Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)
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Houston Riot (1917)
In an era of race riots, the Houston Riot of 1917 stood out because of several grim
phenomena. It was the first race riot in which the deaths of white people (16) out-
numbered black fatalities (4). All of the black participants were soldiers, making it
the first race riot in which black civilians did not take part. The army tried its black
soldiers in the largest court-martial that had ever taken place. Many interpreted the
Houston Riot as the beginning of a trend in which black people were less likely to
endure violence without fighting back (Mennell 1999, 284).
The Houston Riot involved the 3rd Battalion of the 24th Infantry, a unit of
black soldiers who had served with distinction in the American West and in the
Philippines. Pressed to prepare military units for World War I, the War Department
sent the 3rd Battalion to Camp Logan, near Houston, contrary to the previous prac-
tice of avoiding Jim Crow locations for black soldiers. The battalion’s mission was
to guard a new camp that was under construction.
A series of decisions diverted leaders and seasoned soldiers from the 3rd Battal-
ion, creating a deficit in leadership and experience. Captai n William Newman,
who tried to soothe a rocky relationship between the community and the battalion
by relaxing visitation rules in the camp, was lulled by a false sense of tranquility;
he departed for a new duty station just before the riot (Haynes 1976, 43–46).
The weaknesses of the 3rd Battali on exacerbated the so ldiers ’ anger and frus-
tration when they rode the streetcars into Houston. Depending on the attitudes of
the motormen and conductors enforcing Jim Crow laws, the ride could easily turn
into a miserable, humiliating experience, and the officers at Camp Logan seemed
powerless to change the situation (Schuler 1944, 311). The Houston police force
contained notorious race-baiters, and this placed the black soldiers in a potentially
hazardous situation, as they were required to leave their weapons in camp when
they were off duty.
Tensions reached a boiling point when the Houston police detained and beat
two unarmed black soldiers who were military police (Schuler 1944, 317). The
new battalion leader, Major Kneeland S. Snow, thought the trouble had blown
over, and he prepared to leave the camp for a night of entertainment (Haynes
1976, 100–113). However, he noticed some soldiers behaving strangely and
atte mpting to carry off ammunition. Major Snow ordered that all of the soldiers ’
749
weapons be locked up, which was ineffective and left them vulnerable to panic
(Haynes 1976, 136–137). A group of about 30 armed soldiers threatened Major
Snow as he traveled through the camp.
Sergeant Vida Henry and a few other black organizers had plotted to march into
Houston armed, to take revenge against the police. Taking advantage of the com-
motion over the ammunition and rifles, Henry began a march of between 100
and 150 soldiers into Houston, threatening nonparticipants with death (Haynes
1976, 115–127).
However, the hastily organized march, which quickly deteriorated into a riot,
was so disorganized that it deviated wildly from its goals. Of the 16 white people
who were killed as a result of the riot, only 4 were policemen. Although the sol-
diers had not set out to kill civilians, in the ensuing chaos, they shot many at ran-
dom. Most of the propert y damage occurred when panicked c itize ns looted guns
from downtown stores. Armed citizens were allowed into riot a reas to serve as
unofficial police (Haynes 1976, 148–164).
The H ouston police chief had been caught unaware, going to bed early that
night, while the sheriff was an hour’s drive fr om Houston when the riot broke
out (Haynes 1976, 167–169, 176). The police department sent only a few officers
at a time; thus, the soldiers faced little opposition. The police who did show up
quickly retreated because they were outnumbered (Haynes 1976, 140–147).
The head of the Texas National Guard asked the governor to declare martial
law, which he did. The Guardsmen sealed off the riot area by 11:00 p.m., j ust
two hours after the riot started. The black soldiers were demoralized by the deaths
of civilians. Their leader, Sergeant Henry, committed suicide rather than be cap-
tured. Three other black soldiers died from the stray bullets of their own
colleagues.
