Lieven D. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 2: Imperial Russia, 1689-1917

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Government

the streets and the architectural styles to be employed),

decided the structure,

social composition and areas of competence of all provincial and urban insti-

tutions, deﬁned the membership and groupings of urban society, determined

and altered the franchise for towns, noble assemblies and zemstvos, and set the

ﬁscal and other obligations of all institutions, including taxation and billeting

of troops in civilian houses (that is, state and not local needs). At the same time,

local institutions from the time of Peter I were obliged to report and respond

to ‘local needs’ and to stimulate the local economy.

The example of urban government in the eighteenth century will illustrate

how government legislation could bear little relation to reality. Peter I and

Catherine II tried to stimulate the corporate identity of townspeople and the

economic development of Russian towns through legislation which deliber-

ately attempted to incorporate ‘Western’ or ‘European’ practices. Both rulers

attempted to introduce ‘Western’-style craft guilds and passed regulations on

their composition and on the training of apprentices (in 1785 Catherine even

stipulated the hours of work for apprentices including the length of meal

breaks!).

Both rulers deﬁned the composition of urban society by law, and

in addition divided the merchantry into groups according to their declared

capital, and then used these groupings as a basis for the composition of an

elaborate structure of urban institutions of self-government based on repre-

sentatives from each group (six groups in the Charter to the Towns in 1785).

These deﬁnitions were modiﬁed in the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I

but not fundamentally altered.

This legislation, however, ignored the reality of eighteenth-century urban

life. In practice, very few towns outside a few exceptional centres like St Peters-

burg and Moscowhad a sufﬁciently developed economy or sufﬁciently wealthy

merchants to ﬁll all the social categories of townspeople as deﬁned by Peter

and Catherine. In 1786 it was reported that in the province of St Petersburg

only the city of St Petersburg itself had representatives of all six urban groups

and that only there were merchants divided into three guilds as Catherine

had stipulated; the smaller district towns could not ﬁll these social categories.

Urban government could never therefore function as the legislation envisaged

2 R. Jones, ‘Urban Planning and Development of Provincial Towns in Russia during the

Reign of Catherine II’, in J. G. Garrard (ed.), The Eighteenth Century in Russia (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 321–44.

3 PSZ, vol. 22,no.16188, article 105,p.378, The Charter to the Towns, 1785.

4 RGADA Moscow, Fond 16,d.530, ll. 266–66ob, report by N. Saltykov to the Senate, 1786,

also quoted in J. M. Hartley, A Social History of the Russian Empire 1650–1825 (London and

New York: Longman, 1999), p. 42. This theme is developed more fully in J. M. Hartley,

‘Governing the City: St Petersburg and Catherine II’s reforms’, in A. Cross (ed.), St

Petersburg, 1703–1825 (London: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 99–118.

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in the eighteenth century because representatives of some of the social groups

on which the institutional structure was built simply did not exist. Further-

more, Russian towns in this period were overwhelmingly peasant in compo-

sition (state and serf ) and these peasants were not only excluded from urban

government but could also undercut urban guilds with their own home-made

products. The attempt to revitalise urban life whist ignoring the peasant pres-

ence in the towns, the competition of peasant craft goods and the impossibility

of separating the town from the countryside in an overwhelmingly rural econ-

omy made the import of Western-style institutions simply impractical. The

dilemma facing local institutions of having to respond to local needs whilst

carrying out their obligations to the state can also be seen in the weakness

of eighteenth-century urban institutions. Service in urban institutions was

unpopular and regarded as yet another state obligation – like billeting and

conscription – imposed on a long-suffering and impoverished urban popula-

tion. Urban institutions had only limited rights to impose taxation for local

needs; their main function was to meet state ﬁscal obligations.

The ambiguity between local and national obligations is even more clearly

illustrated by the zemstvos after 1864. Zemstvos were given considerable local

rights, including the right to petition the governor directly on local concerns,

to manage the local postal system, to have responsibility for local education

and health, and to levy taxes for local as well as national needs. But these

rights had only been granted after a ministerial struggle (in the centre, not

in the provinces) over the merits of self-government versus central control.

