Jones G.S., Claeys G. The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

of independent citizens to participate in the affairs of the state. Perhaps most

outspoken were the liberals in the Rhineland who were strongly inﬂuenced

by the Belgian example, and who feared with good reason that, unless the

Prussian government would in time give way to the demands of ‘public

opinion’ and grant a progressive constitution for all Prussia, the revolution-

ary spirit would sooner or later cross the Rhine and engulf the country in

revolutionary upheavals. As early as 1830 David Hansemann, a successful

Rhenish entrepreneur, pleaded strongly in a memorandum forwarded to the

Prussian King Frederic William III for constitutional reforms that would

give the propertied classes a say in the r unning of public affairs, accord-

ing to the Belgian and French pattern, in order to replace the inefﬁcient

bureaucratic governmental apparatus of the day (Hansen 1919,pp.111 ff.).

In the 1840s these different strands of the liberal movement began to

coalesce, pulled together by what was referred to as the national idea. The

idea of merging the still numerous small principalities into a German nation

state, with a liberal Prussia taking the lead, became a universal battle-cry of

liberal groups throughout Germany. It was assumed that the achievement of

national unity would also lead to the triumph of liberalism. The cultural elite

took the lead; numerous cultural events, in particular the popular Schiller

festivals, as well as scientiﬁc congresses, commercial and even sports gather-

ings served as powerful platforms for promoting the ideas of constitutional

reform and German national unity. The governments tried hard to suppress

this agitation by means of censorship and the dismissal of persons in public

service who had publicly demanded fundamental change. But this could not

prevent a wide-ranging liberal network in the public arena from emerging.

This network maintained close links between the proponents of reform in

the assemblies, the institutions of local government, the various commercial

bodies and the universities (Gall 1975,pp.105 ff.). Bureaucracies themselves,

especially in Prussia, seemed no longer capable of introducing overdue eco-

nomic and constitutional reforms. They were widely held responsible for

the growing stagnation in society and the economy: they made no effort

to abolish old-fashioned privileges or to remove restrictions, which might

have helped to stimulate economic growth and hold in check the growing

pover ty of the majority of the population.

The liberals demanded constitutionalism, the r ule of law, the upholding

of the rights of the individual citizens as well as the abolition of ancient

and obsolete privileges, freedom of religion, freedom of association and

above all freedom for the press. However, the great majority of the liberals

were not as yet in favour of unrestricted free trade, fearing that this might

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lead to a class-ridden society; on the contrary they wanted to bring about a

‘classless society of individuals of middling economic status [einer klassenlosen

urgergesellschaft mittlerer Existenzen]’.

They envisaged that in due course

the middle classes would encompass the whole nation. Just as the idea of

parliamentary government was not considered by some to be applicable to

German conditions, so there were many who rejected Adam Smith. As late

as 1870 Heinrich von Treitschke argued in the then very inﬂuential journal

Preußische Jahrb

ucher in a series of powerfully written essays under the title

‘Das Constitutionelle K

onigtum in Deutschland’ that the English example

of parliamentary government would never do for Germany (Treitschke

1971,pp.427ff.).

The 1830sand1840s were a crucial period for the formation of liberalism

as a political movement in Germany. Its operations were still hampered by

the authorities, though perhaps no longer quite as harshly as a generation

earlier, when Count Metternich had used the Deutsche Bund as an instru-

ment to keep the activities of liberalism under control. Seen as a force for

the future, liberalism drew strength from its appeal to the idea of the nation

state, which seemed to be on the cards throughout Europe. Guiseppe Mazz-

ini’s nationalist message also made a considerable, if only indirect, impact

upon public opinion. This mixture of national and liberal ideas strongly

appealed to the educated classes, particularly Protestants, but it also found

strong support among the lower classes, especially the artisans. By 1845,the

demand that Prussia should establish an all-Prussian representative assem-

bly instead of the regional parliaments was voiced more strongly than ever

before. A joint representative assembly of the Prussian people might provide

the nucleus for a future German national representation.

It was the increasingly prominent radical wing of the liberal movement in

particular which embraced the national idea most strongly. Nationalism and

radicalism amalgamated into a pseudo-revolutionary ideology that dreamt

of overthrowing the established principalities all over Europe in favour of a

republican order in Germany and beyond. The radical democrats showed

great sympathy for the struggles for national emancipation of the Poles and

other subject nations. Already in 1832 the Hambacher Fest, attended by

some 20,000 people, had provided a rallying ground for radical liberalism.