The Texas National Guard prevented civilians from reaching Camp Logan,
where soldiers were armed with Springfield rifles, the most powerful weapon
available. Next, the National Guard conducted a house-to-house search in the
black community, arresting anyone who had weapons, who had a military uniform,
or who was suspected of sheltering rioters. There were 138 black suspects. The
black community had had nothing to do with the riot, and many of the charges
were dropped (Haynes 1976, 182–185). In fact, black Houstonians perceived the
riot as a n event that would make their l ives worse, and they were correct. There
was a tightening of Jim Crow laws, and in the aftermath of the riot, several black
citizens were shot and killed by police (Haynes 1976, 203).
The Houston chief of police, Clarence Brock, was demoted to his previous posi-
tion as superintendent of parks. The most notorious race-baiter on the police force,
Lee Sparks, was fired f or using excessive force. The city board of inqu iry
750 Houston Riot (1917)
exonerated Houston of any responsibility for the riot (Haynes 1976, 228–230).
The NAACP sent an investigator who concluded that the riot was the result of
friction between police and soldiers (Haynes 1976, 231–234).
One hundred fifty-six soldiers suspected of participating in the riot were briefly
transferred to Camp Furlong in New Mexico. They were then moved to San Anto-
nio, in part to make it easier for Houstonians to testify at the series of three courts-
martial (Haynes 1976, 210–211). The unannounced sentencing and hanging of
13 soldiers by the first court-martial led the NAACP to call for reform. W. E. B.
DuBois protested death sentences for rioters who had served their country honor-
ably, only to be mistreated in Houston (Haynes 1976, 274, 299). The second and
third cour ts-martial resu lted in d eath sentences for 16 mo re men, but the se were
reviewed by President Woodrow Wilson, who let six death sentences stand while
commuting the remainder of the sentences to life in prison. Many of the other par-
ticipants r eceived life sentences . Wilson stressed that the le ssons of the riot had
been sufficiently learned. Wilson pointed out that it was important to recognize
the loyalty of black troops as a whole, to inspire further enthusiasm for military
service.
The lessons of the riot were absorbed in different ways. In Houston, civic leaders
attempted to redefine the riot as happening becaus e of vice an d drin k, a popular
misconception that allowed Houstonians to avoid any soul searching. Wi thin a month
after the riot, the discourse had shifted to the point where the riot was discussed as a
mass slaughter rather than as retaliation against police brutality (Schuler 1944, 335).
The NAACP identified one important result of the riot. The mayor and new
chief of police vigorous ly atte mpted to halt police brutality against black peopl e
(Arnesen 2003, 95). Black citizens of Houston pressed to have th eir own branch
of the NAACP, which was started. On e of the most telling results of the riot was
the mass exodus of black citizens from Houston, estimated at many thousands,
sometimes more than 100 in one day, by NAACP statistics (Arnesen 2003,
94–96). This emigration caused a shortage of black laborers. The city of Houston
banned northern recruiters from approaching black citizens, only to find that noth-
ing could prevent its black population from leaving.
—Merrill Evans
See also all entries under Stono Rebellion (1739); New York Slave Insurrection (1741);
Antebellum Su ppressed S lave Revolts (1800s–1850s); Nat Turner’s Rebellio n (1831);
New Orleans Riot (1866); N ew Orleans Race Riot (19 00); Atlanta Race Riot (1906);
Springfield Race Riot (1908); Red Summer (1919); Tulsa Race Riot (1921); Civil
Rights Movement (1953–1968); Watts Riot (1965); Detroit Riots (1967); Los Angeles
Uprising (1992).
Houston Riot (1917) 751
Further Reading
Arnesen, Eric, ed. Black Protest and the Great Migration: A Brief History with Docu-
ments. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003.
Haynes, Robert V. A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917. Baton Rouge: Louisi-
ana State University Press, 1976.
Mennell, James. “African-Americans and the Selective Service Act of 1917.” Journal of
Negro History 84, no. 3 (1999): 275–287.
Schuler, Edgar A. “The Houston Race Riot, 1917.” Journal of Negro History 29, no. 3
(1944): 300–338.
752 Houston Riot (1917)
Black Soldiers
Before 1900, the U.S. military ha d been one of the least segregated institutions,
but in the early years of the 20th century, it became one of the most segregated.
