anexpertonVietnam,wasmeticulousandprecise.IhadaskedHaigonDecember
7tosendhimasummaryofthesituationsohecouldexertasteadyinginfluence.
ThePRtemptationtoevadeadmittingthattherewasadeadlock,Iwasconvinced,
wouldmakeitmuchharderlatertomanagethenownearlyinevitable recessof
thetalks.Paradoxically,Hanoiwaslikelytomakeitsfinalconcessionsonlyifitwas
convincedthatwewerewillingto riskfailureandtaketheconsequences.Noone
hadmoretolosefromsuchaneventualitythantheauthorof“peaceisathand.”
Buttherewasnowayofhidingadeadlockindefinitely,nochanceofovercoming
itifwewerenotwillingto braveitsimplications.Haig’smessagetoKennedy,in
hisbestArmyprose,readinpart:
Henryrecognizesthatyouhavebeeninadifficultpositionthisweekandthereforefelt
youshouldhavethebenefitofhispersonalviewsonthesituationasitnowstands.Iwould
emphasizethathisexperiencewiththePresidentduringcrisisperiodsconfirmsthefactthat
mostofthePresident’scounselintheabsenceofDr.Kissingerwouldcomefromelements
withintheWhiteHousewhoseorientationandbackgroundwouldcausethemtofocus
primarilyonpublicrelationsconsiderationswhich,whileperfectlyunderstandable,canleavea
serioussubstantivegapduringvitaldeliberations…You,ofcourse,mustbethesolesourceof
substantivecounsel.Henryhopesthatyouwillnotmakeanyotherkindofassessmentsorjoin
inanycomments[on]Congressionalattitudesorpublicopinionwhichareavailabletothe
Presidentfrompeoplewhosetasksarepreciselythat.Yourcounselmustthereforealwaysbein
termsofnationalsecuritysubstance.Inthiscontextitisnowevidentthatwewillneedsome
timetopositionthepublicopinionathomeintheeventthetalksbreakdown.Butthereisno
needtoallowtheseconsiderationstoaffectourstrategyvis‐a‐visHanoi.Hanoihasknownfor
sometimewhattheissuesareandwhatminimumneedsofourstheymustmeet.Thequestion
issimply:cantheybringthemselvestodoso?Tacticalploysfromoursideindicatingthatwe
areinclinedtoavoidfacinguptothefactoftheirintransigencecanonlymakemattersworse
andtheirresolvetohangtoughevenfirmer…
Hanoiknowsexactlywhattheyhavetodo.Iftheymeetourminimumdemandsthe
managementoftheagreementitselfisgoingtotakethemostdeterminedanddecisive
Presidentialleadershiptoenforceanagreementwhichwearenowconvincedbothsideswill
enterintowithaminimumofgoodwill.If,ontheotherhand,thetalksbreakdownbecause
Hanoicouldnotevenacceptourminimumdemands,thereislittledoubtthatwecansucceed
onlyasaresultofthemostcourageousanddeterminednationalleadershipwhichisnot
dominatedbyPRconsiderationsbutratherthesamerealisticassessmentsofthenational
interestwhichhavebroughtustothispoint…
Thefour‐hourmeetingonDecember7suggestedthatthebasicproblem
waspreciselyHanoi’scontinuedprocrastination.Hanoi’sapparentcalculationwas
thatthelapseoftimecouldonlyimproveitsposition;thatwewerehopelessly