carefullynurtureshisownimage;theobsessive pursuitofit,afterall,broughthim
towhereheis.NoChiefExecutivewouldtakekindlytoanappointeewhoiscast
bythemediaasthesourceofallconstructive actions.InNixon’scasethiswas
compoundedbyhisconvictionthathefacedalifelongconspiracyoftheold
Establishmentdeterminedto destroyhimandthatallmediaattentionwas
ultimatelyduetopublicrelat ions,inwhich,inexplicably,hisstaffwassadly
deficient.Hence,hegrewincreasinglyconvincedthatIwasneedlesslytrafficking
withhisenemiesinthe“Georgetownset” andatthesametimewasusingmy
publicrelationsskillstofurbishmyimageandnothis.Hehadapoint,though
mattersweremuchlessinmycontrolthanhebelieved.Inanyevent,theproblem
wasinsolubleforthemoment.SinceNixondidnothaveconfidenceintheState
Departmentasaninstitution,hefeltcompelledtoentrusttheconductof
negotiationstome.ButstartingwiththeIndia‐Pakistancrisisin1971,theWhite
Housepublicrelationsmachineryavoidedfewopportunitiestocutmedownto
size.AndNixonhimselfgrewtesty.Hiscablestomesometimesseemedwritten
moreforarecordofdissociationthanforconveyinginstructions,evenwhile(or
perhapsbecause)hewasgivingmeever‐growingauthority.
DuringthelastphaseoftheVietnamnegotiations,NixonandInever
differedonthesubstanceofournegotiatingposition.Storiesleakedbythepublic
relationssideoftheWhiteHousethatNixon’slegaltraininghadenabledhimto
spotflawsinthedraftingaresupportedbynodocumentsorotherevidence.
(Nixonmayormaynothaveknownofindividualleaks;butthestorieswould
neverhavesurfacedwithoutconfidencethattheywouldreceivePresidential
favor.)Ouronlydifference,ifany,washisdesiretoavoidashowdownbefore
electiondayandmyconvictionthat,howeverdesirable,Hanoiwouldnotpermit
ustoavoidit.Privately,hisviewsabouttheSouthVietnamesePresidentwereno
morecharitablethanmine;hewasdeterminedtoprevailbutnotuntilafter
electionday.ThepublicityIreceivedcausedhimto lookforwaysofshowingthat
hewasincharge,evenwhileusuallyendorsingthestrategyIdevised.Onehadto
deducetheselatenttensionsfromvagueclues;theywerenevermadeexplicitin
ourpersonalcontacts,whichwereunfailinglycourteousandinwhichno
disagreementsurfaced.(Ofcourse,IhadseenenoughofNixonwithothersto
realizethatthiswasnoproofofPresidentialfavor.)ButIwasbeginningtosense
anemergingcompetitivenessthatwascertainsoonerorlatertodestroymy
effectivenessasaPresidentialAssistantandthatwasacceleratedbytheemotions
oftheconcludingphaseoftheVietnamwar.