Hess Earl J. Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861-1864
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78 The Peninsula
for such things—much less than the usual in truth.’’ McClellan promised to
attack ‘‘the first moment I can do so successfully—but I don’t intend to hurry
it—I cannot afford to fail.’’ Meanwhile, he was quite prepared for any sallies
by Magruder; ‘‘the more he does attack the better I shall be contented.’’ With
his emphasis on placing as much heavy ordnance as possible to batter the
Rebels, McClellan was convinced he was ‘‘avoiding the faults of the Allies at
Sebastopol.’’
≤≤
McClellan was content to act as his own supervisor of the siege until he
slogged through the muddy trenches on the afternoon of April 27. ‘‘Went
over the whole extent & saw everything with care,’’ he informed his wife.
McClellan discovered ‘‘so many blunders committed’’ that he appointed Brig.
Gen. Fitz John Porter, commander of the Fifth Corps, as ‘‘Director of the
Siege.’’ McClellan admitted it was ‘‘a novel title,’’ but the position was essen-
tial to the efficient running of the varied work needed to complete the fortifi-
cations. Porter, who enjoyed McClellan’s complete confidence, would ‘‘save
me much trouble, relieve my mind greatly & save much time.’’ Before Porter’s
appointment, the daily details were supervised by the senior brigadier gen-
eral of each division, who was given the title ‘‘General of the Trenches’’ for
his division’s sector. Now Porter could bring his talents to bear and exercise
control over the entire line. With help from two of McClellan’s aides, who
served as an impromptu staff, Porter visited the line of works and acquainted
himself with its configuration and state of readiness. Then he issued instruc-
tions for ‘‘united action under all circumstances on the whole front and for
expediting the completion of the works.’’
≤≥
Despite the sporadic refusal to work, the Army of the Potomac was full of
confidence during its stay in front of the Rebel works at Yorktown. Stephen
Minot Weld, an officer on Porter’s staff, expressed a view that was widely
held. He felt assured that McClellan would never waste lives and was im-
pressed by the enormous marshaling of resources. ‘‘The whole affair will be
conducted on scientific principles applied by skilful engineers, and with a
man at the head whose forte is in this kind of warfare, namely General
McClellan. My idea is that he will take the place with the least possible
sacrifice of life, and in order to do this, he must have sufficient time to carry
out all his plans thoroughly.’’
≤∂
Magruder, Johnston, and the Warwick Line
The Warwick Line that gave McClellan reason to pause was incomplete
when he confronted it in early April. By the end of the month, however, it
would be transformed into one of the strongest defensive positions of the
war. Credit for the construction of the line belongs to John Bankhead Ma-
The Peninsula 79
gruder. Born in Maryland in 1807, Magruder graduated from West Point in
1830 and was commissioned into the infantry. The young officer was soon
transferred to the artillery, where he served for the remainder of his time in
the U.S. Army. He participated in the Second Seminole War and contributed
greatly to the success of Winfield Scott’s campaign to Mexico City in 1847.
Magruder helped build the American siege works at Vera Cruz and com-
manded an artillery company in the bombardment of that strategic port city.
He participated in the battle of Cerro Gordo and continued with Scott all the
way to the Mexican capital. Service on the frontier followed in the 1850s.
≤∑
Magruder became familiar with the art of fortification through his experi-
ence in the artillery. Joseph L. Brent, who served on his staff as chief ord-
nance officer during the Peninsula campaign, thought the flamboyant gen-
eral ‘‘had the faculty of an engineer in discovering strong and weak localities
intended to be defended, and allowed no detail to escape him in the way of
preparation.’’