When the Selective Service Bill of 1917 was debated in Congress, many southern-
ers argued against conscription of black men, fearful that large numbers of armed
black servicemen might cause trouble. President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary
of War Newton Baker reached a compromise: black men would be drafted, but
they would serve in segregated units (Mennell 1999, 275–276, 284). Despite the
segregated milit ary unit s, W. E. B. DuBois and the NAACP called for black citi-
zens to close ranks and work for the greater good during World War I, in hopes that
more equality would follow after the war (Arnesen 2003, 98–99).
Until the run-up to World War I, the custom had been for black troops to serve
overseas or in the North or West, where they were not exposed to Jim Crow laws.
When the 3rd Battalion of the black 24th Infantry was assigned to Houston, the
community was uneasy. Houston had the largest black population, 30,000, of any
Texas city in 1917. Some feared that black soldiers and black civilians might work
together to press for better treatment (Haynes 1976, 23, 198).
The consc ription of black soldiers posed thorny problems about whether the
races would be separated for training and fighting (Mennell 1999, 277). The mili-
tary began training black officers, but they were not in place when the 3rd Battal-
ion came to Houston with 654 black enlisted men and eight white officers.
Within a few weeks of the black soldiers’ arrival, racial tensions had boiled
over. The abrasive enforcement of Jim Crow laws was a sore point among the
black soldiers, but assaults on black servicemen by white policemen pushed mem-
bers of the 3rd Battalion into action (Haynes 1976, 215).
Hastily organized, about 150 black soldiers departed Camp Logan and marched
on Houston, determined to exact revenge on the white police force. In the panic
that resulted when black servicemen thought a white mob was after them, and
white citizens thought a black mob was after them, a total of 16 white people were
killed, including four policemen. Many of the black soldiers did not wish to attack
civilians, and they fell away from the rogue group. The riot was over in two hours.
A total of 156 men suspected of mutiny and riot were disarmed and sent to the
stockade at Camp Furlon g in New Mexico (Haynes, 1976, 210). The ensuing
court-martial, one of three related to the Houston Riot, was the largest t hat had
ever taken p lace in the United States. Eighteen de fendants were hanged, a nd 79
received life sentences (Haynes 1976, 253).
Despite the handling of the Houston Riot, black Americans still sought out the
military as the best opportunity for advancement, because of a lack of alternatives.
753
The Houston Riot did not seem to have much of an effect on black enlistment, but
it did influence Army policy. The War Department returned to its practice of sta-
tioning black soldiers in remote areas of the West and avoided sending t hem to
the South (Haynes 1976, 305).
—Merrill Evans
Further Reading
Arnesen, Eric, ed. Black Protest and the Great Migration: A Brief History with Docu-
ments. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003.
Haynes, Robert V. A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917. Baton Rouge: Louisi-
ana State University Press, 1976.
Mennell, James. “African-Americans and the Selective Service Act of 1917.” Journal of
Negro History 84, no. 3 (1999): 275–287.
Discrimination
Discrimination laid the gr oundwork for the Houston Riot of 1917 . The black
troops that were stationed in Houston had served with distinction in the Philip-
pines and in northern and western cities of the United States, where racist policies
were not an issue. Many troops and civilians of color looked at military service as
a step toward greater respect that would lead black Americans to a position of
equality under the law.
When the black troops arrived at Camp Logan in Houston, they were jolted by
Jim Crow laws compelling segregation of the races in every aspect of public life,
such as business, work, shopping, housing, school attendance, and public transpor-
tation. During the Jim Crow era, from Reconstruction to the Civil Rights Act of
1964, Texas enacted 27 of its own Jim Crow laws, over and above federal segrega-
tion policies. Right away, the law forcing segregation on public streetcars was a
flash point, with some black servicemen ripping segregation signs off of the street-
car walls. By mid-August, the Houston police force, a haven for several notorious
race-baiters, began physically assaulting black soldiers (Haynes 1976, 80–85).
Some Houstonians had fiercely opposed the stationing of black troops in a city
following Jim Crow, out of fear of racial unrest. However, there was an urgent
need to prepare troops and equipment for World War I, and the War Department
gave the sensitivities of Jim Crow a lower priority. Also, building Camp Logan
brought an estimated $2 million to the local economy (Haynes 1976, 47–52). It
was against Houston’s financial interest to appear as a city consumed by racial ten-
sions (Schuler 1944, 301).
