Jones G.S., Claeys G. The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

to the Reich without substantial alterations. Although the constitutional

structure of the Reich looked quite impressive it never got beyond this

compromise between authoritarian and liberal principles.

In domestic affairs the period from 1867 to 1879 was an era of liberal rule.

Bismarck gave the liberals considerable leeway in legal, ﬁnancial and com-

mercial matters. Important national institutions were established: a national

currency, a central bank, a comprehensive commercial code, the harmon-

isation of criminal law in accordance with liberal principles, to name the

most important. However, such legislation always encountered opposition

from Bismarck whenever the rights of the government and notably of the

Emperor could have been affected. Similarly, the press, although on the

whole free, remained subject to some arbitrary restrictions. The balance

sheet seen from a liberal point of view was certainly a positive one; but

the liberals never succeeded in closing the loopholes that allowed recourse

to authoritarian ways of government where necessary. Furthermore, Bis-

marck pushed important legislative projects, like the social insurance system,

through Parliament despite the liberal parties, even though the liberals did

succeed in inserting liberal principles of equity and rationality into these

complex legislative projects, and in having them adapted to the requirements

of a modern society based upon the rule of law.

The National Liberal Party considered itself the party of German uniﬁ-

cation, and as such it was determined to support Bismarck’s foreign policies

unreservedly. In domestic affairs it worked for a gradual completion of the

constitutional order established in 1867 and 1870. But it had internalised the

experience of 1848 and of the Prussian constitutional conﬂict of the early

1860s. Henceforth it would not risk any frontal collision with the Chancellor

not least because his great personal prestige had to be taken into account as a

major factor. Banking on this support, Bismarck drew the National Liberals

into a major confrontation with the Centre Party that had emerged in the

1870s as a serious political rival. The National Liberals violated the principle

of equality by supporting exceptional laws against the Catholic clergy. Even

more seriously they voted for the anti-socialist legislation which Bismarck

introduced after two terrorist attacks. The National Liberals were let down

by their own supporter s who had dismissed their initial reluctance to enter

upon the path of anti-socialist legislation as a violation of their liberal prin-

ciples. Obviously the liberals were in a quandary. Unlike in Britain, German

liberalism had from the beginning failed to retain the nascent working-class

movement within its political camp. The Progressive Party remained faith-

ful to classic liberal principles, and accordingly fought against Bismarck’s

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German liberalism in the nineteenth century

policies tooth and nail, as a continuation of the democratic republicanism

of the 1840s. But they also feared the competition of the Social Democratic

Party, all the more so as in many ways the socialists could be considered

the true heirs of the radical democracy of the Revolution of 1848/49. The

eloquent struggle for liberal principles in open conﬂict with Bismarck won

them few followers, although they were supported by an inﬂuential section

of the liberal press. Generally the Progressive Party was reduced to ‘negative

policies’. In the parliamentary system that developed after the foundation

of the Reich its inﬂuence was marginal.

5 Liberal divisions in imperial Germany

In 1879, Bismarck decided to break once and for all with the National Lib-

eral Party. He opted for a new policy based upon an alliance of conservative

forces in Prussian-German politics under the banner of protectionism. In

order to do so he now did not hesitate to enlist the support of the Centre

Party. This new departure split the National Liberal Party, which so far

had been in favour of free trade, and also its supporters in the country.

Despite this the National Liberals tried hard to hold on to their role as

an informal government party. Gradually one section became a party of

Bismarck-followers despite the indifference of the Chancellor. Bismarck’s

marked swing to the right led to the breakaway of the left wing of the

National Liberal Party. The new Freisinnige Vereinigung was decidedly for

‘free trade’ and it refused to enter into further compromises with Bismarck.

Instead the energetic defence of the liberal achievements since 1867 was

now their main objective. At this stage there was still some hope that the

unity of the liberal movement might be restored in due course. How-

ever, this proved a vain hope, for what actually happened was a process of

progressive fragmentation of the liberal movement. The National Liberals,

especially in Prussia, shifted even further to the right. They now hoped to

save themselves by embracing an aggressive imperialist nationalism and mak-

ing a rapprochement with the Prussian Conservatives (see Winkler 1978,

pp. 5–28). In 1884 the various factions of the liberal left joined forces in

the Freisinnige Partei. However, constant quarrels about the cor rect political

course between the different factions continued unabated, mainly because

of the utter powerlessness of a party that found itself squeezed between the

policies of the government and the agitation of the socialists. Generally,

they were reduced to a representation of the lower middle classes, notably

the artisans and shopkeepers, although they enjoyed a substantial following

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

among the intelligentsia and even the ﬁnancial community that disliked the

tariff policies of the imperial government.