At the same time the governor was given the right to veto zemstvo activity

if it conﬂicted with state interests. In practice, this meant inevitable conﬂict

between zemstvos and local ofﬁcials from the start and resulted in the curbing

of the zemstvos’ independent sphere of activities in 1890. This curb did nothing

to ease relations between the zemstvo and the bureaucracy, and zemstvo

radicalism increased after the accession of Nicholas II in 1894. Conﬂicts at

the local level between zemstvo and governor were most heated over the

zemstvos’ right of taxation, particularly to raise income to provide education

and healthcare, but more acute conﬂicts arose at the turn of the century

between the zemstvos and ofﬁcials in St Petersburg who by this stage not only

opposed the rights of the zemstvo to claim much-needed taxation revenue

but also had come to distrust every manifestation of what they regarded as

elements of radical opposition to the regime.

5 The relations between zemstvos and the centre are best described in T. Fallows, ‘The

Zemstvo and Bureaucracy’, in T. Emmons and W. S. Vucinich (eds.), The Zemstvo in

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The most serious conﬂict between the zemstvos and the central bureau-

cracy focused on the scope for inter-zemstvo contact and co-operation, a

conﬂict which became part of the liberal opposition movement to the tsar

up to and including the year 1905. Zemstvos were instructed to deal only

with matters within the boundaries of their province and district. This restric-

tion was based on the fear that the zemstvos, as representative bodies, albeit

not democratic ones, would seek to expand their responsibilities upwards

through co-operation with other provincial zemstvos and then ultimately in

the ‘crowning ediﬁce’ of a national body. The number of resolutions passed

by zemstvos which included constitutional demands shows that this fear was

not unfounded. This conﬂict was won by the zemstvos in the early twentieth

century just as their political threat to the government diminished following

the establishment of the State Duma and just as many of the provincial nobility

who dominated the zemstvos were coming to renounce these liberal views.

During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–5, and again in the First World War,

the government permitted the formation of an all-Russian union of zemstvos

for the purpose of war relief.

A further indication of the potential conﬂict in state-inspired local govern-

ment can be seen in the relations between local and central ofﬁcials. This was a

dilemma from the start as Peter I attempted to reduce the inﬂuence of powerful

voevody (military commanders) in the provinces by introducing governors in

1708. Governors always trod a difﬁcult line, responsible for the conduct of local

affairs whilst at the same time they were representatives of both the tsar and

the central government. The sheer burden of work imposed by the centre –

it has been estimated that governors had to sign over 100,000 papers per year

by the 1840s

– meant that there were practical impediments to devoting time

to local affairs. Marshals of the nobility, elected by their fellow nobles, also

faced the problem of representing the interests of the provincial nobles whilst

being weighed down with bureaucratic functions imposed by the governor

and the state.

The provincial police force suffered from the same divided

Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

1982), pp. 177–239. The rise of zemstvo radicalism is described in S. Galai, The Liberation

Movement in Russia 1900–1905 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 7–35.

6 T. E. Porter, The Zemstvo and the Emergence of Civil Society in Late Imperial Russia 1864–1917

(San Francisco: Mellen Research University Press, 1991); these activities are described by

a contemporary in T. J. Polner, Russian Local Government during the War and the Union of

Zemstvos (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).

7 B. N. Mironov, ‘Local Government in Russia in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century:

Provincial Government and Estate Self-Government’, JfGO 42 (1994): 165.

8 G. Hamburg, ‘Portrait of an Elite: Russian Marshals of the Nobility 1861–1971’, SR 40, 4

(1981): 585–602.

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loyalties. A rural police ofﬁcer (called the zemskii komissar in 1719 and the zem-

skii ispravnik after 1775) was elected from the nobility but was subordinated

to the local regiment under Peter and then to the governor under Catherine,

and was ultimately responsible to the central government. An urban police

force was set up in 1782 whose responsibility extended beyond dealing with

petty crimes to the preservation of the wellbeing and morals of the urban

population (amongst other things the police had to ensure that the sexes were

segregated in the bathhouses). But in 1802 the police force was subordinated to

the Ministry of Internal Affairs (although land captains, or zemskie nachal’niki,

remained responsible to the governor) and their relationship with local gov-

ernment thereby weakened. The establishment of the Third Department in

1826 in the reign of Nicholas I, made responsible for political security, added

another layer of a secret police force which was entirely removed from local

control.

