Jones G.S., Claeys G. The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought

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Douglas Moggach

A related theoretical current proposes other Kantian means to overcome

the persistent dualisms of modern life, which the French Revolution proved

inadequate to resolve. Here Kant’s idea of the intuitive intellect, a conceptual

understanding that produces its own corresponding objectivity, suggests an

image of the new subjectivity, and of a shared realm of freedom. Among

the early German idealists, Friedrich H

olderlin (1770–1843), companion

of Hegel and Schelling, ﬁnds a model for this productivity of the mind

in artistic practice, as deﬁned by G. E. Lessing (1729–81), for whom not

objects, but actions, or subjectivity at work in the world, provide the proper

contents of art (Lessing 2003,pp.25–129). For H

olderlin, the supersensible

refers to the possibility of community among all ﬁnite spirits, and their claim

of absolute freedom against powers that claim an underivative, transcendent

status (Lypp 1972,p.22 n.24). The noumenal realm of freedom is accessible

in an intellectual intuition, which reveals the unity of subject and subject,

and of subject and external form. The recognition of a common g round

where being and freedom meet checks the dangers implicit in a boundless

subjectivity. The intuition of a preconceptual identity of thinking and being,

attested in art, especially poetry (Harris 1993,p.32; Henrich 2003,pp.279–

95), brings to rest the inﬁnite regress of subjective reﬂection: the constant

retreat of subjectivity before its own products is a problem detected in

Fichte’s reformulation of Kant (Hegel 1971,pp.415–16;Pinkard2002,

pp. 139–44). H

olderlin resists this romantic turn. In evoking a harmony

of reﬂection and objective form, aesthetic insight can preﬁgure and guide

more concrete political transformations.

These developments receive brief but pointed political interpretation

in the anonymous, fragmentary text known as ‘The Earliest System

Programme of German Idealism’,

of 1796 or 1797, which illustrates

olderlin’s inﬂuence, if not his authorship. This text attributes to Kant’s

aesthetics the intention of placing free goal-determination within a natu-

ral order that we can conceive, regulatively, as purposive, in accord with

our own ends. The contemporary world, however, is shaped by the dull

and mechanical interaction of parts (Lypp 1972,p.20). Kant could not

completely free himself from this perspective. Almost simultaneously with

the ‘System Prog ramme’, he would describe and endorse this mechanism

explicitly in his Doctrine of Right, the ﬁrst part of his Metaphysics of Morals

of 1797, basing juridical relations upon constraint or unilateral exclusions

17 On the disputed authorship of this text, in Hegel’s hand, see Gammon 2000,pp.145–70;Mathy

1994,pp.9–10.

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from private spheres. The ‘System Programme’ proposes an alternative, bet-

ter to realise the accord of the natural order with freedom. This ideal is the

transcendence of the mechanical state, and the birth of the aesthetic state

of beautiful and harmonised life-conditions. The idea remains rudimentary

in the ‘System Programme’, but it had already ﬁgured in a work by Carl

von Dalberg (1744–1817), a friend of Schiller (Dalberg 1791),

and, as an

incentive and catalyst for reform, in Schiller’s own Aesthetic Education.To

what extent can modern life be paciﬁed under the category of beauty? Like

Schiller, H

olderlin’s work is devoted to this question. Spontaneity becomes

the idea of freedom as a shaping of the self and society. The aesthetic holds

out prospects of social and political solidarity in an age of increasing division

of labour and specialisation.

4 Spontaneity, schism and expression: Schelling and

the varieties of romanticism

Though he later diminishes the status of the aesthetic (Cesa 2000,pp.199–

217), F. W. J. Schelling (1775–1854), in his System of Transcendental Idealism

(1800), depicts art as the organon of philosophy. It is the vehicle of an

intellectual intuition, or a concept that brings about its own realisation.