By now, liberals of all persuasions were in real trouble. Their main objec-

tive – to bring to completion the programme of liberal constitutionalism on

the national level – had failed, and it was not likely that it would be achieved

in the near future. Many liberals, among them Max Weber, attributed this

to Bismarck’s policies. The Chancellor had thwarted the crystallisation of

liberalism into a self-conscious political party because he would not allow

anyone beside himself an independent position. ‘His entire policy was based

on the effort to prevent the consolidation of any strong and thereby indepen-

dent constitutional party’ (Mommsen 1984,p.164). The great generation

of National Liberal leaders, so Weber maintained, had been succeeded by

weak politicians, because in the atmosphere created by Bismarck strong-

willed personalities were not allowed to grow. ‘The majestic sun that stood

at Germany’s zenith and made the German name shine in the farthest cor-

ner of the ear th was almost too big for us and burned out the bourgeoisie’s

slowly evolving capacity for political judgement’ (Mommsen 1984,p.86).

Indeed, this became the basis of the traditional view that German liberalism

had been weak and undecided throughout and that it always had been too

ready to make its peace with the authorities.

In the 1990s this interpretation was challenged on various grounds. In

the ﬁrst place, seen in an international context, German liberalism had

been by no means as timid as these interpretations (variations of the so-

called Sonderweg thesis) would have it. Subsequent scholarship on German

liberalism has come up with far more diversiﬁed explanations. M. Rainer

Lepsius (1966) had suggested that the domestic constellation of imperial

Germany was largely determined by three fairly sharply distinguished socio-

cultural milieux to which comparatively stable forms of social conduct

corresponded: the traditional conser vative milieu, the Catholic milieu and

subsequently the working-class milieu. These milieux hardened into fairly

stable structures that were unfavourable to dynamism and change. In the

liberal camp there did not exist an equivalent to these stable socio-cultural

milieux, even though there always existed a considerable degree of correla-

tion between Protestantism and a bourgeois mentality that favoured liberal

attitudes (H

ubinger 1994). In this respect, liberalism that for some decades

had been considered the dominant ideology of the day, was clearly worse

placed than its political rivals.

In a way it could be said that liberalism suffered from its former suc-

cesses. The great objective of the liberal movement, namely the creation of

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German liberalism in the nineteenth century

a constitutional nation state organised in accordance with liberal principles,

had lost its magic power over the electorate. For this reason Max Weber

and his generation felt themselves to be ‘epigones’ of the great pioneer

generation of liberals who had helped to establish the German Empire. But

perhaps this was too harsh a judgement. For even though the liberals had not

comprehensively succeeded in their policies at the level of the central gov-

ernment, their impact upon society as a whole had been far greater than is

usually admitted. The liberals did leave their imprint upon German society.

Imperial Germany had become, notwithstanding its pseudo-constitutional

constitution, very much a bourgeois society.

Even though the serious splits

in their ranks substantially impaired their political clout, the liberals managed

to gain and maintain considerable power positions in some of the federal

states, and even more so in local government. For more than forty years

they played a crucial role in local government, in particular in the cities. It is

true that their relatively strong position was to a considerable degree due to

the three-class suffrage which favoured the propertied classes. But they did a

remarkably good job in running the new urban centres often against the bit-

ter opposition of the Catholic Centre Party and the social democrats. They

created a socio-cultural milieu that beneﬁted their own clientele in partic-

ular: the educated upper middle classes and also the business circles. But

the other sections of urban society also proﬁted not only from the cultural

infrastructure that the liberals created but also from the wide-ranging social

beneﬁts of the municipal socialism that was implemented by far-sighted city

councillors and mayors.