It had invoked in moving language a vision of the ‘united free states of Ger-

many’ as part of a future republican confederation of Europe (Mommsen

2 Gall 1975, 1978. For the ensuing controversy see Mommsen 2000 or see also Gall 1997.

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

2000,pp.53–4). At this stage such radicalism was largely rhetorical. Radi-

cals intended to win over public opinion for their views, on the optimistic

assumption that this would sufﬁce in order to transform the established

political order. Even so, the moderate liberals became increasingly worried

about the rising tide of popular unrest that played into the hands of the radi-

cal democrats and signalled a potential revolutionary threat to the established

order of things. A revolution was the last thing which the great majority of

the liberal middle classes wanted; instead they pleaded for gradual reforms

that would not endanger the governmental authorities as such. But by now

they began to realise that the reform process ought to be accelerated for

otherwise the masses of the population might be recruited by the radical

democrats into a programme of revolutionary action.

3 Liberals, Radicals and the Revolutions of 1848

The separation of the radical democrats from the main body of the lib-

eral movement was a slow process. It reached a critical stage just before

the Revolution swept the country in the spring of 1848. With the pro-

mulgation of the so-called Offenburg Programme that was acclaimed by a

large public rally at Offenburg in Baden on 10 September 1847,therad-

icals attempted to force the hands of the liberals. With unrest among the

population mounting Karl Struve and Friedrich Hecker, the authors of this

memorandum, intended to push the liberal movement to the left, and to

abandon their cautious policy of compromise with the established authori-

ties (Hubert 1961,pp.261–2). The Offenburg Programme contained most

of the liberal demands that were in everybody’s minds at the time, in partic-

ular individual freedom, freedom of movement and association, freedom of

conscience and the free pursuit of religion, and in particular freedom for the

press. They also demanded a national representation of the people and the

establishment of national unity. Only the demand for a republic was wisely

omitted. They demanded the replacement of bureaucratic administrations

by popularly elected governmental bodies. But at crucial points they moved

beyond the list of liberal demands. The standing armies should be replaced

by the ar ming of the people; furthermore, existing armies should take an

oath to the constitution. This demand reﬂected the distrust of the armies

among a population that had been harassed by them time and again. Even

more spectacular was the notion that the existing system of taxation should

be replaced by a progressive income tax, but – a rather modern idea –

sparing the personal income essential for an individual’s livelihood.

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German liberalism in the nineteenth century

Otherwise the social demands of the radical democrats were unspeciﬁc:

they pleaded for the ‘equalisation of the unequal relationship between labour

and capital’. Accordingly the society was ‘obliged to elevate and protect

labour’. These proposals were rather nebulous, and far from revolutionary.

However, at the time they amounted to a radical challenge to the existing

social order. The group which the radical democrats wanted to mobilise

was not so much the proletariat – industrialisation in Germany was still in

its infancy and the number of factory workers fairly small – but the lower

middle classes, the artisans and shopkeepers, and possibly also the farm-

workers. The key issue was whether to demand a republic. Undoubtedly, the

reputation of the rulers of the smaller German states among the public was

anything but good, and the Prussian king, Frederic William III, had behaved

in such a manner as to totally undermine the prestige of the Hohenzollern

Monarchy. For these reasons the ordinary people sympathised with the idea

of removing costly royal households and establishing a republican system

according to the model of the United States of America.

The liberals were alarmed. Their model of constitutional government

based upon co-operation between the liberal assemblies and the govern-

ments was at stake, and also their predominant role in the political process.

The radical proposals would have destroyed once and for all the chances

for a peaceful agreement with the governments for which the liberals had

been working hard and diligently. Moreover, the radical democrats now

demanded the introduction of universal male suffrage. It is true that the

liberals hoped to raise the lower orders to a middle-class status, but they

were adamant that only persons with higher education and a certain level

of wealth (which allegedly guaranteed independence of judgement) should

play an active role in politics.

In October 1847 at Heppenheim, the liberals from south-west Germany

drew up an informal programme of their own (Hubertt 1961,p.262). It

outlined the line of action of the liberals in the months that followed, since

everybody expected major developments in the political arena to be in

the ofﬁng. In particular there was the expectation of the establishment of a

national representation of the German people, either a ‘German Federation’

or a Customs Association – Zollverein – that now was demanded by the

assemblies of the smaller states. The Heppenheim Programme reiterated the

political reform proposals of the liberals in considerable detail, whereas it was

virtually silent about the social demands of the radical democrats, notably

‘measures against impoverishment and misery’. Apparently no agreement

could be reached on these highly controversial issues. The national issues

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

were at the forefront of everybody’s minds, whereas the liberals were quite

happy to postpone decisions on the social question.