Schelling conceives this productivity of thought to be an aesthetic act. Art

thus completes philosophy, because the content which the latter can only

depict subjectively, as a concept, can be shown to have an objective pres-

ence in ar tistic depiction (Mathy 1994,pp.11–12). The study of artistic

works allows us, moreover, to recover the creativity of self-consciousness

as it unfolds in nature, and discloses the complex inner structure of sub-

jectivity: a consciousness operating without full self-knowledge, in that the

process of creation is never entirely transparent to reﬂection (Bowie 2000,

pp. 245–6;Bowie1990). This partial opacity distinguishes art from science

and philosophy, allowing it to escape from strict causal determination, and

to originate the new, the unprecedented and the incalculable. Schelling’s

early work seeks to resolve the problem of how the mind relates to the exter-

nal world. He takes up this problem as expressed by Spinoza, for whom

there are two parallel manifestations of a common universal substance, one

objective, the other subjective (Spinoza 2000). Each of the attributes of

18 Dalberg is cited by Schiller in the original publication of Aesthetic Education in the journal Die

Horen. He was among the leaders of the Napoleonic Confederation of the Rhine in 1806,andwas

responsible for implementing signiﬁcant legal reforms in these territories. Schiller 1793 is dedicated

to Dalberg.

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Douglas Moggach

thought and extension (or objectivity) has an identical and necessary con-

tent, guaranteeing their accord, but at the price of subjective freedom, since

subjects confront an entirely determined world. Their freedom amounts

to adaptation to necessity. This problem will prove highly important for

the romantics. Schelling’s initial move is to resolve Spinoza’s attributes of

thought and being into a continuum, where they ﬂow together harmo-

niously, and reveal their common origin at an ‘indifference point’, prior to

the separation of subject and object. Freedom is possible in so far as the

world is not entirely governed by causal laws. This is the lesson of art. While

olderlin’s intellectual intuition reveals a common project of subordinat-

ing the external world to rational freedom, Schelling’s places the prospect

of freedom in the indeterminate and the contingent.

Here idealism and

romanticism begin to establish their own proper identities.

From the point of view of the early romantics like Friedrich Schlegel

(1772–1829), Schelling’s approach to art has two principal defects. First,

Schelling seeks to over-systematise experience.

Instead, the romantics

cast doubt on ultimate foundational principles or deﬁnitive syntheses of

thought and being, and celebrate multiplicity and difference over unity,

thus heralding contemporary ‘post-modern’ attitudes, whose vaunted orig-

inality is dubious. This posture involves the defence of the non-identical,

though the late Schelling, too, is adamant in his criticisms of what he sees

as Hegel’s reduction of being to an aspect of thought.

Secondly, Schelling’s aesthetics distinguish inadequately between ancient

and modern art, seeing in them not distinct historical phases but merely

formal variants on an identical pattern: the ancients depict the inﬁnite in

the ﬁnite, the moderns the ﬁnite in the inﬁnite. Like Schiller and Hegel,

Friedrich Schlegel stresses a break in continuity, an epochal rupture in the

history of art (Mathy 1994,pp.17, 23). After a brief period around 1795

when he upholds the classical unities against the diffuse and eclectic mod-

ern style (Beiser 2003,pp.126–7), Schlegel writes the founding manifestos

of the romantic school in 1797–9 (Schlegel 2003).

In conjunction with

a critique of Fichte’s ahistoricism, Schlegel rejects the timeless universal

19 Ferry 1990,pp.113–14, derives this position from Kant 1987.

20 Hegel, however, maintains close connections to Schelling until the Phenomenology of 1807.

21 Schlegel also feels that the complete lack of a system is an equally detrimental attitude. See Schlegel

2003,p.247.

22 Beiser 2003,pp.3–5, however, sees closer afﬁnities of the romantics with Platonism.

23 Though the term ‘romantic’ is ubiquitous in the writings of its members, the school acquires the

name after 1805 (Behler 1992,pp.22–3).

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Aesthetics and politics

standards of classicism in favour of a contextual and hermeneutic approach

to works of art, soon to be developed by Schleiermacher (Bubner 2003,

pp. 17–28, 35–45). Schlegel differentiates nature- and art-poetry, the one a

mimesis of a natural order, the other an exploration of subjective moods.

Ancient literary and artistic expression depicts a direct appreciation of nature

and objectivity, but it suppresses freedom, whereas modern forms celebrate

an objectless liberty, the endless play of subjective aesthetic powers (Mathy

1994,pp.17–18). This transition leads to an emphasis on the bizarre and the

abnormal (which become especially the themes of later romanticism: Bohrer

1998), but it also indicates new developmental possibilities within modern

subjectivity itself (Jaeschke 1990,pp.5–6), a potential for perfectibility and

so for new and higher stages of aesthetic production. Schlegel anticipates a

future synthesis in the poetry of the objective, based upon neither mere sub-

jectivity nor immediate, external nature; but the outlines of this resolution

remain vague, and he is frequently understood to revel in the dissonances

of modern experience (Hegel 1971,pp.415–16). Richard Wagner will

take up this programme of a new, integral art in his own compositional

work.

