Danver Steven L. (Edited). Revolts, Protests, Demonstrations, and Rebellions in American History: An Encyclopedia (ENG)
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Further Reading
Bauerlein, Mark. Negrophobia: Race Riot in Atlanta in 1906. San Francisc o: Encounter
Books, 2001.
Godshalk, David Fort. Veiled Visions: The 1906 A tlanta Race Riot and the Reshaping of
American Race Relations. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
Mixon, Gregory. The Atlanta Riot: Race, Class, and Violence in a New So uth C ity.
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2005.
White Supremacy
Racial stratification and white ra cism have fueled extralegal violence and ri ots
throughout the 19th and 20th c enturies. The 1906 Atlanta Riot provides one of
the more devastating and spectacular illustrations of the import of white
supremacy.
Over three days, the city that epitomized the promise and problems of the post-
Reconstructi on South was the scene of spontaneous and orchestrated violence,
rooted in long-standing racial tensions, emergent class conflicts, and the conse-
quences of urbanization. In particular, growing economic competition between
blacks and whites, demands f or civil rights, and a public panic over black crime
set the stage for the right.
Like so many other anti-black attacks in the post–Civil War South, the Atlanta
Riot of 1906 erupted a round issues of masculinity, honor, and hierarch y, most
commonlyexpressedaswhitemenprotectingwhitewomenfromallegedly
improper advance s by bl ack men. Newspapers reported four such assaults on
Saturday, September 22. A crowd of perhaps as many as 10,000 whites assembled
in Five Points. Initially, individual African American men were targeted by groups
of white Atlantans, who quickly turned their aggression against black-owned busi-
ness. As the violence escalated, it became more intense and increasingly random.
In response, armed groups of African Americans took to the street to protect their
community from further harm and defend their property from destruction.
Georgia governor Joseph M. Terrell deployed the state militia to quell the vio-
lence and regain control of the central business district, but it was only heavy rains
that dispersed the rioters at 2:00 a.m. on September 23. The presence of the militia
pushed the rioting to the suburbs on the south side of the city. Although meant to
restore law and o rder, over the next tw o days, the mil itia actually reinforced the
vigilantes’ efforts. Not only were there reports of violence and looting unchecked
by the militia, but in the end, it mobilized against African Americans organizing
686 Atlanta Race Riot (1906)
for self-protection, arresting as many as 250 of them in the community
of Brownsville.
In the end, the Atlanta Riot of 1906 resulted in the deaths of at least 25 and per-
haps as many as 70 African American men and two Euro-American men. An addi-
tional 70 African Americans were injured. Although largely forgotten in its
aftermathbymanywhiteAtlantans,theriot had profound consequences. Most
immediately, it devastated the African American commercial district. The events
of 1906 not only reflected white prejudice, but reinforced white supremacy, result-
ing in the passage of further restrictions on black suffrage. Finally, the riot of 1906
intensified tensions within the African American community, intensifying debates
about the best path toward equality, freedom, and dignity.
—C. Richard King
Further Reading
Bauerlein, Mark. Negrophobia: A R ace Riot in Atlanta, 19 06. San Francisco: Encounter
Books, 2001.
Mixon, Gregory. The Atlanta Riot: Race, Class, and Violence in a New South City. Gainesville:
Univ ersity Press of Florida, 2005.
Atlanta Race Riot (1906) 687
Springfield Race Riot (1908)
The Springfield, Illinois, race riot was notorious for the sudden violence in which
two prosperous black citizens were lynched, four white men were killed, and over
100 citizens were injured. Over the course of the two-day riot, dozens of black-
owned and Jewish-owned businesses were destroyed, along with many homes
occupied by black families. Thousands of black citizens fled the city, fearing for
their lives; some never returned. Significantly, very few rioters were held account-
able for the murder and mayhem.
On Friday, August 14, 1908, an angry mob of more than 5,000 assembled out-
side the Springfield j ail, eager to take justice into its own hands. One black pris-
oner, George Richardson, was accused of raping a white woman and another
black prisoner, Joe James, was accus ed of murdering a white man. When the
mob discovered it had been deceived and the prisoners had been moved, it sought
vengeance. Suspecting that Henry Loper’s car had played a role in moving the
black prison ers, the mob demolished Loper’s c ar and restaurant (Senechal 1990,
27–34, 95).