≤∏
The works at Yorktown, Gloucester Point, and Jamestown Island were
started in May 1861 when Robert E. Lee, then major general of the Virginia
Forces, sent an engineer officer to initiate construction. Infantry regiments
were given tools and told to dig in around Yorktown and at Gloucester Point,
but there were never enough troops available to push the work forward as
rapidly as desired. Magruder tried to employ slaves and free black laborers
but was frustrated by many roadblocks. The secretary of war thought it
unlikely the Federals would make a move against Yorktown that fall or win-
ter, and he was reluctant to incur the expense of mobilizing civilian laborers
of any kind. Moreover, he did not want to take slaves from plantations during
harvest season. The Engineer Bureau also made it clear that holding free
black laborers beyond the sixty-day maximum mandated by law was ‘‘cruel’’
and would not be allowed. Governor John Letcher of Virginia even worried
that, in their zeal, labor press gangs might mistake a small population of
Pamunkeys living in King William County and King and Queen County for
free blacks. He strictly prohibited any effort to coerce these Native Ameri-
cans into the work details at Yorktown, though he believed their chief might
voluntarily provide workers if he were asked.
≤π
Magruder was also frustrated when he tried to round up slave labor from
local plantation owners. Thirty-two slaves arrived at Jamestown and worked
one month before their release, but many planters were reluctant to send
their men. William Jerdone of Charles City County complained that he had
already sent eleven slaves in the summer of 1861, still had not been paid for
their labor, and had even lost the tools he had sent with them. He could not
spare any workers now. When Magruder issued a second call for slave la-
80 The Peninsula
borers, Jerdone argued that proper accommodations for them had to be
made before he would risk his valuable property.
Magruder persisted by ordering planters to send help in the spring of
1862. Jerdone was to provide half of his slave force but sent only nine hands.
Several became sick on the job, and one died. Another planter, John A.
Selden of Westover, sent six slaves to Jamestown. Two returned within one
month, and he heard that two others were ill.
Jerdone’s and Selden’s reluctance to comply with the army’s requests was
not unusual. Magruder managed to gather no more than 1,000 slaves in
December 1861 and worked them on semipermanent earthworks around
Yorktown and Gloucester Point, but most were reclaimed by their owners
after a short time on the job.
≤∫
By the time McClellan appeared, the fieldworks that constituted the War-
wick Line barely existed. There were only 11,000 men available to hold a
position that was thirteen and a half miles long. Six thousand Confederates
were detailed to garrison Yorktown, Gloucester Point, and Mulberry Island.
The remainder were stretched out along the rest of the line. Magruder had
the services of a very good chief engineer, Capt. Isaac M. St. John, a Yale
University graduate and prewar civil engineer. Alfred L. Rives dispatched
eight additional engineer officers to help St. John push the works forward in
early April. Despite the immense amount of labor Magruder’s men expended
on the Warwick Line, the commander never hoped it would be a permanent
defensive barrier. He wanted to delay the Federals as long as possible while
heavy reinforcements arrived from Joseph E. Johnston’s army on the Rappa-
hannock River. Magruder was eminently successful in fulfilling this limited
objective.
≤Ω
Half of the defensive power of the Warwick Line was the Warwick River
itself. One of the more substantial streams on the Peninsula, it originated in
the marshes half a mile west of Yorktown and flowed westward across the
flat landscape to the James River. For the most part, the banks were low,
swampy, and ‘‘covered with dense fringes of thickets and small trees,’’ as
Union brigade leader Oliver Otis Howard put it. In its lower course, down-
stream from Lee’s Mill, the river ran through a hollow 400 yards wide, with
forty-foot-high bluffs on either side, before emptying into the tidal basin
formed by the James.
≥≠
Magruder enhanced the defensive power of this obstacle by strengthen-
ing two dams built by civilian millers—at Wynn’s Mill and Lee’s Mill—and
building three new dams to flood the stream. Protected by earthworks, these
dams turned a watercourse that naturally was about two feet deep and fif-
teen feet wide above Lee’s Mill into a watery obstacle fifty feet wide. It could
The Peninsula 81
still be waded with some difficulty in places, but there were no longer any
fords. Magruder estimated that at least three-fourths of the length of the
river was completely impassable for infantry. The newly constructed dams
were located one mile above Lee’s Mill, two-thirds of a mile farther up-
stream at a place called Garrow’s Point (which was called Dam No. 1), and a
half-mile above Wynn’s Mill, the uppermost location. Because spring rains
washed chunks of earth away, the Confederates had to undertake enormous
labor to maintain the dams. Brig. Gen. Howell Cobb complained that if more
rain fell, Dams No. 1 and 2 ‘‘both will go. All that ten engineers & several
hundred negroes could do to day has been done,’’ he informed his superior on
April 9.
