Lieven D. (ed.) The Cambridge History of Russia, Volume 2: Imperial Russia, 1689-1917
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Russian society, law and economy
junkers to preserve their increasingly anachronistic position as a rural ruling
class through ruthless agrarian interest-group politics.
28
The Russian situation in which the land-owning gentry suffered but aris-
tocratic families became the core of a new industrial-era plutocracy was very
common to Europe as a whole. On the eve of the First World War the ratio
of debt to income among the Russian aristocracy was usually a good deal
healthier than it had been a century before. Russia’s richest aristocrats had
incomes of between £100,000 and £200,000 per annum. Given their some-
times immense holdings of shares and urban land, there was every reason to
expect these incomes to soar as the industrial economy took off, as had hap-
pened to some aristocratic incomes in England and Germany. Even the Urals
aristocratic magnates, though temporarily falling on bad times, had much
room for optimism in 1914. With bank capital and new railways on the point
of linking the region’s vast iron ore deposits to the coal of western Siberia,
there was good reason to expect huge future profits from their still immense
landholdings.
In the early twentieth century the biggest threat to the land-owning class
was political rather than economic. In 1905 peasant looters tried to destroy
many noble estates. In 1906–7 peasant deputies, who made up a majority in
the first two Dumas, demanded the expropriation of all private large-scale
land-owning in Russia. The revolution of 1905–6 in fact drove the regime and
the nobility back into close alliance. The landowners understood that without
the support of the tsarist police and army their estates would be forfeit. Mean-
while the government learned the dangers of isolation even from its natural
supporters among Russia’s elites. Relations between crown and landed nobil-
ity were much better after 1906 than they had been in the decade before 1905.
Nevertheless tensions remained, often for reasons which were already famil-
iar from Prussian developments. In Russia, as earlier in Prussia, the regime’s
response to near revolution had been to set up a parliament dominated by
representatives of the land-owning elite, who for the first time were able to
articulate programmes, unite to defend their group interests, and choose their
own leaders. In time the Prussian agrarians became a formidable conservative
lobby and a thorn in the side of the Berlin government. Their Russian equiv-
alents strongly circumscribed Stolypin’s reformist strategy because of their
great influence in both the lower (Duma) and upper (State Council) houses of
the newly established parliament.
28 Becker, Nobility,pp.44, 53.
242
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
The elites
European comparisons suggest that in 1914 the Russian land-owning nobil-
ity was both not powerful enough and too powerful for its own good. In
nineteenth-century England 7,000 individuals, mostly members of the aristoc-
racy and gentry, owned over 80 per cent of the land. Prussian land-owning
was never this aristocratic, but in some provinces the big estates covered more
than half the land. Both upper classes controlled rural society with little diffi-
culty. In the English tenant farmer and the Prussian ‘big’ peasant the nobles
also had powerful allies in the defence of property and order. In 1848–9 the
Prussian nobles could play off peasant and landless labourer in a way that was
far harder in most of Russia, given the relative solidarity of the much more
homogeneous communal peasantry. On the other hand, however, the Russian
nobles had not yet succeeded in marginalising themselves in the manner of
the west and south German nobilities. By 1914 the latter very seldom owned
more than 5 per cent of the land in any province and were barely a worthwhile
target for expropriation. By contrast, even in the Central Industrial region
(admittedly in 1905) the Russian nobles still owned 13.7 per cent of the land. In
the south and west German case, many generations had passed since the end
of serfdom and the tensions it had caused. In addition, the growing power of
urban and industrial lobbies was tending to create a common agrarian front,
which in Catholic areas enjoyed the powerful support of the Church. None of
this applied in Russia.
29
For rather obvious reasons, between 1860 and 1945 political stability was
more tenuous in the poorer ‘Second World’ periphery of Europe than in its
richer First World core. Property was less secure against social revolution and
large agrarian property least secure of all. If this was true a fortiori of Russia it
was not much less true of Hungary, Italy, Spain or even Ireland. In the Irish case
the uniquely wealthy English tax-payer bought out the landlords on generous
terms, in the process probably weakening the Anglo-Irish union but killing
any chance of social revolution.
