Greenhalgh E. Victory through Coalition Britain and France during the First World War

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disputes right up to the Armistice. Hence the problem of comma nd and

the successive mechanisms put in place to solve that problem have

loomed large in these pages.

Political coordination was equally difficult. Moving from lack of con-

tact, through international conferences to the more regularised meetings

of the Supreme War Council, the politicians found no mutual adaptation

of grand strategic aims that could work with little friction. The row over

manpower was still generating heat in the autumn of 1918. To the end

Clemenceau believed that the British would fight to the last Frenchman.

To the end Lloyd George was determined that he would not permit a

repeat Passchend aele. Therefore he created, with the briefest-serving

French premier, a Supreme War Council that sat in isolated splendour

at Versailles. As a command mechanism, the SWC provided an umbrella

for all the Allied organisations and a ready-made structure for the peace

negotiations. However, if a camel is a horse designed by a committee, it

proved that a camel was not the beast to lead allied armies against a

Ludendorff.

It is a tragedy that vitally necessary cooperation was achieved more

easily in the ci vilian (bureaucratic) sphere than in the political or military

sphere. National pride and the military mind (at the level of high com-

mand, at least) hampered the search for a suitable mechanism of com-

mand. The coordinating machinery that ran the programme committees

and the AMTC worked much more efficiently. Convoy defeated the

submarine; American troops were transported to Europe in great num-

bers; all the materiel losses (and more) suffered in the German spring

offensives of 1918 were replaced speedily; and rationing and price limita-

tions fos tered a sense of common sacrifice on the home front that enabled

the final victory. All these successes were as vital as those on the field

of battle.

A few, far-sighted men played a vital role in the Allied programme

committees and AMTC that worked more efficiently than the military

side. Etienne Cle´mentel, the Commerce Minister, is an unsung hero of

these pages. His constant pushing for Allied mechanisms to make good

French deficiencies in shipping and in raw materials created many of the

war-winning formulae. In Britain professional men such as Sir Eric

Geddes, Sir Joseph Maclay, Sir Arthur Salter brought their expertise to

the solving of transportation problems that lay at the heart of the Allied

effort. Jean Monnet’s pivotal role as the link between Cle´mentel and

the people in London has led to the face of Europe as it is seen today in

the EC.

Dominating personalities were equally important in the political and

military spheres. Even in such a dehumanising war, attested by the

Coalition as a defective mechanism? 283

Verdun ossuaries or the lists of the missing on the Menin Gate, the need

for individual leadership was acute. David Lloyd George and Georges

Clemenceau came to incarnate the will to win that Asquithian laisser-faire

methods and successive French ministries had failed to produce. Foch’s

will to win shone clearly between 21 and 26 March 1918, and made the

desirability of his appointment to supreme command as clear to Lord

Milner as it was to the French. Yet Foch’s position was insecure. Appeals

could be made against his orders, and he had to fight to get his powers

clarified and even his title accepted. His relationship with Haig was rocky,

and Pershing was equally difficult to deal with. The source of his author-

ity was unclear. To whom did he answer? Presumably Clemenceau could

have forced his resignation as a French Army officer, but would the Allies

who had acc epted him as supr eme commander respect such an action?

Foch walked a tightrope in 1918, and the fact that he did not fall off

reflects both his personal qualities of tact and his experience of coordinat-

ing Allied military action since October 1914 at First Ypres.

In liaison work Clive was clearly an exc ellent liai son officer, but the

French had a succession of heads of their MMF. They never seemed to

realise the need to put an effort into the liaison machinery, especially

given the fact that they wanted more out of the British. At Foch’s head-

quarters, the liaison officers (DuCane, Grant and Dillon amongst the

British, and the American Colonel T. Bentley Mott) all grew very fond of

the Allied commander-in-chief. When an effort was made to reduce

friction, as Dillon did in 1916, rather than to increase it, as Vallie`res’

reports at the same time were doing, the result could not be oth er than

greater efficiency.