On the other hand, the ability of the state to interfere in local adminis-

tration was always curbed by two factors – the problem of communications

in the vast empire, and poverty. Even in the middle of the nineteenth cen-

tury it took forty-four days for a letter from Orenburg province to reach

St Petersburg.

The situation improved only in the 1860s with the introduc-

tion of the telegraph. The poignancy and comic effect of Gogol’s Government

Inspector (Revizor, written in the 1830s) is based on the fact that inspectors so

rarely visited the provinces in person so allowing local ofﬁcials to act as they

wished. Furthermore, the lawlessness of the Russian countryside – whether

it be through bands of deserters or brigands or the spontaneous activities of

individuals – militated against orderly government of any kind. Poverty meant

that the state lacked the funds to staff the provinces in full or to offer high

enough salaries to make elective posts attractive. The result was that Russia

was seriously under-manned at all levels (with the possible exception of the

peasant commune before 1861 which is outside the scope of this chapter). In

1763 Russia employed 16,500 ofﬁcials in central and local government, while

Prussia, with less than 1 per cent of Russia’s land area employed some 14,000

civil servants.

It has been estimated that in 1796 there were only 6 administra-

tors per 10,000 inhabitants; by 1857 this had only increased to 17 administrators

per 10,000 inhabitants.

One estimate in 1897 was that there were just over

9 S. F. Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830–1870 (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1972), p. 45.

10 R. E. Jones, The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility 1762–1785 (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1973), p. 182.

11 Mironov, ‘Local Government in Russia’, 200.

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100,000 ofﬁcials with some police responsibility at all levels in Russia.

Despite

the amount of legislation devoted to local administration the conclusion has to

be that Russia was under- rather than over-governed throughout the imperial

period.

The operation of local administration

The problems outlined above made smooth and complete implementation of

government legislation impossible to achieve. Local administration was fur-

ther weakened by the exclusion of large sections of the population from its

control. Before the reforms of the 1860s, many of the matters relating to the

everyday concerns of peasants – state peasants and serfs – were dealt with

by peasants themselves through the commune. The commune not only dis-

tributed state obligations such as taxation and the recruit levy but also acted

as a peasant court of ﬁrst instance, using customary law and ‘peasant justice’

for civil matters and minor criminal offences. The Statute of Administration

of 1775 established a structure of courts for state peasants, but serfs only par-

ticipated in the state legal system when they were accused of major criminal

offences or when they were litigants in cases involving other social estates

(which could happen in disputes in town courts involving so-called ‘trading

peasants’). After emancipation and the reforms of 1864, exclusively peasant

institutions were retained, as in the case of the commune, or created, in the

case of volost’ peasant courts where customary law continued to be applied,

so that peasants were deliberately treated differently from other members of

society, separately and outside the reformed state court structure.

This sug-

gested that the reforms of 1864, like those of 1775, were primarily urban,and

were of relevance to towns but not to the countryside, where, of course, the

majority of the population lived. Industrial workers before the 1860s in the

12 J. W. Daly, Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia 1866–1905 (DeKalb:

Northern Illinois University Press, 1998), p. 9. Weissman quotes a much lower ﬁgure

of 47,866 police at the beginning of the twentieth century from a Police Department

report: N. Weissman, ‘Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, 1900–1914’, RR 44, 1 (1985): 47.The

ﬁgures are difﬁcult to interpret as it is not clear whether several categories, such as night

watchmen and other patrolmen, are included.

13 Velychenko has recently challenged the view that Russia was ‘undergoverned’ by arguing

that valid comparisons should be made between the levels of stafﬁng in Russia with

European colonies rather than with West European states, but his argument, although

stimulating, cannot disguise the serious undermanning of institutions and of police forces

in European Russia or in towns in the empire which can legitimately be compared with

towns elsewhere in Europe: S. Velychenko, ‘The Size of the Imperial Russian Bureaucracy

and Army in Comparative Perspective’, JfGO 49, 3 (2001): 346–62.