30
This option was not available in the rest of
peripheral Europe. In Italy in 1920–1 fascism made great strides by helping the
landowners, especially of Tuscany and the Po valley, to crush agrarian rad-
icalism. In Spain and Hungary it took full-scale military counter-revolution
backed by formidable foreign intervention to save the land-owning aristoc-
racy from probable destruction. In Russia in 1917 only the victory of military
counter-revolution could have saved the big estates, which would have been
29 Lieven, Aristocracy, chapters 2 and 3.
30 W. Kissane, Explaining Irish Democracy (Dublin: University College of Dublin Press, 2002),
chapter 4.
243
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Russian society, law and economy
expropriated as certainly by a democratically elected parliament as they were
in fact by peasant mobs and Bolshevik decrees. One could very legitimately see
the regimes of General Franco or Admiral Horthy as a high price to pay for the
survival of aristocracy. In the specific Russian case, however, the destruction
of the traditional rural elite went along with the emergence of a Bolshevik
regime whose leaders seldom had much sympathy for, or understanding of,
agriculture or peasants. Under Stalin this regime was to mount an assault
on the Russian peasantry which went well beyond anything conceivable to
Horthy or Franco.
31
31 The best comparative work on the politics of aristocratic landownership in Europe in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is R. Gibson and M. Blinkhorn (eds.),
Landownership and Power in Modern Europe (London: Harper Collins, 1991).
244
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
12
The groups between: raznochintsy,
intelligentsia, professionals
elise kimerling wirtschafter
Beginning in the eighteenth century, when regularised bureaucracy struck
deep roots in imperial Russia, policy-makers struggled to visualise the middle
layers of Russian society. The vast geographical reaches of the empire, the
cultural diversity of its population and the absence of constituted political
bodies made it difficult to define the social groups situated between the mass
of peasant cultivators and the governing classes of noble landowners, civil
servants and military officers. As early as the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury Muscovite officials codified the assignment of Russian subjects to legally
defined ranks (chiny) that carried specific rights, privileges and obligations to
the state. This practice continued in the eighteenth century, when agglomer-
ated social categories (sostoianiia or sosloviia) took shape, and remained a key
feature of Russian social organisation until the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.
Sometimes called ‘estates’ by modern-day historians, the Russian sostoianiia
consisted of hereditary statuses that functioned both as tools of administration
and as social communities.
1
The Russian categories did not play a political role
equivalent to that of the French
´
Etats or German St
¨
ande, but they did share
important features with these groups. Like corporate groups in Western and
Central Europe, Russian nobles, clergy and townspeople enjoyed distinctive
hereditary privileges; however, in contrast to the European groups, their priv-
ileges were not historically constituted in the local law codes, institutions and
offices of identifiable territories.
2
Indeed, at the Russian monarch’s discretion,
without the consent of any corporate institution, privileges could be granted
or rescinded and obligations redefined.
1 The classic analysis remains, Gregory L. Freeze, ‘The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm in Russian
Social History’, AHR 91 (1986): 11–36.
2 There were exceptions in the Ukrainian, Polish, Baltic German and Finnish lands that
were absorbed into the Russian Empire but allowed, in varying degrees, to preserve local
laws and corporate institutions.
245
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Russian society, law and economy
Alongside the primary categories of Russian society – the nobles, clergy,
merchants, townspeople and peasants – the Russian government also erected
a range of subgroups characterised by distinctive occupational functions, ser-
vice obligations and legal privileges. Among the most significant and per-
sistent of these subgroups, the category of the raznochintsy (literally ‘people
of various ranks’ or ‘people of diverse origins’) appeared early in the eigh-
teenth century and remained an officially recognised social status until the
late nineteenth century. In some legal-administrative usages, the designation
‘from the raznochintsy’ referred to outsiders or non-members of a given social
category or community – for example, non-nobles or town residents who
were not registered members of the official urban community (the posad). In
other applications, the raznochintsy represented an umbrella category encom-
passing a range of protoprofessionals and lesser servicemen: low-ranking civil
servants and unranked administrative employees, retired soldiers, the children
of senior military officers born before a father’s ennoblement, the children of
personal (non-hereditary) nobles, non-noble students in state schools and vari-
ous specialists, scholars, artists and performers. Careful perusal of the relevant
legislation suggests that the malleable contours of the raznochintsy derived
from both positive definitions based on function and negative definitions based
on exclusion.