The ability of such individuals to speak each other’s language – and

both literally and metaphorically to understand what the other was saying –

was also important. The English text of the Versailles Treaty marked the

end of French as the diplomatic language, a change mark ed by the

provision of English-language classes by the MMF in 1918. In Britain a

1918 command paper pointed out the ignorance of foreign countries and

peoples, the prewar deficiencies in teaching modern languages, and the

need to improve the teaching of the ‘most important European language’

for Britain, namely French.

Although victory was gained in November 1918, it might have come

earlier. If Britain and France – the only two great powers that saw the fight

through from start to finish – had developed cooperative mechanisms to

eliminate friction so as to obtain the most useful output for the energy

Cmd 9036 (1918), p. 61.

284 Victory through Coalition

expended, the war would surely have ended sooner. The sa me might be

said of the Second World War, when the lessons had to be re-learned.

Then, divided by a common language, the Allies demonstrated at length

how little they had learned from the war to end all war, and consequently

lengthened that conflict as well.

Notwithstanding all the foregoing, it must be said that the Franco-

British coalition, for all it was a defective mechanism, was effective

enough to defeat one of the five perfect institutions that Europe is sup-

posed to have produced. The British Parliament and the Roman Curia

may yet survive. The Russian ballet and French opera may have lost their

preeminence. But the Franco-British coalition defeated the Prussian

Great General Staff.

Coalition as a defective mechanism? 285

Bibliographical essay

This essay makes no claim to be comprehensive. The literature on the First World

War is too extensive for that. It aims simply to evaluate the most significant works

that were used as secondary sources in this study, and also to present some recent

publications for further reading. The works, including general histories, that are

not mentioned here are cited with full bibliographical details at the first mention in

each chapter where they occur. The primary sources that were used are listed at

the end of this essay in ‘Archival sources’.

GENERAL WORKS

Three recently published general histories of the First World War cover very well

its international nature. Stevenson and Strachan (only the first volume of the

latter’s projected trilogy is published thus far) provide new insights; and Prior and

Wilson in Cassell’s History of Warfare series give a much briefer account, well

illustrated and provided with modern maps (which are notably lacking in

Stevenson and Strachan). The essays in Chickering and Fo¨ rster provide an insight

into current historiographical trends.

Among single-country studies, the most useful for Britain are still Trevor

Wilson and John Bourne. For France, the late J.-B. Duroselle is always illumin-

ating. J. J. Becker’s classic has been translated into English. Cambridge University

Press’s New Approaches to European History has a multi-authored volume on

France and the Great War (Smith, Audoin-Rouzeau and A. Becker), but it is

more useful on the home front and the impact of the war than on the fighting.

Clayton provides a much-needed guide in English to the French Army, which

should be supplemented by Robert Doughty’s forthcoming (2005) work. Herwig

gives us the view from the other side of the hill, showing that the Austro-German

coalition was no easier for being more unequal.

A much neglected source of information is the series of monographs published

by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the economic and social

history of the world war in the 1920s and ’30s (see Cle´mentel and Salter in the

‘Shipping and logistics’ section below). Jules Maurin discusses the series briefly in

the proceedings of the international conference held in Montpellier in 1998. For

those seeking to find out about recent trends, the proceedings provide a useful

overview of recent French historiography.

The question of coalition warfare is strangely neglected, given its continuing

importance. The crucial Franco-British coalition has also suffered neglect – almost

286

total neglect in France with the honourable exception of Duroselle (writing

in English). The French journal Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains

produced a special dossier in 1995, ‘L’alliance franco-britannique pendant la

Grande Guerre’, with three articles by David Dutton, Martin Horn and William

J. Philpott – all derived from their Ph.D. theses. Although published by a French

journal and translated into French, it is significant that no French author is

included. As for works in English, Wallach’s reliance on published memoirs

makes his treatment too superficial; and Philpott’s over-reliance on British

sources and over-concentration on the first two years of the war when Sir John

French was British commander-in-chief make for some curious conclusions.

