
Yet the LCC’s record does not really bear out this strategic role. The Council
eventually took control of education, trams and poor law infirmaries. By the
s, it owned bridges and tunnels across the Thames, miles of
tramway, parks, fire stations, mental hospitals, and more than ,
schools. Nevertheless, housing apart, the LCC did little to change the physical
structure of London. For example, it laid out far fewer new streets than its sup-
posedly lethargic predecessor, the Metropolitan Board of Works;
25
and the
Labour-controlled LCC after showed no interest in planning that extended
beyond its county boundaries. Wider proposals for regional planning were con-
demned by the chairman of the LCC Town Planning Committee as ‘fascist’ and
‘un-British’.
26
It is difficult to see how the LCC could plan with much vision
when it only had responsibility for the declining inner parts of a rapidly expand-
ing whole.
As for the new boroughs, there was some scepticism as to whether their res-
idents would identify with them. H. G. Wells claimed that localism was being
eroded by every new form of communication. Philip Waller observes that ‘Civic
pride in most London districts had to be contrived.’ Londoners naturally
identified with localities, not with boroughs. Yet in some cases, the construction
of local identity was remarkably successful: for example, in the socialist fiefdoms
of Poplar and Bermondsey.
27
For Wells the solution to London’s problems lay in a ‘Greater London’ that
would embrace the entire commuting population of the Home Counties. Part
of the logic underlying the creation of the LCC had been the need to equalise
rates between poor and rich districts, such that the West End would contribute
to solving the problems of the East End. Geographically, too, the problems of
poor districts were not to be solved in situ but elsewhere, in suburbs that lay
outside the County of London. In the richest parish – St James, Piccadilly
– had a rateable value per head that was nearly seven times that of the poorest
parish – Bethnal Green. To yield an equivalent income, a much higher rate in
the pound had to be levied in poor areas. East End vestries also complained that,
although they contributed on an equal basis to the MBW, most of the Board’s
expenditure was concentrated in central London. By , the gap had widened:
St Martin-in-the-Fields had a per capita valuation thirteen times that of Mile
End.
28
By then a programme of rate equalisation and fiscal integration of the
City and second-tier authorities had been implemented, but most suburbs with
Modern London
25
Porter, London, p. .
26
Garside, ‘West End’, p. .
27
Waller, Town, p. ; for Wells, see Porter, London, p. , Garside, ‘West End’, pp. –; on
Poplar, see J. Gillespie, ‘Poplarism and proletarianism: unemployment and Labour politics in
London, –’, in Feldman and Stedman Jones, eds., Metropolis, pp. –, G. Rose,
‘Locality, politics, and culture: Poplar in the s’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,
(), –, G. Rose, ‘Imagining Poplar in the s: contested concepts of community’,
Journal of Historical Geography, (), –; on Bermondsey, see E. Lebas, ‘When every street
became a cinema: the film work of Bermondsey Borough Council’s public-health department,
–’, History Workshop Jour nal, (), –.
28
Davis, Reforming London, pp. –.
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