≥∞
The Warwick Line was the most formidable field fortification built in the
eastern theater of operations before the Chancellorsville campaign. It em-
ployed defense in depth, which was comparatively rare in the Civil War, at
two key points. The Confederates made heavy use of traverses for flank
protection of infantry as well as artillery, and they utilized communication
trenches, covered ways, bombproofs, and water obstacles. As an added boon
to researchers and students of the war, the best of these works are well
preserved in Newport News Park and Colonial National Historical Park.
The heavy works at Yorktown itself wrapped around the place on three
sides. These were semipermanent fortifications mounting a number of heavy
guns, with thick parapets and deep ditches. They also, in many places, dupli-
cated British defenses from the 1781 siege. Several water batteries had guns
trained to fire on boats steaming up the York River. Across the wide stream at
Gloucester Point, the Confederates had a smaller but equally strong complex
of semipermanent works. These were principally designed to fire on Union
boat traffic.
From Yorktown, a line of hastily constructed field fortifications took shape
across the Peninsula with several strongpoints. While the Federals called the
first two works on this line the White and Red Redoubts, the Confederates
designated the former as Fort Magruder. Both were self-contained works
connected to the line of infantry trench. They were located on the spine of
high ground that served as the watershed of the Peninsula. This ground
seemed the most likely spot for a Union attack, so a second line of infantry
trench was dug to the rear, connected to the front line with communication
trenches. Wynn’s Mill was the next strongpoint, located at a significant bend
in the Warwick Line and therefore demanding many traverses. Dam No. 1 at
Garrow’s Point also was studded with multiple artillery and infantry lines to
create defense in depth, and Lee’s Mill was treated with heavy artillery
emplacements. Mulberry Island, on the north bank of the James River, was
82 The Peninsula
Confederate artillery emplacement, Yorktown. Taken by George N. Barnard in June
1862, this view shows a carriage that had mounted a gun the Confederates named after
D. H. Hill. Note the extensive use of sandbags and the log-and-post revetment. (Library
of Congress)
the western anchor of the Warwick Line. Fort Crafford was located here to
fire on river traffic.
Many Union engineers came to admire the work done by the Confederates
at Yorktown. Naturally they could more easily see the impediments to an
approach toward the line and caught only limited glimpses of the works
themselves. John G. Barnard wrote that ‘‘every kind of obstruction which the
countryside offered, such as abatis, marsh, inundation, & c., was skilfully
used.’’
≥≤
The Confederates owed a debt of gratitude to John Magruder for his
effective transformation of this meager line of works into a formidable posi-
tion. But Magruder would soon be superseded. President Davis had decided
early in April that Joseph E. Johnston should transfer most of his men to the
Peninsula and take command there. The shift of troops began immediately,
the object being to leave no more than 8,000 men on the Rappahannock.
Johnston inspected the Warwick Line on April 14 to determine how long it
would be advisable to hold at Yorktown.
Johnston brought to the task a great deal of experience, prestige, and
careful attention to detail, but he seems to have been predisposed to aban-
The Peninsula 83
don the Warwick Line from the beginning. A graduate of the West Point class
of 1829, with Robert E. Lee, Johnston was commissioned into the artillery. As
a member of Winfield Scott’s staff, he helped to oversee the siege of Vera
Cruz and later commanded troops in the battles outside Mexico City. John-
ston was made brigadier general and held the post of quartermaster general
of the U.S. Army in June 1860. He played a large role in the victory at First
Manassas and was a natural selection for command of the army defending
northern Virginia and Richmond.
Yet Johnston shared McClellan’s conservative approach to military opera-
tions. Always ready to act on the defensive, he also felt more secure po-
sitioned close to the capital. Johnston now made a cursory inspection of
Magruder’s fortifications. He looked at the works surrounding the town and
visited the Red and White Redoubts and Wynn’s Mill. What he saw created a
quiet sense of gloom, so he apparently canceled a planned trip to Gloucester
Point and the third line of Rebel works on the Peninsula, at Williamsburg.