Neilson and Prete’s edited collection has no essay on the Franco-British

experience. One needs to go back as far as Maurice who was writing during the

Second World War with the express intention of drawing out some lessons for

future conduct to get anything approaching the breadth of analysis that Neilson

gives, for example, in his study of the Anglo-Russian alliance.

Becker, Jean-Jacques, The Great War and the French People (New York: St Martin’s

Press, 1986)

Bourne, J. M., Britain and the Great War 1914–1918 (London: Arnold, 1989)

Chickering, Roger, and Stig Fo¨ rster, Great War, Total War: Combat and

Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (Washington, DC: German

Historical Institute / Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

Clayton, Anthony, Paths of Glory: The French Army 1914–18 (London: Cassell, 2003)

Doughty, Robert A., Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great

War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005)

Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, ‘Strategic and Economic Relations During the First

World War’, in Neville Waites (ed.), Troubled Neighbours: Franco-British

Relations in the Twentieth Century (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson,

1971), 40–66

‘Entente and Me´sentente’, in Douglas Johnson, Franc¸ois Crouzet and Franc¸ois

Be´darida (eds.), Britain and France: Ten Centuries (Folkestone: Dawson,

1980), 274–80

Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains 180 (October 1995): special issue

devoted to ‘L’alliance franco-britannique pendant la Grande Guerre’

Herwig, Holger H., The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary

1914–1918 (London: Arnold, 1997)

Maurice, Frederick, Lessons of Allied Co-operation: Naval, Military and Air,

1914–1918 (London: Oxford University Press, 1942)

Maurin, Jules, and Jean-Charles Jauffret (eds.), La Grande Guerre 1914–1918: 80

ans d’historiographie et de repre´sentations (Montpellier: UMR 5609 du CNRS –

ESID, 2002)

Neilson, Keith, Strategy and Supply: The Anglo-Russian Alliance, 1914–1917

(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984)

Neilson, Keith, and Roy A. Prete (eds.), Coalition Warfare: An Uneasy Accord

(Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983)

Philpott, William J., Anglo-French Relations and Strategy on the Western Front,

1914–18 (London: Macmillan / New York: St Martin’s Press, 1996)

Bibliographical essay 287

Prior, Robin, and Trevor Wilson, The First World War (London: Cassell, 1999)

Smith, Leonard V., Ste´phane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, France and

the Great War 1914–1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)

Stevenson, D., 1914–1918: The History of the First World War (London: Allen

Lane, 2004) (published in New York by Basic Books as Cataclysm: The First

World War as Political Tragedy)

Strachan, Hew, The First World War, vol. I. To Arms (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2001)

Wallach, Jehudah, Uneasy Coalition: The Entente Experience in World War I

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993)

Wilson, Trevor, The Myriad Faces of War: Britain and the Great War, 1914–1918

(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986)

MEMOIRS, DIARIES AND BIOGRAPHIES

Notoriously suspect, memoirs and diaries may provide nonetheless useful clues,

not least in sensitive matters where omissions or downright falsehoods reveal

much about the writer. The military are just as guilty as the politicians. Haig’s

diaries must be used with care (see my article in the Journal of Military History),

and it must be remembered that Blake’s selection is but a small portion of the

whole and is derived from the later typescript rather than the original manuscript

diary. Callwell’s extensive quotations from Sir Henry Wilson’s diaries are very

useful, especially since they are also indiscreet (as was recognised at the time).

We await the publication of selections from Sir John French’s diaries by the Army

Records Society. The literature on Haig is vast, and is perhaps best approached

via Bond and Cave’s ‘re-appraisal’.

Two of the three principal French generals, Joffre and Foch, both produced

memoirs, both clearly based on preliminary drafts produced by their staffs or on

operational documents. Pe´tain did not publish a memoir. Prete is good on Joffre;

but we lack an archivally based study of Foch’s command such as Prior and

Wilson produced for the British general Sir Henry Rawlinson. Neiberg’s recent

profile of Foch in the Brassey series is brief, relying on a few well-known sources

and the recently reprinted French biography by Jean Autin. The first volume of

the memoirs of Foch’s chief of staff, Maxime Weygand, is detailed and, despite its

uncritical stance, supplements the Foch memoirs.