14 S. F. Frank, Crime, Cultural Conﬂict, and Justice in Rural Russia 1856–1914 (Berkeley: Univer-

sity of California Press, 1999), pp. 36–40.

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large privately owned enterprises mainly comprised assigned, or possessional,

serfs who were also outside the jurisdiction of local administration. The army,

the clergy and several national and religious groups were also governed by a

separate jurisdiction (although conﬂicts within towns between the Church and

urban institutions, which was common in the seventeenth century, declined

in the eighteenth century, particularly after the secularisation of Church land

in 1764). These anomalies and the continuation of ‘legal separateness’ point

to a fundamental problem in local administration, namely whether admin-

istration should be centred on soslovie, or social ‘estate’, reﬂecting corporate

interests (such as urban institutions of self-government and noble assemblies),

or whether administration should, or could be, ‘all-class’ or ‘all-estate’ (which

was partly the case with some of the 1775 institutions, which excluded serfs

but not state peasants, and fully the case with the zemstvos). An analysis of

the functioning of both types of institution illustrates some of the dilemmas

facing local administration during the imperial period.

Corporate institutions

The universal obligations of state service for individuals in Russia from the

reign of Peter I – service for nobles (formal until 1762 and informal thereafter),

dues and conscription for townspeople and peasants – combined with the

government’s deliberate choice of ‘collective responsibility’ as a means by

which villages and towns (at least until the urban tax reform of 1775) met these

obligations – inhibited the development of independent, corporate bodies

which could defend the interests of their members against the government.

This is not to say that corporate institutions could not become a pervasive and

essential part of the life of the Russian people – the peasant commune for all

categories of peasants is testimony to this – but it goes some way to explain the

failure of the urban population or the nobility to develop powerful ‘Western’

or Central European-style corporate institutions.

The tsars – from Peter to Nicholas II – legislated at length on the struc-

tures of urban self-government and on the composition, responsibilities and

privileges of the urban population. It has been seen above that government

hoped through legislation to ‘Westernise’ or modernise Russian towns by the

introduction of Western-style guilds, the creation, and then re-creation, of cat-

egories of urban citizens and the development of corporate institutions. The

impracticability of this legislation in itself damaged the ability of corporate

institutions to function in the way envisaged in the legislation, and only wors-

ened from the late nineteenth century when the inﬂux of new urban residents

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was not matched by an attempt to change the nature of urban representation.

Further damage was inﬂicted by the inadequacies of the legislation itself, in

particular: the confusion over administrative and judicial functions in Peter I’s

ratushy (town councils) in 1699 and magistraty or magistracies, established in

1721, which were not fully resolved by the re-deﬁnition of the magistracies as

urban courts in Catherine II’s legislation of 1775; the overlapping jurisdictions

of the strata of town dumas established after 1775 and overlapping between the

dumas and the urban courts and the urban police force; the ambiguous role of

the governor in urban affairs (especially after the Municipal Statute of 1892); the

relationship between urban government and the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

the vast amount of paperwork which passed through institutions (Mironov

has estimated that some 100, 000 documents passed through the St Petersburg

city duma from 1838 to 1840);

the lack of clarity over the rights of the towns

to raise local taxes for local needs; inadequate control over urban budgets, at

least until the 1840s. The constant competition from an overwhelming peasant

population in an overwhelmingly rural country in itself was always going to

militate against the importance of towns and townspeople.

In the late eighteenth century there is some limited evidence to suggest

that despite these inadequacies of legislation Catherine’s 1785 Charter to the

Towns did have some positive effects, quite possibly linked with the attempts

in her reign to modernise and beautify towns by building schemes and town

planning. The attempt to dignify urban ofﬁce not only by ﬁnancial rewards

but by social recognition made at least the highest urban posts more attractive.

Urban institutions began to play some part in the economic life of the cities

which went beyond mere tax collectors for the state. Indeed, the physical

inability of the centre to control the activities of local administrators enabled

the towns to circumvent the legislation and make institutions more responsive

to genuine urban needs. Urban posts became the preserve of a small number of

prominent families, which, while it reﬂects poorly on the democratic nature

of urban institutions, at least demonstrates that urban administration was

considered to be of importance. In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century,

however, absenteeism increased in urban institutions while urban government

became more chaotic and disorderly.