3
The multiplicity of economic, service and protoprofessional subgroups that
made up the raznochintsy highlighted both the complicated structure of Rus-
sia’s ‘groups between’ and the desire of the government to impose legal-
administrative controls across society. Throughout the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, resource mobilisation, the regularisation and expansion
of state service, and the spread of education gave rise to new social groups that,
in accordance with the political thinking of the time, needed to be institution-
alised as legally defined social categories. Because each category performed
specific functions in society and polity, the various subgroups of raznochintsy
tended to correspond to recognisable occupations. Yet as the composition
of the raznochintsy also showed, the realities of everyday life – the ways in
which people struggled to survive and thrive – were far too amorphous and
changeable to be contained within prescribed social relationships.
For much of the imperial period, the raznochintsy included entrepreneurial
and needy individuals whose economic relationships violated officially recog-
nised social and geographic boundaries. Well into the nineteenth century, for
3 For full treatment, see E. K. Wirtschafter, Structures of Society: Imperial Russia’s ‘People of
Various Ranks’ (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1994).
246
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Raznochintsy, intelligentsia, professionals
example, debt relations, private employment, and lost social identities allowed
non-nobles to exploit serf labour, even though the possession of serfs had
become an exclusive noble right in the 1750s.
4
Similarly, in violation of the 1649
Law Code (Ulozhenie) and much subsequent legislation, peasants continued to
set up shop in the towns, a privilege theoretically restricted to registered mem-
bers of the official urban community (the townspeople or meshchane). Notwith-
standing legal prohibitions and cameralist policing, the Russian government
appeared powerless to prevent the illicit pursuit of profit. Nor did it necessarily
want to stymie the inventiveness of wayward subjects; when properly regu-
lated through the sale of trading privileges, illicit economic ventures acquired
official sanction and served the fiscal interests of the state. Thus, the ascribed
(pripisannyi) or trading (torguiushchii) peasant of the eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries could legally reside in a town on condition that he pay taxes
as both a peasant and a member of the urban community.
5
With the help of
flexible legal definitions, including the various definitions of the raznochintsy,
officials tolerated or only half-heartedly prosecuted enterprising subjects who
usurped the economic privileges assigned by law to other social groups.
The category of the raznochintsy, by incorporating social and economic
relationships that lay outside the framework of official ‘society’, at once facil-
itated and undermined governmental control. Prior to the abolition of serf-
dom in 1861, the pursuit of profit, the satisfaction of greed and the struggle to
subsist frequently took the form of forbidden economic activity that the gov-
ernment sought to eradicate or co-opt. Moreover, because some productive,
potentially beneficial economic ventures (subsequently regarded as legitimate
entrepreneurship) remained illicit and informally organised, business fortunes
also could be highly unstable. Thus, for over three decades, from 1813 until
1844, the serf entrepreneur Nikolai Shipov roamed the Russian Empire geo-
graphically and occupationally, by legal and illegal means, until finally he
achieved emancipation and became a sutler in the Caucasus and Bessarabia.
6
As Shipov’s experience illustrates, the Russian government’s insistence that
economic functions be based on social origin inevitably led ambitious and tal-
ented individuals to violate the law. The presence of successful entrepreneurs
4 E. K. Wirtschafter, ‘Legal Identity and the Possession of Serfs in Imperial Russia’, JMH 70
(1998): 561–87; Wirtschafter, Structures of Society,pp.26–31, 76–85.
5 R. Hellie, ‘The Stratification of Muscovite Society: The Townsmen’, RH 5 (1978): 119–75;
E. K. Wirtschafter, Social Identity in Imperial Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University
Press, 1997), pp. 130–4; Wirtschafter, Structures of Society,pp.18–26, 31–4, 89.