754 Houston Riot (1917)
Many black soldiers in Houston felt white officers were too narrow-minded to
judge the behavior of black soldiers impartially. Therefore, black soldiers did not
report instances of abuse to their officers, leading to a false aura of contentment.
This lack of communication helped set the stage for racial violence (Haynes
1976, 80–85).
During Houston’s t wo-hour riot, when a partial battalion of black soldiers set
out to avenge mistreatment by white police officers, 15 white people were killed,
with another victim dying l ater. In its investigation, the NAACP noted that the
police gave arms to white citizens while confiscating weapons from black citizens.
The NAACP determined that the riot was the result of conflicts with police
(Arensen 2003, 96). City leaders had attempted to smear the black soldiers, a
minority of whom had r ioted, as being corrupted by women and alcohol in the
camp (Haynes 1976, 233–234).
In a series of courts-martial, 29 black soldiers were sentenced to death. A mili-
tary review of the circumstances of the riot recommended that two white officers,
and perhaps a thi rd, be court-martialed for dereliction of duty. The white officers
were never tried, feeding suspicion that there was a racial double standard of mili-
tary justice (Haynes 1976, 304).
Some historians place the Houston Riot of 1917 in the larger context of black
citizens’ rising expectations of equal enforcement under the law. Under this inter-
pretation, the riot was one of the earliest militant protests for equality (Haynes,
1976, 318; Mennell 1999, 284–285).
—Merrill Evans
Further Reading
Arnesen, Eric, ed. Black Protest and the Great Migration: A Brief History with Docu-
ments. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003.
Haynes, Robert V. A Night of Violence: The Houston Riot of 1917. Baton Rouge: Louisi-
ana State University Press, 1976.
Mennell, James. “African-Americans and the Selective Service Act of 1917.” Journal of
Negro History 84, no. 3 (1999): 275–287.
Schuler, Edgar A. “The Houston Race Riot, 1917.” Journal of Negro History 29, no. 3
(1944): 300–338.
Houston Riot (1917) 755
Boston Police Strike (1919)
The Boston Police Strike of 1919 occurred during a period of post–World War I labor
unrest amid growing public fears of communism following the 1917 Bolshevik Rev-
olution. Although members of the Boston police force had legitimate labor griev-
ances, public opinion quickly turned against the striking policemen, and organized
labor suffered major losses during the 1920s. Massachusetts governor Calvin Coo-
lidge took a strong stand against the strike, and his position in opposition to the
unionization of public employees helped him secure the 1920 Republican vice presi-
dential nomination as the running mate of Warren G. Harding.
War readjustment produced considerable social, political, cultural, and political
confl ict within the United States during 1919. Suffering from a stroke, President
Woodrow Wilson was unable to thwart growing disillusionment with the Ver-
sailles Treaty and League of Nations, which was eventually rejected by the Senate.
The Great Migration of African Americans from the southern United States to the
Northinpursuitofemploymentcontributedtoracialconflictincitiessuchas
Chicago along with the resurgence of the Ku Klux Klan. Associating the new
immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe with a rising tide of Bolshevism,
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer unleashed a series of government raids t o
arrest and deport immigrants suspected of harboring radical political views.
American labor was beset with postwar inflation and a flooded labor market due
to returning war veterans. A series of labor strikes swept the nation, wi th almost
one-fifth of the workforce on strike at some point during the turbulent y ear of
1919. Over 400,000 steel workers le ft their jobs, while fears of radi calism were
flamed b y the Seattle General strike from February 6 to 11, which began wit h
walkouts in the city’s shipyards. When Seattle mayor Ole Hanson suppressed the
strike, he was the target of several assassination attempts. In Massachusetts, textile
workers at Lawrence were on strike in support of a nine-hour day and six-day
week, while telephone operators and elevated train workers in Boston also
engaged in work stoppages that disrupted public services.
Amid this background of discontent, the Boston police force sought a redress of
long-standing labor grievances. New police recruits in Boston received a salary of
only two dollars a day; a figure established in 1857. Work weeks sometimes
exceeded 90 hours as officers labored seven days a week with a day off every other
week. Constantly on call, officers were unabl e to l eave the city on their days off
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