As the nineteenth century progressed, the large cities had to face far greater

challenges in terms of housing, law and order, education, transport, health and

sanitation as rural labourers ﬂooded into the towns to seek employment in the

15 B. Mironov, ‘Bureaucratic or Self-Government: The Early Nineteenth Century Russian

City’, SR 52, 2 (1993): 249.

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Provincial and local government

newly established factories without an effective administration or adequate

ﬁnancial base. The need for more effective urban government which could

address the economic, cultural and physical needs of the population had been

partly recognised in the municipal reform of St Petersburg in 1846 and Moscow

(and Odessa) in 1862, followed by the municipal statute of 1870, and seems to

have encouraged the development of what can be termed a ‘civil society’ in the

larger towns such as St Petersburg, Moscow and Odessa.

This development

was, however, deliberately undermined by restrictions being placed on the

urban franchise and on the independence of towns from the governor in the

municipal statute of 1892. In Moscow, where there was a more established

and stable urban class and where a sense of ‘civic responsibility’ seems to have

developed, these issues were addressed to an extent. In St Petersburg, however,

where the needs of the court, the central bureaucracy and the wealthy noble

residents outweighed those of the merchantry and industrialists, these issues

remained unresolved, with the inevitable consequence of the aggravation of

social tensions within the city.

In Odessa, municipal government declined in

effectiveness after the restrictions imposed on its activities in 1892 and lost the

support of the professional classes,

whilst it deliberately neglected the needs

of the new wave of urban poor employed in the factories. In this respect it can

be said that corporate administration in the towns failed to respond to the

needs of a rapidly changing urban population.

Catherine established the corporate institution for the nobility – noble

assemblies – originally in 1766 to elect deputies for the Legislative Commission,

although their functions were more fully deﬁned in the Statute of Provincial

Administration of 1775 and then in the Charter to the Nobles in 1785.The

assemblies were supposed to fulﬁl state needs, namely to conduct the three-

yearly election of nobles to posts in the new institutions of local administration

established in 1775, but were also designed to stimulate a sense of local cor-

porate responsibility by keeping records of nobles and to consider and act

collectively to address local needs in the wake of the abolition of compulsory

noble service to the state in 1762 and the beginnings of a settled provincial

16 Well described in M. F. Hamm (ed.), The City in the Late Imperial Russia (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1986), especially in the chapters on Kiev by Hamm and Odessa

by F. W. Skinner. See also M. F. Hamm, Kiev: A Portrait, 1800–1917 (Princeton University

Press, 1993) and V. A. Nardova, ‘Municipal Self-Government after the 1870 Reform’, in

B. Eklof, J. Bushnell and L. Zakharova, Russia’s Great Reforms, 1855–1881 (Bloomington:

Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 181–96.

17 J. H. Bater, ‘Some Dimensions of Urbanization and the Response of Municipal

Government: Moscow and St Petersburg’, RH 5, 1 (1978): 46–63.

18 Skinner, ‘Odessa and the Problem of Urban Modernization’, in The City in Late Imperial

Russia,p.236.

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noble society. Noble assembles, however, suffered from the same failure of

the government to recognise the reality of provincial life which had adversely

affected urban corporate institutions established by Peter I and Catherine II. In

practice, the wealthy and most educated nobility preferred to live away from

their estates, and in the remoter parts of Russia the resident nobility tended

to be impoverished, to the extent that few met the qualiﬁcations (which were

based on income and service rank) to vote or take elective ofﬁce.