Among the French politicians, Poincare´’s eleven-volume memoirs of his

presidency are invaluable. They are based on his contemporary notes and often

provide the only information about what was discussed in the French cabinet, since

no minutes were kept. Keiger’s recent biography is disappointingly light on his

wartime actions. Suarez’s multi-volume study of Briand is equally important,

because it cites documents that were destroyed in 1940. Clemenceau is well served.

His own Grandeur and Misery of Victory is partial, but Duroselle and Watson are

both useful. The four-volume account published by the head of his military cabinet

is invaluable, since Clemenceau burned his papers. It is to be hoped that Hanks’

recent doctoral thesis on Clemenceau will be published in some form.

Of the two British prime ministers, the second is better served. John Grigg’s

sympathetic biography (the 1916–18 volume published posthumously)

288 Bibliographical essay

illuminates Lloyd George’s own highly unreliable (but very readable) memoirs.

Even the index is enjoyable. Under Haig, for instance, the sub-heads read: ‘his

refusal to face unpleasant facts’; ‘his limited vision’; ‘Germans accustomed to his

heavy-footed movements’; ‘viciously resists LG’s attempts to get Unity of

Command’; ‘convinced he was a better soldier than Foch’. Suttie’s study of the

Lloyd George memoirs as history is forthcoming. Cassar’s recent advocacy of

Asquith as a war leader is unconvincing; and the premier’s letters (up until May

1915) to his confidante, Venetia Stanley, remain a good guide.

The ambassadors – Paul Cambon in London, and Lord Bertie succeeded by

Lord Derby in Paris – provide a slightly different slant. Cambon’s edited corre-

spondence is rather too discreet, but the selection from Bertie’s diary published by

his daughter-in-law is useful. Even more useful is David Dutton’s recent edition of

the 1918 diary of Lord Derby in its entirety.

Much of the final victory was due to a successful bureaucracy that supported

the efforts of the military. The bureaucrat par excellence of the war was Sir Maurice

Hankey, and his Supreme Command, with its diary extracts (supplemented by

Roskill), is perhaps less self-serving than many other contemporary accounts.

Autin, Jean, Foch ou le triomphe de la volonte´ (Paris: Perrin, 2nd edn 1998)

Blake, Robert (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914–1919 (London: Eyre

& Spottiswoode, 1952)

Bond, Brian, and Nigel Cave (eds.), Haig: A Re-appraisal 70 Years On (Barnsley:

Leo Cooper, 1999)

Brock, Michael, and Eleanor Brock (eds.), H. H. Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982)

Callwell, Major-General Sir C. E., Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Bart., G.C.B.,

D.S.O: His Life and Diaries, 2 vols. (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd, 1927)

Cambon, Paul, Correspondance 1870–1924, 3 vols. (ed. H. Cambon, Paris:

Grasset, 1940)

Cassar, George H., Asquith as War Leader (London: Hambledon, 1994)

Clemenceau, Georges, Grandeurs et mise`res d’une victoire (Paris: Plon, 1930)

(trans. as Grandeur and Misery of Victory (London: George G. Harrap &

Co. Ltd, 1930))

Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste, Clemenceau (Paris: Fayard, 1988)

Dutton, David (ed.), Paris 1918: The War Diary of the British Ambassador, the 17th

Earl of Derby (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001)

Foch, Mare´chal, Me´moires pour servir a` l’ histoire de la guerrre de 1914–1918, 2 vols.