The Jewi sh-owned Fishman’s Pawn Shop was another early ta rget. The attack
appeared to have been planned in a dvance. The mob stole tools t hat they then
used to destroy the black residential neighborhoods known as the “Badlands”
(Anonymous 2008, 5). About one-quarter of the houses in that neighborhood were
owned by Isadore Kanner, a Russian Jewish immigrant. The police did not intervene
while the mob attacked the black neighborhood. The rioters attempted to protect
white families living in the Badlands neighborhood by having them pin white cloths
to their entrances. The riot took an uglier turn when rioters prevented firefighters
from putting out flames. Rioters also attacked black invalids (Senechal 1990, 35–
37). Scott Burton, a black barber, and William Donnegan, an 80-year-old retired
black shoemaker, were pulled from their homes and lynched. By 9:15 that evening,
the city had requested troops from the state of Illinois, and 500 militia were sent in.
By Saturday evening, 1,400 militia were stationed in Springfield, and they were
able to make headway against the mob. The police arrested suspected rioters, and
they prevented further att acks on black neighborhoods. Black families w ere per-
mitted to take shelter in the Springfield arsenal (Senechal 1990, 40).
Several times on Saturday evening, crowds formed, but in the major trouble
spots, they were dispersed by the militia. The crowds noted the pattern in the
689
way the militia were deployed, and they exploited the militia’s weaknesses by
causing trouble in areas where only small groups were on the loose. By Sunday
morning, the riot was over (Senechal 1990, 43–45).
On the first day of the riot, the rioters were seen as reformers who were ridding
the city of black people and of disreputable businesses such as gambling parlors,
saloons, and houses of prostitution. By the second day of the riot, perceptions had
changed. Upstanding citizens no longer stood among the crowds of onlookers,
offering tacit approval. The rioters wanted white-owned businesses to stop employ-
ing black workers. However, those who used black employees depended upon them
and did not want anyone dictating their employment practices. This segment of the
populace did not desire an “all-white” Springfield (Senechal 1990, 126). Also, by
this time, the nati onal press had picked up the story and residents were cons cious
of Springfield being cast in an unfavorable light (Senechal 1990, 48).
In another twist to the narrative of the Springfield riot, only black-owned busi-
nesses in the vice district were destroyed; all of the comparable white-owned busi-
nesses went untouched. The mob also destroyed black-owned businesses such as
barbershops, restaurants, shoemakers, an upholstery shop, and a bicycle shop
(Senechal 1990, 14). The black com munity had believed that assimilation would
come because of hard work and economic success. The attacks that took place
during the Springfield riot suggested that black citizens were targeted specifically
because of their economic success, a sobering repudiation of the American dream.
Many rioters were disadvantaged people who resented the achievements of the
black middle class. Even though the riot was over within two days, for several
weeks afterward, there were sneak attacks on black citizens. The police denied
that this was happening and provided no protection (Senechal 1990, 136).
Mabel Halle, the married white woman who accused a black man of raping her,
exonerated the man she originally accused, implicated another black man, then
finally conceded that she had had sexual relations with a white man who was
someone she knew. Her accusation had been one of the tinderboxes setting off
the riot, yet Springfield authorities never charged her with filing a false report.
She moved away within a few months (Senechal 1990, 158–159).
The grand jury brought 107 indictments against 80 people, including four police
officers who were accused of failing to stop the riot. There was only one conviction.
Rioters threatened people who were called t o testify, and white juries refused to
find rioters guilty (Crouthamel 1960, 176). The acquittal of Abraham Reimer
(sometimes spelled Raymer) was one of the most publicized. H e was an itinerant
Jewish peddler who participated in the riot and who was accused of lynching Wil-
liam Donnegan. Reimer’s case was unusual in that most people in the Jewish com-
munity of Springfield had been victims of the riot, not perpetrators. His case
received national coverage, and it sent the message that regardless of the evidence,
690 Springfield Race Riot (1908)
there would be little accountability for an incident that had exacted a heavy toll in
deaths, injuries, and property damage. Six years after the riot, the city of Spring-
field was still compensating victims for damages (Senechal 1990, 159, 181).