Although the assemblies did serve to ﬁll posts, which in turn provided

some much needed income for some of the poorer provincial nobles, and

although the elections generated equally welcome social activity which broke

the tedium of life in the provincial backwaters, their signiﬁcance for the devel-

opment of a corporate mentality was limited. Even by the end of Catherine

II’s reign, absenteeism in assemblies at election time was rife. The prestige of

the assemblies was undermined further by Paul I, who abolished assemblies

at provincial level. Although Alexander I restored the provincial assemblies,

the damage was done and the power of the governor grew over their conduct

of affairs. The property qualiﬁcations for active participation – that is, voting –

were further restricted in the reign of Nicholas I. Indeed, the noble assemblies

were almost moribund when they were artiﬁcially revived during the debates

on local administration in the wake of the Emancipation. This debate led to a

not entirely welcome participation by the assemblies, in particular because six

noble assemblies requested the establishment of a national parliament. The

assemblies continued to coexist alongside the zemstvos after 1864. The intense

political activity in the years 1904 to 1905 also affected the assemblies, although

they tended to be more moderate than the zemstvos. There is no doubt that

a corporate sense of shared interests and, not least, shared fears developed

within the provincial gentry in the early years of the twentieth century as

their land-ownership diminished. But the fact that this manifested itself far

more within the zemstvos – that is, within ‘all-estate’ bodies – than within the

noble assemblies was a reﬂection of the limited power and importance of this

corporate institution for the nobility.

‘All-estate’ institutions

A limited attempt to create ‘all-estate’ institutions was made by Catherine II

in 1775 when she established alongside the corporate institutions for the towns

and nobles (her draft Charter for the State Peasantry was never promulgated)

19 The operation of noble assemblies is described in Hartley, A Social History of the Russian

Empire,pp.92–6.

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Provincial and local government

an elaborate local government structure of courts and institutions for preserv-

ing law and order and for welfare in which members of three estates – nobles,

townspeople andstate peasants –participated,butwhichexcludedserfs.Courts

were segregated by the estate of the litigant in the ﬁrst two instances and mem-

bers of each of the three estates elected members of these courts (although

state peasants only elected assessors and not the judges). But, at least in prin-

ciple, nobles and state peasants sat together in the two institutions set up in

1775 whose functions are most imprecise: the conscience court (sovestnyi sud),

a court which was set up to handle cases which fell outside the normal scope

of civil and criminal offences (and which included a rather vague provision for

habeus corpus, a concept acquired by Catherine from her reading of Black-

stone in French translation);

the lower land court (nizhnii zemskii sud) whose

activitiesare largely unrecorded, but which was supposed to handle rural police

matters and petty crimes. All three estates also participated in the boards of

social welfare (prikazy obshchestvennogo prizreniia) which were given an initial

capital of 15,000 roubles each and which had responsibilities for a whole range

of welfare institutions, including national schools, hospitals, almshouses, asy-

lums, houses of correction, workhouses and orphanages. There is no record

of the way in which representatives of different estates worked in this body. At

least in some provinces the board was extremely active, although it was not

always possible to set up the full range of institutions envisaged; reports in

the 1780s found that the institutions were almost complete in the provinces of

central Russia but that in Olonets province only a hospital had been opened.

Progress in establishing national schools was impressive given that the boards

were operating almost from scratch; by 1792 there were 302 national schools

teaching 16,322 boys and 1,178 girls.

Some boards also acted quite effectively

as provincial banks by lending out its original capital at interest.

A more comprehensive attempt to create an ‘all-estate’ institution occurred

in 1864, with the establishment of zemstvos at the provincial and district level.

This statute followed the Emancipation of the Serfs, and the consequent need

20 For the operation of this court see J. M. Hartley, ‘Catherine’s Conscience Court: An

English Equity Court?’, in A. Cross (ed.), Russia and the West in the Eighteenth Century

(Newtonville, Mass.: Oriental Research Partners, 1983), pp. 306–18.

21 Sankt-Peterburg Filial Instituta russkoi istorii, St Petersburg, Fond 36,d.478,f.16, report

by A. R. Vorontsov from Olonets guberniia; also cited in J. M. Hartley, ‘Philanthropy in the

Reign of Catherine the Great: Aims and Realities’, in R. Bartlett and J. M. Hartley (eds.),

Russia in the Age of Enlightenment: Essays for Isabel de Madariaga (Basingstoke: Macmillan,

1990), p. 181.

22 Hartley, A Social History of Russia,p.138.

23 J. M. Hartley, ‘The Boards of Social Welfare and the Financing of Catherine II’s State

Schools’, SEER 67, 2 (1989): 211–27.

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