theagreement.Finally,HaigsentmethePresident’sinstructionsfortheconduct
ofthetalks:
AssumingyouareabletoslipMonday’smeetingtolateMondayafternoon,youshould
thenholdtoughontheDMZissue,confirmingthatthePresidentremainsadamant.IfMoscow’s
assistanceisevident,wemaythenfindHanoicaving.Ifnot,thePresidentbelieves,andIknow
youdoaswell,thatwemustnotbreakoffthetalksonMonday.Inthateventyoushouldreturn
foranewsessionhopefullyasearlyaspossibleonTuesdaymorning,thusgivingme[Haig]
maximumtimetoleaveTuesdaynightwiththeVicePresident.Thiswillenableustomanage
theVicePresident’spersonalschedule,thelow‐keyedannouncementandcoordinationwith
BunkerandThieu.AlsoonTuesdayyoushouldagainenterthetalksinatoughposturebywhich
timeMoscow’sultimateleverageshouldbeevidentif,infact,theyexerciseitatall.IfLeDuc
Thoisstillintransigent,youshouldthentryourcompromiseasthefinalUSconcession.Ifeven
thisfails,thePresident,aswepredicted,wouldevenbewillingtocavecompletelywiththe
hopesthatwecanstillbringThieuaround.
Inotherwords,NixonhaddisavowedtoDobryninmycompromiseproposal
asbeingtoosoft.Atthesametimeheinstructedmetoputitforwardandto
acceptHanoi’sformulationasalastresort.Hewantedtoprevailbybluffing
Dobryninbutwasultimatelypreparedtocavein.Abluffinwhichthegap
betweentheformalpositionandwhatonewillacceptissowidecannotwork.
Inanyevent,LeDucThowasonestepaheadofuswhenwemeton
December11.Hewantednoagreement,atleastonthisround.Thepossibility
thatwemightcaveinhadobviouslyoccurredtohimaswell;hethereforemoved
decisivelytoescapetheembarrassingsituationwhereintherewasonlyoneissue
leftonwhichwemightyield.Hemovedquicklytoremovethisdanger.First,he
rejectedsigningproceduresthatwehadassumedsettled.(Thiswasacomplex
arrangementbywhichSaigoncouldsignwithoutrecognizingtheCommunist
ProvisionalRevolutionaryGovernment.)Next,forty‐eighthoursafterconceding
theissueofAmericanciviliantechniciansassistingSouthVietnamesearmed
forces,heinsistedthatthisappliedonlytothepublictextoftheagreementto
avoidembarrassingus.Henowaskedforawrittenprivateunderstandingthatour
technicianswouldbewithdrawn.Healso,regretfully,wasnotyetreadytodiscuss
anyoftheprotocols.AndhisinstructionsontheDMZwouldnotarriveuntilnext
day.LeDucTho,inshort,madeitclearthathewouldnotsettlethatday,nor
(giventheoutstandingissues)wasasettlementlikelyonthemorrow.This
behaviorwasinitselfirritating.Itwasdoublyinsultingtodelayaconclusionwhen
theNorthVietnamesehadknownthatforthelastforty‐eighthourstheVice