The early efforts at synthesis by Friedrich Schlegel and his collaborators

are a facet of the aesthetic revolution, the cultural transformation of individ-

ual and social life. The political demarcations traced by Heine and Ruge in

the 1840s, between republican idealism and conservative romanticism, are

not yet germane. Schlegel himself writes a defence of republicanism in 1796

(Schlegel 1996,pp.93–112). While eschewing rigorous systematisation of

thought, he attempts a g reat philosophical fusion, between the seemingly

incompatible positions of Spinoza, Leibniz and Fichte. From Spinoza, as

read by Schelling, comes the idea of a pantheistic nature, with thought and

being as continuous and complementary outpourings from a single source;

from Leibniz (and from contemporary discoveries in chemistry and physics),

the idea of nature not as a mechanism, but as the play of living forces; and

from Fichte, ideas of spontaneous and permanent creation, and the ref-

erence of objective forces and forms to the subject. This synthesis proves

unstable, and it is the autonomy of the subject, the Fichtean dimension,

that is ultimately sacriﬁced in romanticism (Beiser 2003,pp.185–6). As in

Wordsworth, a recognition of an engulﬁng natural order serves to limit the

arrogations of the self. Subjective creativity is expressive of the powers of

nature and not of rational freedom. Meanwhile, subjects are increasingly

thrust back into their own private, inner worlds. They are thus integrated

into nature, but increasingly separated from each other.

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In its analysis of the workings of modern subjectivity, romantic thought

conﬁrms Hegel’s view of its participation in the culture of diremption. The

contradiction between the subject and society comes to permeate romantic

thought (R

usen 1976,p.19). The idea of irony highlights this detach-

ment. Hegel describes romantic irony as the divorce between conscious

selves and their essential ends, resulting from a one-sided subjective moral-

ity which cannot make the transition to the shared values and practices

of ethical life. Seeking to draw the criteria of their judgements from an

abstract interiority, and not from the network of social ties and mutual

recognition, subjects fall into contradiction with objectivity (Hegel 1991,

pp. 180–6). Their ends become contingent and arbitrary, and while they

acknowledge this arbitrariness, they are incapable of advancing to reconcil-

iation. Their subjectivity becomes exhausted in self-absorption. A typical

ﬁgure of romantic inwardness is thus the ‘beautiful soul’ critically described

in the Phenomenology, a pure self-regarding consciousness which disdains to

realise itself in objectivity (Hegel 1967a, pp. 658–66). This ﬁgure is distinct

both from the classical ‘beautiful individual’ as a microcosm of the polis,and

from the modern ‘free and inﬁnite personality’, whose reﬂexiveness guides

it back to unity with others. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834), who,

after Schiller (1793), gives this image its most poignant expression, depicts

the beautiful soul as the ‘unmoved centre of a turning world’ (Schleierma-

cher’s Soliloquy of 1810, cited in Simpson 1984,p.12), evoking an inward-

ness that detaches the subject from objective relations. Anticipating facets

of Schopenhauer’s thought, Schleiermacher distinguishes a devalued phe-

nomenal realm from the essential and the noumenal, now conceived as

the domain of a pure self-consciousness, and he subordinates the ﬁnite

subject to an ineffable absolute, accessible not through rational thought,

but in feelings of dependency and subordination. Thus ideas of both self-

realisation and autonomy are cast into doubt. Schleiermacher, like Hamann

and Jacobi, afﬁrms religious faith as a spontaneous act of submission to

a rationally inaccessible power. In contrast to Kant, the spontaneous act

of the subject is not regulated by an autonomous self-legislation, but by

heteronomous compliance; aspects of the Kantian self thus come to be

sundered. Hegel will be severely critical of this stance: Schleiermacher’s

intended endorsement of Christianity is predicated upon an introspection

that threatens to undermine social cohesion and unity (Simpson 1984,pp.