Even so, the tide had turned against the liberals. A clearly discernible lib-

eral strategy no longer existed. With the rise of a mature capitalist economy

and a structural crisis in the agrarian economy, together with the persis-

tent problems faced by the traditional artisans and shopkeepers in a rapidly

developing industrial society, no political strategy could have suited the ideal

and material interests of the liberal constituency in its entirety. Therefore,

the political activities of the various factions of liberalism varied according

to region, time and circumstances. The liberal parties were forced to enter

into different coalitions, either on the right or on the left, and this drove

the various factions of the liberal movement even further apart.

In Wilhelmine Germany liberalism presented itself in fragmented form.

Already in their Heidelberg Programme of 1884 the National Liberals had

declared their main political objective to be the defence of the established

3 This point has been made recently most strongly by Geoff Eley in Jarausch and Jones 1990.

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

order against the challenges from the right, but even more from the socialist

left. They now also opted for a pronounced nationalist policy in order to

hold the different factions in the party together. They prided themselves on

being staunch supporters of the new Weltpolitik that in 1894 was launched by

Prince B

ulow and William II, and supported both the rearmament policies

of the imperial government and in particular the policy of constructing a

strong German battle ﬂeet. When the drive for a strong German Empire

overseas did not immediately yield the anticipated successes, the National

Liberals demanded from the government that it should not refrain from

using the weight of the military might of imperial Germany as a diplo-

matic weapon, and it should not shrink away from war if there was no

alternative.

In Prussia the National Liberals now co-operated with the Conservatives,

as far as possible, rather than joining forces with the Progressive liberals. A

reform of the Prussian suffrage law was now out of the question even though

it was overdue, especially after progressive taxation had been introduced in

1891. Johannes von Miquel, who by now had changed his position as leader

in the National Liberal Party for the post of Prussian ﬁnance minister,

thought that the National Liberals ought to become the standard bearer of

a plebiscitary national monarchy under the leadership of William II thus

exploiting the popular support for the monarchy (though not necessar-

ily the person of the monarch himself). It goes without saying that the

National Liberals were now prepared to support new anti-socialist measures

again. Furthermore, Max Weber suspected that the German bourgeoisie

would have welcomed a populist plebiscitarian regime under William II

which would protect them against the socialist threat and likewise against

new social reforms. With utmost contempt he stated in May 1895 in his

famous Freiburg Inaugural Lecture: ‘It is all too obvious that a part of the

upper bourgeoisie long for the rise of a new Caesar who would protect

them against rising masses from below, and likewise against the projects of

social policies which seem to be pursued by some of the [smaller] German

dynasties’ (Weber 1984a). However, for some year s, if only up to a point,

the strategy of co-operation with the Conservatives in Prussia worked out.

The formation of the so-called ‘bloc’ of the Conservative and Liberal par-

ties under Count B

ulow in 1906 seemed to herald a new era of success

in overseas policies, and moderate progress in constitutional matters. Three

years later this dream was rudely shattered; German policies were again

dominated by an alliance of the Centre Party and the conservatives, while

liberals of all persuasions were left out in the cold once again.

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German liberalism in the nineteenth century

The Progressive liberals that formed the core of the new Freisinnige Partei

had always been energetic opponents of aggressive foreign policies and

colonial acquisitions which appeared neither to be viable nor in the interest

of their supporters. Likewise they had been staunch opponents of military

armaments, if only because in military matters the power of Parliament over

the budget was severely restricted. However, in 1892, and again in 1893,

Count Caprivi declared himself ready to end these relics of the Pr ussian

military state, and to grant normal parliamentar y budgetary rights to the

Reichstag even in military affairs, provided that the Progressive liberals

would vote for a moderate army bill. The progressive wing of the party

thought it advisable to give up their fruitless radical opposition in this

ﬁeld. Eventually they separated from the party and founded the Freisinnige

Vereinigung. They thought that the radical opposition to the government had

not led anywhere and pleaded for limited co-operation with the government

in order to trade in reforms concerning constitutional and other material

issues, for instance the reform of military justice. The conﬂict between

faithfulness to the principles of orthodox liberal doctrine and concessions

on tactical grounds was a permanent one, but the strategy of the Progressive

liberals was to some degree successful.