The lack of legal consequences for rioters fit in with local perceptions of what
had happened. Before the riot, Springfield had the reputation of being one of the
most corrupt Midwestern cities; this poor opinion only intensified afterward. In
the early hours of the riot, the mob wanted to exact revenge on two black prison-
ers. After the prisoners were moved, the mission shifte d to ridding Springfield of
disreputable businesses, under the guise of “reform” (Senechal 1990, 85). How-
ever, the unspoken mission was t o attack black-owned and Jewish-owned busi-
nesses, and to a ttack homes occupied by black families. Local law enforcement
was intimidated by the size of the crowd, and police did little to stop the rioters
until more forces arrived. By Saturday, when t he militia arrived in force and it
looked as though order would be restored, Springfield’s f our newspapers called
the rioters “bums and hoodlums” and “ riff raff” (Senech al 1990, 37, 47). Th is
change of opinion signaled more than semantics. Most Springfield residents
avoided thinking of the disturbance as a race riot (Senechal 1990, 169, 176). The
focus shifted from racism to issues of class. In their rush to put the race riot behind
them, Springfield residents looked for larger trends, such a s t he fallout from
urbanization and industrialization (Goldstein 2006, 62).
If influential citizens could think of the riot as stemming from hooliganism rather
than racism, they could avoid examining the role of racism in Springfield. No one
had to accept responsibility for the deaths of six citizens. Springfield citizens refo-
cused the blame on lax law enforcement and on corrupt city officials. Black victims
received no sympathy. In the wider arena of public opinion in the North, the riot and
its aftermath were harshly criticized. Spurred by the riot, black citizens worked with
social workers, activists, and philanthropists to hold an organizational meeting for
the NAACP in Springfield, on February 12, 1909 (Crouthamel 1960, 178–181).
—Merrill Evans
See also all entries under Stono Rebellion (1739); New York Slave Insurrection (1741);
Antebellum Suppressed Slave Revolts ( 1800s–1850s); Nat Turner’s Rebellion (1831);
New Orleans Riot (1866); New Orleans Race Riot (1900); Atlanta Race Riot (1906); Hous-
ton Riot (1917); Red Summer (1919); Tulsa Race Riot (1921); Civil Rights Movement
(1953–1968); Watts Riot (1965); Detroit Riots (1967); Los Angeles Uprising (1992).
Further Reading
Anonymous. Springfield, Illinois, Race Riot of 1908. Springfield, IL: Springfield Conven-
tion and Visitors Bureau, 2008.
Springfield Race Riot (1908) 691
Crouthamel, James L. “The Springfield Riot of 1908.” Journal of Negro History 45, no. 3
(1960): 164–181.
Goldstein, Eric L. The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Senechal, Roberta. The Sociogenesis of a Race Riot: Springfield, I llinois, in 1908.
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990.
692 Springfield Race Riot (1908)
Jewish Americans
For Jewish and black citizens, a history of contradictory relationships—both solid-
arity and distrust—marked the run-up to the 1908 riot in Springfield.
Like many other northern cities, Springfield experienced swift social and
economic change, straining connections among citizens. Some saw Springfield’s
leaders as corrupt, because they did not crack down on businesses such as brothels,
gambling parlors, and opium dens, facilitating a scofflaw atmosphe re (Senechal
1990, 134). Jewish and black citizens found themselves excluded from many busi-
ness and social opportunities. They felt they were treated with equal unfairness,
but it was hard for them to work together because of conflicting social currents.
Jewish immigrants to Springfield were quick to recognize anti-black attacks as
similar to the anti-Semitic pogroms that had caused them to flee Europe. However,
some Jewish citizens were afraid close associations with black people would drag
down their hard-won social status. Some Jews resolved this conflict by thinking of
the victims of pogroms as “innocent” Jews, while believing race riots had been
sparked by black criminality (Goldstein 2006, 62–67).
For Springfield Jews who had emigrated from cosmopolitan cities in Eastern
Europe, it seemed natural to do business with black customers. A dditionally, this
group of Jews tended to have higher occupational skills and did not perceive black
people as competing with them for jobs. These Jews often owned businesses such
as grocery stores, pawnshops, secondhand stores, and saloons. Most black writers
avoided criticizing Jews even in instances when they felt Jewish business owners
may have exploit ed the black community (Adams and Bracey 1999, 237–238 ).
Paradoxically, the black communi ty continued to view the economic success of
Jewish business owners as an example to be followed (Franklin 1998, 204). Thus,
the business relationships between blacks and Jews were less than solid. A
national recession in 1907 strained these already-fraying alliances.
The 1908 riot was a clear departure from business as usual in Springfield, in that
one of the rin glea der s was a R ussi an Jew, Abraha m Reimer (s ometi mes spelled
Raymer). Many Jews were ashamed of his racist activities, but an all-white jury
acquitted him of murder and of property crimes. Around the country, Jews sus-
pected Reimer had been a scapegoat (Senechal 1990, 97).