11, 14, 19). The recognition of this danger helps to explain Hegel’s vig-

orous anti-subjectivist polemics of the Philosophy of Right (Hegel 1991,

pp. 9–23).

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Aesthetics and politics

Romantic irony attests to a divorce between the inner and the outer

similar to that characterising the religious movement of pietism (Simpson

1984,p.14), though in Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg, 1772–1801), this

idea is linked to a defence of Catholicism, and not of Reformed Christianity

(Novalis 1996). Irony is a form of reﬂection that dissociates subjects from

their attributes or externalisations. If Herder’s idea of reﬂection is to resolve

external form into the workings of force, and thus to maintain a continuity

between subject and object, Friedrich Schlegel adopts a view closer to

Mendelssohn’s concept of reﬂection as the inward turn of the subject away

from its outer manifestations. Schlegel’s idea of irony implies that in external

forms are not to be found authentic expressions of subjective self-awareness,

but merely transitory moments of creation and destruction (Menke 1999,

pp. 604, 608), from which the subject stands aloof. His thought attests to

complex inﬂuences from Fichte’s ﬁrst Wissenschaftslehre of 1794–5 (M. Frank

1995,pp.65–85), though Fichte’s major concern is to show how subjects

assume relations towards the objective, and how they seek to rationalise it

under the command of practical reason. Such practical motives are missing

from Schlegel’s texts. Kantian ideals of rational self-determination are also

challenged by the recognition of transcendent powers, beyond the reach

of subjectivity (Cesa 2000,pp.199–217); these powers can be taken to be

beneﬁcent, as by Novalis, but increasingly they assume a more threatening

mien, and they penetrate within consciousness itself, rendering the self

impermeable to knowledge.

The separation of the subject from externality has consequences for

the understanding of being and objectivity. The early romantics incline

towards a Spinozistic or pantheist view of substance as a self-causing

continuum (Lypp 1972,p.28), but this idea is difﬁcult to harmonise

with the emphasis on forms as transient and discontinuous. Against

ideas of process and historical continuity, the romantics break down

subjective activity into discrete and incommensurable moments, each

fraught with radically different and unforeseeable outcomes (Bohrer 1998,

p. 12;Mathy1994,p.16). Particularly in the late romantics, time is dis-

solved into atomistic points, each capable of initiating fundamentally new

series of events (Bohrer 1998,p.11). Causal regularity and the rule of sci-

entiﬁc rationality are thereby dismissed. This tendency has been identiﬁed

as a subjectiﬁed occasionalism (Schmitt 1924,p.23). It represents a revival

24 This view persists in Freud, in conjunction with a new idea of subjectivity as multiple, construed in

naturalistic or scientistic terms.

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Douglas Moggach

in secular garb of the early modern idea of instantaneous and inscr utable

divine interventions into the created order, upsetting any predictably oper-

ating natural causes. Deriving from the works of Nicholas Malebranche

(1638–1715), occasionalism offers an alternative to Spinoza’s formulation

of the relation of thought and being. It detaches the operation of causality

from physical bodies, and attributes it to a transcendent source in divine

will; observable physical interactions do not really cause each other, but are

merely the deceptive appearance of deeper, immaterial forces (Malebranche

1945, Book VI; McCracken 1983,ch.3). Thus, in contrast to Spinoza,

there is no necessity or determinism in nature. In subjectifying occasional-

ism, the late romantics stress moment over process, multiplicity over unity,

unpredictability over recurrence. Unlike Malebranche’s theological account,

it is now the ﬁnite subject who is empowered to effect changes, and these

(at least in the later romantics) follow no providential designs.

The shift towards occasionalism can be documented through views of

accident and its place in a larger order. While H

olderlin’s strongly anti-

romantic ideal of transparency leads him to seek the subordination of

contingency to rational rule (Lypp 1972,p.19; Raulet 1992,p.159), Novalis

celebrates the contingent and the accidental for shattering routine and

auguring the new: ‘All the accidents of our lives are materials from which we

can make what we will’ (cited in Bohrer 1998,p.12 [my translation, DM]).