In principle two different strands of liberal politics had emerged: mod-

erate liberalism and democratic radicalism. Tensions between these two

alternative conceptions would determine the characteristics of the liberal

movement until the First World War. Moderate liberals hoped to bring

about far-reaching social change through a continuous evolutionary process

that involved repeated compromises with the governments. Governments,

it was hoped, would have to give way step-by-step when confronted with

the constant pressure of a powerful public opinion, expressed by the various

parliamentary assemblies, the representative bodies of local government, the

press (which was largely controlled by the liberals) and numerous private

associations. Thanks to the universally accepted principle of the rule of law

the judiciary was expected to keep the governments on a constitutional

course. Abolishing all unjust privileges and obsolete restrictions on the

economy would instil new dynamism in society and create badly needed

economic growth. All this should be crowned by the establishing of a Ger-

man nation state which would harmonise the numerous legal and economic

regulations in the various principalities, while maintaining the traditional

diversity of regions and countries through a federalist constitution.

The radical democrats, for their part, hoped to mobilise the masses for

decisive action against the princes and monarchs by appealing to a pro-

gramme that included universal suffrage, the general arming of the people

and far-reaching though unspeciﬁed social reforms that would bridge the

gap that had opened up between ‘labour’ and ‘capital’. They opted for a

clear break with the past, both on political and socio-economic questions.

They dreamt of establishing a German republican state on a federalist basis,

in some way similar to the constitution of the United States of America, or

possibly even as a part of a federation of the democratic nations of Europe.

A few months later the Revolution of 1848 spilled over from France

and Belgium into Germany and pulled the ground from under the feet of

the established governments. Liberals were strongly sought after in order

to forestall a further advance of the revolutionary process. The liberals

had worked hard to forestall the Revolution, but now that it was upon

them, they were determined to take the lead. Hastily the German Feder-

ation agreed to arrange the election of an all-German National Assembly

that eventually met in Frankfurt on 18 May 1848. Likewise, Prussia and

the smaller principalities took the spokesmen of the liberal movement on

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German liberalism in the nineteenth century

board, and speedily introduced new constitutions that by and large met the

liberal demands of the day. Initially it was not considered signiﬁcant that

the governments had succeeded in retaining control of the armed forces,

as they proved not reliable enough to confront the revolutionary popula-

tion directly. The ‘March governments’ which maintained control until late

autumn 1848 succeeded in fundamentally modifying the structure of state

and society in the individual states. They also took the lead in the Frankfurt

National Assembly. Wisely they co-operated with the radical democrats on

many issues, notably the introduction of universal suffrage for men with

only a few restrictions. Largely in co-operation with the more moderate

sections of the radical democrats they also drew up the Frankfurt imperial

constitution which, although in the end scrapped ignominiously once con-

servative forces had regained control, remains one of the most impressive

and magisterial documents of German liberalism. They even managed to

establish a provisional Reich executive. The liberals were determined to

get their way on two points: (a) to go for a compromise with the German

princes, which included introducing constitutional government in the fed-

eral states, and (b), as per their slogan at the time, ‘to bring the revolution to

an end’. Some sections of the radical democrats rebelled against this course

of action by force. In April 1848 Hecker and Struve organised a revolution-

ary uprising in southern Germany, which, however, soon collapsed, and

likewise an attempt to storm the Paulskirche on 5 September 1848,after

it ignominiously had agreed to accept the armistice with Denmark. In the

eyes of the public these actions largely discredited the left.

Even so the radical democrats sought to rally their supporters with all

the means at their disposal; pamphlets, posters, public agitation and the

organisation of popular associations. From 14 to 17 June 1848 they held

an impressive rally in Frankfurt in which most of the prominent radi-

cal democrats, among them Andreas Gottschalk, Moses Hess and Ludwig

Feuerbach, participated. Despite this their fervent pleas for a democratic

republic as the only durable solution to the ‘German Question’ made little

impact.

