Chapter 4
4-2 FM 7-0 12 December 2008
4-5. Forces and headquarters deploying to an ongoing operation or available for immediate alert and dep-
loyment to a contingency are in the available phase. At the end of the available phase, units return to the
reset phase, and the cycle begins again.
4-6. Both the generating force and the operational Army participate in and respond to ARFORGEN. The
generating force supports operational Army training. Operational Army commanders develop plans for
training mission-essential tasks. Commanders prioritize resource allocation based on the following factors:
time available, training time required, resource availability, and the directed mission. The generating force
adjusts level of support to meet operational Army requirements. (See FMI 3-0.1 for additional information
on ARFORGEN.)
THE MODULAR FORCE’S EFFECT ON TRAINING MANAGEMENT
4-7. In 2003, the Army implemented a fundamental shift towards a brigade-based, modular force. This
transformation, combined with implementing ARFORGEN, has resulted in changes to training relation-
ships and responsibilities, especially with regard to Reserve Component organizations.
MODULAR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS
4-8. The Army’s shift to modular organizations and the need to conduct full spectrum operations as part
of unified action have changed the way the Army views training and readiness in units. Army formations
are no longer based on large, fixed divisions. Brigade-sized, functional organizations—brigade combat
teams (BCTs), modular support brigades, and functional brigades—have replaced the larger, hierarchical
ones. (See FM 3-0, appendix C.)
4-9. Units are tailored through ARFORGEN to create force packages to meet specific mission require-
ments. Force packages often are composed of units from multiple commands and installations. Thus, mod-
ular brigades often deploy and work for headquarters other than the one exercising administrative control
(ADCON) over them. Senior commanders are responsible for the training and readiness of these units until
they are assigned or attached to a force package. As a result, both ADCON commanders and future force-
package commanders can influence the development, resourcing, and execution of unit training plans and
deployment preparation. However, unit commanders are ultimately responsible for the training, perfor-
mance, and readiness of their units. (FM 3-0, paragraphs B-25 through B-27, discusses ADCON.)
4-10. Staffs at all levels must be well-trained in the operations process in order to integrate modular forma-
tions—or for their unit to be integrated into a force package. Staffs, therefore, require a high degree of un-
derstanding of the limitations and capabilities of the different types of units that may compose a force
package. Commanders also train their staffs to control, or be integrated into, a force package capable of
conducting operations as part of unified action. Staffs must be agile, capable of helping commanders exer-
cise command and control. Through the command and control warfighting function commanders, assisted
by their staffs, integrate all the warfighting functions and subordinate units to accomplish missions. (See
FM 3-0, chapter 4.)
4-11. Staff training requires frequent training on digital command and control information systems. The
staff is a weapon system. As with crews of any weapon system, staffs require training as often as necessary
to maintain readiness and ensure their ability to integrate their information systems with other digital sys-
tems. Staff training cannot be an afterthought. It must be an integral part of the unit’s training plans. Lead-
ers’ operational experience in staff functions and coordination can help focus staff training requirements.
4-12. Modular formations are more agile, expeditionary, and versatile than previous Army organizations.
However, modular organizations require a higher degree of training and operational synchronization at the
brigade level. Today’s BCT commanders coordinate and synchronize the training and proficiency of the
many functional units organic to the BCT. This is quite different from a maneuver brigade commander’s
responsibilities under the Army of Excellence structure. For example, under the Army of Excellence, the
artillery battalion was organic to the division artillery and the support battalion to the division support
command. The commanders of the division artillery and support command oversaw training for their or-
ganic battalions. This arrangement allowed maneuver brigade commanders to focus on training their ma-
neuver battalions. In contrast, today’s BCT commander is responsible for training the BCT’s organic artil-