6 Shipov’s son graduated from the Kherson Gymnasium and became a teacher in Odessa.
V. N. Karpov, Vospominaniia – N. N. Shipov, Istoriia moei zhizni, repr. (Moscow and
Leningrad: Academia, 1933); Wirtschafter, Structures of Society,pp.90–1.
247
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Russian society, law and economy
among the raznochintsy revealed the skill with which ordinary Russians not
only evaded state authority but also manipulated official social definitions in
the interest of personal security and profit.
Try as it might to contain society’s development within hereditary social
categories, the imperial government’s need to mobilise human and material
resources also created legal opportunities for the crossing of social bound-
aries. The imposition of service obligations opened avenues of social mobility
and spawned new subgroups of raznochintsy. When serfs, state peasants and
registered townspeople were conscripted into the army, they became legally
free from the authority of the landlord or local community; consequently,
soldiers’ wives and any children born to soldiers or their wives after the for-
mer entered service also attained legal freedom. Legal emancipation surely
represented upward mobility, yet its realisation and consequences remained
problematic. For while soldiers and their families enjoyed special economic
and educational privileges, their actual lives did not always conform to official
prescriptions. Soldiers’ wives (soldatki) could obtain passports allowing them
to engage in urban trades, and soldiers’ sons (soldatskie deti) were required to
enter military schools and eventually active service; however, local communi-
ties did not necessarily tolerate the presence of soldiers’ wives, and soldiers’
children, including female and illegitimate children, did not necessarily end
up in the appropriate schools, institutions or occupational groups. By freeing
lower-class people from local seignorial and community controls, the demands
of military service produced a floating population, eligible for registration in
a variety of service and economic groups, but not always living within the
confines of their legal status.
7
Whether historians focus attention on economic activities or state service,
a dynamic relationship between governmental policy and spontaneous soci-
etal development underlies the phenomenon of the raznochintsy. Effective
government required both trained personnel and a prosperous populace. But
whereas the extraction of resources from society encouraged the imposition
of ever-tighter social controls, the demand for educated servicemen loosened
social restrictions and encouraged social mobility. Throughout the imperial
period, commoners acquired education, benefited from the rewards of state
service and rose into the hereditary nobility precisely because the state needed
technically competent administrative and military personnel. At the higher lev-
els of Russian society, the Table of Ranks institutionalised this process, which
7 E. K. Wirtschafter, ‘Social Misfits: Veterans and Soldiers’ Families in Servile Russia’,
Journal of Military History 59 (1995): 215–35.
248
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Raznochintsy, intelligentsia, professionals
included the creation of service-related raznochintsy. Established in 1722 by
Peter the Great, the Table of Ranks regulated promotion and ennoblement in
military, state and court service.
8
In state service, promotion to rank eight con-
ferred hereditary nobility, whereas ranks nine to fourteen granted personal
nobility. Personal nobles enjoyed all the rights and privileges of hereditary
nobles, including the right to possess populated estates, but their non-noble
children did not inherit these rights.
9
Thus children born to civil servants or
military officers prior to hereditary ennoblementbelonged to the raznochintsy,
as did individual servicemen whose positions fell below the Table of Ranks and
those whose ranks did not confer nobility (hereditary or personal). Adding to
the complexity of these arrangements, a law of 1832 established the title ‘hon-
oured citizen’, which granted noble-like privileges – exemption from conscrip-
tion, the capitation and corporal punishment – in recognition of economic and
cultural achievements.
10
As the number of servicemen and educated non-nobles grew and as enno-
blement occurred at ever-higher ranks, the significance of the raznochintsy
moved beyond the realm of legal-administrative order into the realm of social
consciousness. With the founding of Moscow University in 1755, the official
boundaries of the raznochintsy had expanded to include all non-noble stu-
dents at the university and preparatory gymnasia, many of whom would go
on to serve in the army and bureaucracy.
