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© 2000 CRC Press LLC
Generally, security analysis is concerned with the system's response to
disturbances. In steady-state analysis the transition to a new operating condition
is assumed to have taken place, and the analysis ascertains that operating
constraints are met in this condition (thermal, voltage, etc.). In dynamic security
analysis the transition itself is of interest, i.e., the analysis checks that the
transition will lead to an acceptable operating condition. Examples of possible
concern include loss of synchronism by some generators, transient voltage at a
key bus (e.g., a sensitive load) failing below a certain level and operation of an
out-of-step relay resulting in the opening of a heavily loaded tie-line.
The computational capability of some control centers may limit
security analysis to steady state calculations. The post-contingency steady-state
conditions are computed and limit checked for flow or voltage violations. The
dynamics of the system may then be ignored and whether the post-contingency
state was reached without losing synchronism in any part of the system remains
unknown. As a result, instead of considering actual disturbances, the
contingencies are defined in terms of outages of equipment and steady-state
analysis is done for these outages. This assumes that the disturbance did not
cause any instability and that simple protective relaying caused the outage.
Normally, any loss of synchronism will cause additional outages thus making
the present steady-state analysis of the post-contingency condition inadequate
for unstable cases. It is clear that dynamic analysis is needed.
In practice, we define a list of equipment losses for static analysis.
Such a list usually consists of all single outages and a careful choice of multiple
outages. Ideally, the outages should be chosen according to their probability of
occurrence but these probabilities are usually not known. In some instance the
available probabilities are so small that comparisons are usually meaningless.
The choice of single outages is reasonable because they are likely to occur more
often than multiple ones. Including some multiple outages is needed because
certain outages are likely to occur together because of proximity (e.g., double
lines on the same tower) or because of protection schemes (e.g., a generator may
be relayed out when a line is on outage). The size of this list is usually several
hundred and can be a couple of thousand.
For dynamic security analysis, contingencies are considered in terms of
the total disturbance. All faults can be represented as three phase faults, with or
without impedances, and the list of contingencies is a list of locations where this
can take place. This is a different way of looking at contingencies where the
post-contingency outages are determined by the dynamics of the system
including the protection system. Obviously, if all possible locations are
considered, this list can be very large.
In steady-state security analysis, it is not necessary to treat all of the
hundreds of outages cases using power flow calculations, because the operator is
interested in worst possibilities rather than all possibilities. It is practical to use
some approximate but faster calculations to filter out these worst outages, which
can then be analyzed by a power flow. This screening of several hundred