(Paris: Plon, 1931)

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, ‘Myth and Memory: Sir Douglas Haig and the Imposition

of Allied Unified Command in March 1918’, Journal of Military History 63: 3,

771–820

Grigg, John, Lloyd George: War Leader 1916–1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2002)

Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command 1914–1918, 2 vols. (London: George Allen

& Unwin, 1961)

Hanks, Robert K., ‘Culture Versus Diplomacy: Clemenceau and Anglo-

American Relations during the First World War’ (Ph.D. thesis, University

of Toronto, 2002)

Bibliographical essay 289

Keiger, J. F. V., Raymond Poincare´ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

Lennox, Lady Algernon Gordon (ed.), The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame

1914–1918, 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1924)

Lloyd George, David, War Memoirs, 6 vols. (London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson,

1933–6)

Me´moires du Mare´chal Joffre, 2 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1932)

Mordacq, Ge´ne´ral, Le Ministe`re Clemenceau: journal d’un te´moin, 4 vols. (Paris:

Plon, 1930–1)

Neiberg, Michael S., Foch: Supreme Allied Commander in the Great War

(Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003)

Poincare´, Raymond, Au service de la France: neuf anne´es de souvenirs , 11 vols.

(Paris: Plon, 1926–74)

Prete, Roy A., ‘Joffre and the Question of Allied Supreme Command,

1914–1916’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Western Society for

French History 16 (1989), 329–38

Roskill, Stephen, Hankey: Man of Secrets,vol.I.1877–1918 (London: Collins, 1970)

Suarez, Georges, Briand: sa vie, son œuvre. Avec son Journal et de nombreux docu-

ments ine´dits, 5 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1938–41)

Suttie, Andrew, Rewriting the Great War: Lloyd George’s War Memoirs as

History (forthcoming)

Watson, David Robin, Georges Clemenceau: A Political Biography (London: Eyre

Methuen, 1974)

Weygand, Maxime, Me´moires, vol. I. Ide´al ve´cu (Paris: Flammarion, 1950)

COMMAND: MILITARY AND POLITICAL

Any study of the military command must start with the official histories: the

British series for operations in France and Belgium under the general editorship

and authorship of Sir J. E. Edmonds (all the volumes have been reprinted in a joint

venture between the Imperial War Museum and Battery Press); and the much

more extensive (and surprisingly under-exploited) Les Arme´es Franc¸aises dans la

Grande Guerre, in 103 volumes with some of the eleven ‘tomes’ in several parts,

each with a volume of maps and, most importantly, with up to four volumes of

annexes containing a vast number of original documents reproduced in full.

The British side of the strategy question has been studied more widely than the

French where little has been written (but see Clayton above) since Pedroncini

published his doctoral dissertation on Pe´tain as commander-in-chief in 1974. Nor

has King’s study of civil–military relations in France been superseded, despite

having been written before open access to the archives.

For Britain, David French’s two studies remain essential reading. They are

supplemented, but not replaced, by George Cassar and Brock Millman. David

Woodward is the essential text on civil–military relations, despite my several

disagreements in the foregoing pages with his conclusions.

Cassar, George, Kitchener’s War: British Strategy from 1914 to 1916 (Washington,

DC: Brassey’s, 2004)

290 Bibliographical essay

Edmonds, Brigadier-General Sir J. E., et al., Military Operations: France and

Belgium, volumes for 1914–18, with annexes (London: Macmillan/HMSO,

1927–47)

France. Ministe`re de la Guerre. Etat-Major de l’Arme´e. Service Historique, Les

Arme´es Franc¸aises dans la Grande Guerre, 103 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie natio-

nale, 1922–38)

French, David, British Strategy and War Aims 1914–1916 (London: Allen &

Unwin, 1986)

The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition 1916–1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1995)

King, J. C., Generals and Politicians: Conflict Between France’s High Command,

Parliament and Government, 1914–1918 (Berkeley / Los Angeles: University

of California Press, 1951)

Millman, Brock, Pessimism and British War Policy 1916–1918 (London: Frank

Cass, 2001)

Pedroncini, Guy, Pe´tain Ge´ne´ral en Chef 1917–1918 (Paris: Presses Universitaires

de France, 1974)

Woodward, David R., Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark, DE: University of

Delaware Press, 1983)

On the Somme see Strachan’s thoughtful essay and the new study by Prior and

Wilson for the British side of the battle. That any French fought in the battle is

largely forgotten. That the battle still gives rise to conflict is shown in the differing

interpretations of myself and Philpott, aired over several issues of War in History.