Johnston noted the shortages of axes and ammunition, discounted the fact
that already 31,500 troops were working feverishly on the line, and easily
came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to hold at Yorktown. In a
conference with the president, Johnston was opposed by Davis and Lee, both
of whom wanted the army to delay McClellan as long as possible on the
Peninsula. Johnston agreed to wait until the Federals were ready to open
with their heavy artillery, but he had no intention of fighting for the War-
wick Line.
≥≥
Johnston’s decision meant that Magruder’s earthworks would never really
be tested in battle. Was this decision wise? It was based mostly on Johnston’s
aversion to risking everything in battle and his preference for winning his
goals through maneuver. But it was also inspired by the incomplete nature of
the earthworks themselves. Magruder’s men literally were in the process of
turning the line into a strong position. Two weeks later, when the Yorktown
phase of the Peninsula campaign neared its end, that line was stronger, and
Johnston would have 55,000 men to defend it. There is no doubt that he
could have prolonged the stalemate at Yorktown by many days, if not weeks,
if he had been willing to suffer casualties. But the ultimate outcome would
probably have been a Union victory anyway. Brig. Gen. Jubal A. Early, whose
brigade held the section that included the Red and White Redoubts, later
noted that the Rebels could not have launched significant attacks on the
Federals because of the obstruction posed by the Warwick River, and they
were too thinly stretched to be certain of resisting a massive attack. Early
thought that McClellan could have ‘‘shelled us out of’’ the works. It was,
therefore, merely a matter of time before the Warwick Line would have
84 The Peninsula
to be abandoned, but, typically, Johnston was eager to do so early rather
than late.
≥∂
Meanwhile, McClellan’s engineer officers scanned what they could see of
the Rebel line and concluded that the only weak area was around Dam No 1.
The river just below the dam was shallow enough to be waded, and the
works were not yet complete. The Federals launched a reconnaissance in
force against the dam on April 16. Local commanders exceeded their instruc-
tions, and the push turned into a serious attack. It was preceded by a general
bombardment by the field artillery; a total of twenty-two Union guns were in
the vicinity of the dam, while only three Confederate pieces were in place to
defend it. The bombardment started at 9:00 a.m. and lasted nearly all day.
Two of the Rebel guns rarely fired, giving the Federals the impression that
they had silenced them. The artillery at Wynn’s Mill also participated in the
exchange.
≥∑
Four companies of the 4th Vermont waded the river just below the dam,
where the water was from two to five feet deep, at 4:00 p.m. They took the
defending Confederates by surprise, driving the 15th North Carolina and the
16th Georgia out of the works. Reinforced by 600 men from their own regi-
ment and the 6th Vermont, the Federals remained in the captured works for
more than an hour before a Confederate counterattack drove them out.
More troops of the 4th Vermont attacked along the dam, but they were easily
repulsed. The 6th Vermont crossed farther downstream and made a brief
lodgment on the other side, but it was pushed back by a Rebel counterstrike.
The Federals gained nothing by this operation and lost 44 killed and 148
wounded. Two days later, a truce was arranged so the Confederates could
deliver 29 of the Vermont dead to the Federals in the middle of the dam.
≥∏
Life in the Trenches
On the same day that the Rebels gave up the Yankee dead at Dam No. 1,
Ward Osgood of the 15th Massachusetts offered his brother the opinion that
‘‘it will be quite a long siege—the taking of Yorktown probably two or three
weeks.’’ He was prescient about the schedule but naive at terming a three-
week siege a long affair. Other than enduring heavy manual labor, the ordi-
nary Federal soldier fared well, which contributed to Osgood’s lack of con-
cern about the outcome. The routine of the 1st Massachusetts was probably
typical of that of other regiments. The men were up by 4:00 a.m., formed
under arms for one hour in case of a Rebel attack at dawn, then ate breakfast
and counted out the details for work on the fortifications. They returned by
dark but often had their sleep interrupted by false alarms delivered by the
pickets. Their daily routine was enlivened by the increasingly fierce sharp-
The Peninsula 85
shooting that took place on both sides of the Warwick River and the exten-
sive use of balloons for reconnaissance.