Freedom here lies in indeterminacy, not in rational autonomy; in Willk

ur,

taken as arbitrary action, and not Wille, or submission to universal law. This

attitude again highlights the romantic divorce between spontaneous subjec-

tive action and self-legislation. Occasionalism is not fully realised in early

romanticism, however, because Schlegel holds a developmental view of his-

tory, in which the chaos of the present portends undetermined possibilities

for a future synthesis of subject and object. Novalis, too, retains a teleo-

logical perspective in which the accidents of individual life are ultimately

integrated. He combines a modern view of the reﬂexive subject with a

defence of traditional values and relations, sanctioned by providence. Thus

accident still ﬁgures within a potential order (Novalis in Bernstein 2003,

pp. 203–38). Late romanticism shatters this order in favour of a fragmented

reality, a ‘substanceless punctualisation’ (Bohrer 1998,pp.12–13)ofinﬁ-

nite and incommensurable possibilities. The fantastic, a pathological and

demonic realm of inexplicable effects, comes to predominate in the work

of Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853, though he is also counted among the early

romantics), E. T. A. Hoffmann (1776–1822) and Edgar Allan Poe ( 1809–

49). By a kind of auxesis or rhetorical augmentation (Aristotle 1926, 1368a

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Aesthetics and politics

40f), Mendelssohn’s reﬂexive shift away from form as constituted towards

the subject as constitutive extends into a view of objectivity not as a causally

governed domain, but as ﬁelds of arbitrary actions and outcomes.

A distinct current of thought generally described as romantic takes its

lead not from Mendelssohn, but from Herder. Here the central concept

is not irony, but expression, the authentic rendering in objectivity of an

essential subjective content. Following Leibniz’s translation of form into

conﬁguration, the str ucturing activity described by bodies themselves in

their movements, Herder stresses the aesthetic, formative power of the self

as an expression of its freedom (while also stressing continuity between the

realms of nature and spirit). Ethically, as in Rousseau, an implicit subjectiv-

ity must give itself an authentic manifestation in the external world. This

transposition of subjective content into objective and stable form encap-

sulates Herder’s expressivist view of freedom (Taylor 1989,pp.368–90).

Further applying Leibniz’s monadic doctrine, Herder considers each sub-

ject as offering a unique and irreplaceable perspective on the totality of

human accomplishments, and realising an aspect of a composite human

personality; these subjects appear both as individuals and as collectivities,

though the relations between these levels are not always clear in his thought.

Expressivism serves as a criterion for assessing the modern social order.

Herder detects in modernity a growing tendency towards a mechanistic

reduction, not an increase, of social differentiation: the division of labour

reduces workers to standardised, interchangeable units, whose movement is

imparted from without (Herder 1877,pp.534–64). Like the early idealist

‘System Programme’, he equates mechanism and heteronomy. Authori-

tarianism is inherent in modern society as connections are severed and

solidarities break down, and as the protection of intermediate bodies is

withdrawn, releasing the egoistic individual as a prey to the naked power of

the state (Herder 1965,pp.27–145). In opposition to the mechanical unity

of this modern state, Herder views the people or the nation as an organic

entity, a shared pattern of ethical life reﬂecting a dynamic inner principle

(Helfer 1990,pp.367–81). The endogenous movements of these collective

subjects generate a spontaneous order of increasing complexity, based upon

extended interactions and recognition of multiplicity. This tendency par-

allels Hegel’s synthesising, reﬂexive moment of modern freedom. Unlike

Novalis’ preference for hierarchy and subordination, Herder’s organicism

implies the diffusion rather than centralisation of power.

The impact of

25 Simpson 1984,p.15, on organicist theories of art, society and nature.

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Douglas Moggach

such views in the formation of modern national consciousness has been

profound, especially in the period of the revolutions of 1848.Tocitea

single example, Elias Lonnrot (1802–84), whose two editions of the Kale-

vala, the great Finnish national epic, appeared in 1835 and 1849, applied

(though unsystematically) both Herderian ideas of expression and Hegel’s

theory of the epic to his compilations of folk material. His publications

gave powerful voice to indigenous traditions, and catalysed the emergence

of a national self-awareness under conditions of Russian tutelage (Karkama

2003; Manninen, 1996).