Greenhalgh, Elizabeth, ‘Why the British Were on the Somme in 1916’, War in

History 6: 2 (1999), 147–73

‘Flames Over the Somme: A Retort to William Philpott’, War in History 10: 3

(2003), 335–42

Philpott, William, ‘Why the British Were Really on the Somme: A Reply to

Elizabeth Greenhalgh’, War in History 9: 4 (2002), 446–71

Prior, Robin, and Trevor Wilson, The Somme (London: Yale University Press,

2005)

Strachan, Hew, ‘The Battle of the Somme and British Strategy’, Journal of

Strategic Studies 21: 1 (1998), 79–95

The Nivelle episode has been much written about, d espite its temporal

brevity. All the p artic ipan ts exc ept Ni velle himself have left versions of the

story. Spears has given a full and fair account, with a large number of documents

reproduced as annexes. His papers in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military

Archives reveal the care he took to c ontact the French and British players.

Woodward has analysed the proceedings at length from the point of view of

British civil–military relations, but devotes little time to the French. On the

French side, King’s account (see above), despite its age, is still valuable. Kuntz

like King also predates the archival record, but is a useful summary. The fullest

accounts are in Civrieux and Painleve´. The former cites extensively from the

report produced in 1917 by the French Senate’s Army Commission.

Bibliographical essay 291

Civrieux, Commandant, Pages de ve´rite´: l’offensive de 1917 et le commandement du

Ge´ne´ral Nivelle (Paris / Brussels: Van Oest, 1919)

Kuntz, K., ‘Le Proble`me de l’unite´ de commandement sur le front franco-

britannique au de´but de 1917’, Revue d’Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale

(January and April 1939), 19–50 and 129–68

Painleve´, Paul, Comment j’ai nomme´ Foch et Pe´tain: la politique de guerre de 1917, le

commandement unique interallie´ (Paris: Alcan, 1924)

Spears, Major-General Sir E. L., Prelude to Victory (London: Jonathan Cape,

1939)

The critical events of 1918 – the German spring offensives and the victorious

Allied counter-offensives that began in July and ended in the Armistice – are

frequently treated in summary fashion. Philpott (see above), for example, covers

21 March 1918 to the Armistice in pages 154–60. Harris and Barr are also brief,

and make little mention of the French. Sheffield treats 1918 much more fully, but

once again makes little mention of the French. Bliss’ account of the steps leading

to unified command is still worth reading. We still need a comprehensive account

of the year of victory.

Bliss, Tasker H., ‘The Evolution of the Unified Command’, Foreign Affairs 1: 2

(December 1922), 1–30

Hanks, Robert K., ‘How the First World War Was Almost Lost: Anglo-French

Relations and the March Crisis of 1918’ (MA thesis, University of Calgary,

1992)

Harris, Paul, with Niall Barr, Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred

Days’ Campaign, 8 August – 11 November 1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998)

Sheffield, Gary, Forgotten Victory: The First World War – Myths and Realities

(London: Headline, 2001)

LIAISON

Perhaps something in the temperament or work practices of good liaison officers

makes them readable authors as well. Their reports and diary comments are

available in the archives, and may be supplemented by their postwar writings.

Spears is the doyen of British liaison officers. His Liaison 1914 is a classic; and his

account of the events of the opening months of 1917 (see above) is equally

informative and supplemented by a good number of original documents printed

as appendixes. Dillon published extracts from his diaries; and DuCane had his

account of the months he spent with Foch in 1918 privately published (see

‘Archival sources’).

Among the French, Huguet wrote a bitter indictment of the British, at odds

with his perceived Anglophilia in 1914 and 1915 but provoked by postwar

hostility and failure of the Anglo-French military guarantee. Lengthy extracts

from Vallie`res’ diaries were used in the biography that his son published.

Poincare´’s liaison officer at GQG, Herbillon, published his memoirs in 1930.

The extracts from the journals and letters of the unofficial liaison officer, Lord

Esher, are also useful. Esher knew everyone who was anyone, and wrote incessantly.

292 Bibliographical essay