≥π
Outnumbered two to one, the Confederates had more work, picket duty,
and stress to endure. They vividly described the difficulties of the siege in let-
ters home and in their postwar memoirs. High-ranking officers felt as much
stress as the common soldier. Daniel Harvey Hill slept only three hours each
night and admitted that his men slept as little. ‘‘They stay in the trenches in
the rain & cold all night, & all day,’’ he reported. ‘‘Sickness is making terrible
havoc among them.’’ The 8th Alabama was continuously in the trenches
from April 3 through May 3, except for four days, and the men were con-
stantly working. ‘‘During the Siege the men were much exhausted from the
heavy duty and incessant watching,’’ recalled Hilary A. Herbert, an officer of
the 8th. ‘‘To add to our discomfort, a cold wintry rain was falling more than
half the time.’’ The rain was especially noteworthy, for it seemed to pour
nearly every day. The trenches often were filled with water, men sank six
inches into the mud, and clothing and blankets were soaked. The flat terrain
impeded drainage, and the dams along the Warwick further lessened the
flow. A morass formed along the stream that separated the two armies. Due
to the close proximity of the Yankees, the Rebels could rarely afford to build
fires to ward off the chilly weather, and rations often were reduced to a bit of
salt meat and hard bread.
≥∫
Many Confederate regiments had to endure artillery fire or engage in
minor operations to deny terrain advantages to the enemy. The 24th Virginia
sallied forth on the evening of April 12 to cut down an orchard and burn
some buildings used by Yankee sharpshooters. They were fired on by pickets,
and one man was wounded. Two other regiments and a battery supported
the Virginians as they finished their work in ninety minutes. All along the
line the daily sharpshooting increased in strength and vigor, forcing the men
to crouch low behind their parapets. ‘‘I have had to lay in water nee Deep all
day and all Night to Ceep the yankey Balls from hiting me,’’ complained
Henry M. Talley of the 38th Virginia. Sometimes the firing reached an inten-
sity that compelled regimental and brigade leaders to ready their men for an
attack. One-third of the 23rd North Carolina were kept on guard at all times,
and the rest were placed in the works at 10:00 p.m. on April 19, because
commanding officers were worried about the increased firing near Wynn’s
Mill. The men were allowed rest later that night, but Orderly Sgt. Henry C.
Wall had to waken them for duty at 3:00 a.m. on April 20; he had a very
difficult time getting them up and into the works.
≥Ω
Thus thousands of Union and Confederate troops were exposed to the
peculiar dangers and duties of trench warfare, even though the attrition of
86 The Peninsula
manpower was limited and the length of line and frequency of combat were
nothing like the coming Petersburg campaign. Despite all this, the morale of
Johnston’s troops remained high. They were as yet mostly green soldiers filled
with a high level of motivation for the war, and everyone wanted to do his part
for the cause. The growing strength of their earthworks increased their confi-
dence, for without them the army could not have held its position at York-
town. Long after the war, artillery officer Edward Porter Alexander would
remember the Warwick Line as ‘‘mere ditches with dirt thrown out in front,’’
but most Confederates were proud of their digging at Yorktown. A Tar Heel
soldier named Joseph F. Gibson thought the place was ‘‘well fortified.’’ The
works were stronger than those at Manassas Junction, he rightly concluded.
‘‘We are so strongly fortified that they can’t hurt us at all,’’ crowed James
Peter Williams of Brown’s Chesapeake Artillery. Nathaniel Venable Watkins, a
member of the 4th Virginia Heavy Artillery, was impressed by the strength
and even the beauty of the works at Gloucester Point. ‘‘It is perfectly astonish-
ing to see the great amount of work which has been done during the last two
or three weeks,’’ he wrote to his wife on April 18. ‘‘The whole face of things has
been changed since I first came here, and our fortifications are I think twice as
strong. It will be a most beautiful place when finished—the batteries are laid
off so regularly & some of them turfed over so beautifully. I was standing
guard this morning on the highest point of our works where I could have a full
view of Yorktown, all of our works, York river, and the Yankee fleet. I often
wished that you could be with me, and enjoy the beautiful scenery.’’