Besides, many otherwise left-minded liberals found it futile, if not utterly

unjustiﬁed, that the Progressives stuck to their former doctrinaire opposi-

tion to armaments and a ‘sensible’ German Weltpolitik (Weber 1984a). Max

Weber belonged to those who believed that only a strong future-oriented

policy of overseas expansion could overcome the lethargy of the liberal

movement and provide the dynamism for a second liberal era. In England

Weber had detected a very different attitude both of the liberals and of

the working class to the state. He attributed this ‘to the reverberations of a

world power position which constantly faced the state with great tasks in

power politics and which involved the people in constant political educa-

tion’, something which during Bismarck’s reign had been sadly neglected

(Weber 1984a, p. 88). Weber argued that a policy of imperialist expansion

overseas was no more than the continuation of the foundation of the Ger-

man Empire. ‘We must grasp that the uniﬁcation of Germany was a youthful

spree, indulged in by the nation in its old age; it would have been better if

it had never taken place, since it would have been a costly extravagance, if it

was the conclusion rather than the starting point for German power politics

on a global scale’ (Weber 1984a, p. 69). Indeed, an inﬂuential minority

among left-wing liberals became determined supporters of German impe-

rialist policies, among them Friedrich Naumann and Paul Rohrbach. But

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

though it prevented the liberals from becoming totally marginalised, the

assumption that this would solve the basic dilemma of German liberalism in

the post-liberal age proved unfounded. In fact neither the National Liberals

nor the Progressives ever succeeded in reconquering the centre-ground of

parliamentary politics at the national level.

6 Moves towards realignment and the First World War

The crucial problem was the attitude to the working classes and in particular

the Social Democratic Party. By the turn of the century it had become clear

that a policy of suppressing the social democratic movement would not

work, and that social democracy was here to stay. Lujo Brentano had been

one of the few liberal thinkers who had argued that the liberals must come

to terms with the industrial working class. He pleaded for social reforms,

and for the recognition of the trade unions as the legitimate representatives

of the working class, and for a social order in which strikes would be

considered legitimate weapons in the struggle between industrial workers

and employers. Likewise, he maintained, the legislation that had so far

been weighted heavily in favour of the entrepreneurs should be thoroughly

revised. The younger generation of scholars in t he Verein f

ur Socialpolitik

– the so-called ‘socialists in the chair’ – took the same line. Max Weber,

for one, condemned the plans of the imperial government to make the

incitement to strikes a criminal offence; this was ‘a law for old women’

rather than for self-conscious members of the working class. This message

was not lost on the liberals. In particular Theodor Barth of the Freisinnige

Vereinigung and Friedrich Naumann with his National-Soziale Verein acted

as inﬂuential spokesmen for a programme of progressive social legislation.

Naumann argued ﬁrst in a series of publications and then after he joined

the Progressive Party in 1906 on the ﬂoor of Parliament that the future

of progressive liberalism in industrial society could only lie in close co-

operation with the Social Democrats, especially with their moderate wing,

the Revisionists.

The pleas by Brentano, Naumann and Theodor Barth were not without

effect. Both parties progressively abandoned the traditional free trade ideol-

ogy which had argued that self-help of the individual, not state assistance,

was the only way to salvation. The National Liberals were more reluctant

to embark upon this path. But even among them, notably in Saxony, the

National Liberal Party under the leadership of Gustav Stresemann changed

its traditional outlook and became the ‘party of industry’ (see Pohl 1995,

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German liberalism in the nineteenth century

pp. 195–216). Although Stresemann championed above all the interests of

commerce and industry, in sharp opposition to the Conservatives he also

sought to attract not only the votes of the white-collar workers, but those

of the industrial workers as well. Hence the Saxon National Liberals looked

for ways and means to mediate between the entrepreneurs and the peo-

ple employed in trade and industry, and in this respect gave a lead for

the National Liberal Party as a whole. In contrast to the reluctance of the

National Liberals, the Progressives were deeply engaged in issues of social

reform. They succeeded in introducing liberal principles into Wilhelmine

social legislation, notably the comprehensive insurance system established

in 1911. It is a myth that the liberals failed in the ﬁeld of social policy. On

the contrary, during the pre-war years their impact upon social legislation

was substantial (Tober 1999).