11
Born of the government’s need
for scholars, artists, technical specialists and trained servicemen, the educated
commoners became the most widely recognised subgroup of raznochintsy. In
nineteenth-century literature, memoirs and journalism, and in much subse-
quent commentary and scholarship, the category of the raznochintsy referred
to upwardly mobile educated commoners who belonged to a ‘society’ (obshch-
estvo) or ‘public’ (publika) of diverse social origins. This notion of ‘society’ as
an abstract entity arose in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries
to indicate fashionable or polite society (le grand monde), ‘the civil society
8 For recent treatment, see L. E. Shepelev, Chinovnyi mir Rossii XVIII–nachalo XX v. (St
Petersburg: Iskusstvo-SPb, 1999). See also S. M. Troitskii, Russkii absoliutizm i dvorianstvo
v XVIII v.: Formirovanie biurokratii (Moscow: Nauka, 1974); P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Pravi-
tel’stvennyi apparat samoderzhavnoi Rossii v XIX v. (Moscow: Mysl’, 1978).
9 Beginning in 1845 rank fiveconferred hereditary nobility; ranks nine through six, personal
nobility; and ranks fourteen through ten, personal honoured citizenship. A decree of 1856
then raised the attainment of hereditary nobility to rank four. L. E. Shepelev, Otmenennye
istoriei – chiny, zvaniia tituly v Rossiiskoi imperii (Leningrad: Nauka, 1977), pp. 11–16, 47–101.
10 Wirtschafter, Structures of Society,pp.34, 76–7.
11 Of the two preparatory gymnasia attached to Moscow University, one was ‘for nobles,
and the other for raznochintsy, except serfs’. PSZ, 1st series: 1649–1825, 46 vols. (St
Petersburg: Tip. II Otd., 1830), vol. 14,no.10346. Quoted in Wirtschafter, Structures
of Society,p.22.
249
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Russian society, law and economy
of the educated’, or educated Russians who were ‘neither agents of the
government (pravitel’stvo) nor in the traditional sense its subjects (narod)’.
12
Organised around print culture and sites of polite sociability, ‘society’ origi-
nated in the educated service classes of the eighteenth century, which while
overwhelmingly noble, also encompassed a sizeable contingent of non-noble
raznochintsy.
13
Almost from the outset, however, noble members of ‘society’ questioned
the moral worthiness of the educated raznochintsy. Noble instructions to
the Legislative Commission of 1767–8 defined the raznochintsy not simply
as non-nobles, an established legal-administrative usage, but also as new ser-
vice nobles in the derogatory sense of social upstarts. This derogatory usage
acquired broad resonance in the nineteenth century, when major literary fig-
ures such as Nikolai Gogol and Ivan Turgenev depicted the raznochintsy as
social and cultural inferiors. For P. D. Boborykin, a noble journalist prominent
in the 1860s, the raznochintsy likewise represented social and cultural inferi-
ors who nonetheless participated in the literary, theatrical and musical life of
St Petersburg.
14
Whatever their contributions to the empire’s military might
and cultural glory, and these received recognition already in the eighteenth
century, the raznochintsy in no way represented the best ‘society’.
But the noble Boborykin also used the category raznochintsy in a more neu-
tral sense to describe participants in a socially diverse urban cultural milieu.
Out of this milieu there emerged in the middle of the nineteenth century an
identifiable group of non-noble radical intellectuals enshrined in Russian cul-
tural memory as ‘the raznochintsy’. Associated with the likes of V. G. Belinsky,
N. G. Chernyshevsky and N. A. Dobroliubov, the educated raznochintsy of
the 1840s–70s combined literary careers with social radicalism and political
opposition. As in the past, some members of Russian ‘society’ disdained the
raznochintsy, seeing in their radical ideas and alternative lifestyle, a threat to
morality and civilisation. To others, the raznochintsy represented a generation
of ‘new people’ who would lead the country through a revolutionary transfor-
mation to a bright and joyous future. Regardless of how the raznochintsy
were judged, their presence in the consciousness of Russia’s educated
12 M. Raeff, ‘Transfiguration and Modernization: The Paradoxes of Social Disciplining,
Paedagogical Leadership, and the Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Russia’, in H.