∂≠
The Fall of Yorktown
The tranquillity that Watkins so much enjoyed was interrupted on April 30
when the first Union artillery fire from the heavy batteries descended on York-
town. McClellan wanted the guns to fire on the wharf to interrupt the flow of
supplies to the Warwick Line. Battery No. 1, the heaviest of the Union gun
emplacements, opened at 2:00 p.m. with five 100-pounder Parrotts and one
200-pounder Parrott. Half a dozen ships at the wharf immediately scattered.
The heaviest Confederate ordnance able to return fire was an 8-inch Colum-
biad, no match for the monster Parrotts, and it was firing at its maximum
range, 6,200 yards. Firing slowly because of the difficulty of reloading such
huge guns, the Federals pumped thirty-nine projectiles—an assortment of
solid shot, percussion shells, time fuse shells, and even four Greek fire shells—
into the wharf area. They continued the shelling on May 1 despite a heavy fog.
That day, Johnston held a conference of his officers to express his decision
to evacuate Yorktown. These few shells were enough to send his large army
retreating up the Peninsula. Johnston was convinced that the heavier Union
The Peninsula 87
artillery would silence his guns and pave the way for an assault or siege
approaches. The evacuation was ordered for the evening of May 2, but the
Confederates had to endure a hail of sixty rounds on the wharf and the water
batteries that day as they prepared to leave. Their 8-inch Columbiad burst
trying to counter this heavy fire. Johnston had to postpone the evacuation
one day, until the evening of May 3, due to administrative confusion regard-
ing the organization of his trains. That day, Battery No. 1 fired thirty-four
rounds, unanswered by the Confederates, and five other Union batteries
were ready to open on May 4.
∂∞
The evacuation took the Federals by surprise. McClellan was happy that
some of his guns were firing at the wharf and jubilant at the near prospect of
a full-scale bombardment by all of his heavy batteries. ‘‘It will be a tremen-
dous affair when we do begin & will I hope make short work of it.’’ He
expected the full bombardment to begin on May 5 or 6 and believed York-
town would fall in two days. The Federals noticed their enemy was unusually
quiet on the night of May 3, and McClellan suspected either an attack or a
withdrawal. ‘‘I do not want these rascals to get away from me without a
sound drubbing,’’ he bragged to his wife.
∂≤
Despite McClellan’s desire to test the batteries, everyone in blue received
the news of Johnston’s evacuation with joy and relief. Many units immedi-
ately crossed the narrow no-man’s-land and entered the Rebel works. Some
Unionists met with a terrible surprise: dozens of torpedoes planted in ex-
posed places. American soldiers had never encountered such weapons be-
fore, and these explosives struck everyone as diabolical because they killed
and maimed by surprise and seemed to take life for the sake of killing rather
than to achieve some immediate tactical goal. Even many Confederates
found their use distasteful.
The torpedoes were entirely the work of Brig. Gen. Gabriel James Rains,
commander of an Alabama and Georgia brigade in Daniel Harvey Hill’s left
wing. A West Point graduate, Rains had experimented with explosives in
the prewar army and had devised an especially sensitive detonation device.
Without receiving permission from higher authorities, he had taken it upon
himself to plant artillery shells in front of certain sections of the works at
Yorktown but left them unarmed. Only when the order to evacuate was given
did he prime the booby traps and order the planting of many more shells
inside the works. In addition to delaying the Federal pursuit, Rains was
motivated by a desire to avenge the shelling of his hometown of New Bern,
North Carolina, just before it was captured on March 15.
∂≥
The first torpedoes were encountered more than 100 yards in front of the
town defenses at Yorktown. They were 8- and 10-inch mortar shells rigged