But what is true is that the political fruits of these policies never ripened,

not least because of the outbreak of the First World War. The fervent

hope that in due course the liberals might regain political control via a

coalition ‘From Bassermann to Bebel’ never materialised; only in Baden

did a Großblock of the liberal parties and the Social Democrats assume

power for a few years. The fear of the alleged socialist danger among the

supporters of the liberal par ties still precluded any far-reaching political

arrangements with the Social Democrats, except in individual electoral

districts. Thus in some federal states, notably in Saxony, the National Liberals

managed to gain a hegemony in Parliament, while in others the Progressives

maintained a strong position. This was true in particular at more local

levels of government, notably the city governments that for the most part

continued to be controlled by liberals of either party. The attempts to join

forces with the Conservative Party were abandoned. By now liberalism in

its different forms considered itself a modernising force in German politics,

whereas the Conservatives were seen as an outdated party.

Such tendencies also made themselves felt at the imperial level. After

the landslide victory of the Social Democrats in 1912 a different parlia-

mentary constellation emerged, namely informal co-operation between the

National Liberals and the progressive wing of the Centre Party that crys-

tallised around a young and energetic ﬁgure, namely Matthias Erzberger,

who eventually succeeded Ludwig Windthorst as the grand old man of

German political Catholicism. Both parties now worked energetically for

a modernisation of the system of rule in imperial Germany, in constant

struggle with an unwilling government and an Emperor who disliked all

party interference with his ‘personal rule’. During the First World War

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

this informal co-operation gradually hardened into a substantive political

alliance. Instead of tr ying to change the constitution and possibly introduce

a parliamentary government in accordance with the British pattern, they

chose an indirect approach to strengthening the inﬂuence of Parliament:

in crucial government departments committees were appointed in which

the majority parties were represented and which would ensure that the

increasing frustration of the public about the conduct of the war was at

least taken into account by the government. In 1917 these endeavours were

crowned by the establishment of a special parliamentary committee – the

Interfraktionelle Ausschuß – with the aim of gaining effective control over the

policies of the government, especially on the question of government peace

initiatives. In this committee their leaders represented the so-called Major-

ity parties, including both Liberal parties, with Stresemann becoming a key

ﬁgure. However, this body failed mainly because the General Staff refused

to accept its decisions as binding on them. Still, their power stopped short

of the military authorities. The old cancer of the German political order

came once again into the open. However, a ﬁrm understanding between

the party leaders had now been formed and this was to provide the basis

for more constructive parliamentary policies in the future. By the autumn

of 1917, imperial Germany had moved a good deal closer towards a parlia-

mentary democracy. Eventually, in 1919, t he same party leaders who two

years before had gathered in the Interfraktionelle Ausschuß formed the ﬁrst

parliamentary government of the Weimar Republic.

432

Visions of stateless society

k. steven vincent

To be GOVERNED is to be kept in view, inspected, spied upon, directed, legis-

lated, regulated, prosecuted, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, estimated, val-

ued, censured, commanded by those who do not have the right, the wisdom, nor

the virtue to do so . . . To be GOVERNED is to be at each operation, at each

transaction, at each movement, noted, registered, counted, taxed, stamped, mea-

sured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorised, annotated, admonished, forbidden,

reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under pretext of public utility, and in the

name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed,

exploited, monopolised, extorted, pressured, mystiﬁed, robbed; then, at the slightest

resistance, at the ﬁrst word of complaint, to be reprimanded, ﬁned, run down, harassed,

tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, bound, imprisoned, shot, machine-gunned, judged,

condemned, deported, sacriﬁced, sold, betrayed; and, to top it all off, mocked,

ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; that is its

morality! (Proudhon 1923b, p. 344)

Like worn-out old men, their skin shriveled and their feet stumbling, gnawed at by

moral sicknesses, incapable of embarking on the tide of new ideas, the States of Europe

squander what strength remains to them, and while living on credit on their past, they

merely hasten their ends by squabbling like aged gossips. (Kropotkin 1992,p.24)

The Anarchists are simply unterriﬁed Jeffersonian Democrats. They believe that ‘the

best government is that which governs least’ and that that which governs least is no

government at all. (Tucker 1969,p.14)

1 Moral and rational foundations

The state has traditionally been viewed as important for a variety of reasons:

as an inescapable condition of order; as an efﬁcient and expert instrument

to co-ordinate aff airs of the economy and society; as the locus of com-

munity and moral unity. This essay is concerned with those who rejected

these identiﬁcations and who believed that the idea of justice required the

abolition of the state and of all other authoritarian institutions not based

on some form of co-operative agreement among autonomous individuals.

Central to this stance – often referred to as anarchism – was the belief that

433