During the Revolution the initially rather ﬂuid political divisions hard-

ened into formal political parties. The radical democrats founded Demo-

cratic Associations throughout the country, whereas the moderate liber-

als tried to rally their supporters in Constitutional Associations. However,

both the radical democrats and moderate liberals now had to cope with

a formidable movement of conservative associations, and also with the

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Wolfgang J. Mommsen

beginnings of a socialist movement. Until April 1849 the newly founded

political associations mobilised a considerable section of the population

behind their banners. During the brief campaign to rescue the Frankfurt

Reich constitution the liberal and radical associations operated together,

although ultimately to no avail. While the liberals considered military resis-

tance against the reaction futile, the radical democrats resorted to armed

uprisings in Saxony and in south Germany. But they could not hold their

own for long against the professional armies of Prussia and the other German

states.

The political associations that had been formed in the later stages of the

Revolution of 1848–9 must be considered as the beginning of an organised

political party system, and the liberals had played an important part in it.

However, after the violent suppression of the Revolution these associations

dissolved without trace. They were to resurface under different names in

the early 1860s. Ofﬁcially the Revolution of 1848 remained anathema to

liberals. It was only the social democrats who later celebrated the memory

of the German Revolution of 1848. Bourgeois parties, liberals of different

persuasions included, regarded 1848 as a youthful mistake that had badly

miscarried.

The failure of the Revolution had been a severe shock for liberals and

democrats alike. However, in the longer term all was not lost. The liberal

constitutions that had been introduced in Prussia and most of the smaller

states were substantially revised. In Prussia a new ﬁrst chamber was estab-

lished. The introduction of the three-class suffrage was supposed to end the

domination of the chamber of deputies by the liberal bourgeoisie once and

for all. Constitutional guarantees were scaled down in a conservative fash-

ion and in some cases totally rescinded. Admittedly, for the time being, the

position of the liberals was severely weakened; they had a hard time main-

taining a hold in the assemblies, and they chose to compromise rather than

get involved in new conﬂicts with the authorities. However, to some degree

the representative bodies of local government and the commercial bodies

served as a refuge for liberal politics. The democrats also steadfastly opposed

the repressive legislation of the governments. This resistance earned them

little respect, however, and in Prussia led to their virtual disappearance from

the political arena.

Even so most of the German states, not least Prussia, remained constitu-

tional states. The liberals had been defeated, but in crucial areas of state and

society liberal principles survived. There was no return to pre-Revolution

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bureaucratic absolutism. Thus the apparently sudden revival of liberalism in

the early 1860s was not quite as sudden as it might appear.

4 The ‘new era’, the constitutional conﬂict and uniﬁcation

In 1858 the prince-regent William announced the beginning of a new era;

Prussia was determined to make what he called moral acquisitions and a wise

legislation and the promotion of a greater degree of German unity (Hubert

1986). The monarch appeared willing to co-operate with the liberals who

in turn proceeded in a moderate fashion in order not to push him back into

the conservative camp. Similarly in Baden in 1860, a liberal government was

installed under the leadership of two prominent politicians, and in the next

decade it became the model of such government. Indeed the experience of

liberalism in power left its mark throughout Germany. The dawn of a new

liberal era seemed to have arrived. This new departure was greatly assisted

by the developments in the international arena. The Franco-Italian War

of 1859 and the foundation of the Italian nation state had had a profound

impact upon the political climate in Germany. Now all of a sudden the

issue of national unity was on the agenda again, and the governments

were expected by an excited public to respond to this new situation with

more than just words. In 1862 the Nationalverein was founded as a joint

organisation of German liberals across the state boundaries with the aim of

promoting a united Germany. The public expected a liberal Prussia to take

the lead in this process. It would appear that the liberals in Pr ussia now

had a unique chance of achieving substantial reforms under a new liberal

administration.

However, their attempt to push through a reorganisation of the Prussian

army along liberal lines met with unexpected resistance on the part of

Prince William. The demand to maintain the Landwehr law and to abolish

the mandatory three years’ military service led to a severe constitutional

conﬂict between the Prussian government and the Chamber of Deputies in

which the newly founded Progressive Party possessed a huge majority. As

a last resort the Crown eventually appointed Otto von Bismarck as head of

government. He did not establish a dictatorship, but he was not prepared

to give an inch to the parliamentary majority. The conﬂict developed into

a fundamental clash over whether there should be parliamentary or royal

control of the armed forces. Bismarck repeatedly dissolved the House of

Deputies, yet the Progressive Party majority that enjoyed the overwhelming

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support of the press could not be broken. The liberals for their part were

determined to see things through and eventually achieve a decisive victory

over ‘this wretched Junker’, as Heinrich Treitschke put it at the time.