B
¨
odeker and E. Hinrichs (eds.), Alteuropa – Ancien R
´
egime – Fr
¨
uhe Neuzeit: Probleme und
Methoden der Forschung (Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt: Fromann-Holzboog, 1991), p. 109. See
also A. Netting, ‘Russian Liberalism: The Years of Promise’, unpublished PhD disserta-
tion, Columbia University (1967), p. 20.
13 M. M. Shtrange, Demokraticheskaia intelligentsiia Rossii v XVIII veke (Moscow: Nauka,
1965).
14 Wirtschafter, Structures of Society,pp.98–101.
250
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Raznochintsy, intelligentsia, professionals
classes contributed to the formation of another sociocultural identity, the
intelligentsia, which has remained an ‘institution’ of Russian society to the
present day.
15
On-going scholarly research shows that the conceptual and historical reality
of the intelligentsia, no less than that of the raznochintsy, cannot be subordi-
nated to any single collective meaning.
16
Historians situate ‘the origins of the
Russian intelligentsia’ in a variety of social milieus: the educated and increas-
ingly disaffected service nobility of the eighteenth century; the idealist philo-
sophical circles that formed around the universities, salons and ‘thick’ journals
of the 1830s–40s; and finally, the radical raznochintsy and nihilist movement of
the 1860s.
17
One historian counts over sixty definitions of the ‘intelligentsia’ in
the scholarship of the former Soviet Union, the most common being a social
group composed of individuals ‘professionally employed in mental labour’.
Echoing the official classifications of Soviet society, this definition equates the
intelligentsia with the technically specialised professions of modern times.
18
Clearly, the possibilities for definition and redefinition are numerous. Suffice
it to say that any effort to summarise or critically evaluate the massive histo-
riography on the intelligentsia can hardly do justice to the complexity of the
phenomenon or the diligence of its scholars.
15 On the continuity of the intelligentsia ‘counterculture’, see J. Burbank, ‘Were the Russian
Intelligenty Organic Intellectuals?’ in L. Fink, S. T. Leonard and D. M. Reid (eds.), Intel-
lectuals and Public Life: Between Radicalism and Reform (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1996), pp. 97–120.
16 As a collective term, intelligentsia appeared in Russia from the 1830s to the 1860s.
Wirtschafter, Structures of Society,pp.101–2, 125–33; O. Muller, Intelligencija. Untersuchungen
zurGeschichteeines politischenSchlagwortes (Frankfurt: Athenaum, 1971); and most recently
S. O. Shmidt, ‘K istorii slova “intelligentsiia”’, reprinted in Obshchestvennoe samosoznanie
rossiiskogo blagorodnogo sosloviia, XVII–pervaia tret’ XIX veka (Moscow: Nauka, 2002), pp.
300–9.
17 I provide here only a handful of references. M. Raeff, Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia:
The Eighteenth-Century Nobility (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966); M. Malia,
Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1961); D. Brower, ‘The Problem of the Russian Intelligentsia’, SR 26 (1967): 638–47;
D. Brower, Training the Nihilists: Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1975); A. Walicki, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to
Marxism, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979); V.
Nahirny, ‘The Russian Intelligentsia: From Men of Ideas to Men of Convictions’, Com-
parative Studies in Society and History 4 (1962): 403–35; V. Nahirny, The Russian Intelligentsia:
From Torment to Silence (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1983). For fuller historio-
graphic treatment, see Wirtschafter, Structures of Society,pp.93–150; Wirtschafter, Social
Identity,pp.86–99.
18 S. I. Khasanova, ‘K voprosu ob izuchenii intelligentsii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii’, in G.
N. Vul’fson (ed.), Revoliutsionno-osvoboditel’noe dvizhenie v XIX–XX vv. v Povolzh’e i Pri-
ural’e (Kazan: Izd. Kazanskogo universiteta, 1974), pp. 37–54; V. R. Leikina-Svirskaia,
‘Formirovanie raznochinskoi intelligentsii v Rossii v 40-kh godakh XIX v.’, Istoriia SSSR
(1958)no.1: 83–104; V. R. Leikina-Svirskaia, Intelligentsiia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX
veka (Moscow: Mysl’, 1971).
251