
didsoitwouldgivethema“provocation”tocomein.Theyarerompinginthereandtheonlygovernmentin
Cambodiainthelast25yearsthathadthegutstotakeapro‐Westernandpro‐Americanstandisreadytofall.I
amthinkingofsomeonelikeBobMurphywhowouldbesentthereonatriptoreportbacktomeandwhowould
goinandreassureLonNol.This,ofcourse,wouldbeparalleltoyouractivitieswhichwillbeundertaken
immediatelyaftertheNSCmeeting,intheeventthatIdecidetogoonthiscourse,withsomeofthelily‐livered
Ambassadorsfromourso‐calledfriendsintheworld.Wearegoingtofindoutwhoourfriendsarenow,because
ifwedecidetostandupheresomeoftherestofthemhadbettercomealongfast.
IwilltalktoyouaboutthisaftertheNSCmeeting.
10
JohnMitchelltooknotesofthemeetingandwroteaconcisetwo‐pagememorandum:
MEMORANDUMOFMEETINGApril28,
PRESENT:ThePresident,SecretaryofState,SecretaryofDefense,AttorneyGeneral
SUBJECT:Cambodia/SouthVietnam
ThesubjectmeetingwasheldintheOvalOfficeofThePresidentonTuesday,April28,1970,commencing
at10:20a.m.andlastingforapproximatelytwentyminutes.
ThePresidentstatedthatthepurposeofthemeetingwastoadvisethosepresentofthedecisionshehad
reachedwithrespecttothedevelopingsituationinSouthVietnamandCambodia.ThePresidentfurtherstated
thathehadhadthesubjectunderconstantconsiderationforthepasttendaysandhadtakenintoconsideration
alloftheinformationprovidedbytheDirectorofCentralIntelligence,theJointChiefsofStaffandAdmiral
McCainandhisstaffatthebriefinginHawaii.ThePresidentfurtherstatedthat,inarrivingathisdecision,he
hadtakenintoconsiderationthepositionstakenbytheSecretaryofStateandSecretaryofDefensein
oppositiontotheuseofU.S.ForcesinCambodiaandthefactthatDr.Kissingerwasleaningagainstthe
recommendationofsuchuse.
ThePresidentfurtherstatedthatthepreviousdayhehadmadecertaininquiriesofAmbassadorBunker
andGeneralAbrams.ThePresidentreadhiscommunicationtoAmbassadorBunkerandtheAmbassador’sreply
receivedlateMondayevening.
ThePresidentfurtherstatedthat,baseduponhisreviewofthegeneralCambodiansituation,hehad
decidednottochangethecurrentU.S.positionwithrespecttomilitaryassistancetoCambodiaorhis
authorizationfortheARVNoperationintheParrot’sBeak.ThePresidentfurtherstatedthathehaddecidedto
confirmtheauthorizationforacombinedU.S./GVNoperationagainstCOSVNheadquartersinFishHookinorder
toprotectU.S.ForcesinSouthVietnam.ThePresidentexpressedtheopinionthattheCOSVNoperationwas
necessaryinordertosustainthecontinuationoftheVietnamizationProgramandwouldpossiblyhelpin,but
notdetractfrom,U.S.effortstonegotiatepeace.
ThePresidentfurtherstatedthathehadtakenintoconsideration,inarrivingathisdecisions,theprobable
adversereactioninsomeCongressionalcirclesandsomesegmentsofthepublic.ThePresidentfurtherstated
that,inordertoestablishtherecordoftheeventsleadingtohisdecisionsandtheadvicehehadreceived
concerningthesubjectmatterthereof,thepreviouseveninghehaddictatedatapewhichincludedthecontrary
recommendationsoftheSecretaryofStateandtheSecretaryofDefense.
AtthecloseofthePresident’sstatementshelefttheOvalOfficetoattendanothermeetingintheCabinet
Room.Therewasnodiscussionofthesubjectmatterofthemeetingbyothersinattendanceduringthe
presenceofthePresident.
[Signed:]J.N.Mitchell
11
SeeElizabethBecker,“Cambodia:ALookatBorderWarwithVietnam,”WashingtonPost,Dec.27,1978;Henry
Kamm,“PolPotConfirmedAssertionbyNixon,”NewYorkTimes,March18,1979,p.7.
12
NewYorkTimes,May18,1970.
13
Seee.g.,StanleyKarnow,“Cambodia:Nixon’stheOne,”WashingtonPost,Jan.12,1979.
14
Seee.g.,WilliamShawcross,“Cambodia:TheBlame,”TheSundayTimes(London),Dec.12,1976;“Who‘Lost’
Cambodia?”NewYorkTimes,Feb.6,1979;Sideshow,passim.
15
E.g.,Shawcross,Sideshow,pp.372‐373,389.Shawcross,whothusexcusedtheKhmerRougeatrocities,was
amazinglyupbraidedinturnbyanotherwriterwhoallegedthattherewasinsufficientevidencetheatrocities
evertookplace.RichardDudman,TheNewYorkTimesBookReview,April22,1979.Someofourcriticsseemto
bereadytogivePolPotthebenefitofthedoubtbeforetheirowngovernment.