5 Art, modernity and autonomy: Hegel and the Hegelian School

Hegel’s posthumous Lectures on Aesthetics, published in 1835 by Hein-

rich Gustav Hotho (1802–73), situate Kant within the modern culture of

oppositions. Kant’s philosophy recreates the conﬂict of thought and being,

understanding and sensibility, that are characteristic of modernity; but at

the same time, sensing a higher unity, he struggles to overcome these con-

tradictions (Hegel 1964,pp.88, 90–1). Hegel contends t hat there are other

sites in which Kant approaches, without attaining, the vantage point of his

own philosophy. Kant’s new presentation of teleological reason in the Third

Critique anticipates the Hegelian conception of reason’s embodiment in

objectivity, and, consistent with the demands of modernity, shows that this

embodiment cannot be an immediate unity, as in the classical world; instead,

it must be worked out through the very oppositions generated by free sub-

jectivity. While for Hegel the Critique of Judgement distinctly innovates in this

way, the First Critique should not be read as exclusively dualistic, either; it

contains tensions like those of the Third. Hegel argues, for example, that the

transcendental schematism of the Critique of Pure Reason places concept and

intuition into intimate and dynamic harmony, but that Kant fails to follow

up the implications of this insight, reverting to his formulaic distinction of

spontaneity and receptivity (Hegel 1971,pp.347–8; Pippin 1989,pp.69,

275 n.30). The critical philosophy thus constitutes a unity, but a defective

unity, which posits ﬁxed oppositions even when it glimpses the prospect of

a higher and more concrete unity (Lebrun 1970,pp.469 n.6, 471–3). Kant’s

system is overly subjective, constricting reason’s ability to actualise itself in

the world. Kantian morality does not grasp the concrete forms of freedom,

but remains mired in inwardness.

Hegel proposes to develop the rational Idea, the unity of thought and

being, beyond the conﬁnes of Kantian dualism. This unity is not the static

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identity of the ancient Eleatics, but a process of development in which

objective reality is reshaped through experiences of rational freedom. Hegel

expresses this dynamism in his concept of Wirklichkeit, the actuality or causal

efﬁcacy of reason, its ability to fashion aspects of the objective world into

the vehicle of spirit, and to perfect and transcend its previous achievements

(Hegel 1975c, pp. 142, 200–2, 1975b, pp. 147–9). This sense of Wirklichkeit

derives from Aristotle’s idea of energeia, the presence or activity of form and

end in matter, but in keeping with the primacy of freedom in modernity,

the end is not ﬁxed within a natural order, but involves free, rational self-

determination. Hegel deﬁnes personality as the subjective form of this

movement, the ability to determine one’s own attributes, to transform

given particularity into conscious individuality by investing it with reﬂective

choice. The achievement of modernity will be to recognise the inﬁnity of

the personality, its capacity for freedom, rational autonomy and shared

ethical life.

The role of aesthetics for Hegel is deﬁned in relation to this idea of

Wirklichkeit. The modern subject is too complex to express its content ade-

quately in art. Simultaneously, however, artistic achievement is a facet of

reason’s objectivity. It is not to be seen as the mere dilution of the idea

in matter (Kimmerle 1999,pp.91–9), though pure philosophical cognition

exceeds it in its insight into the rational idea. Art is rather a manifesta-

tion of this idea, its parousia or tangible presence in the world. Like living

organisms, beautiful objects partake of a necessary ordering of their parts,

and they manifest the power of reason to propel itself into objectivity. The

harmony of beauty is not simply a subjectively gauged accord, but a form

of manifestation of reason in its objectivity. As in Plato’s Symposium, beauty

is a mode of emergence of reason; but the rational idea is no longer a given,

objective form. It is now, as modernity demands, mediated by subjective

activity. Like Herder, Hegel establishes a continuity between subjectivity

and the forms of expression; but aesthetic forms can no longer reveal the

capacities of the subject in all their complexity. This harmony was attainable

for the beautiful individual of ancient Greece, but not for the reﬂexive selves

of modern society. At the same time, to revel in the detachment between

subject and form, and to fail to grasp the possibility of a higher synthesis, is

for Hegel the hallmark of a deviant romantic irony.

This attitude, struck

26 Hegel 1991,pp.170–86, provides a description of romantic irony, and a striking critical anticipation

of post-modern attitudes. See also Hegel 1971,pp.415–16. For distinctions among types of irony,

see Henckmann 1990,pp.214–40.

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