubious worth.

While there were improvements during

Catherine’s reign, ﬁnancial policy-making and the process of budget-making

remained weak until the last decades of the nineteenth century. Even in 1879,

a committee established to examine ways of reducing government expendi-

ture reported that the Ministry of Finance could exert little inﬂuence over

the process by which expenditure was determined and noted that, in effect,

the Finance Ministry had proved unable to assert its authority over the spend-

ing ministries.

The process of budget-making was essentially driven by the

demands of the spending ministries and the role of the Ministry of Finance was

to raise the revenue that was demanded to meet the spending plans of each

ministry. The absence of proper cabinet government in Russia until the ﬁrst

decade of the twentieth century also contributed to the lack of a clear direction

in ﬁnancial policy. Individual ministers had the right of access to the emperor

and were able to plead the case for their own ministries’ spending plans directly

to the tsar, bypassing their fellow ministers. The inter-departmental Commit-

tee of Finances, designed to provide overall political direction for the empire’s

ﬁnancial policies, played an inconsistent role. While it was the formal arena

in which ﬁscal and monetary policy could be debated, its signiﬁcance could

depend on the level of interest that the emperor displayed in its affairs, as well

3 S. M. Troitskii, Finansovaia politika russkogo absolutizma v XVIII veke (Moscow: Nauka,

1966), p. 221.

4 I. de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,

1981), p. 470.

5 ‘Ob uchrezhdenii osoboi komissii o sokrashcheniem raskhodov’, 30 December 1878,

RGIA, Fond 560,op.22,d.160, ll. 12–13.

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as in the political status of the Minister of Finance and on his place within the

hierarchy of the empire’s governing elite.

∗∗∗

It was military expenditure that dominated Russia’s state ﬁnances. During the

eighteenth century, the army and navy consistently accounted for more than

half of the Russian state’s spending and, at times, more than 60 per cent of

the budget was devoted to military expenditure.

This is hardly surprising,

given Russia’s persistent involvement in wars and the continuing impetus to

extend the territorial boundaries of the empire. Military expenditure grew

signiﬁcantly during times of war, with sharp increases during the Napoleonic

Wars, the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1878–9.

There was

also a considerable increase in military spending in the years preceding the

First World War, with expenditure growing from 420 million roubles in 1900

to 820 million roubles in 1913.

Although this did not represent a signiﬁcant

increase in the proportion of the government’s income devoted to military

spending, since the state’s budget was growing rapidly during this period, it

was a much heavier burden than at ﬁrst appears. By 1914, Russian military

expenditure exceeded that of Britain, even though Britain’s army and navy

were needed to protect the security of its far-ﬂung empire.

Throughout the

nineteenth century, there wererepeated efforts to restrain military expenditure

and government committees regularly grappled with the problem of the cost

of the Russian army and navy. A special committee met in 1818, followed by a

reviewof military expenditureby A. A.Arakcheev in 1822, and a further attempt

to rein in expenditure in 1835. This last review concluded that reductions in

expenditure during the 1820s had had a negative impact on both Russia’s

military forces and on the overall national economy, as a reduced demand for

materials by the army had resulted in an overall reduction in the prices of

domestically produced goods and this had affected both manufacturers and

the treasury, since the government suffered a consequent loss of tax revenues.

The dominant place that Russia’s military strength played in the government’s

6 A. Kahan, The Plow, the Hammer and the Knout (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1985),

pp. 336–7; W. Pintner, ‘The Burden of Defense in Imperial Russia, 1725–1914’, RR 43 (1984):

248–9.

7 ‘Finansovaia politika v period 1861–1880 gg.’, Otechestvennye zapiski (1882), no. 11,pp.1–3.

8 A. P. Pogrebinskii, Ocherki istorii ﬁnansov dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii (XIX–XX vv.) (Moscow:

Gosﬁnizdat, 1954), p. 176.

9 See P. Gatrell, Government, Industry and Rearmament in Russia, 1900–1914: The Last Argument

of Tsarism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 152–5. Gatrell suggests that

the proportion of Russia’s national income devoted to military expenditure was almost

twice as heavy as for the more economically developed countries of Britain, France and

Germany.

470

State ﬁnances

thinking is reﬂected in the results of the 1835 review: the committee could only

suggest ‘housekeeping measures’ to limit military spending and then only if

both economic and military conditions continued to be stable.

A further

attempt was made to reduce overall government expenditure in 1861 but, in

the aftermath of the debacle in the Crimea, no serious attempt was made to

constrain military spending.

The 1879 committee’s work came at the end

of the Russo-Turkish War, when it was again clearly impolitic to propose

any major reductions in military spending. At the ﬁrst hint of a proposed

reduction in the army’s budget, D. A. Miliutin, the minister of war, wrote

to A. A. Abaza, the president of the State Council’s economic department

that ‘any signiﬁcant reduction in [military] expenditure would rapidly cause

damage to the crucial matter of the state’s readiness to support its political

dignity’.

Abaza’s committee had begun with the lofty ambition of moving

beyond short-term solutions to the recurrent ﬁnancial difﬁculties that faced

the Russian government, and instead putting in place measures that would

prevent ministries increasing their expenditure after their annual budget had

been set. But by the middle of 1879, Abaza was compelled to admit that due

to ‘the alarming events of recent times’, ministries had been unable to devote

adequate attention to the work of his committee and that they had proved

very tardy in providing the information he needed in order to proceed.

The

Russian bureaucracy proved able to frustrate these plans; central authority was

not yet well established enough to override the power of individual ministries.

Russia’s military expenditure continued to grow in absolute terms, but

other calls on the state’s budget came to play a signiﬁcant part in govern-

ment spending. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Russian

government considerably extended its activities and, in particular, played a

much greater direct role in the economy of the country. The government’s

recognition of the importance of the railway network in stimulating Russia’s

overall economic performance, together with the absence of other sources of

investment capital, meant that the state itself took on much of the burden of

ﬁnancing Russia’s railways. The Ministry of Communications accounted for

10 ‘Komitet o sokrashchenii raskhodov po ministerstvam: voennomu, morskomu, inos-

trannykh del i vedomstvam: pochtovomu, putei soobshchenii i dukhovnomu. 1835’,

RGIA, Fond 1172,op.16,d.1, ll. 54–7.

11 ‘Komitet ﬁnansov. Po zapiske Ministra Finansov o ﬁnansovykh merakh: uvelichenie

dokhodov; sokrashchenie raskhodov; svod rospisi. 1861’, RGIA, Fond 563,op.2,d.144,

ll. 2–5. The War Ministry was able to suggest savings of only 881,000 roubles, out of a

total annual budget of more than 90 million roubles.

12 D. A. Miliutin to A. A. Abaza, 29 May 1879, RGIA, Fond 1214,op.1,d.23,l.1a.

13 ‘Doklad Predsedatelia Osoboi Komissii A. A. Abaza s kratkim otchetom o deiatel’nosti

Osoboi Komissii’, 11 June 1879, RGIA, Fond 1214,op.1,d.26, ll. 32–4.

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