Bismarck deﬁed the resolutions of the parliamentary majority and carried

on with the army reorganisation, appealing to the famous theory of a gap in

the constitution – that it did not state what was to be done if government

and parliament could not agree. Furthermore he went on to censor the

press and reprimand those civil servants and judges who had sided with the

parliamentary majority. Step by step he thereby removed the constitutional

conditions that guaranteed the rule of law.

Bismarck had realised that support for the liberals in the country was

not as solid as it appeared to be. In fact, the parliamentary strength of the

liberals was largely due to the effects of the three-class suffrage that massively

favoured the representation of the upper middle classes. The liberals, in their

turn, were not in a position to mobilise the masses of the population against

the government, even if they had wished to do so; revolutionary action

lay beyond their political horizon. Bismarck had exposed the weak spot

in the armour of liberalism, namely the assumption that when conﬂict

arose, the government would eventually give way, thanks to the force of

public opinion. In Prussia, the roots of the liberals among the populace

were weak. The liberals could only count on organisations of notables and

ofﬁce-holders. By contrast, the conservatives had successfully built up so-

called People’s Associations throughout the country. Hence a revolutionary

appeal to the people would have been fruitless.

Finally Bismarck’s surprising victories in the wars against Denmark in

1864 and Austria in 1866 totally undermined the political position of the

Progressive Party in Prussia. All that was left to the Progressive Party was

the meagre satisfaction of noting Bismarck’s request for an indemnity from

a House of Deputies no longer dominated by the liberals. This marked

an acceptance in principle that the constitution had been violated by his

policies. Prussian politics had undergone a fundamental reversal. The pro-

gressive wing of the liberals had suffered a crushing defeat, with long-term

consequences for the position of liberalism in the nascent German nation

state. The triumph of the Prussian armies over Austria cleared the way for

the establishment of a North German Federation, the ﬁrst step towards

national unity. The enthusiasm of the public, the liberals included, was

boundless. Now a new party was founded that declared that its predomi-

nant task was ‘energetically to support the government in its endeavour to

erect a united and powerful North-German state’ (Miquel 1911,p.19). The

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National Liberals – as they now called themselves – were fully aware of the

fact that in doing so they would have to forfeit for the time being important

liberal objectives: ‘The age of ideas is over. German unity has come down

to us from the dreamland into the prosaic land of reality’ (Miquel 1911,

p. 19). But they hoped that they might in due course be able to establish

a truly constitutional form of government in line with liberal principles.

So far they were not yet prepared totally to succumb to the doctrine of

realpolitik.

Bismarck’s policies of uniﬁcation were guided not least by the consid-

eration that the passionate demand for a Ger man nation state had to ﬁnd

some sort of fulﬁlment. Bismarck successfully directed the public desire

for a united Germany on to a conservative track. For the time being he

received the enthusiastic support of public opinion for this policy. Even

so, he could not manage without the co-operation of various liberal fac-

tions in establishing the North German Confederation. This association

of the states north of the Main under Prussian leadership provided the

framework for the German Reich that came into being after the Franco-

Prussian War of 1870/71. It was achieved with the loyal co-operation of

the National Liberals and the other liberal factions in the North German

parliamentary assembly which was duly elected on the basis of the suf-

frage that had been agreed upon in the Frankfurt Paulskirche twenty-two

years earlier. The National Liberals came to be the leading faction in the

North German Reichstag, and they managed to draw up the constitution

of the North German Confederation in a tough but constructive struggle

with Bismarck. However, they failed to achieve their main goal – that of

establishing a genuine constitutional system with a cabinet of ministers indi-

vidually responsible for running their depar tments. They had to put up with

a pseudo-constitutional system that granted Bismarck, as Reich Chancellor

and Prime Minister of Prussia, exceedingly wide-ranging powers. From the

very beginning the new constitution was a compromise between the liberal

idea of constitutional government and Prussian-German authoritarian rule;

and this was especially true of parliamentary control of military expenditure.

On the one hand, the new constitution was, by international standards, sur-

prisingly democratic. This was because of the universal suffrage, which was

disliked by the liberal parties because they believed that in this way Bismarck

tried to mobilise the support of the underprivileged sections of the people

against them. On the other hand, all direct participation of the parties in

running the government was excluded. In 1871 this complicated pseudo-

parliamentary constitution which left many issues unresolved was extended

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