The riot defied any single inte rpreta tion. The mob destroyed 21 bla ck-owned
businesses and many Jewish businesses, to the extent that the element of anti-
Semitism was unmistakable. The attack on Fishman’s Pawn Shop appeared to have
been planned in advance, with rioters stealing weapons that were used to destroy
the black residential neighborhoods known as the “Badlands” (Anonymous 2008,
5). Many other Jewish businesses were looted (Senec hal 1990, 33). Isadore
693
Kanner, a Russian Jewish immigrant, owned one-quarter of the buildings that were
destroyed in the Badlands. During the mayhem, some Jewish citizens risked their
lives to protect their black neighbors (Senec hal 1990, 147). In t he aftermath of
the Springfield riot, Jews and blacks recogn ized that together, they had bee n tar-
geted for acts of terror. Together, they formed the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People within one year.
—Merrill Evans
Further Reading
Adams, Maurianne, and John Bracey, eds. Strangers and Neighbor s: Relations between
Blacks and Jews in the United States. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press,
1999.
Anonymous. Springfield, Illinois, Race Riot of 1908. Springfield, IL: Springfield Conven-
tion and Visitors Bureau, 2008.
Franklin, V. P., et al., eds. African Americans and Jews in the Twentieth Century: Studies in
Convergence and Conflict. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998.
Goldstein, Eric L. The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Senechal, Roberta. The Sociogenesis of a Race Riot: Springfield, I llinois, in 1908.
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990.
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People (NAACP)
Riding a wave o f outrage over t he unpunished crimes of the Spring field riot of
1908, the NAACP sprang to lif e in 1909. It was a diverse coalition that included
abolitionists, black radicals, social justice progressives, and socialists (McPherson
1975, 388). The group formed on a national level and quickly started branches in
Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.
(Thornbrough 1961, 494). The founders planned for the NAACP to serve as a re-
source for black citizens, helping with public rela tions, social research, law, poli-
tics, and education (Rudwick 1957, 413).
When it was founded, the group was originally called the National Negro Com-
mittee but changed its name to the NAACP within the first year. One of the
NAACP’s first actions was to investigate the arrest of a black man in Asbury Park,
New Jersey, who was charged with murder. There was no evidence, and the
NAACP was able to secure his release (Ovington 1947, 108).
694 Springfield Race Riot (1908)
The NAACP drew its members from several organizations that had preceded it,
particularly the National Afro-American League, led by T. Thomas Fortune, editor
of the New York Age, who campaigned against mob law and lynching. The emi-
nent sociologist, scholar, and activist W. E. B. Du Bois joined the National Afro-
American League in 1905, re-e nergizing it a nd helping it laun ch the Niag ara
Movement, a group frustrated with the slow pace of social justice for black citi-
zens (Thornbrough 1961, 494–495, 509).
At the NAACP’s first conference in New York City, Du Bois presented scientific
evidence that blacks are not inferior to whites. He also showed the close relation-
ship of politics and economics. Without mentioning the name of Booker T.
Washington, a black leader who advocated a “gradualist” approach, Du Bois said
the de-emphasis on voting rights hurt rights for blacks overall (Rudwick 1957, 415).
At this confe rence, the NAACP adopted resolut ions similar to those of the
National Afro-American League, including strict enforcement of the U.S.
Constitution, particularly civil rights g uaranteed under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The gro up endorsed equal educat iona l opportunities, with equal expendi-
tures in public schools, and equal voting rights in accordance with the Fifteenth
Amendment (Thornbrough 1961, 511). The NAACP denounced the economic
and political repression of bl ack citizens. President William Howard Taft was
admonished to remove illegal restrictions on the hiring of black applicants for
federal positions. The group declined to denounce lynching but opposed violence
in general (Rudwick 1957, 417–418).
Du Bois’s role in the NAACP was one of applied sociology. He was editor of
the group’s journal, The Crisis, which advocated social justice for black citizens
in the United States and around the world (Deegan 2002, 63). The NAACP kept
a map with pins marking lynchings. It also tracked the destruction of black homes
(Ovington 1947, 112).
In its first decade, the NAACP’s achievements included building mass member-
ship, working against segregation in the federal civil service, working for legal
Springfield Race Riot (1908) 695
Participants of the 20th annual session of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, June 1929. (Library of Congress)